Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 3573 |
efficiant , ita haec pars dialectica , sive illam dicere malumus disputatricem , ut est utilis saepe et finitionibus et comprehensionibus et separandis quae sunt differentia , et resolvenda ambiguitate , distinguendo , dividendo , illiciendo , implicando , ita , si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen , obstabit melioribus et sectas ad tenuitatem suam vires ipsa subtilitate consumet .
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even so the science of dialectic, or if you prefer it of disputation, while it is often useful in definition, inference, differentiation, resolution of ambiguity, distinction and classification, as also in luring on or entangling our opponents, yet if it claim to assume the entire direction of the struggles of the forum, will merely stand in the way of arts superior to itself and by its very subtlety will exhaust the strength that has been pared down to suit its limitations. |
| 3574 |
Itaque reperias quosdam in disputando mire callidos , cum ab ilia cavillatione discesserint , non magis sufficere in aliquo graviore actu quam parva quaedam animalia , quae in angustiis mobilia campo deprehenduntur .
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As a result you will find that certain persons who show astonishing skill in philosophical debate, as soon as they quit the sphere of their quibbles, are as helpless in any case that demands more serious pleading as those small animals which, though nimble enough in a confined space, are easily captured in an open field. |
| 3575 |
Iam quidem pars illa moralis , quae dicitur Ethice , certe tota oratori est accommodata . Nam in tanta causarum , sicut superioribus libris diximus , varietate , cum alia coniectura quaerantur , alia finitionibus concludantur , alia iure summoveantur vel transferantur , alia colligantur vel ipsa inter se concurrant vel in diversum ambiguitate ducantur , nulla fere dici potest , cuius non parte in aliqua tractatus aequi ac boni reperiatur , plerasque vero esse quis nescit , quae totae in sola qualitate consistant ?
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Proceeding to moral philosophy or ethics, we may note that it at any rate is entirely suited to the orator. For vast as is the variety of cases (since in them, as I have pointed out in previous books, we seek to discover certain points by conjecture, reach our conclusions in others by means of definition, dispose of others on legal grounds' or by raising the question of competence, while other points are established by syllogism and others involve contradictions or are diversely interpreted owing to some ambiguity of language ), there is scarcely a single one which does not at some point or another involve the discussion of equity and virtue, while there are also, as everyone knows, not a few which turn entirely on questions of quality. |
| 3576 |
In consiliis vero quae ratio suadendi est ab honesti quaestione seposita ? Quin ilia etiam pars tertia , quae laudandi ac vituperandi officiis continetur , nempe in tractatu recti pravique versatur .
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Again in deliberative assemblies how can we advise a policy without raising the question of what is honourable? Nay, even the third department of oratory, which is concerned with the tasks of praise and denunciation, must without a doubt deal with questions of right and wrong. |
| 3577 |
An de iustitia , fortitudine , abstinentia , temperantia , pietate non plurima dicet orator ? Sed ille vir bonus , qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum linguae perceperit , sed qui virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiat , nec in cogitando ita laborabit sed , quod sciet , vere dicet .
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For the orator will assuredly have much to say on such topics as justice, fortitude, abstinence, self-control and piety. But the good man, who has come to the knowledge of these things not by mere hearsay, as though they were just words and names for his tongue to employ, but has grasped the meaning of virtue and acquired a true feeling for it, will never be perplexed when he has to think out a problem, but will speak out truly what he knows. |
| 3578 |
Cum sit autem omnis generalis quaestio speciali potentior , quia universo pars continetur , non utique accedit parti quod universum est , profecto nemo dubitabit , generales quaestiones in illo maxime studiorum more versatas .
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Since, however, general questions are always more important than special (for the particular is contained in the universal, while the universal is never to be regarded as something superimposed on the particular), everyone will readily admit that the studies of which we are speaking are pre-eminently concerned with general questions. |
| 3579 |
iam vero cum sint multa propriis brevibusque comprehensionibus finienda ( unde etiam status causarum dicitur finitiuus ) , nonne ad id quoque instrui ab iis , qui plus in hoc studii dederunt , oportet ? Quid ? non quaestio iuris omnis aut verborum proprietate aut aequi disputatione aut voluntatis coniectura continetur ? quorum pars ad rationalem , pars ad moralem tractatum redundat .
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Further, since there are numerous points which require to be determined by appropriate and concise definitions (hence the definitive basis of cases), it is surely desirable that the orator should be instructed in such things by those who have devoted special attention to the subject. Again, does not every question of law turn either on the precise meaning of words, the discussion of equity, or conjecture as to the intention—subjects which in part encroach on the domain of dialectic and in part on that of ethics? |
| 3580 |
Ergo natura permixta est omnibus istis oratio , quae quidem oratio est vere . Nam ignara quidem huiusce doctrinae loquacitas erret necesse est , ut quae vel nullos vel falsos duces habeat . Pars vero naturalis , cum est ad exercitationem dicendi tanto ceteris uberior , quanto maiore spiritu de divinis rebus quam humanis eloquendum est , tum illam etiam moralem , sine qua nulla esse , ut docuimus , oratio potest , totam complectitur .
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Consequently all oratory involves a natural admixture of all these philosophic elements—at least, that is to say, all oratory that is worthy of the name. For mere garrulity that is ignorant of all such learning must needs go astray, since its guides are either non-existent or false. Physics on the other hand is far richer than the other branches of philosophy, if viewed from the standpoint of providing exercise in speaking, in proportion as a loftier inspiration is required to speak of things divine than of things human; and further it includes within its scope the whole of ethics, which as we have shown are essential to the very existence of oratory. |
| 3581 |
Nam si regitur providentia mundus , administranda certe bonis viris erit res publica ; si divina nostris animis origo , tendendum ad virtutem nec voluptatibus terreni corporis serviendum . An haec non frequenter tractabit orator ? Iam de auguriis , responsis , religione denique omni , de quibus maxima saepe in senatu consilia versata sunt , non erit ei disserendum , si quidem , ut nobis placet , futurus est vir civilis idem ? Quae denique intelligi saltem potest eloquentia hominis optima nescientis ?
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For, if the world is governed by providence, it will certainly be the duty of all good men to bear their part in the administration of the state. If the origin of our souls be divine, we must win our way towards virtue and abjure the service of the lusts of our earthly body. Are not these themes which the orator will frequently be called upon to handle? Again there are questions concerned with auguries and oracles or any other religious topic (all of them subjects that have often given rise to the most important debates in the senate) on which the orator will have to discourse, if he is also to be the statesman we would have him be. And finally, how can we conceive of any real eloquence at all proceeding from a man who is ignorant of all that is best in the world? |
| 3582 |
Haec si ratione manifesta non essent , exemplis tamen crederemus . Siquidem et Periclem , cuius eloquentiae , etiamsi nulla ad nos monumenta venerunt , vim tamen quandam incredibilem cum historici , tum etiam , liberrimum hominum genus , comici veteres tradunt , Anaxagorae physici constat auditorem fuisse , et Demosthenem , principem omnium Graeciae oratorum , dedisse operam Platoni .
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If our reason did not make these facts obvious, we should still be led by historical examples to believe their truth. For Pericles, whose eloquence, despite the fact that it has left no visible record for posterity, was none the less, if we may believe the historians and that free-speaking tribe, the old comic poets, endowed with almost incredible force, is known to have been a pupil of the physicist Anaxagoras, while Demosthenes, greatest of all the orators of Greece, sat at the feet of Plato. |
| 3583 |
Nam M . Tullius , non tantum se debere scholis rhetorum , quantum Academiae spatiis , frequenter ipse testatus est ; neque se tanta in eo unquam fudisset ubertas , si ingenium suum consaepto fori , non ipsius rerum naturae finibus terminasset . Verum ex hoc alia mihi quaestio exoritur , quae secta conferre plurimum eloquentiae possit , quanquam ea non inter multas potest esse contentio .
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As for Cicero, he has often proclaimed the fact that he owed less to the schools of rhetoric than to the walks of Academe: nor would he ever have developed such amazing fertility of talent, had he bounded his genius by the limits of the forum and not by the frontiers of nature herself. But this leads me to another question as to which school of philosophy is like to prove of most service to oratory, although there are only a few that can be said to contend for this honour. |
| 3584 |
Nam in primis nos Epicurus a se ipse dimittit , qui fugere omnem disciplinam navigatione quam velocissima iubet . Neque vero Aristippus , summum in voluptate corporis bonum ponens , ad hunc nos laborem hortetur . Pyrrhon quidem quas in hoc opere habere partes potest ? cui iudices esse , apud quos verba faciat , et reum , pro quo loquatur , et senatum , in quo sit dicenda sententia , non liquebit .
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For in the first place Epicurus banishes us from his presence without more ado, since he bids all his followers to fly from learning in the swiftest ship that they can find. Nor would Aristippus, who regards the highest good as consisting in physical pleasure, be likely to exhort us to the toils entailed by our study. And what part can Pyrrho have in the work that is before us? For he will have doubts as to whether there exist judges to address, accused to defend, or a senate where he can be called upon to speak his opinion. |
| 3585 |
Academiam quidam utilissimam credunt , quod mos in utramque partem disserendi ad exercitationem forensium causarum proxime accedat . Adiiciunt loco probationis , quod ea praestantissimos in eloquentia viros ediderit . Peripatetici studio quoque se quodam oratorio iactant ; nam theses dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum . Stoici , sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere praeceptoribus suis defuisse concedant necesse est , ita nullos aut probare acrius aut concludere subtilius contendunt .
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Some authorities hold that the Academy will be the most useful school, on the ground that its habit of disputing on both sides of a question approaches most nearly to the actual practice of the courts. And by way of proof they add the fact that this school has produced speakers highly renowned for their eloquence. The Peripatetics also make it their boast that they have a form of study which is near akin to oratory. For it was with them in the main that originated the practice of declaiming on general questions by way of exercise. The Stoics, though driven to admit that, generally speaking, their teachers have been deficient both in fullness and charm of eloquence, still contend that no men can prove more acutely or draw conclusions with greater subtlety than themselves. |
| 3586 |
Sed haec inter ipsos , qui velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti nefas ducunt a suscepta semel persuasione discedere . Oratori vero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges .
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But all these arguments take place within their own circle, for, as though they were tied by some solemn oath or held fast in the bonds of some superstitious belief, they consider that it is a crime to abandon a conviction once formed. On the other hand, there is no need for an orator to swear allegiance to any one philosophic code. |
| 3587 |
Maius enim est opus atque praestantius , ad quod ipse tendit , et cuius est velut candidatus , si quidem est futurus cum vitae , tum etiam eloquentiae laude perfectus . Quare in exemplum bene dicendi facundissimum quemque proponet sibi ad imitandum , moribus vero formandis quam honestissima praecepta rectissimamque ad virtutem viam deliget . Exercitatione quidem utetur omni , sed tamen erit plurimus in maximis quibusque ac natura pulcherrimis .
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For lie has a greater and nobler aim, to which he directs all his efforts with as much zeal as if he were a candidate for office, since he is to be made perfect not only in the glory of a virtuous life, but in that of eloquence as well. He will consequently select as his models of eloquence all the greatest masters of oratory, and will choose the noblest precepts and the most direct road to virtue as the means for the formation of an upright character. He will neglect no form of exercise, but will devote special attention to those which are of the highest and fairest nature. |
| 3588 |
Nam quae potest materia reperiri ad graviter copioseque dicendum magis abundans quam de virtute , de re publica , de providentia , de origine animorum , de amicitia ? Haec sunt , quibus mens pariter atque oratio insurgat , quae vere bona , quid mitiget metus , coerceat cupiditates , eximat nos opinionibus vulgi animumque caelestem erigat .
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For what subject can be found more fully adapted to a rich and weighty eloquence than the topics of virtue, politics, providence, the origin of the soul and friendship? The themes which tend to elevate mind and language alike are questions such as what things are truly good, what means there are of assuaging fear, restraining the passions and lifting us and the soul that came from heaven clear of the delusions of the common herd. |
| 3589 |
Neque ea solum , quae talibus disciplinis continentur , sed magis etiam , quae sunt tradita antiquitus dicta ac facta praeclare , et nosse et animo semper agitare conveniet . Quae profecto nusquam plura maioraque quam in nostrae civitatis monumentis reperientur .
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But it is desirable that we should not restrict our study to the precepts of philosophy alone. It is still more important that we should know and ponder continually all the noblest sayings and deeds that have been handed down to us from ancient times. And assuredly we shall nowhere find a larger or more remarkable store of these than in the records of our own country. |
| 3590 |
An fortitudinem , iustitiam , fidem , continentiam , frugalitatem , contemptum doloris ac mortis melius alii docebunt quam Fabricii , Curii , Reguli , Decii , Mucii aliique innumerabiles ? Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent , tantum Romani , quod est maius , exemplis .
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Who will teach courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, simplicity, and contempt of grief and pain better than men like Fabricius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mucius and countless others? For if the Greeks bear away the palm for moral precepts, Rome can produce more striking examples of moral performance, which is a far greater thing. |
| 3591 |
Tantum quod non cognitis ille rebus adquieverit , qui non modo proximum tempus lucemque praesentem intueri satis credat , sed omnem posteritatis memoriam spatium vitae honestae et curriculum laudis existimet . Hinc mihi ille iustitiae haustus bibat , hinc sumptam libertatem in causis atque consiliis praestet . Neque erit perfectus orator , nisi qui honeste dicere et sciet et audebit .
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But the man who does not believe that it is enough to fix his eyes merely on his own age and his own transitory life, but regards the space allotted for an honourable life and the course in which glory's race is run as conditioned solely by the memory of posterity, will not rest content with a mere knowledge of the events of history. No, it is from the thought of posterity that he must inspire his soul with justice and derive that freedom of spirit which it is his duty to display when he pleads in the courts or gives counsel in the senate. No man will ever be the consummate orator of whom we are in quest unless he has both the knowledge and the courage to speak in accordance with the promptings of honour. |
| 3592 |
Iuris quoque civilis necessaria huic viro scientia est et morum ac religionum eius rei publicae , quam capesset . Nam qualis esse suasor in consiliis publicis privatisve poterit tot rerum , quibus praecipue civitas continetur , ignarus ? Quo autem modo patronum se causarum non falso dixerit , qui , quod est in causis potentissimum , sit ab altero petiturus , paene non dissimilis iis , qui poetarum scripta pronuntiant ?
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III. Our orator will also require a knowledge of civil law and of the custom and religion of the state in whose life he is to bear his part. For how will he be able to advise either in public or in private, if he is ignorant of all the main elements that go to make the state? How can he truthfully call himself an advocate if he has to go to others to acquire that knowledge which is all-important in the courts? He will be little better than if he were a reciter of the poets. |
| 3593 |
Nam quodammodo mandata perferet , et ea , quae sibi a iudice credi postulaturus est , aliena fide dicet , et ipse litigantium auxiliator egebit auxilio . Quod ut fieri nonnunquam minore incommodo possit , cum domi praecepta et composita et sicut cetera , quae in causa sunt , inde discendo cognita ad iudicem perfert , quid fiet in iis quaestionibus , quae subito inter ipsas actiones nasci solent ? non deformiter respectet et inter subsellia minores advocatos interroget ?
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For he will be a mere transmitter of the instructions that others have given him, it will be on the authority of others that he propounds what he asks the judge to believe, and he whose duty it is to succour the litigant will himself be in need of succour. It is true that at times this may be effected with but little inconvenience, if what he advances for the edification of the judge has been taught him and composed in the seclusion of his study and learnt by heart there like other elements of the case. But what will he do, when he is confronted by unexpected problems such as frequently arise in the actual course of pleading? Will he not disgrace himself by looking round and asking the junior counsel who sit on the benches behind him for advice? |
| 3594 |
Potest autem satis diligenter accipere , quae tum audiet , cum ei dicenda sunt , aut fortiter adfirmare aut ingenue pro suis dicere ? Possit in actionibus : quid fiet in altercatione , ubi occurrendum continuo , nec libera ad discendum mora est ? Quid , si forte peritus iuris ille non aderit ? Quid , si quis non satis in ea re doctus falsum aliquid subiecerit ? Hoc enim est maximum ignorantiae malum , quod credit eum scire qui moneat .
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Can lie hope to get a thorough grasp of such information at the very moment when he is required to produce it in his speech? Can he make his assertions with confidence or speak with native simplicity as though his arguments were his own? Grant that he may do so in his actual speech. But what will he do in a debate, when he has continually to meet fresh points raised by his opponent and is given no time to learn up his case? What will do, if he has no legal expert to advise him or if his prompter through insufficient knowledge of the subject provides him with information that is false? It is the most serious drawback of such ignorance, that he will always believe that his adviser knows what he is talking about. |
| 3595 |
Neque ego sum nostri moris ignarus oblitusve eorum , qui velut ad arculas sedent et tela agentibus subministrant , neque idem Graecos quoque nescio factitasse , unde nomen his pragmaticorum datum est . Sed loquor de oratore , qui non clamorem modo suum causis , sed omnia , quae profutura sunt , debet .
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I am not ignorant of the generally prevailing custom, nor have I forgotten those who sit by our store-chests and provide weapons for the pleader: I know too that the Greeks did likewise: hence the name of pragmaticus which was bestowed on such persons. But I am speaking of an orator, who owes it as a duty to his case to serve it not merely by the loudness of his voice, but by all other means that may be of assistance to it. |
| 3596 |
Itaque eum nec inutilem , si ad horam forte constiterit , neque in testationibus faciendis esse imperitum velim . Quis enim potius praeparabit ea quae , cum aget , esse in causa velit ? Nisi forte imperatorem quis idoneum credit in proeliis quidem strenuum et fortem et omnium , quae pugna poscit , artificem , sed neque delectus agere nec copias contrahere atque instruere nec prospicere commeatus nec locum capere castris scientem ; prius est enim certe parare bella quam gerere .
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Consequently I do not wish my orator to be helpless, if it so chance that he puts in an appearance for the preliminary proceedings to which the hour before the commencement of the trial is allotted, or to be unskilful in the preparation and production of evidence. For who, sooner than himself, should prepare the points which he wishes to be brought out when he is pleading? You might as well suppose that the qualifications of a successful general consist merely in courage and energy in the field of battle and skill in meeting all the demands of actual conflict, while suffering him to be ignorant of the methods of levying troops, mustering and equipping his forces, arranging for supplies or selecting a suitable position for his camp, despite the fact that preparation for war is an essential preliminary for its successful conduct. |
| 3597 |
Atqui simillimus huic sit advocatus , si plura , quae ad vincendum valent , aliis reliquerit , cum praesertim hoc , quod est maxime necessarium , nec tam sit arduum , quam procul intuentibus fortasse videatur . Namque omne ius , quod est certum , aut scripto aut moribus constat ; dubium aequitatis regula examinandum est .
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And yet such a general would bear a very close resemblance to the advocate who leaves much of the detail that is necessary for success to the care of others, more especially in view of the fact that this, the most necessary element in the management of a case, is not as difficult as it may perhaps seem to outside observers. For every point of law, which is certain, is based either on written law or accepted custom: if, on the other hand, the point is doubtful, it must be examined in the light of equity. |
| 3598 |
Quae scripta sunt aut posita in more civitatis , nullam habent difficultatem , cognitionis sunt enim , non inventionis ; at quae consultorum responsis explicantur , aut in uerborum interpretatione sunt posita aut in recti pravique discrimine . Vim cuiusque vocis intelligere aut commune prudentium est aut proprium oratoris ; aequitas optimo cuique notissima .
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Laws which are either written or founded on accepted custom present no difficulty, since they call merely for knowledge and make no demand on the imagination. On the other hand, the points explained in the rulings of the legal experts turn either on the interpretation of words or on the distinction between right and wrong. To understand the meaning of each word is either common to all sensible men or the special possession of the orator, while the demands of equity are known to every good man. |
| 3599 |
Nos porro et bonum virum et prudentem in primis oratorem putamus , qui cum se ad id , quod est optimum natura , direxerit , non magnopere commovebitur , si quis ab eo consultus dissentiet ; cum ipsis illis diversas inter se opiniones tueri concessum sit . Sed etiam , si nosse , quid quisque senserit , volet , lectionis opus est , qua nihil est in studiis minus laboriosum .
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Now I regard the orator above all as being a man of virtue and good sense, who will not be seriously troubled, after having devoted himself to the study of that which is excellent by nature, if some legal expert disagrees with him; for even they are allowed to disagree among themselves. But if he further wishes to know the views of everyone, he will require to read, and reading is the least laborious of' all the tasks that fall to the student's lot. |
| 3600 |
Quodsi plerique , desperata facultate agendi , ad discendum ius declinaverunt , quam id scire facile est oratori , quod discunt qui sua quoque confessione oratores esse non possunt ? Verum et M . Cato cum in dicendo praestantissimus , tum iuris idem fuit peritissimus , et Scaevolae Servioque Sulpicio concessa est etiam facundiae virtus .
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Moreover, if the class of legal experts is as a rule drawn from those who, in despair of making successful pleaders, have taken refuge with the law, how easy it must be for an orator to know what those succeed in learning, who by their own confession are incapable of becoming orators! But Marcus Cato was at once a great orator and an expert lawyer, while Scaevola and Servius Sulpicius were universally allowed to be eloquent as well. |
| 3601 |
Et M . Tullius non modo inter agendum nunquam est destitutus scientia iuris , sed etiam componere aliqua de eo coeperat , ut appareat posse oratorem non discendo tantum iuri vacare , sed etiam docendo .
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And Cicero not merely possessed a sufficient supply of legal knowledge to serve his needs when pleading, but actually began to write on the subject, so that it is clear that an orator has not merely time to learn, but even to teach the law. |
| 3602 |
Verum ea , quae de moribus excolendis studioque iuris praecipimus , ne quis eo credat reprehendenda , quod multos cognovimus , qui taedio laboris , quem ferre tendentibus ad eloquentiam necesse est , confugerint ad haec deverticula desidiae . Quorum alii se ad album ac rubricas transtulerunt et formularii vel , ut Cicero ait , leguleii quidam esse maluerunt , tanquam utiliora eligentes ea , quorum solam facilitatem sequebantur ;
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Let no one, however, regard the advice I have given as to the attention due to the development of character and the study of the law as being impugned by the fact that we are familiar with many who, because they were weary of the toil entailed on those who seek to scale the heights of eloquence, have betaken themselves to the study of law as a refuge for their indolence. Some of these transfer their attention to the praetor's edicts or the civil law, and have preferred to become specialists in formulae, or legalists, as Cicero calls them, on the pretext of choosing a more useful branch of study, whereas their real motive was its comparative easiness. |
| 3603 |
alii pigritiae arrogantioris , qui subito fronte conficta immissaque barba , veluti despexissent oratoria praecepta , paulum aliquid sederunt in scholis philosophorum , ut deinde in publico tristes , domi dissoluti captarent auctoritatem contemptu ceterorum . Philosophia enim simulari potest , eloquentia non potest .
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Others are the victims of a more arrogant form of sloth; they assume a stern air and let their beards grow, and, as though despising the precepts of oratory, sit for a while in the schools of the philosophers, that, by an assumption of a severe mien before the public gaze and by an affected contempt of others they may assert their moral superiority, while leading a life of debauchery at home. For philosophy may be counterfeited, but eloquence never. |
| 3604 |
In primis vero abundare debet orator exemplorum copia cum veterum , tum etiam novorum , adeo ut non ea modo , quae conscripta sunt historiis aut sermonibus velut per manus tradita , quaeque cotidie aguntur , debeat nosse , verum ne ea quidem , quae sunt a clarioribus poetis ficta , negligere .
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Above all, our orator should be equipped with a rich store of examples both old and new: and he ought not merely to know those which are recorded in history or transmitted by oral tradition or occur from day to day, but should not neglect even those fictitious examples invented by the great poets. |
| 3605 |
Nam illa quidem priora aut testimoniorum aut etiam iudicatorum obtinent locum , sed haec quoque aut vetustatis fide tuta sunt aut ab hominibus magnis praeceptorum loco ficta creduntur . Sciat ergo quam plurima ; unde etiam senibus auctoritas maior est , quod plura nosse et vidisse creduntur , quod Homerus frequentissime testatur . Sed non est exspectanda ultima aetas , cum studia praestent ut , quantum ad cognitionem pertinet rerum , etiam praeteritis saeculis vixisse videamur .
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For while the former have the authority of evidence or even of legal decisions, the latter also either have the warrant of antiquity or are regarded as having been invented by great men to serve as lessons to the world. He should therefore be acquainted with as many examples as possible. It is this which gives old age so much authority, since the old are believed to have a larger store of knowledge and experience, as Homer so frequently bears witness. But we must not wait till the evening of our days, since study has this advantage that, as far as knowledge of facts is concerned, it is capable of giving the impression that we have lived in ages long gone by. |
| 3606 |
Haec sunt , quae me redditurum promiseram , instrumenta non artis , ut quidam putaverunt , sed ipsius oratoris . Haec arma habere ad manum , horum scientia debet esse succinctus , accedente verborum figurarumque facili copia et inventionis ratione et disponendi usu et memoriae firmitate et actionis gratia . Sed plurimum ex his valet animi praestantia , quam nec metus frangat nec adclamatio terreat nec audientium auctoritas ultra debitam reverentiam tardet .
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Such are the instruments of which I promised to give account, the instruments, that is, not merely of the art, as some have held, but of the orator himself. These are the weapons that he should have ready to his hand, this the knowledge with which he must be equipped, while it must be supplemented by a ready store of words and figures, power of imagination, skill in arrangement, retentiveness of memory and grace of delivery. But of all these qualities the highest is that loftiness of soul which fear cannot dismay nor uproar terrify nor the authority of the audience fetter further than the respect which is their due. |
| 3607 |
Nam ut abominanda sunt contraria his vitia confidentiae , temeritatis , improbitatis , arrogantiae , ita citra constantiam , fiduciam , fortitudinem nihil ars , nihil studium , nihil profectus ipse profuerit , ut si des arma timidis et imbellibus . Invitus mehercule dico , quoniam et aliter accipi potest , ipsam verecundiam , vitium quidem , sed amabile et quae virtutes facillime generet , esse interim adversam , multisque in causa fuisse , ut bona ingenii studiique in lucem non prolata situ quodam secreti consumerentur .
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For although the vices which are its opposites, such as arrogance, temerity, impudence and presumption, are all positively obnoxious, still without constancy, confidence and courage, art, study and proficiency will be of no avail. You might as well put weapons into the hands of the unwarlike and the coward. It is indeed with some reluctance, as it may give rise to misunderstanding, that I say that even modesty (which, though a fault in itself, is an amiable failing which may easily be the mother of virtues) is on occasion an impediment and has frequently caused the fruits of genius and study to consume away in the mildew of obscurity merely because they have never been displayed to the public day. |
| 3608 |
Sciat autem , si quis haec forte minus adhuc peritus distinguendi vim cuiusque verbi leget , non probitatem a me reprehendi , sed verecundiam , quae est timor quidam reducens animum ab iis quae facienda sunt ; inde confusio et coepti paenitentia et subitum silentium . Quis porro dubitet vitiis adscribere adfectum , propter quem facere honeste pudet ?
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But in case any of my readers should still lack skill to distinguish the precise meaning of each word, I would have him know that it is not honest shame that is the object of my criticism, but that excess of modesty which is really a form of fear deterring the soul from doing what is its duty to do, and resulting in confusion of mind, regret that our task was ever begun, and sudden silence. For who can hesitate to give the name of fault to a feeling that makes a man ashamed to do what is right? |
| 3609 |
Neque ego rursus nolo eum , qui sit dicturus , et sollicitum surgere et colore mutari et periculum intelligere ; quae si non accident , etiam simulanda erunt . Sed intellectus hic sit operis , non metus , moveamurque , non concidamus . Optima est autem emendatio verecundiae fiducia , et quamlibet imbecilla frons magna conscientia sustinetur .
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On the other hand, I am not unwilling that the man who has got to make a speech should show signs of nervousness when he rises to his feet, should change colour and make it clear that he feels the risks of his position: indeed, if these symptoms do not occur naturally, it will be necessary to simulate them. But the feeling that stirs us should be due to the realisation of the magnitude of our task and not to fear: we should be moved, but not to the extent of collapsing. But the best remedy for such excess of modesty is confidence: however great our natural timidity of mien, we shall find strength and support in the consciousness of the nobility of our task. |
| 3610 |
Sunt et naturalia , ut supra dixi , quae tamen et cura iuvantur , instrumenta , vox , latus , decor ; quae quidem tantum valent , ut frequenter famam ingenii faciant . Habuit oratores aetas nostra copiosiores , sed , cum diceret , eminere inter aequales Trachalus videbatur . Ea corporis sublimitas erat , is ardor oculorum , frontis auctoritas , gestus praestantia , vox quidem non , ut Cicero desiderat , paene tragoedorum , sed super omnes , quos ego quidem audierim , tragoedos .
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There are also those natural instruments which, as I mentioned above, may be further improved by care, such as voice, lungs and grace of carriage and movement, all of which are of such importance as frequently to give a speaker the reputation for talent. Our own age has had orators of greater resource and power, but Trachalus appeared to stand out above all his contemporaries, when he was speaking. Such was the elect produced by his lofty stature, the fire of his eye, the dignity of his brow, the excellence of his gesture, coupled with a voice which was not almost a tragedian's, as Cicero demands that it should be, but surpassed the voice of all tragedians that I have ever heard. |