Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 1673 |
Ideoque miror inter duos diversarum sectarum velut duces non mediocri contentione quaesitum , singulisne quaestionibus subiiciendi essent loci , ut Theodoro placet , an prius docendus iudex quam movendus , ut praecipit Apollodorus , tanquam perierit haec ratio media , et nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum . Haec praecipiunt , qui ipsi non dicunt in foro , ut artes a securis otiosisque compositae ipsa pugnae necessitate turbentur .
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I am consequently surprised that there should be a violent dispute between the leaders of two opposite schools as to whether such commonplaces should be applied to individual questions (which is the view of Theodorus), or whether the judge should be instructed in the facts before any appeal is made to his feelings (the latter being the view of Apollodorus), as though no middle course were possible and no regard were to be had to the exigencies of the case itself. Those who lay down such rules have no experience of speaking in the actual courts, the result being that text-books composed in the calm leisure of the study are sadly upset by the necessities of forensic strife. |
| 1674 |
Namque omnes fere , qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam mysteria tradiderunt , certis non inveniendorum modo argumentorum locis , sed concludendorum quoque nos praeceptis alligaverunt ;
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For practically all those who have set forth the law of speaking as though it were a profound mystery, have tied us down not merely to fixed topics for argument, but to definite rules as to how we should draw our conclusions. |
| 1675 |
de quibus brevissime praelocutus , quid ipse sentiam , id est quid clarissimos oratores fecisse videam , non tacebo .
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propose after making a few preliminary remarks on the subject to give a frank expression of my own views, or in other words to set forth what I perceive to have been the practice of the most distinguished orators. |
| 1676 |
Igitur enthymema et argumentum ipsum , id est rem , quae probationi alterius adhibetur , appellant et argumenti elocutionem , eam vero , ut dixi , duplicem : ex consequentibus , quod habet propositionem coniunctamque ei protinus probationem , quale pro Ligario , Causa tum dubia , quod erat aliquid in utraque parte , quod probari posset ; nunc melior ea iudicanda est , quam etiam dii adiuverunt ; habet enim rationem et propositionem , non habet conclusionem .
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Tile term enthymeme is applied not merely to the actual argument, that is to say, the matter adduced to prove something else, but also to its expression, the nature of which, as I have already pointed out, is twofold. It may be drawn from denial of consequents, when it will consist of a proposition immediately followed by a proof, as in the following passage from the pro Ligario; "At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was something to be said on both sides. But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported. " Here we have a proposition and a reason, but no formal conclusion: it is therefore tile incomplete syllogism known as an enthymeme. |
| 1677 |
Ita est ille imperfectus syllogismus . Ex pugnantibus vero , quod etiam solum enthymema quidam vocant , fortior multo probatio est . Tale est Ciceronis pro Milone : Eius igitur mortis sedetis ultores , cuius vitam si pletis per vos restitui posse , nolitis .
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It may on the other hand be drawn from incompatibles, in which case the proof will be much stronger; indeed some restrict the title of enthymeme to this form of argument. The following passage from the pro Milone of Cicero will provide a parallel: " You are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if you thought it within your power to do so. " |
| 1678 |
Quod quidem etiam aliquando multiplicari solet , ut est ab eodem et pro endem reo factum : Quem igitur cum omnium gratia noluit , hunc voluit cum aliquorum querela ? quem iure , quem loco , quem tempore , quem impune non est ausus , hunc iniuria , iniquo loco , alieno tempore , cum periculo capitis non dubitavit occidere ?
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This form of argument may even at times consist of a number of clauses, as in the following passage from the same speech : " Was he resolved then to kill to the dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to kill to the satisfaction of all? Are we to believe that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time and place and the risk involved to his own life, to kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he might have done so legally, at his own time and place and without the least danger to himself? " |
| 1679 |
Optimum autem videtur enthymematis genus , cum propositio dissimili vel contraria ratio subiungitur , quale est Demosthenis : Non enim , si quid unquam contra leges actum est , idque tu es imitatus , idcirco te convenit poena liberari ; quin e contrario damnari multo magis . Nam ut , si quis eorum damnatus esse , tu haec non scripsisses , ita , damnatus tu si fueris , non scribet alius .
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The most effective kind of enthymeme seems however to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition as in the following passage from Demosthenes : " For if at any time an act has been committed contrary to law and you have imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you should go scot free; on the contrary it is an additional reason why you should be condemned. For if any of those who transgressed the law had been condemned, you would not have proposed this, and further, if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind. " |
| 1680 |
Epichirematos et quattuor et quinque et sex etiam factae sunt partes a quibusdam . Cicero maxime quinque defendit , ut sit propositio , deinde ratio eius , tum adsumptio et eius probatio , quinta complexio ; quia vero interim et propositio non egeat rationis et adsumptio probationis , nonnunquam etiam complexione opus non sit , et quadripertitam et tripertitam et bipertitam quoque fieri posse ratiocinationem .
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As regards the epicheieme, some authorities hold that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. Cicero urges that there are not more than five at most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. But since at times the major premise does not require a reason nor the minor a proof, while occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, he holds that the epicheireme may consist of only four, three, or even two parts. |
| 1681 |
Mihi et pluribus nihilominus auctoribus tres summum videntur . Nam ita se habet ipsa natura , ut sit , de quo quaeratur et per quod probetur ; tertium adiici potest velut ex consensu duorum antecedentium . Ita erit prima intentio , secunda adsumptio , tertia connexio . Nam confirmatio primae ac secundae partis et exornatio eisdem cedere possunt ,
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Personally however follow the majority of authorities in holding that there are not more than three parts. For it follows from the very nature of reasoning that there must be something to form the subject of enquiry and something else to provide the proof, while the third element which has to be added may be regarded as resulting from the agreement of the two previous elements. Thus the first part will be the major, the second the minor premise and the third the conclusion. For the confirmation and development of both premises may reasonably be included in the parts to which they belong. |
| 1682 |
quibus subiiciuntur . Sumamus enim ex Cicerone quinque partium exemplum : Melius gubernantur ea , quae consilio reguntur quam quae sine consilio administrantur . Hanc primam partem numerant ; eam deinceps rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis approbari putant oportere . Hoc ego totum cum sua ratione unum puto ; alioqui si ratio pars est , est autem varia ratio , plures partes esse dicantur .
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Let us then take an example from Cicero of the epicheireme consisting of five parts. " Those things which are controlled by reason are better governed than those which are not. " This they call the first part and consider that it requires to be established by various reasons and a copious display of eloquence. Personally I hold that the whole of this together with its reason forms but one part. Otherwise, if the reason is to be treated as a separate part and if there are a variety of reasons, this will involve an addition to the number of parts. Next he produces the minor premise: |
| 1683 |
Adsumptionem deinde ponit : Nihil autem omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundus administratur . Huius adsumptionis quarto in loco iam porro inducunt approbationem ; de quo idem quod supra dico .
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"But there is nothing better administered than the universe." The proof of this minor premise is treated as the fourth part of the epicheireme. My criticism of this statement is identical with my criticism of the preceding. |
| 1684 |
Quinto inducunt loco complexionem , quae aut id infert solum quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur , hoc modo , Consilio igitur mundus administratur ; aut , unum in locum cum conduxit breviter propositionem et adsumptionem , adiungit quid ex his conficiatur , ad hunc modum : Quodsi melius geruntur , quae consilio quam quae sine consilio administrantur , nihil autem omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundus administratur , consilio igitur mundus administratur . Cui parti consentio .
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The fifth place they assign to the conclusion which either merely makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts ( i.e. "Therefore the universe is governed by reason" ) or after briefly bringing major and minor premise together adds what is deduced from them with the following result: " But if on the one hand things that are controlled by reason are better governed than things which are not and on the other nothing is better administered than the universe, then it follows that the universe is governed by reason. " As regards this part of the epicheireme I agree. |
| 1685 |
In tribus autem , quas fecimus , partibus non est forma semper eadem , sed una , in qua idem concluditur quod intenditur : Anima immortalis est . Nam quidquid ex se ipso movetur , immortale est ; anima autem ex se ipsa movetur , immortalis igitur est anima . Hoc fit non solum in singulis argumentis sed in totis causis , quae sunt simplices , et in quaestionibus .
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I have said that the epicheireme consists of three parts: its form is not however invariable. There is firstly the form in which the conclusion is identical with what has already been stated in the major premise. " The soul is immortal, since whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal. " This process occurs not merely in individual arguments, but in whole cases, provided they are of a simple character, and also in questions. |
| 1686 |
Nam et hae primam habent propositionem : Sacrilegium commisisti ; Non , quisquis hominem occidit , caedis tenetur , deinde rationem ; ( sed haec est in causis et quaestione longior quam in singulis argumentis ) et plerumque summa complexione , vel per enumerationem vel per brevem conclusionem , testantur , quid effecerint . In hoc genere propositio dubia est , de hac enim quaeritur .
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For cases and questions always have first a major premise, such as "You have committed sacrilege," or "Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty of murder." Second comes a reason, which is stated at greater length in cases and questions than in separate arguments, while finally comes the conclusion in which as a rule they set forth the point they have proved either by enumeration of particulars or in the form of a hasty conclusion. In this type of epicheireme the major premise is doubtful, since it is still under investigation. |
| 1687 |
Altera est complexio non par intentioni sed vim habens parem : Mors nihil ad nos , nam quod est dissolutum , sensu caret ; quod autem sensu caret , nihil ad nos . In alio genere non eadem propositio est quae connexio : Omnia animalia meliora sunt quam inanima , nihil autent melius est mundo , mundus igitur animal . Hic potest videri deesse intentio . Potuit enim sic constitui ratiocinatio : Animal est mundus , omnia enim animalia meliora sunt quam inanima et cetera .
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There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force " Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us. " There is a third form in which the major premise and the conclusion are different. " All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate. " It may be thought that in this case there is no real major premise, since it would be possible to state the reasoning in the following form: "The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate," etcetera. |
| 1688 |
Haec propositio aut confessa est ut proxima , aut probanda ut , Qui beatam vitam vivere volet , philosophetur oportet , non enim conceditur ; cetera sequi nisi confirmata prima parte non possunt . Item adsumptio interim confessa est ut , Omnes autem volunt beatam vitam vivere ; interim probanda ut illa , Quod est dissolutum , sensu caret ; cum , soluta corpore anima an sit immortalis vel ad tempus certe maneat , sit in dubio . Quam adsumptionem alii , rationem alii vocant .
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This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires to be proved as in the following: "He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher" : for this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises must be established before we can arrive at the conclusion. Sometimes again the minor premise is an admitted fact, as for instance, "But all men wish to live a happy life," while sometimes it requires to be proved, as for example the statement quoted above, "That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling," since it is doubtful whether the soul is immortal after its release from the body or only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a minor premise, some a reason. |
| 1689 |
Epichirema autem nullo differt a syllogismis , nisi quod illi et plures habent species et vera colligunt veris , epichirematis frequentior circa credibilia est usus . Nam si contingeret semper controversa confessis probare , vix esset in hoc genere usus oratoris . Nam quo ingenio est opus , ut dicas :
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There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion. |
| 1690 |
Bona ad me pertinent , solus enim sum filius defuncti , vel solus heres , cum iure bonorum possessio testati secundum tabulas testamenti detur ,
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For what skill does it require to say, "The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased," or " I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me " ? |
| 1691 |
ad me igitur pertinet .Sed cum ipsa ratio in quaestionem venit , efficiendum est certum id quo probaturi sumus quod incertum est : ut si ipsa forte intentione dicatur aut filius non es aut non es legitimus aut non es solus , itemque aut non es heres , aut non iustum testamentum est , aut capere non potes , aut habes coheredes , efficiendum est iustum , propter quod nobis bona adiudicari debeant .
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But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says "You are not his son" or "You are illegitimate" or "You are not his only son" ; or, again, "You are not his heir" or "The will is invalid" or "You are not entitled to inherit" or "You have co-heirs," we must prove the validity of the reason on which we base our claim that the property should be adjudicated to us. |
| 1692 |
Sed tum est necessaria illa summa connexio , cum intervenit ratio longior ; alioqui sufficient intentio ac ratio : Silent enim leges inter arma nec se expectari iubent , cum ei , qui exspectare velit , ante iniusta poena luenda sit quam iusta repetenda . Ideoque id enthymema , quod est ex consequentibus , rationi simile dixerunt . Sed et singula , interimque recte , ponuntur , ut ipsum illud Silent leges inter arma ;
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But when a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the major premise and the reason would suffice. " Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed. " Hence it has been asserted that the form of enthymeme which is based on denial of consequents resembles a reason. But sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single proposition as in the example just quoted, "The laws are silent in the midst of arms." |
| 1693 |
et a ratione incipere fas est , deinde concludere , ut ibidem : Quodsi duodecim tabulae nocturnum furem quoquo modo , diurnum autem , si se telo defenderet , interfici impune voluerunt , quis est qui , quoquo modo quis interfectus sit , puniendum putet ? Variavit hic adhuc et rursus rationem tertio loco posuit , cum videat aliquando gladium nobis ab ipsis porrigi legibus .
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We may also begin with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech : " But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed? " 'The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the reason placed third, as in the phrase, "When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves." |
| 1694 |
Ppr constantem partis duxit ordinem : Insidiatori vero et latroni quae potest inferri iniusta nex ? hoc intentio ; Quid comitatus nostri , quid gladii volunt ? hoc ratio ; Quos habere certe non liceret , si uti illis nullo pacto liceret , hoc ex ratione et intentione connexio .
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On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance: "How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim?" Next comes the reason: "What is the object of our escorts and our swords?" Last comes the conclusion resulting from the major premise and the reason: " Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them. " |
| 1695 |
Huic generi probationis tribus occurritur modis , id est per omnes partes . Aut enim expugnatur intentio aut adsumptio aut conclusio , nonnunquam omnia . Intentio expugnatur : Iure occidi eum , qui insidiatus sit . Nam prima statim quaestio pro Milone est , an ei fas sit lucem intueri qui a se hominem necatum esse fateatur .
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This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the major premise or the minor or the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The major premise is refuted in the following case: "I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me." For the very first question in the defence of Milo is " whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day. " |
| 1696 |
Expugnatur adsumptio omnibus iis quae de refutatione diximus . Et ratio quidem nonnunquam est vera , cum eius propositio vera non sit ; interim verae propositionis falsa ratio est . Virtus bonum est , verum est ; si quis rationem subiiciat , quod ea locupletes faciat , verae intentionis falsa sit ratio . Conclusio autem aut vera negatur ,
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The minor premise is refuted by all the methods which we mentioned in dealing with refutation. As to the reason it must be pointed out that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is not true, but may on the other hand sometimes be false although the proposition is true. For example, "Virtue is a good thing" is true, but if the reason, "Because it brings us wealth," be added, we shall have an instance of a true major premise and a false reason. |
| 1697 |
cum aliud colligit quam id quod ex prioribus efficitur , aut nihil ad quaestionem dicitur pertinere . Non est vera sic : Insidiator iure occiditur ; nam cum vitae vim adferat ut hostis , debet etiam repelli ut hostis ; recte igitur Clodius ut hostis occiditur est ; non utique , nondum enim Clodium insidiatorem ostendimus . Sed fit vera connexio , Recte igitur insidiator ut hostis occiditur ; nihil ad nos , nondum enim Clodius insidiator apparet .
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With regard to the conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it infers something which does not logically result from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. The truth is denied in the following case: " We are justified in killing one who lies in wait for us; for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though he were an enemy: therefore Milo was justified in killing Clodius as an enemy. " The conclusion is not valid, since we have not yet proved that Clodius lay in wait for him But the conclusion that we are therefore justified in killing one who lies in wait for us is perfectly true, though irrelevant to the case, for it is not yet clear that Clodius lay in wait for Milo. |
| 1698 |
Sed ut potest vera esse intentio et ratio et tamen falsa connexio , ita , si illa falsa sunt , nunquam est vera connexio .
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But while the major premise and the reason may both be true and the conclusion false, yet if both are false, the conclusion can never be true. |
| 1699 |
Enthymema ab aliis oratorius syllogismus , ab aliis pars dicitur syllogismi , propterea quod syllogismus utique conclusionem et propositionem habet et per omnes partes efficit , quod proposuit , enthymema tantum intelligi contentum sit .
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Some call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, while others regard it as a part of the syllogism, because whereas the latter always has its premises and conclusion and effects its proof by the employment of all its parts, the ethymeme is content to let its proof be understood without explicit statement. |
| 1700 |
Syllogismus talis : Solum bonum virtus , nam id demum bonum est , quo nemo male uti potest ; virtute nemo male uti potest , bonum est ergo virtus . Enthymema ex consequentibus : Bonum est virtus , qua nemo male uti potest . Et contra , Non est bonum pecunia ; non enim bonum , quo quis male uti potest ; pecunia potest quis male uti , non igitur bonum est pecunia . Enthymema ex pugnantibus : An bonum est pecunia ,
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The following is an example of a syllogism: " Virtue is the only thing that is good, for that alone is good which no one can put to a bad use: but no one can make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good. " The enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of consequents. "Virtue is a good thing because no one can put it to a bad use." On the other hand take the following syllogism. " Money is not a good thing; for that is not good which can be put to a bad use: money may be put to a bad use; therefore money is not a good thing. " The enthymeme draws its conclusion from incompatibles. "Can money be a good thing when it is possible to put it to a bad use?" |
| 1701 |
qua quis male uti potest ?—Si pecunia , quae est in argento signato , argentum est , qui argentum omne legavit , et pecuniam , quae est in argento signato , legavit ; argentum autem omne legavit , igitur et pecuniam , quae est in argento , legavit , habet formam syllogismi . Oratori satis est dicere , Cum argentum legaverit omne , pecuniam quoque legavit , quae est in argento .
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The following argument is couched in syllogistic form: " If money in the form of silver coin is silver, the man who bequeathed all his silver to a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined silver: but he bequeathed all his silver: therefore he included in the bequest all money in the form of coined silver. " But for the orator it will be sufficient to say, "Since he bequeathed all his silver, he included in his bequest all his silver money." |
| 1702 |
Peregisse mihi videor sacra tradentium artes , sed consilio locus superest . Namque ego , ut in oratione syllogismo quidem aliquando uti nefas non duco , ita constare totam aut certe confertam esse aggressionum et enthymematum stipatione minime velim . Dialogis enim et dialecticis disputationibus erit similior quam nostri operis actionibus , quae quidem inter se plurimum differunt .
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I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules still leave scope for free exercise of the judgment. For although I consider that there are occasions when the orator may lawfully employ the syllogism, I am far from desiring him to make his whole speech consist of or even be crowded with a mass of epicheiremes and enthymemes. For a speech of that character would resemble dialogues and dialectical controversies rather than pleadings of the kind with which we are concerned, and there is an enormous difference between the two. |
| 1703 |
Namque in illis homines docti et inter doctos verum quaerentes minutius et scrupulosius scrutantur omnia , et ad liquidum confessumque perducunt , ut qui sibi et inveniendi et iudicandi vindicent partes , quarum alteram τοπικήν alteram κριτικήν vocant .
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For in the former we are confronted with learned men seeking for truth among men of learning; consequently they subject everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention and judgment, calling the former τοπική or the art of selecting the appropriate material for treatment, and the latter κριτική or the art of criticism. |
| 1704 |
Nobis ad aliorum iudicia componenda est oratio , et saepius apud omnino imperitos atque illarum certe ignaros litterarum loquendum est , quos nisi et delectatione allicimus et viribus trahimus et nonnunquam turbamus adfectibus , ipsa , quae iusta ac vera sunt , tenere non possumus .
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We on the other hand have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth and justice. |
| 1705 |
Locuples et speciosa et imperiosa vult esse eloquentia ; quorum nihil consequetur , si conclusionibus certis et in unam prope formam cadentibus concisa et contemptum ex humilitate et odium ex quadam severitate et ex copia satietatem et ex similitudine fastidium attulerit .
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Eloquence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken up into conclusive inferences which are generally expressed in the same monotonous form: on the contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its severity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness boredom. |
| 1706 |
Feratur ergo non semitis sed campis , non uti fontes angustis fistulis colliguntur sed ut beatissimi amnes totis vallibus fluunt , ac sibi viam , si quando non acceperit , faciat . Nam quid illa miserius lege velut praeformatas infantibus litteras persequentium et , ut Graeci dicere solent , quem mater amictum dedit , sollicite custodientium : propositio ac conclusio ex consequentibus et repugnantibus ?
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Eloquence therefore must not restrict itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed through narrow pipes like the water of fountains, but flow as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys; and if it cannot find a channel it must make one for itself. For what can be more distressing than to be fettered by petty rules, like children who trace the letters of the alphabet which others have first written for them, or, as the Greeks say, insist on keeping the coat their mother gave them. Are we to have nothing but premises and conclusions from consequents and incompatibles? Must not the orator breathe life into the argument and develop it? |
| 1707 |
Non inspiret ? non augeat ? non mille figuris variet ac verset ? ut ea nasci et ipsa provenire natura , non manu facta et arte suspecta magistrum fateri ubique videantur ? Quis unquam sic dixit orator ? Nonne apud ipsum Demosthenen paucissima huius generis reperiuntur ? Quae apprehensa Graeci magis ( nam hoc solum peius faciunt ) in catenas ligant et inexplicabili serie connectunt , et indubitata colligunt et probant confessa et se antiquis per hoc similes vocant , deinde interrogati nunquam respondebunt , quem imitentur . Sed de figuris alio loco .
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Must lie not vary and diversify it by a thousand figures, and do all this in such a way that it seems to come into being as the very child of nature, not to reveal an artificial manufacture and a suspect art nor at every moment to show traces of an instructor's hand? What orator ever spoke thus? Even in Demosthenes we find but few traces of such a mechanism. And yet the Greeks of to-day are even more prone than we are (though this is the only point in which their practice is worse than ours) to bind their thoughts in fetters and to connect them by an inexorable chain of argument, making inferences where there was never any doubt, proving admitted facts and asserting that in so doing they are following the orators of old, although they always refuse to answer the question who it is that they are imitating. However of figures I shall speak elsewhere. |
| 1708 |
Nunc illud adiiciendum , ne iis quidem consentire me , qui semper argumenta sermone puro et dilucido et distincto ceterum minime elato ornatoque putant esse dicenda . Namque ea distincta quidem ac perspicua debere esse confiteor , in rebus vero minoribus etiam sermone ac verbis quam maxime propriis et ex usu ;
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For the present I must add that I do not even agree with those who hold that arguments should always be expressed in language which is not only pure, lucid and distinct, but also as free as possible from all elevation and ornateness. I readily admit that arguments should be distinct and clear, and further that in arguments of a minor character the language and words should be as appropriate and as familiar as possible. |
| 1709 |
at si maior erit materia , nullum iis ornatum , qui modo non obscuret , subtrahendum puto . Nam et saepe plurimum lucis adfert ipsa translatio , cum etiam iuris consulti , quorum summus circa verborum proprietatem labor est , litus esse audeant dicere , qua fluctus eludit .
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But if the subject be one of real importance every kind of ornament should be employed, so long as it does nothing to obscure our meaning. For metaphor will frequently throw a flood of light upon a subject: even lawyers, who spend so much trouble over the appropriateness of words, venture to assert that the word litus is derived from eludere, because the shore is a place where the waves break in play. |
| 1710 |
Quoque quid est natura magis asperum , hoc pluribus condiendum est voluptatibus ; et minus suspecta argumentatio dissimulatione , et multum ad fidem adiuvat audientis voluptas . Nisi forte existimamus Ciceronem haec ipsa mala in argumentatione dixisse , silere leges inter arma , et gladium nobis interim ab ipsis porrigi legibus .Hic tamen habendus istis modus , ut sint ornamento non impedimento .
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Further, the more unattractive the natural appearance of anything, the more does it require to be seasoned by charm of style: moreover, an argument is often less suspect when thus disguised, and the charm with which it is expressed makes it all the more convincing to our audience. Unless indeed we think that Cicero was in error when he introduced phrases such as the following into an argumentative passage: "The laws are silent in the midst of arms," and "A sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves." However, we must be careful to observe a happy mean in the employment of such embellishments, so that they may prove a real ornament and not a hindrance. |