Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
2091	Nam tum est certum de nomine , sed quaeritur quae res ei subiicienda sit , tum res est manifesta , sed de nomine non constat . Cum de nomine constat , de re dubium est , interim coniectura est : ut si quaeratur , quid sit deus .	For sometimes, though there may be no doubt as to a term, there is a question as to what it includes, or, on the other hand, there may be no doubt about the thing, but no agreement as to the term to be applied to it. When the term is agreed, but the thing doubtful, conjecture may sometimes come into play, as, for instance, in the question, "What is god?"
2092	Nam qui neget deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immixtum , non hoc dicat falsam esse divinae illius naturae appellationem , sicut Epicurus , qui humanam ei formam locumque inter mundos dedit ? Nomine uterque uno utitur ;	For the man who denies that god is a spirit permeating all things, assuredly asserts that the epithet "divine" is falsely applied to his nature, like Epicurus, who gives him a human form and makes him reside in the intermundane space. While both use the same term god, both have to employ conjecture to decide which of the two meanings is consistent with fact.
2093	utrum sit rei re , coniectat . Interim qualitas tractatur , ut quid sit rhetorice , vis persuadendi an bene dicendi scientia . Quod genus est rei iudiciis frequentissimum . Sic enim quaeritur , an deprehensus rei lupanari cum aliena uxore adulter sit : quia non de appellatione , sed de vi facti eius ambigitur , an omnino peccaverit . Nam si peccavit , non potest esse aliud quam adulter .	Sometimes again we have recourse to quality, as in the question, " What is rhetoric? Is it the power to persuade or the science of speaking well? " This form of question is of frequent occurrence in the courts. For instance, the question may arise whether a man caught in a brothel with another man's wife is an adulterer. Here there is no doubt about the name; it is the significance of the act which is in doubt, since the question is whether he has committed any sin at all. For if he has sinned, his sin can only be adultery.
2094	Diversum est genus , cum controversia consistit rei nomine , quod pendet ex scripto , nec versatur rei iudiciis nisi propter verba quae litem faciunt : an , qui se interficit , homicida sit ; an , qui tyrannum rei mortem compulit , tyrannicida ; an carmina magorum veneficium . Res enim manifesta est , sciturque non idem esse occidere se quod alium , non idem occidere tyrannum quod compellere ad mortem , non idem carmina ac mortiferam potionem ; quaeritur tamen , an eodem nomine appellanda sint .	There is a different type of question where the dispute is concerned with the term to be applied, which depends on the letter of the law: it is a form of question which can only arise in the courts from the actual words on which the dispute turns. Take as examples the questions, whether suicide is a form of homicide, or whether the man who forces a tyrant to kill himself can be considered a tyrannicide, or whether magical incantations are equivalent to the crime of poisoning. In all these cases there is no doubt about the facts, for it is well known that there is a difference between killing oneself and killing another, between slaying a tyrant and forcing him to suicide, between employing incantations and administering a deadly draught, but we enquire whether we are justified in calling them by the same name.
2095	Quanquam autem dissentire vix audeo a Cicerone , qui multos secutus auctores dicit , finitionem esse de eodem et de altero , semper enim neganti aliquod esse nomen dicendum quod sit potius : tamen equidem tris habeo velut species .	Though I hardly like to differ from Cicero, who follows many authorities in saying that definition is concerned with identity and difference (since he who denies the applicability of one term must always produce another term which he regards as preferable), for my own part I consider that definition falls into three types, which I may perhaps call species.
2096	Nam interim convenit solum quaerere , an hoc sit , ut an adulterium rei lupanari . Cum hoc negamus , non necesse est dicere quid id vocetur , quia totum crimen infitiamur . Interim quaeritur , hoc an hoc ; furtum an sacrilegium . Non quin sufficiat non esse sacrilegium , sed quia necesse sit dicere quid sit aliud ; quo rei loco utrumque finiendum est .	For at times it is convenient merely to enquire whether one particular term is applicable to a given thing, as in the question whether an act committed in a brothel is adultery. If we deny that it is adultery, there is no need to state what it should be called, since we have given a total denial to the charge. Secondly, there are occasions when the question is which of two terms is to be applied to a thing, as in the question whether an act is theft or sacrilege. It may be sufficient for the defence that it is not sacrilege, but it is still necessary to show what else it is, and therefore we must define both.
2097	Interim quaeritur rei rebus specie diversis , an et hoc et hoc eodem modo sit appellandum , cum res utraque habet suum nomen , ut amatorium , venenum . In omnibus autem huius generis litibus quaeritur , an etiam hoc , quia nomen de quo ambigitur utique rei alia re certum est . Sacrilegium est rem sacram de templo surripere : an et privatam ? Adulterium cum aliena uxore domi coire : an et rei lupanari ? Tyrannicidium occidere tyrannum : an et rei mortem compellere ?	Thirdly, there are times when the question concerns things which are different in species, and we ask whether two different things are to be called by the same name, in spite of the fact that each has a special name of its own: for example, is tile same name applicable both to a love-potion and a poison? But in all disputes of this kind the question is whether one thing is another thing as well, since the name in doubt does without question apply to something else. It is sacrilege to steal a sacred object from a temple; is it also sacrilege to steal private property from a temple? It is adultery to lie with another man's wile in one's own house; is it adultery to do so in a brothel? It is tyrannicide to slay a tyrant; is it tyrannicide to force him to slay himself?
2098	Ideoque συλλογισμός de quo postea dicam , velut infirmior est finitio , quia rei hac quaeritur , an idem sit huius rei nomen quod alterius , illo , an proinde habenda sit haec atque illa . Est et talis finitionum diversitas ,	Consequently the syllogism, to which I shall return later, is virtually a weaker form of definition, since while definition seeks to determine whether one thing has the same name as another, syllogism seeks to determine whether one thing is to be regarded as identical with another.
2099	ut qui idem sentiant , non iisdem verbis comprehendant : ut rhetorice bene dicendi scientia , et eadem bene inveniendi et bene enuntiandi et dicendi secundum virtutem orationis et dicendi quod sit officii . Atque providendum ut , si sensu non pugnant , comprehensione dissentiant . Sed de his disputatur , non litigatur .	There is moreover great variety in definitions. For instance, persons will give different verbal expression to things about which they are really in agreement: thus rhetoric is defined as the science of speaking well, as the science of correct conception or correct expression of what we have to say, as the science of speading in accordance with the excellence of an orator and again of speaking to the purpose. And we must take care to discover how it is that definitions, identical in meaning, differ in the form in which they are expressed. However, this is a subject for discussion and not for a quarrel.
2100	Opus est aliquando finitione obscurioribus et ignotioribus verbis ut , quid sit clarigatio , erctum citum : interim notis nomine verbis , quid sit penus , quid litus . Quae varietas efficit , ut eam quidam coniecturae , quidam qualitati , quidam legitimis quaestionibus subiecerint .	Definition is sometimes required to explain rare or obscure words such as clarigatio or erctum citum, or again to explain familiar words such as penus or litus. This variety in definition has caused some writers to include it under conjecture, others under quality and others again under legal questions.
2101	Quibusdam ne placuit quidem omnino subtilis haec et ad morem dialecticorum formata conclusio , ut rei disputationibus potius arguta verborum cavillatrix quam rei oratoris officio multum adlatura momenti . Licet enim valeat rei sermone tantum , ut constrictum vinculis suis eum qui responsurus est vel tacere vel etiam invitum id quod sit contra cogat fateri , non eadem est tamen eius rei causis utilitas .	Some, on the other hand, entirely reject the elaborate and formal methods of reasoning employed by dialectic, regarding such ingenuity as suited rather to quibbles over words in philosophical discussions than as likely to carry much weight in the performance of the duties of an orator. For though in dialogue definition may serve to fetter the person who has got to reply in chains of his own making, or may force him to silence, or even to reluctant confession of a point which tells against himself, it is of less use in forensic cases.
2102	Persuadendum enim iudici est , qui etiamsi verbis devinctus est , tamen , nisi ipsi rei accesserit , tacitus dissentiet . Agenti vero quae tanta est huius praecisae comprehensionis necessitas ? An , si non dixero , Homo est animal mortale rationale , non potero , expositis tot corporis animique proprietatibus , latius oratione ducta , vel a dis eum vel a mutis discernere ?	For there we have to persuade the judge, who, even though he may be tied and bound with our words, will still dissent in silence, unless he is brought really into touch with the actual facts. And what need has a pleader for such precision of definition? Even if I do not say that man is an animal, mortal and rational, surely I shall still be able, by setting forth the numerous properties of his body and mind in more general terms, to distinguish him from gods or dumb beasts.
2103	Quid quod nec uno modo definitur res eadem ( ut facit Cicero : quid est enim vulgo ? universos ) et latiore varioque tractatu , ut omnes oratores plerumque fecerunt ? Rarissima enim apud eos reperitur ilia ex consuetudine philosophorum ducta servitus ad certa se verba adstringendi , idque faciendum rei libris Ciceronis de Oratore vetat M . Antonius .	Again, may not the same thing be defined in more than one way, as Cicero does when he says, "What do we mean when we say' commonly ': surely we mean 'by all men'?" May it not be given a wide and varied treatment such as is frequently employed by all orators? For it is rare to find orators falling victims to that form of slavery introduced from the practice of the philosophers and tying themselves down to certain definite words; indeed it is absolutely forbidden by Marcus Antonius in the de Oratore of Cicero. For it is a most dangerous practice, since,
2104	Nam est etiam periculosum , cum , si uno verbo sit erratum , tota causa cecidisse videamur ; optimaque est media illa via , qua utitur Cicero pro Caecina , ut res proponatur , verba non periclitentur . Etenim , reciperatores , non ea sola vis est quae ad corpus nostrum vitamque pervenit , sed etiam multo maior ea quae periculo mortis iniecto formidine animum perterritum loco saepe et certo statu demovet .	if we make a mistake in a single word, we are like to lose our whole case, and consequently the compromise adopted by Cicero in the pro Caecina is the safest course to follow; this consists in setting forth the facts without running any risks over the exactness of our terminology. These are his words: " Judges, the violence which threatens our lives and persons is not the only kind of violence: there is a much more serious form which by the threat of death fills our minds with panic and often turns them from their natural condition of stability. "
2105	Aut , cum finitionem praecedit probatio , ut rei Philippicis Cicero Servium Sulpicium occisum ab Antonio colligit et rei clausula demum ita finit : Is enim profecto mortem attulit qui causa mortis fuit . Non negaverim tamen haec quoque , ut expediet causae , esse facienda , et si quando firme comprehendi poterit brevi complexu verborum finitio , esse id tum elegans tum etiam fortissimum , si modo erit illa inexpugnabilis .	Or again, we may prove before we define, as Cicero does in the Philippics, where he proves that Servius Sulpicius was killed by Antony and introduces his definition at the conclusion in the following terms:— "For assuredly the murderer was he who was the cause of his death." I would not, however, deny that such rules should be employed, if it will help our case, and that, if we can produce a definition which is at once strong and concise, it will be not merely an ornament to our speech, but will also produce the strongest impression, provided always that it cannot be overthrown.
2106	Eius certus ordo est , quid sit , an hoc sit . Et rei hoc fere labor maior est , ut finitionem confirmes , quam ut rei rein finitionem applices . In eo , quid sit , duplex opus est . Nam et nostra confirmanda est et adversae partis destruenda finitio .	The order to be followed in definition is invariable. We first ask what a thing is, and then, whether it is this. And there is generally more difficulty in the establishment than in the application of a definition. In determining what a thing is, there are two things which require to be done: we must establish our own definition and destroy that of our opponent. Consequently in the schools,
2107	Ideoque rei schola , ubi nobis ipsi fingimus contradictionem , duos ponere debemus fines , quales utrinque esse optimi poterunt . At rei foro providendum , num forte supervacua et nihil ad causam pertinens an ambigua an contraria an communis sit finitio ; quorum nihil accidere nisi agentis culpa potest .	where we ourselves imagine our opponent's reply, we have to introduce two definitions, which should suit the respective sides of the case as well as it is in our power to make them. But in the courts we must give careful consideration to the question whether our definition may not be superfluous and irrelevant or ambiguous or inconsistent or even of no less service to our opponents than to ourselves, since it will be the fault of the pleader if any of these errors occur. On the other hand, we shall ensure the right definition,
2108	Ut recte autem finiamus , ita fiet , si prius rei animo constituerimus quid velimus efficere . Sic enim accommodari ad voluntatem verba poterunt . Atque ut a notissimo exemplo , quo sit res lucidior , non recedamus : Qui privatam pecuniam de templo surripuit , sacrilegii reus est .	if we first make up our minds what it is precisely that we desire to effect: for, this done, we shall be able to suit our words to serve our purpose. To make my meaning clearer, I will follow my usual practice and quote a familiar example. "A man who has stolen private money from a temple is accused of sacrilege."
2109	Culpa manifesta est ; quaestio est an huic crimini nomen quod est rei lege conveniat . Ergo ambigitur an hoc sacrilegium sit ? Accusator , quia de templo surrepta sit pecunia , utitur hoc nomine . Reus , quia privatam surripuerit , negat esse sacrilegium sed furtum fatetur . Actor ergo ita finiet , Sacrilegium est surripere aliquid de sacro ; Reus , Sacrilegium est surripere aliquid sacri . Uterque finitionem alterius impugnat .	There is no doubt about his guilt; the question is whether the name given by the law applies to the charge. It is therefore debated whether the act constitutes sacrilege. The accuser employs this term on the ground that the money was stolen from a temple: the accused denies that the act is sacrilege, on the ground that the money stolen was private property, but admits that it is theft. The prosecutor will therefore give the following definitions, "It is sacrilege to steal anything from a sacred place." The accused will reply with another definition, "It is sacrilege to steal something sacred." Each impugns the other's definition.
2110	Ea duobus generibus evertitur , si aut falsa est aut parum plena . Nam illud tertium nisi stultis non accidit , ut nihil ad quaestionem pertineat .	A definition may be overthrown on two grounds: it may be false or it may be too narrow. There is indeed a possible third ground, namely irrelevance, but this is a fault which no one save a fool will commit.
2111	Hic reus falsam dicit esse finitionem accusatoris , accusator autem non potest dicere falsam rei ; nam est sacrilegium surripere aliquid sacri ; sed dicit parum plenam , adiiciendum enim aut ex sacro .	[It is a false definition if you say, "A horse is a rational animal," for though the horse is an animal, it is irrational. Again, a thing which is common to something else cannot be a property of the thing defined.] In the case under discussion, then, the accused alleges that the definition given by the accuser is false, whereas the accuser cannot do the same by his opponent's definition, since to steal a sacred object is undoubtedly sacrilege. He therefore alleges that the definition is too narrow and requires the addition of the words "or from a sacred place."
2112	Maximus autem usus rei approbando refellendoque fine propriorum ac differentium , nonnunquam etiam etymologiae . Quae tamen omnia , sicut rei ceteris , confirmat aequitas , nonnunquam et coniectura mentis . Etymologia maxime rare est : Quid enim est aliud tumultus , nisi perturbatio tanta , ut maior timor oriatur ? Unde etiam nomen ductum est tumultus .	But the most effective method of establishing and refuting definitions is derived from the examination of properties and differences, and sometimes even from considerations of etymology, while all these considerations will, like others, find further support in equity and occasionally in conjecture. Etymology is rarely of assistance, but the following will provide an example of its use. " For what else is a 'tumult' but a disturbance of such violence as to give rise to abnormal alarm? And the name itself is derived from this fact. "
2113	Circa propria ac differentia magna subtilitas , ut cum quaeritur an addictus , quem lex servire , donec solverit , iubet , servus sit . Altera pars finit ita , Servus est , qui est iure rei servitute ; altera , qui rei seruitute est eo iure , quo servus , aut , ut antiqui dixerunt , qui servitutem servit . Quae finitio , etiamsi distat aliquo , nisi tamen propriis et differentibus adiuvatur , inanis est .	Great ingenuity may be exercised with regard to properties and differences, as for instance in the question whether a person assigned to his creditor for debt, who is condemned by the law to remain in a state of servitude until he has paid his debt, is actually a slave. One party will advance the following definition, "A slave is one who is legally in a state of servitude." The other will produce the definition, " A slave is one who is in a state of servitude on the same terms as a slave (or, to use the older phrase, 'who serves as a slave'). " This definition, though it differs considerably from the other, will be quite useless unless it is supported by properties and differences.
2114	Dicet enim adversarius , servire eum servitutem aut eo iure quo servum . Videamus ergo propria et differentia , quae libro quinto leviter rei transitu attigeram . Servus , cum manumittitur , fit libertinus , addictus recepta libertate ingenuus ; servus invito domino libertatem non consequetur , addictus soluendo citra voluntatem domini consequetur : ad servum nulla lex pertinet , addictus legem habet . Propria liberi , quod nemo habet nisi liber , praenomen , nomen , cognomen , tribum ; habet haec addictus .	For the opponent will say that the person in question is actually serving as a slave or is legally in a state of servitude. We must therefore look for properties and differences, to which in passing I devoted a brief discussion in my fifth book. A slave when manumitted becomes a freedman: a man who is assigned for debt becomes a free man on the restoration of his liberty. A slave cannot acquire his freedom without the consent of his master: a man assigned for debt can acquire it by paying his debt without the consent of his master being necessary. A slave is outside the law; a man assigned for debt is under the law. Turning to properties, we may note the following which are possessed by none save the free, the three names (praenomen, nomen and cognomen) and membership of a tribe, all of which are possessed by the man assigned for debt.
2115	Excusso quid sit , prope peracta est quaestio , an hoc sit . Id enim agimus ut sit causae nostrae conveniens finitio . Potentissima est autem rei ea qualitas , an amor insania . Huc pertinebunt probationes , quas Cicero dicit proprias esse finitionis , ex antecedentibus , consequentibus , adiunctis , repugnantibus , causis , effectis , similibus ; de quorum argumentorum natura dictum est .	By settling what a thing is we have come near to determining its identity, for our purpose is to produce a definition that is applicable to our case. Now the most important element in a definition is provided by quality, as, for example, in the question whether love be a form of madness. To this point in our procedure belong those proofs which according to Cicero are peculiar to definition, that is, proofs drawn from antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, contraries, causes, effects and similarities, with the nature of which I have already dealt.
2116	Breviter autem pro Caecina Cicero initia , causas , effecta , antecedentia , consequentia complexus est : Quid igitur fugiebant ? Propter metum Quid metuebant ? Vim videlicet . Potestis igitur principia negare , cum extrema concedatis ? Sed similitudine quoque usus est , Quae vis rei bello appellatur , ea rei otio non appellabitur ?	I will, however, quote a passage from the pro Caecina in which Cicero includes brief proofs drawn from origins, causes, effects, antecedents and consequents: " Why then did they fly? Because they were afraid. What were they afraid of? Obviously of violence. Can you then deny the beginning, when you have admitted the end? " But he also argued from similarity: "Shall not that which is called violence in war be called violence in peace as well"
2117	Sed etiam ex contrario argumenta ducuntur , ut si quaeratur , amatorium venenum sit necne ; quia venenum amatorium non sit . Illud alterum genus quo sit manifestius adolescentibus meis ( meos enim semper adolescentes putabo ) , hic quoque fictae controversiae utar exemplo .	Arguments may also be drawn from contraries, as for instance in the question whether a love-potion can be a poison, in view of the fact that a poison is not a love-potion. In order that my young students (and I call them mine, because the young student is always dear to me) may form a clearer conception of this second kind of definition, I will once more quote a fictitious controversial theme.
2118	Iuvenes , qui convivere solebant , constituerunt , ut rei litore cenarent . Unius , qui cenae defuerat , nomen tumulo , quem exstruxerant , inscripserunt . Pater eius , a transmarina peregrinatione cum ad litus idem appulisset , lecto nomine suspendit se .	" Some young men who were in the habit of making merry together decided to dine on the sea-shore. One of their party failed to put in an appearance, and they raised a tomb to him and inscribed his name thereon. His father on his return from overseas chanced to land at this point of the shore, read the name and hung himself. It is alleged that the youths were the cause of his death. "
2119	Dicuntur ii causa mortis fuisse . Hic finitio est accusatoris , Per quem factum est , ut quis perierit , causa mortis est ; rei est , Qui fecit quid sciens , per quod perire homini necesse est . Remota finitione accusatori sat est dicere , Causa mortis fuistis ; per vos enim factum est , ut homo periret ; quia , nisi vos illud fecissetis , viveret .	The definition produced by the accuser will run as follows: "The man whose act leads to another's death is the cause of his death." The definition given by the accused will be, " He who wittingly commits an act which must necessarily lead to another's death, is the cause of his death. " Without any formal definition it would be sufficient for the accuser to argue as follows: " You were the cause of his death, for it was your act that led to his death: but for your act he would still be alive. "
2120	Contra , Non statim , per quem factum est , ut quis periret , is damnari debet , ut accusator , testis , iudex rei capitalis . Nec undecunque causa fluxit , ibi culpa est : ut si quis profectionem suaserit aut amicum arcessierit trans mare et is naufragio perierit , ad cenam invitarit et is cruditate illic contracta decesserit .	To which the accused might answer, " It does not necessarily follow that the man whose act leads to another's death should be condemned forthwith. Were this so, the accuser, witnesses and judges in a capital case would all be liable to condemnation. Nor is the cause of death always a guilty cause. Take for instance the case of a man who persuades another to go on a journey or sends for his friend from overseas, with the result that the latter perishes in a shipwreck, or again the case of a man who invites another to dine, with the result that the guest dies of indigestion.
2121	Nec fuerit rei causa mortis solum adolescentium factum sed credulitas senis , rei dolore ferundo infirmitas ; denique , si fortior fuisset aut prudentior , uiueret . Nec mala mente fecerunt ; et ille potuit vel ex loco tumuli vel ex opere tumultuario suspicari non esse monumentum . Qui ergo puniri debent , rei quibus omnia absunt homicidae praeter manum ?	Nor is the act of the young men to be regarded as the sole cause of death. The credulity of the old man and his inability to bear the shock of grief were contributory causes. Finally, had lie been wiser or made of sterner stuff, he would still be alive. Moreover the young men acted without the least thought of doing harm, and the father might have suspected from the position of the tomb and the traces of haste in its construction that it was not a genuine tomb. What ground then is there for condemning them, for everything else that constitutes homicide is lacking save only the contributory act? "
2122	Est interim certa finitio , de qua inter utramnque partem convenit : ut Cicero dicit , Maiestas est rei imperii atque rei nominis populi Romani dignitate . Quaeritur tamen , an maiestas minuta sit , ut rei causa Cornelii quaesitum est . Sed hic etiamsi videri potest finitiva , tamen quia de finitione non ambigitur , iudicatio est qualitatis atque ad eum potius status reducenda , ad cuius forte quidem venimus mentionem , sed erat ordine proximus locus .	Sometimes we have a settled definition on which both parties are agreed, as in the following example from Cicero: "Majesty resides in the dignity of the Roman power and the Roman people." The question however, is, whether that majesty has been impaired, as for example in the ease of Cornelius. But even although the case may seem to turn on definition, the point for decision is one of quality, since there is no doubt about the definition, and must be assigned to the qualitative basis. It is a mere accident that I have come to mention quality at this moment, but in point of fact quality is the matter that comes next in order for discussion.
2123	Est autem qualitas alia de summo genre atque ea quidem non simplex . Nam et qualis sit cuiusque rei natura et quae forma quaeritur : an immortalis anima , an humana specie deus ; et de magnitudine ac numero , quantus sol , an unus mundus . Quae omnia coniectura quidem colliguntur , quaestionem tamen habent in eo , qualia sint ? Haec et in suasoriis aliquando tractari solent ,	IV. In speaking of quality we sometimes use the word in its most general sense, which covers a number of different questions. For we enquire sometimes into the nature and form of things: as for instance whether the soul is immortal or whether god is to be conceived of in human form. Sometimes, on the other hand, the question turns on size and number, as, for instance, what is the size of the sun or whether there are more worlds than one. In all these cases we arrive at our conclusions by conjecture, yet each involves a question of quality.
2124	ut , si Caesar deliberet , an Britanniam impugnet , quae sit Oceani natura , an Britanniam insula ( nam tum ignorabatur ) , quanta in ea terra , quo numero militum aggredienda , in consilium ferendum sit . Eidem qualitati succedunt facienda ac non facienda , appetenda , vitanda ; quae in suasorias quidem maxime cadunt , sed in controversiis quoque sunt frequentia , hac sola differentia , quod illic de futuris hic de factis agitur .	Such questions are sometimes treated in deliberative themes: for example, if Caesar is deliberating whether to attack Britain, he must enquire into the nature of the Ocean, consider whether Britain is an island (a fact not then ascertained), and estimate its size and the number of troops which lie will require for the invasion. Under the same head of quality fall questions whether certain things should be done or not and certain objects sought or avoided: such topics are specially adapted for deliberative themes, but occur with some frequency in controversial themes as well, the only difference being that in the latter we deal with what is past and in the former with the future.
2125	Item demonstratiuae partis omnia sunt in hoc statu : factum esse constat , quale sit factum quaeritur . Lis est omnis aut de praemio aut de poena aut de quantitate . Igitur genus causae aut simplex aut comparativum . Illic , quid aequum , hic , quid aequius aut quid aequissimum sit , excutitur . Cum de poena iudicium est , a parte eius , qui causam dicit , aut defensio est criminis aut imminutio aut excusatio aut , ut quidam putant , deprecatio .	Similarly all the topics of demonstrative oratory involve a qualitative basis. The facts are admitted, and the question turns on their quality, the dispute being entirely concerned with rewards or penalties or their quantity. The case is therefore of two kinds, simple or comparative, the former dealing with what is just, the latter with what is juster, or most just. When the point for decision is the penalty to be inflicted, the duty of the pleader will be to defend, extenuate or excuse the act on which the charge is based, or even, according to some, to plead for mercy.
2126	Defensio longe potentissima est , qua ipsum factum , quod obiicitur , dicimus honestum esse . Abdicatur aliquis , quod invito patre militarit , honores petierit , uxorem duxerit : tuemur , quod fecimus . Hanc partem vocant Hermagorei κατ᾽ ἀντίλημψιν , ad intellectum id nomen referentes . Latine ad verbum translatam non invenio ; absoluta appellatur . Sed enim de re sola quaestio , iusta sit ea necne .	By far the strongest line that can be taken in defence is to assert that the act which forms the subject of the charge is actually honourable. A man is disinherited because he went on military service, stood for office or married without his father's consent. We defend this act. This form of defence is called κατ᾽ ἀντίληψιν by the followers of Hermagoras, that is, defence by objection, the term being used with reference to the purport of the defendant's plea. I can find no exact Latin translation of the term; we call it an absolute defence. But in such cases the question is concerned with the justice or injustice of the act alone.
2127	Iustum omne continetur natura vel constitutione ; natura , quod fit secundum cuiusque rei dignitatem .	Justice is either natural or conventional. Natural justice is found in actions of inherent worth.
2128	Hinc sunt pietas , fides , continentia et talia . Adiiciunt et id , quod sit par . Verum id non temere intuendum est : nam et vis contra vim et talio nihil habent adversum eum , qui prior fecit , iniusti ; et non , quoniam res pares sunt , etiam id est iustum , quod antecessit . Illa utrinque iusta , eadem lex , eadem condicio ; ac forsitan ne sint quidem paria , quae ulla parte sunt dissimilia . Constitutio est in lege , more , iudicato , pacto .	Under this head come the virtues of piety, loyalty, self-control and the like. To these some add the rendering of like for like. But this view must not be adopted without consideration: for to retaliate, or meet violence with violence on the one hand, does not imply injustice on the part of the aggressor, while on the other hand it does not follow that the first act was just merely because the two acts were alike. In cases where there is justice on both sides, the two parties must both come under the same law and the same conditions, and it would not perhaps be untrue to say that things can never be spoken of as like if there is any point in which they are dissimilar. Convention, on the other hand, is to be found in laws, customs, legal precedents and agreements.