Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 1445 |
In primis igitur argumenta a persona ducenda sunt ; cum sit , ut dixi , divisio , ut omnia in haec duo partimur , res atque personas , ut causa , tempus , locus , occasio , instrumentum , modus et cetera , rerum sint accidentia . Personis autem non quidquid accidit exsequendum mihi est , ut plerique fecerunt , sed unde argumenta sumi possunt .
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Firstly, then, arguments may be drawn from persons; for, as I have already said, all arguments fall into two classes, those concerned with things and those concerned with persons, since causes, time, place, occasion, instruments, means and the like are all accidents of things. I have no intention of tracing all the accidents of persons, as many have done, but shall confine myself to those from which arguments may be drawn. |
| 1446 |
Ea porro sunt , genus , nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque creduntur , et nonnunquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt ; natio , nam et gentibus proprii mores sunt , nec idem in barbaro , Romano , Graeco probabile est ;
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Such are birth, for persons are generally regarded as having some resemblance to their parents and ancestors, a resemblance which sometimes leads to their living disgracefully or honourably, as the case may be; then there is nationality, for races have their own character, and the same action is not probable in the case of a barbarian, a Roman and a Greek; |
| 1447 |
patria , quia similiter etiam civitatum leges , instituta , opiniones habent differentiam ; sexus , ut latrocinium facilius in viro , veneficium in femina credas ; aetas , quia aliud aliis annis magis convenit ; educatio et disciplina , quoniam refert , a quibus et quo quisque modo sit institutus ; habitus corporis ,
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country is another, for there is a like diversity in the laws, institutions and opinions of different states; sex, since for example a man is more likely to commit a robbery, a woman to poison; age, since different actions suit different ages; education and training, since it makes a great difference who were the instructors and what the method of instruction in each individual case; |
| 1448 |
ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis , robur petulantiae , his contraria in diversum ; fortuna , neque enim idem credibile est in divite ac paupere , propinquis amicis clientibus abundante et his omnibus destitute ; condicionis etiam distantia , nam clarus an obscurus , magistratus an privatus , pater an filius , civis an peregrinus , liber an servus , maritus an caelebs , parens liberorum an orbus sit , plurimum distat ; animi natura ,
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bodily constitution, for beauty is often introduced as an argument for lust, strength as an argument for insolence, and their opposites for opposite conduct; fortune, since the same acts are not to be expected from rich and poor, or from one who is surrounded by troops of relations, friends or clients and one who lacks all these advantages; condition, too, is important, for it makes a great difference whether a man be famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private individual, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, a free man or a slave, married or unmarried, a father or childless. |
| 1449 |
etenim avaritia , iracundia , misericordia , crudelitas , severitas aliaque his similia adferunt frequenter fidem aut detrahunt , sicut victus luxuriosus an frugi an sordidus , quaeritur ; studia quoque , nam rusticus , forensis , negotiator , miles , navigator , medicus aliud atque aliud efficiunt .
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Nor must we pass by natural disposition, for avarice, anger, pity, cruelty, severity and the like may often be adduced to prove the credibility or the reverse of a given act; it is for instance often asked whether a man's way of living be luxurious, frugal or parsimonious. Then there is occupation, since a rustic, a lawyer, a man of business, a soldier, a sailor, a doctor all perform very different actions. |
| 1450 |
Intuendum etiam , quid adfectet quisque , locuples videri an disertus , iustus an potens . Spectantur ante acta dictaque , ex praeteritis enim aestimari solent praesentia . His adiiciunt quidam commotionem ; hanc accipi volunt temporarium animi motum , sicut iram , pavorem ;
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We must also consider the personal ambitions of individuals, for instance whether they wish to be thought rich or eloquent, just or powerful. Past life and previous utterances are also a subject for investigation, since we are in the habit of inferring the present from the past. To these some add passion, by which they mean some temporary emotion such as anger or fear; they also add design, which may refer to the past, |
| 1451 |
consilia autem et praesentis et praeteriti et futuri temporis ; quae mihi , etiamsi personis accidunt , per se referenda tamen ad illam partem argumentorum videntur , quam ex causis ducimus ; sicut habitus quidam animi , quo tractatur , amicus an inimicus . Ponunt in persona et nomen ;
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present or future. These latter, however, although accidents of persons, should be referred to that class of arguments which we draw from causes, as also should certain dispositions of mind, for example when we inquire whether one man is the friend or enemy of another. |
| 1452 |
quod quidem ei accidere necesse est , sed in argumentum raro cadit , nisi cum aut ex causa datum est , ut Sapiens , Magnus , Pius ; aut et ipsum alicuius cogitationis attulit causam , ut Lentulo coniurationis , quod libris Sibyllinis aruspicumque responsis dominatio dari tribus Corneliis dicebatur , seque eum tertium esse credebat post Sullam Cinnamque , quia et ipse Cornelius erat . Nam et illud apud Euripidem frigidum sane ,
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Names also are treated as accidents of persons; this is perfectly true, but names are rarely food for argument, unless indeed they have been given for some special reasons, such as the titles of Wise, Great, Pious, or unless the name has suggested some special thought to the bearer. Lentulus for instance had the idea of conspiracy suggested to him by the fact that according to the Sibylline books and the Responses of the soothsayers the tyranny was promised to three members of the Cornelian family, and he considered himself to be the third in succession to Sulla and Cinna, since he too bore the name Cornelius. |
| 1453 |
quod nomen Polynicis , ut argumentum morum , frater incessit . Iocorum tamen ex eo frequens materia , qua Cicero in Verrem non semel usus est . Haec fere circa personas sunt aut his similia . Neque enim complecti omnia vel hac in parte vel in ceteris possumus , contenti rationem plura quaesituris ostendere .
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On tile other hand the conceit employed by Euripides where he makes Eteocles taunt his brother Polynices on the ground that his name is evidence of character, is feeble in the extreme. Still a name will often provide the subject for a jest, witness the frequent jests of Cicero on the name of Verres. Such, then, and the like are the accidents of persons. It is impossible to deal with them all either here or in other portions of this work, and I must content myself with pointing out the lines on which further enquiry should proceed. |
| 1454 |
Nunc ad res transeo , in quibus maxime sunt personis iuncta , quae agimus , ideoque prima tractanda . In omnibus porro , quae fiunt , quaeritur aut Quare ? aut Ubi ? aut Quando ? aut Quomodo ? aut Per quae facta sunt ?
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I now pass to things: of these actions are the most nearly connected with persons and must therefore be treated first. In regard to every action the question arises either Why or Where or When or How or By what means the action is performed. |
| 1455 |
Ducuntur igitur argumenta ex causis factorum vel futurorum ; quarum materiam , quam quidam ὕλην , alii δύναμιν nominaverunt , in duo genera , sed quaternas utriusque dividunt species . Nam fere versatur ratio faciendi circa bonorum adeptionem , incrementum , conservationem , usum , aut malorum evitationem , liberationem , imminutionem , tolerantiam ;
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Consequently arguments are drawn from the causes of past or future actions. The matter of these causes, by some called ὕλη, by others δύναμις, falls into two genera, which are each divided into four species. For the motive for any action is as a rule concerned with the acquisition, increase, preservation and use of things that are good or with the avoidance, diminution, endurance of things that are evil or with escape there from. All these considerations carry great weight in deliberative oratory as well. |
| 1456 |
quae et in deliberando plurimum valent . Sed honestas causas habent recta , prava contra ex falsis opinionibus veniunt . Nam est his initium ex iis , quae credunt bona aut mala ; inde errores existunt et pessimi adfectus , in quibus sunt ira , odium , invidia , cupiditas , spes , ambitus , audacia , metus , cetera generis eiusdem . Accedunt aliquando fortuita , ebrietas , ignorantia , quae interim ad veniam valent , interim ad probationem criminis , ut si quis , dum alii insidiatur , alium dicitur interemisse .
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But right actions have right motives, while evil actions are the result of false opinions, which originate in the things which men believe to be good or evil. Hence spring errors and evil passions such as anger, hatred, envy, desire, hope, ambition, audacity, fear and others of a similar kind. To these accidental circumstances may often be added, such as drunkenness or ignorance, which serve sometimes to excuse and sometimes to prove a charge, as for instance when a man is said to have killed one person while lying in wait for another. Further, |
| 1457 |
Causae porro non ad convincendum modo , quod obiicitur , sed ad defendendum quoque excuti solent , cum quis se recte fecisse , id est honesta causa , contendit ; qua de re latius in tertio libro dictum est .
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motives are often discussed not merely to convict the accused of the offence with which he is charged, but also to defend him when he contends that his action was right, that is to say proceeded from an honourable motive, a theme of which I have spoken more fully in the third book. |
| 1458 |
Finitionis quoque quaestiones ex causis interim pendent . An tyrannicida , qui tyrannum , a quo deprehensus in adulterio fuerat , occidit ? An sacrilegus , qui , ut hostes urbe expelleret , arma templo adfixa detraxit ?
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Questions of definition are also at times intimately connected with motives. Is a man a tyrannicide if he kills a tyrant by whom he has been detected in the act of adultery? Or is lie guilty of sacrilege who tore down arms dedicated in a temple to enable him to drive the enemy from the city? |
| 1459 |
Ducuntur argumenta et ex loco . Spectatur enim ad fidem probationis , montanus an planus , maritimus an mediterraneus , consitus an incultus , frequens an desertus , propinquus an remotus , opportunus consiliis an adversus ; quam partem videmus vehementissime pro Milone tractasse Ciceronem .
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Arguments are also drawn from place. With a view to proving our facts we consider such questions as whether a place is hilly or level, near the coast or inland, planted or uncultivated, crowded or deserted, near or far, suitable for carrying out a given design or the reverse. This is a topic which is treated most carefully by Cicero in his pro Milone. |
| 1460 |
Et haec quidem ac similia ad coniecturam frequentius pertinent , sed interim ad ius quoque : privatus an publicus , sacer an profanus , noster an alienus ; ut in persona , magistratus , pater , peregrinus . Hinc enim quaestiones oriuntur :
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These points and the like generally refer to questions of fact, but occasionally to questions of law as well. For we may ask whether a place is public or private, sacred or profane, our own or another's, just as where persons are concerned we ask whether a man is a magistrate, a father, a foreigner. |
| 1461 |
Privatam pecuniam sustulisti ; uerum quia de templo , non furtum sed sacrilegium est . Occidisti adulterum , quod lex permittit ; sed quia in lupanari , caedes est . Iniuriam fecisti ; sed quia magistratui , maiestatis actio est .
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Hence arise such questions as the following. " You have stolen private money, but since you stole it from a temple, it is not theft but sacrilege. " You have killed adulterers, an act permitted by law, but since the act was done in a brothel, it is murder. " "You have committed an assault, but since the object of your assault was a magistrate, the crime is lèse-majesté. |
| 1462 |
Vel contra : Licuit , quia pater eram , quia magistratus . Sed circa facti controuersiam argumenta praestant , circa iuris lites materiam quaestionum . Ad qualitatem quoque frequenter pertinet locus , neque enim idem ubique aut licet aut decorum est ; quin etiam in qua quidque civitate quaeratur interest , moribus enim et legibus distant .
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Similarly it may be urged in defence, "The act was lawful, because I was a father, a magistrate." But such points afford matter for argument when there is a controversy as to the facts, and matter for enquiry when the dispute turns on a point of law. Place also frequently affects the quality of an action, for the same action is not always lawful or seemly under all circumstances, while it makes considerable difference in what state the enquiry is taking place, for they differ both in custom and law. |
| 1463 |
Ad commendationem quoque et invidiam valet . Nam et Aiax apud Ovidium : Ante rates , inquit , agimus causam , et mecum confertur Ulixes ?Et Miloni inter cetera obiectum est , quod Clodius in monumentis ab eo maiorum suorum esset occisus .
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Further arguments drawn from place may serve to secure approval or the reverse. Ajax for instance in Ovid says:— "What! do we plead our cause before the ships? And is Ulysses there preferred to me?" Again one of the many charges brought against Milo was that he killed Clodius on the monument of his ancestors. |
| 1464 |
Ad suadendi momenta idem valet , sicut tempus , cuius tractatum subiungam . Eius autem , ut alio loco iam dixi , duplex significatio est ; generaliter enim et specialiter accipitur . Prius illud est :—nunc , olim , sub Alexandro , cum apud Ilium pugnatum est , denique praeteritum , instans , futurum . Hoc sequens habet et constituta discrimina :—aestate , hieme , noctu , interdiu ; et fortuita :—in pestilentia , in bello , in convivio .
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Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as "now, "formerly, "in the reign of Alexander, "in the days of the siege of Troy," and whenever we speak of past, present or future. The second sense occurs when we speak either of definite periods of time such as "in summer, "in winter, "by night, "by day," or of fortuitous periods such as "in time of pestilence, "in time of war, "during a banquet." |
| 1465 |
Latinorum quidam satis significari putaverunt , si illud generale tempus , hoc speciale tempora vocarent . Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis quidem et in illo demonstrativo genere versatur , sed in iudiciis frequentissima est .
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Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense "time," and the special "times." In both senses time is of importance in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but not so frequently as in forensic. |
| 1466 |
Nam et iuris quaestiones facit et qualitatem distinguit et ad coniecturam plurimum confert : ut cum interim probationes inexpugnabiles adferat , quales sunt , si dicatur ( ut supra posui ) signator , qui ante diem tabularum decessit , aut commisisse aliquid , vel cum infans esset vel cum omnino natus non esset ;
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For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I have already cited, when one of the signatories to a document has died before the day on which it was signed, or when a person is accused of the commission of some crime, although he was only an infant at the time or not yet born. |
| 1467 |
praeter id , quod omnia facile argumenta aut ex iis , quae ante rem facta sunt , aut ex coniunctis rei aut insequentibus ducuntur . Ex antecedentibus : Mortem minatus es , noctu existi , proficiscentem antecessisti ; causae quoque factorum praeteriti sunt temporis .
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Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning; "You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him." Motives of actions may also belong to past time. |
| 1468 |
Secundum tempus subtilius quidam , quam necesse erat , diviserunt , ut esset iuncti Sonus auditus est ; adhaerentis Clamor sublatus est . Insequentis sunt illa Latuisti , profugisti , livores et tumores apparuerunt . Iisdem temporum gradibus defensor utetur ad detrahendam ei quod obiicitur fidem .
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Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making "a sound was heard" an example of circumstances combined with an act and "a shout was raised" an instance of circumstances attached to an act. As regards subsequent circumstances I may cite accusations such as "You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse." The counsel for the defence will employ the same divisions of time to discredit the charge which is brought against him. |
| 1469 |
In his omnis factorum dictorumque ratio versatur , sed dupliciter . Nam fiunt quaedam quia aliud postea futurum est , quaedam quia aliud ante factum est : ut , cum obiicitur reo lenocinii , speciosae marito , quod adulterii damnatam quondam emerit ; aut parricidii reo luxurioso , quod dixerit patri , Non amplius me obiurgabis . Nam et ille non quia emit leno est , sed quia leno erat emit ; nec hic , quia sic erat locutus , occidit , sed , quia erat occisurus , sic locutus est .
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In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father "You have rebuked me for the last time." For in the former case the accused is not a procurer because he bought the woman, but bought her because he was a procurer, while in the latter the accused is not a parricide because he used these words, but used them because lie intended to kill his father. |
| 1470 |
Casus autem , qui et ipse praestat argumentis locum , sine dubio est ex insequentibus , sed quadam proprietate distinguitur , ut si dicam : Melior dux Scipio quam Hannibal ; vicit Hannibalem . Bonus gubernator ; nunquam fecit naufragium . Bonus agricola ; magnos sustulit fructus . Et contra : Sumptuosus fuit ; patrimonium exhausit . Turpiter vixit ; omnibus invisus est .
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With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say, "Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal" ; "He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked" ; "He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests" ; or referring to bad qualities, "He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony" ; "His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all." |
| 1471 |
Intuendae sunt praecipueque in coniecturis et facultates ; credibilius est enim occisos a pluribus pauciores , a firmioribus imbecilliores , a vigilantibus dormientes , a praeparatis inopinantes ;
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We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite. |
| 1472 |
quorum contraria in diversum valent . Haec et in deliberando intuemur , et in iudiciis ad duas res solemus referre , an voluerit quis , an potuerit ; nam et voluntatem spes facit . Hinc illa apud Ciceronem coniectura , Insidiatus est Clodius Miloni , non Milo Clodio ; ille cum servis robustis , hic cum mulierum comitatu , ille equis , hic in raeda , ille expeditus , hic paenula irretitus .
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Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: " Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak. " |
| 1473 |
Facultati autem licet instrumentum coniungere ; sunt enim in parte facultatis et copiae . Sed ex instrumento aliquando etiam signa nascuntur , ut spiculum in corpore inventum .
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With resources we may couple instruments, which form part of resources and means. But sometimes instruments will provide us with indications as well, as for instance if we find a javelin sticking in a dead body. |
| 1474 |
His adiicitur modus , quem τρόπον dicunt , quo quaeritur , quemadmodum quid sit factum . Idque tum ad qualitatem scriptumque pertinet , ut si negemus adulterum veneno licuisse occidere , tum ad coniecturas quoque , ut si dicam bona mente factum , ideo palam ; mala , ideo ex insidiis , nocte , in solitudine . In rebus autem omnibus ,
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To these we may add manner, the Greek τρόπος, in regard to which we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned sometimes with quality and the letter of the law (we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with questions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act was committed with a good intent and therefore openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacherously, by night, in a lonely place. |
| 1475 |
de quarum vi ac natura quaeritur , quasque etiam citra complexum personarum ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa , per se intueri possumus , tria sine dubio rursus spectanda sunt , An sit , Quid sit , Quale sit . Sed , quia sunt quidam loci argumentorum omnibus communes , dividi haec tria genera non possunt , ideoque locis potius , ut in quosque incurrent , subiicienda sunt .
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In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the nature and meaning of an act, and which can be considered by themselves apart from all considerations of persons and all else that gives rise to the actual cause, there are clearly three points to which we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are certain "places" of argument which are common to all three questions, this triple division is impracticable and we must therefore consider these questions rather in connexion with those "places" in which they most naturally arise. |
| 1476 |
Ducuntur ergo argumenta ex finitione seu fine ; nam utroque modo traditur . Eius duplex ratio est ; aut enim simpliciter quaeritur , sitne hoc virtus ; aut praecedente finitione , quid sit virtus . Id aut universum verbis complectimur , ut Rhetorice est bene dicendi scientia ; aut per partes , ut Rhetorice est inveniendi recte et disponendi et eloquendi cum , firma memoria et cum dignitate actionis scientia .
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Arguments, then, may be drawn from definition, sometimes called finitio and sometimes finis. Definition is of two kinds. We may ask whether a particular quality is a virtue or make a definition precede and ask what is the nature of a virtue. Such a definition is either stated in general terms, such as Rhetoric is the science of speaking well, or in detail, such as Rhetoric is the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery. Further, |
| 1477 |
Praeterea finimus aut vi , sicut superiora , aut ἐτυμολογίᾳ , ut si assiduum ab asse dando , et locupletem a locorum , pecuniosum a pecorum copia . Finitioni subiecta maxime videntur genus , species , differens ,
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we may define a word by giving its content as in the preceding instances, or by etymology: we may for instance explain assiduus by deriving it from as and do, locuples by deriving it from copia locorum, pecuniosus from copiapecorum. Genus, species, difference and property seem more especially to afford scope for definition, for we derive arguments from all of these. |
| 1478 |
proprium ; ex iis omnibus argumenta ducuntur . Genus ad probandam speciem minimum valet , plurimum ad refellendam . Itaque non , quia est arbor , platanus est , at quod non est arbor , utique platanus non est ; nec quod virtus est , utique iustitia est , at quod non est virtus , utique non potest esse iustitia . Itaque a genere perveniendum ad ultimam species : ut Homo est animal non est satis , id enim genus est ; mortale , etiamsi est species , cum aliis tamen communis finitio ; rationale , nihil supererit ad demonstrandum id quod velis . Contra species firmam probationem habet generis ,
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Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not a tree is certainly not a plane tree; again, a virtue is not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species; for example, to say that man is an animal will not suffice; for animal merely gives us the genus: nor yet will the addition of the words "subject to death" be adequate; for although this epithet gives us a species, it is common to other animals as well. If, however, we define man as a rational animal, we need nothing further to make our meaning clear. |
| 1479 |
infirmam refutationem . Nam , quod iustitia est , utique virtus est ; quod non est iustitia , potest esse virtus , si est fortitudo , constantia , continentia . Nunquam itaque tolletur a specie genus , nisi ut omnes species , quae sunt generi subiectae , removeantur , hoc modo , Quod nec rationale nec morale est neque animal , homo non est .
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On the other hand species will give us clear proof of genus, but is of little service for its elimination. For example, justice is always a virtue, but that which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance in the following sentence: That which is neither rational nor mortal nor an animal is not a man. |
| 1480 |
His adiiciunt propria et differentia . Propriis confirmatur finitio , differentibus solvitur Proprium autem est aut quod soli accidit , ut homini sermo , risus ; aut quidquid utique accidit sed non soli , ut igni calfacere . Et sunt eiusdem rei plura propria , ut ipsius ignis lucere , calere . Itaque , quodcunque proprium deerit , solvit finitionem ; non utique , quodcunque erit , confirmat .
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To these they add property and difference. Properties serve to establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man. Or it may be something specially belonging to an object, but not to it alone; heating for instance is a property of fire. The same thing may also have a number of properties: light and heat are both properties of fire. Consequently, the omission of any property in a definition will impair it, but the introduction of a property, whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a definition. |
| 1481 |
Saepissime autem , quid sit proprium cuiusque , quaeritur : ut , si per ἐτυμολογίαν dicatur , Tyrannicidae proprium est tyrannum , occidere , negemus ; non enim , si traditum sibi eum carnifex occiderit , tyrannicida dicatur , nec si imprudens vel invitus .
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We have, however, often to consider what is a property of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will. |
| 1482 |
Quod autem proprium non erit , differens erit , ut aliud est servum esse aliud seruire ; qualis esse in addictis quaestio solet : Qui servus est , si manu mittatur , fit libertinus , non item addictus ;
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What is not a property will be a difference: it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, and another to be in a state of servitude; hence the distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned to their creditors for debt: A slave, if he is manumitted becomes a freedman, but this is not the case with one who is assigned. There are also other points of difference which are dealt with elsewhere. |