Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

[Close]

	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1027	Ideoque eam non orationis totius partem unam esse credendum est sed quaestionum etiam singularum . Quae est enim quaestio , in qua non promittere possit orator , quid primo , quid secundo , quid tertio sit loco dicturus ? quod est proprium partitionis . Quam ergo ridiculum est , quaestionem quidem speciem esse probationis , partitionem autem , quae sit species quaestionis , partem totius orationis vocari ?	Consequently we must regard partition not as one part of a whole speech, but as a part of each individual question that may be involved. For what question is there in which an orator cannot set forth the order in which he is going to make his points? And this of course is the function of partition. But how ridiculous it is to make each question an aspect of proof, but partition which is an aspect of a question a part of the whole speech.
1028	Egressio vero vel , quod usitatius esse coepit , excessus , sive est extra causam , non potest esse pars causae , sive est in causa , adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum , ex quibus egreditur . Nam si , quidquid in causa est , pars causae vocabitur , cur non argumentum , similitudo , locus communis , adfectus , exempla partes vocentur ?	As for digression (egressio, now more usually styled excessus ), if it lie outside the case, it cannot be part of it, while, if it lie within it, it is merely an accessory or ornament of that portion of the case from which digression is made. For if anything that lies within the case is to be called part of it, why not call argument, comparison, commonplace, pathos, illustration parts of the case?
1029	Tamen nec iis adsentior , qui detrahunt refutationem tanquam probationi subiectam , ut Aristoteles ; haec enim est , quae constituat , illa , quae destruat . Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus novat , quod prooemio non narrationem subiungit sed propositionem . Verum id facit , quia propositio ei genus , narratio species videtur , et hac non semper , illa semper et ubique credit opus esse .	On the other hand I disagree with those who, like Aristotle, would remove refuation from the list on the ground that it forms part of the proof: for the proof is constructive, and the reputation destructive. Aristotle also introduces another slight novelty in making proposition, not statement of facts, follow the exordium. This however he does because he regards proposition as the genus and statement of facts as the species, with the result that he holds that, whereas the former is always and everywhere necessary, the latter may sometimes be dispensed with.
1030	Verum ex his quas constitui partibus non , ut quidque primum dicendum , ita primum cogitandum est ; sed ante omnia intueri oportet , quod sit genus causae , quid in ea quaeratur , quae prosint , quae noceant , deinde quid confirmandum sit ac refellendum , tum quo modo narrandum .	It is however necessary to point out as regards these five parts which I have established, that that which has to be spoken first is not necessarily that which requires our first consideration. But above all we must consider the nature of the case, the question at issue and the arguments for and against. Next we must consider what points are to be made, and what refuted, and then how the facts are to be stated.
1031	Expositio enim probationum est praeparatio , nec esse utilis potest , nisi prius constiterit , quid debeat de probatione promittere . Postremo intuendum , quemadmodum iudex sit conciliandus . Neque enim nisi totius causae partibus diligenter inspectis scire possumus , qualem nobis facere animum cognoscentis expediat , severum an mitem , concitatum an remissum , adversum gratiae an obnoxium .	For the stalement of facts is designed to prepare the way for the proofs and must needs be unprofitable, unless we have first determined what proofs. are to be promised in the statement. Finally we must consider how best to win the judge to take our view. For we cannot be sure until we have subjected all the parts of the case to careful scrutiny, what sort of impression we wish to make upon the judge: are we to mollify him or increase his severity, to excite or relax his interest in the case, to render him susceptible to influence or the reverse?
1032	Neque ideo tamen eos probaverim , qui scribendum quoque prooemium novissime putant . Nam ut conferri materiam omnem et , quid quoque loco sit opus , constare decet , antequam dicere aut scribere ordiamur , ita incipiendum ab iis , quae prima sunt .	I cannot however approve the view of those who think that the exordium should actually be written last. For though we must collect all our material and determine the proper place for each portion of it, before we begin to speak or write, we must commence with what naturally comes first.
1033	Nam nec pingere quisquam aut fingere coepit a pedibus , nec denique ars ulla consummatur ibi , unde ordiendum est . Quid fiet alioqui , si spatium componendi orationem stilo non fuerit ? nonne nos haec inversa consuetudo deceperit ? Inspicienda igitur materia est , quo praecepimus ordine , scribenda , quo dicemus .	No one begins a portrait by painting or modelling the feet, and no art finds its completion at the point where it should begin. Otherwise what will happen if we have not time to write our speech? Will not the result of such a reversal of the proper order of things be that we shall be caught napping? We must therefore review the subject-matter in the order laid down, but write our speech in the order in which we shall deliver it.
1034	Ceterum causa omnis , in qua pars altera agentis est , altera recusantis , aut unius rei controversia constat aut plurium . Haec simplex dicitur , illa coniuncta . Una controversia est per se furti , per se adulterii . Plures aut eiusdem generis , ut in pecuniis repetundis , aut diversi , ut si quis sacrilegii et homicidii simul accusetur . Quod nunc in publicis iudiciis non accidit , quoniam praetor certa lege sortitur , principum autem et senatus cognitionibus frequens est et populi fuit ; privata quoque iudicia saepe unum iudicem habere multis et diversis formulis solent .	X. Every cause in which one side attacks and the other defends consists either of one or more controversial questions. In the first case it is called simple, in the second complex. An example of the first is when the subject of enquiry is a theft or an adultery taken by itself. In complex cases the several questions may all be of the same kind, as in cases of extortion, or of different kinds, as when a man is accused at one and the same time of homicide and sacrilege. Such cases no longer arise in the public courts, since the praetor allots the different charges to different courts in accordance with a definite rule; but they still are of frequent occurrence in the Imperial or Senatorial courts, and were frequent in the days when they came up for trial before the people. Private suits again are often tried by one judge, who may have to determine many different points of law.
1035	Nec aliae species erunt , etiamsi unus a duobus dumtaxat eandem rem atque ex eadem causa petet aut duo ab uno aut plures a pluribus , quod accidere in hereditariis litibus interim scimus , quia quamvis in multis personis causa tamen una est , nisi si condicio personarum quaestiones variaverit .	There are no other species of forensic causes, not even when one person brings the same suit on the same grounds against two different persons, or two persons bring the same suit against one, or several against several, as occasionally occurs in lawsuits about inheritances. Because although a number of parties may be involved, there is still only one suit, unless indeed the different circumstances of the various parties alter the questions at issue.
1036	Diversum his tertium genus , quod dicitur comparativum ; cuius rei tractatus in parte causae frequens est , ut cum apud centumviros post alia quaeritur et hoc , uter dignior hereditate sit . Rarum est autem , ut in foro iudicia propter id solum constituantur , sicut divinationes , quae fiunt de accusatore constituendo , et nonnunquam inter delatores , uter praemium meruerit .	There is however said to be a third and different class, the comparative. Questions of comparison frequently require to be handled in portions of a cause, as for instance in the centum viral court, when after other questions have been raised the question is discussed as to which of two claimants is the more deserving of an inheritance. It is rare however for a case to be brought into court on such grounds alone, as in divinations which take place to determine who the accuser shall be, and occasionally when two informers dispute as to which has earned the reward.
1037	Adiecerunt quidam numero mutuam accusationem , quae ἀντικατηγορία vocatur , allis videlicet succedere hanc quoque comparativo generi existimantibus , cui similis erit petitionum invicem diversarum , quod accidit vel frequentissime . Id si et ipsum vocari debet ἀντικατηγορία ( nam proprio caret nomine ) duo genera erunt eius , alterum quo litigatores idem crimen invicem intentant , alterum quo aliud atque aliud . Cui et petitionum condicio par est .	Some again have added a fourth class, namely mutual accusation, which they call ἀντικατηγορία Others, however, regard it as belonging to the comparative group, to which indeed the common case of reciprocal suits on different grounds bears a strong resemblance. If this latter case should also be called ἀντικατηγορία (for it has no special name of its own), we must divide mutual accusation into two classes, in one of which the parties bring the same charge against each other, while in the other they bring different charges. The same division will also apply to claims.
1038	Cum apparuerit genus causae , tum intuebimur , negeturne factum , quod intenditur , an defendatur , an alio nomine appelletur , an a genere actionis repellatur ; unde sunt status .	As soon as we are clear as to the kind of cause on which we are engaged, we must then consider whether the act that forms the basis of the charge is denied or defended, or given another name or excepted from that class of action. Thus we determine the basis of each case.
1039	His inventis , intuendum deinceps Hermagorae videtur , quid sit quaestio , ratio , iudicatio , continens , vel , ut alii vocant , firmamentum . Quaestio latius intelligitur omnis , de qua in utramque partem vel in plures partes dici credibiliter potest .	XI. As soon as these points are ascertained, the next step, according to Hermagoras, should be to consider what is the question at issue, the line of defence, the point for the judge's decision and the central point, or, as others call it, the foundation of the case. The question in its more general sense is taken to mean everything on which two or more plausible opinions may be advanced.
1040	In iudiciali autem materia dupliciter accipienda est : altero modo , quo dicimus multas quaestiones habere controversiam , quo etiam minores omnes complectimur , altero , quo significamus summam illam , in qua causa vertitur ; de hac nunc loquor , ex qua nascitur status , an factum sit ,	In forensic subjects however it must be taken in two senses: first in the sense in which we say that a controversial matter involves many questions, thereby including all minor questions; secondly in the sense of the main question on which the case turns. It is of this, with which the basis originates, that I am now speaking. We ask whether a thing has been done, what it is that has been done, and whether it was rightly done.
1041	quid factum sit , an recte factum sit . Has Hermagoras et Apollodorus et alii plurimi scriptores proprie quaestiones vocant , Theodorus , ut dixi , capita generalia , sicut illas minores aut ex illis pendentes specialia . Nam et quaestionem ex quaestione nasci et speciem in species dividi convenit .	To these Hermagoras and Apollodorus and many other writers have given the special name of questions; Theodorus on the other hand, as I have already said, calls them general heads, while he designates minor questions or questions dependent on these general heads as special heads. For it is agreed that question may spring from question, and species be subdivided into other species.
1042	Hanc igitur quaestionem veluti principalem vocant ζήτημα . Ratio autem est , qua id , quod factum esse constat , defenditur . Et cur non utamur eodem , quo sunt usi omnes fere , exemplo ? Orestes matrem occidit , hoc constat ; dicit se iuste fecisse : status erit qualitatis ; quaestio , an iuste fecerit , ratio , quod Clytaemnestra maritum suum , patrem Orestis , occidit ; hoc αἴτιον dicitur . κρινόμενον autem iudicatio , an oportuerit vel nocentem matrem a filio occidi .	This main question, then, they call the ζήτημα. The line of defence is the method by which an admitted act is defended. I see no reason why I should not use the same example to illustrate this point that has been used by practically all my predecessors. Orestes has killed his mother: the fact is admitted. He pleads that he was justified in so doing: the basis will be one of quality, the question, whether he was justified in his action, the line of defence that Clytemnestra killed her husband, Orestes' father. This is called the αἴτιον or motive. The point for the decision of the judge is known as the κρινόμενον and in this case is whether it was right that even a guilty mother should be killed by her son.
1043	Quidam diviserunt αἴτιον et αἰτίαν ut esset altera , propter quam iudicium constitutum est , ut occisa Clytaemnestra , altera , qua factum defenditur , ut occisus Agamemnon . Sed tanta est circa verba dissensio , ut alii αἰτίαν causam iudicii , αἴτιον autem facti vocent , alii eadem in contrarium vertant . Latinorum quidam haec initium et rationem vocaverunt , quidam utrumque eodem nomine appellant .	Some have drawn a distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτίαν making αἴτιον mean the cause of the trial, namely the murder of Clytemnestra, αἰτία the motive urged in defence, namely the murder of Agamemnon. But there is such lack of agreement over these two words, that some make αἰτία the cause of the trial and αἴτιον the motive of the deed, while others reverse the meanings. If we turn to Latin writers we find that some have given these causes the names of initinum, the beginning, and ratio, the reason, while others give the same name to both.
1044	Causa quoque ex causa , id est αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίου nasci videtur , quale est : Occidit Agamemnonem Clytaemnestra , quia ille filiam communem immolaverat et captivam pellicem adducebat . Iidem putant et sub una quaestione plures esse rationes , ut si Orestes et alteram adferat causam matris necatae , quod responsis sit impulsus ; quot autem causas faciendi , totidem iudicationes ; nam et haec erit iudicatio , an responsis parere debuerit .	Moreover cause seems to spring from cause, or as the Greeks say αἴτιον ἐξ αἰτίον as will be seen from the following:— Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon, because he had sacrificed their daughter and brought home a captive woman as his paramour. The same authors think that there may be several lines of defence to one question: for instance Orestes may urge that he killed his mother because driven to do so by oracles. But the number of points for the decision of the judge will be the same as the number of alleged motives for the deed: in this case it will be whether he ought to have obeyed the oracles.
1045	Sed et una causa plures habere quaestiones et iudicationes ( ut ego arbitror ) potest , ut in eo , qui , cum adulteram deprehensam occidisset , adulterum , qui tum effugerat , postea in foro occidit . Causa enim est una , adulter fuit ; quaestiones et iudicationes , an illo tempore , an illo loco licuerit occidere .	But one alleged motive may also in my opinion involve several questions and several points for the decision of the judge, as for instance in the case when the husband caught his wife in adultery and slew her and later slew the adulterer, who had escaped, in the market place. The motive is but one: "he was an adulterer." But there arise as questions and points for decision by the judge, whether it was lawful to kill him at that time and at that place.
1046	Sed sicut , cum sint plures quaestiones omnesque suos status habeant , causae tamen status unus sit , ad quem referuntur omnia , ita iudicatio maxime propria , de qua pronuntiatur .	But just as, although there be several questions, each with its special basis, the basis of the case is but one, namely that to which all else is referred, even so the real point for the decision of the judge is, strictly speaking, that on which judgment is given.
1047	συνέχον autem ( quod , ut dixi , continens alii , firmamentum alii putant , Cicero firmissimam argumentationem defensoris et adpositissimam ad iudicationem ) quibusdam id videtur esse , post quod nihil quaeritur , quibusdam id quod ad iudicationem firmissimum adfertur .	As for the σύνεχον the central argument, as I have mentioned it is called by some, or the foundation as it is called by others, or as Cicero styles it the strongest argument of the defender and the most relevant to the decision of the judge, some regard it as being the point after which all enquiry ceases, others as the main point for adjudication.
1048	Causa facti non in omnes controversias cadit . Nam quae fuerit causa faciendi , ubi factum negatur ? At ubi causa tractetur , negant eodem loco esse iudicationem quo quaestionem , idque et in Rhetoricis Cicero et in Partitionibus dicit .	The motive of the deed does not arise in all controversial cases. For how can there be a motive for the deed, when the deed is denied? But when the motive for the deed does come up for discussion, they deny that the point for the decision of the judge rests on the same ground as the main question at issue, and this view is maintained by Cicero in his Rhetorica and Partitiones.
1049	Nam in coniectura est quaestio ex illo Factum , non factum an factum sit . Ibi ergo iudicatio , ubi quaestio , quia in eadem re prima quaestio et extrema disceptatio . At in qualitate , Matrem Orestes occidit : recte , non recte , an recte occiderit , quaestio nec statim iudicatio . Quando ergo ? Ilia patrem meum occiderat ; sed non ideo tu matrem debuisti occidere ; an debuerit , hic iudicatio .	For when it has been asserted and denied that a deed was done, the question whether it was done is resolved by conjecture, and the decision of the judge and the main question rest on the same ground, since the first question and the final decision are concerned with the same point. But when it is stated and denied that Orestes was justified in killing his mother, considerations of quality are introduced: the question is whether he was justified in killing her, but this is not yet the point for the decision of the judge. When, then, does it become so? "She killed my father. "Yes, but that did not make it your duty to murder your mother." The point for the decision of the judge is whether it was his duty to kill her.
1050	Firmamentum autem verbis ipsius ponam : si velit Orestes dicere eiusmodi animum matris suae fuisse in patrem suum , in se ipsum ac sorores , in regnum , in famam generis et familiae , ut ab ea poenas liberi potissimum sui petere debuerint .	As regards the foundation, I will put it in the words of Cicero himself:— " The foundation is the strongest argument for the defence, as for instance, if Orestes were ready to say that the disposition of his mother towards his father, himself and his sisters, the kingdom, the reputation of the race and the family were such that it was the peculiar duty of her children to punish her. "
1051	Utuntur alii et talibus exemplis : Qui bona paterna consumpserit , ne contionetur ; in opera publica consumpsit ; quaestio , an , quisquis consumpserit , prohibendus sit : iudicatio , an , qui sic .	Others again use illustrations such as the following:— "He who has spent his patrimony, is not allowed to address the people. "But he spent it on public works." The question is whether everyone that spends his patrimony is to be prohibited, while the point for decision is whether he who spent it in such a way is to be prohibited.
1052	Vel , ut in causa militis Arrunti , qui Lusium tribunum vim sibi inferentem interfecit , quaestio , an iure fecerit , ratio , quod is vim afferebat ; iudicatio , an indemnatum , an tribunum a milite occidi oportuerit .	Or again take the case of the soldier Arruntius, who killed the tribune Lusius for assaulting his honour. The question is whether he was justified in so doing, the line of defence, that the murdered man made an assault upon his honour, the point for the decision of the judge, whether it was right that a man should be killed uncondemned or a tribune by a soldier.
1053	Alterius etiam status quaestionem , alterius iudicationem putant . Quaestio qualitatis , an recte Clodium Milo occiderit .	Some even regard the basis of the question as being different from the basis of the decision. The question as to whether Milo was justified in killing Clodius, is one of quality. The point for the decision of the judge, namely whether Clodius lay in wait for Milo, is a matter for conjecture.
1054	Iudicatio coniecturalis , an Clodius insidias fecerit . Ponunt et illud , saepe causam in aliquam rem dimitti , quae non sit propria quaestionis , et de ea iudicati . A quibus multum dissentio . Nam et illa quaestio , an omnes , qui paterna bona consumpserint , contione sint prohibendi , habeat oportet suam iudicationem . Ergo non alia quaestio alia iudicatio erit , sed plures quaestiones et plures iudicationes .	They also urge that a case is often diverted to the consideration of some matter irrelevant to the question, and that it is on this matter that judgment is given. I strongly disagree. Take the question whether all who have spent their patrimony are to be prohibited from addressing the people. This question must have its point for decision, and therefore the question and the point for decision are not different, but there are more than one question and more than one point for decision in the case. Again, in the case of Milo,
1055	Quid ? non in causa Milonis ipsa coniectura refertur ad qualitatem ? nam si est insidiatus Clodius , sequitur , ut recte sit occisus . Cum vero in aliquam rem missa causa recessum est a quaestione , quae erat , et hic constituta quaestio , ubi iudicatio est .	is not the question of fact ultimately referred to the question of quality ? For if Clodius lay in wait for Milo, it follows that he was justifiably killed. But when the case is shifted to some other point far removed from the original question, even in this case the question will be found to reside in the point for decision.
1056	Paulum in his secum etiam Cicero dissentit . Nam in Rhetoricis ( quemadmodum supra dixi ) Hermagoran est secutus ; in Topicis ex statu effectam contentionem κρινόμενον existimat , idque Trebatio , qui iuris erat consultus , adludens qua de re agitur appellat ; quibus id contineatur , continentia , quasi firmamenta defensionis , quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit ;	As regards these questions Cicero is slightly inconsistent with himself. For in the Rhetorica, as I have already mentioned, he followed Hermagoras, while in the Topicai he holds that the κρινόμενον or disputed point is originated by the basis, and in addressing the lawyer Trebatius on this subject he calls it the point at issue, and describes the elements in which it resides as central arguments or foundations of the defence which hold it together and the removal of which causes the whole defence to fall to the ground.
1057	at in Partitionibus oratoriis firmamentum , quod opponitur defensioni , quia continens , quod primum sit , ab accusatore dicatur , ratio a reo , ex rationis et firmamenti quaestione disceptatio sit iudicationum . Verius igitur et brevius ii , qui statum et continens et iudicationem idem esse voluerunt ; continens autem id esse , quo sublato lis esse non possit .	But in the Partitiones Oratoriae he gives the name of foundation to that which is advanced against the defence, on the ground that the central argument, as it logically comes first, is put forward by the accuser, while the line of defence is put forward by the accused, and the point for the decision of the judge arises from the question jointly raised by the central argument and the line of defence. The view therefore of those who make the basis, the central argument, and the point for the decision of the judge identical, is at once more concise and nearer to the truth. The central argument, they point out, is that the removal of which makes the whole case fall to the ground.
1058	Hoc mihi videntur utramque causam complexi , et quod Orestes matrem et quod Clytaemnestra Agamemnonem occiderit . Iidem iudicationem et statum consentire semper existimarunt , neque enim aliud eorum rationi conveniens fuisset .	In this central argument they seem to me to have included both the alleged causes, that Orestes killed his mother and that Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon. the same authorities have likewise always held that the basis and the point for the decision of the judge are in agreement; any other opinion would have been inconsistent with their general views.
1059	Verum haec adfectata subtilitas circa nomina rerum ambitiose laborat , a nobis in hoc assumpta solum , ne parum diligenter inquisisse de opere , quod aggressi sumus , videremur ; simplicius autem instituenti non est necesse per tam minutas rerum particulas rationem docendi concidere .	But this affectation of subtlety in the invention of technical terms is mere laborious ostentation: I have undertaken the task of discussing them solely that I might not be regarded as having failed to make sufficient inquiry into the subject which I have chosen as my theme. But it is quite unnecessary for an instructor proceeding on less technical lines to destroy the coherence of his teaching by attention to such minute detail.
1060	Quo vitio multi quidem laborarunt , praecipue tamen Hermagoras , vir alioqui subtilis et in plurimis admirandus , tantum diligentiae nimium sollicitae , ut ipsa eius reprehensio laude aliqua non indigna sit .	Many however suffer from this drawback, more especially Hermagoras who, although he labours these points with such anxious diligence, was a man of penetrating intellect and in most respects deserves our admiration, so that even where we must needs blame him, we cannot withhold a certain meed of praise.
1061	Haec autem brevior et vel ideo lucidior multo via neque discentem per ambages fatigabit nec corpus orationis in parva momenta diducendo consumet . Nam qui viderit , quid sit , quod in controversiam veniat , quid in eo et per quae velit efficere pars diversa , quid nostra , quod in primis est intuendum , nihil eorum ignorare , de quibus supra diximus , poterit .	But the shorter method, which for that very reason is also by far the most lucid, will not fatigue the learner by leading him through a maze of detail, nor destroy the coherence of his eloquence by breaking it up into a number of minute departments. For he who has a clear view of the main issue of a dispute, and divines the aims which his own side and his opponents intend to follow and the means they intend to employ (and it is to the intentions of his own side that he must pay special attention), will without a doubt be in possession of a knowledge of all the points which I have discussed above.
1062	Neque est fere quisquam modo non stultus atque ab omni prorsus usu dicendi remotus , quin sciat , et quid litem faciat , ( quod ab illis causa vel continens dicitur ) et quae sit inter litigantes quaestio , et de quo iudicari oporteat ; quae omnia idem sunt . Nam et de eo quaestio est , quod in controversiam venit , et de eo iudicatur , de quo quaestio est .	And there is hardly anyone, unless he be a born fool without the least acquaintance with the practice of speaking, who does not know what is the main issue of a dispute (or as they call it the cause or central argument ) and what is the question between the parties and the point on which the judge has to decide, these three being identical. For the question is concerned with the matter in dispute and the decision of the judge is given on the point involved in the question.
1063	Sed non perpetuo intendimus in haec animum et cupiditate laudis utcunque acquirendae vel dicendi voluptate evagamur , quando uberior semper extra causam materia est , quia in controversia pauca sunt , extra omnia , et hic dicitur de his , quae accepimus , illic , de quibus volumus .	Still we do not keep our attention rigidly fixed on such details, but the desire to win praise by any available means and the sheer delight in speaking make us wander away from the subject, since there is always richer material for eloquence outside the strict theme of the case, inasmuch as the points of any given dispute are always few, and there is all the world outside, and in the one case we speak according to our instructions, in the other on the subjects of our own choice.
1064	Nec tam hoc praecipiendum est , ut quaestionem , continens , iudicationem inveniamus ( nam id quidem facile est ) , quam ut intueamur semper , aut certe si digressi fuerimus saltem respiciamus , ne plausum adfectantibus arma excidant .	We should teach not so much that it is our duty to discover the question, the central argument, and the point for the decision of the judge (an easy task), as that we should continually keep our attention on our subject, or if we digress, at least keep looking back to it, lest in our desire to win applause we should let our weapons drop from our grasp.