Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 951 |
Eadem in singulis differentia . Maxime favet iudex , qui sibi dicentem assentiri putat . Idem praecipit illud quoque ( quod mox Cornelius Celsus prope supra modum invasit ) , quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas , utendum proxima derivatione verborum , ut pro temerario fortem , pro prodigo liberalem , pro avaro parcum vocemus ; quae eadem etiam contra valet . Quod quidem orator , id est vir bonus , nunquam faciet , nisi forte communi utilitate ducetur .
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Similar differences of opinion are found in individuals. A judge is most favourable to the orator whose views he thinks identical with his own. Aristotle also urges a point, which at a later date Cornelius Celsus emphasised almost to excess, to the effect that, since the boundary between vice and virtue is often ill-defined, it is desirable to use words that swerve a little from the actual truth, calling a rash man brave, a prodigal generous, a mean man thrifty; or the process may, if necessary, be reversed. But this the ideal orator, that is to say a good man, will never do, unless perhaps he is led to do so by consideration for the public interest. |
| 952 |
Laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines . Nam pro parente est conditor , et multum auctoritatis adfert vetustas , ut iis , qui terra dicuntur orti ; et virtutes ac vitia circa res gestas eadem quae in singulis , illa propria quae ex loci positione ac munitione sunt . Cives illis ut hominibus liberi decori .
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Cities are praised after the same fashion as men. The founder takes the place of the parent, and antiquity carries great authority, as for instance in the case of those whose inhabitants are said to be sprung from the soil. The virtues and vices revealed by their deeds are the same as in private individuals. The advantages arising from site or fortifications are however peculiar to cities. Their citizens enhance their fame just as children bring honour to their parents. |
| 953 |
Est laus et operum , in quibus honor , utilitas , pulchritudo , auctor spectari solet . Honor ut in templis , utilitas ut in muris , pulchritudo vel auctor utrobique . Est et locorum , qualis Siciliae apud Ciceronem , in quibus similiter speciem et utilitatem intuemur ; speciem in maritimis , planis , amoenis ; utilitatem in salubribus , fertilibus . Erit et dictorum honestorum factorumque laus generalis , erit et rerum omnis modi .
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Praise too may be awarded to public works, in connexion with which their magnificence, utility, beauty and the architect or artist must be given due consideration. Temples for instance will be praised for their magnificence, walls for their utility, and both for their beauty or the skill of the architect. Places may also be praised, witness the praise of Sicily in Cicero. In such cases we consider their beauty and utility: beauty calls for notice in places by the sea, in open plains and pleasant situations, utility in healthy or fertile localities. |
| 954 |
Nam et somni et mortis scriptae laudes et quorundam a medicis ciborum . Itaque , ut non consensi hoc laudativum genus circa solam versari honesti quaestionem , sic qualitate maxime contineri puto ; quamquam tres status omnes cadere in hoc opus possint , iisque usum C . Caesarem in vituperando Catone notaverit Cicero . totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis , quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi , hic laudari solent .
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Again praise in general terms may be awarded to noble sayings or deeds. Finally things of every kind may be praised. Panegyrics have been composed on sleep and death, and physicians have written eulogies on certain kinds of food. While therefore I do not agree that panegyric concerns only questions regarding what is honourable, I do think that it comes as a rule under the heading of quality, although all three bases may he involved in Panegyric and it was observed by Cicero that all were actually used by Gaius Caesar in his denunciation of Cato. But panegyric is akin to deliberative oratory inasmuch as the same things are usually praised in the former as are advised in the latter. |
| 955 |
Deliberativas quoque miror a quibusdam sola utilitate finitas . Ac si quid in his unum sequi oporteret , potior fuisset apud me Ciceronis sententia , qui hoc materiae genus dignitate maxime contineri putat . Nec dubito , quin ii , qui sunt in illa priore sententia , secundum opinionem pulcherrimam ne utile quidem , nisi quod honestum esset , existimarint .
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VIII. I am surprised that deliberative oratory also has been restricted by some authorities to questions of expediency. If it should be necessary to assign one single aim to deliberative I should prefer Cicero's view that this kind of oratory is primarily concerned with what is honourable. I do not doubt that those who maintain the opinion first mentioned adopt the lofty view that nothing can be expedient which is not good. |
| 956 |
Et est haec ratio verissima , si consilium contingat semper bonorum atque sapientium . Verum apud imperitos , apud quos frequenter dicenda sententia est , populumque praecipue , qui ex pluribus constat indoctis , discernenda sunt haec et secundum communes magis intellectus loquendum .
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That opinion is perfectly sound so long as we are fortunate enough to have wise and good men for counsellors. But as we most often express our views before an ignorant audience, and more especially before popular assemblies, of which the majority is usually uneducated, we must distinguish between what is honourable and what is expedient and conform our utterances to suit ordinary understandings. |
| 957 |
Sunt enim multi , qui etiam , quae credunt honesta , non tamen satis eadem utilia quoque existiment , et quae turpia esse dubitare non possunt , utilitatis specie ducti probent , ut foedus Numantinum iugumque Caudinum .
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For there are many who do not admit that what they really believe to be the honourable course is sufficiently advantageous, and are misled by the prospect of advantage into approving courses of the dishonourable nature of which there can be no question: witness the Numantine treaty and the surrender of the Caudine Forks. |
| 958 |
Ne qualitatis quidem statu , in quo et honestorum et utilium quaestio est , complecti eas satis est . Nam frequenter in his etiam coniecturae locus est , nonnunquam tractatur aliqua finitio , aliquando etiam legales possunt incidere tractatus , in privata maxime consilia , si quando ambigetur an liceat .
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Nor does it suffice to restrict deliberative oratory to the basis of quality which is concerned with questions of honour and expediency. For there is often room for conjecture as well. Sometimes again definition is necessary or legal problems require handling; this is especially the case when advice has to be given on private matters, where there is some doubt of the legality of the course under consideration. Of conjecture' |
| 959 |
De coniectura paulo post pluribus . Interim est finitio apud Demosthenen , Det Halonnesum Philippus , an reddat ? apud Ciceronem in Philippicis , Quid sit tumultus ? Quid ? non illa similis iudicialium quaestio de statua Servi Sulpici , an iis demum ponenda sit , qui in legatione ferro sunt interempti ?
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I shall speak more fully a little later on. Returning to definition for the moment, we find it in the question raised by Demosthenes, "whether Philip should give or restore Halonnesus," and to that discussed by Cicero in the Philippics as to the nature of a tumultus. Again does not the question raised in connection with the statue of Servius Sulpicius as to " whether statues should be erected only in honour of those ambassadors who perish by the sword " bear a strong resemblance to the questions that are raised in the law courts? |
| 960 |
Ergo pars deliberativa , quae eadem suasoria dicitur , de tempore futuro consultans quaerit etiam de praeterito . Officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi . Prooemio , quale est in iudicialibus , non ubique eget , quia conciliatus est ei quisque , quem consulit . Initium tamen quodcunque debet habere aliquam prooemii speciem ; neque enim abrupte nec unde libuit incipiendum , quia est aliquid in omni materia naturaliter primum .
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The deliberative department of oratory (also called the advisory department), while it deliberates about the future, also enquires about the past, while its functions are twofold and consist in advising and dissuading. Deliberative oratory does not always require an exordium, such as is necessary in forensic speeches, since he who asks an orator for his opinion is naturally well disposed to him. But the commencement, whatever be its nature, must have some resemblance to an exordium. For we must not begin abruptly or just at the point where the fancy takes us, since in every subject there is something which naturally comes first. |
| 961 |
In senatu et utique in contionibus eadem ratio quae apud iudices , adquirendae sibi plerumque eorum , apud quos dicendum sit , benevolentiae . Nec mirum , cum etiam in panegyricis petatur audientium favor , ubi emolumentum non in utilitate aliqua , sed in sola laude consistit .
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In addressing the senate or the people the same methods apply as in the law courts, and we must aim as a rule at acquiring the goodwill of our audience. This need cause no surprise, since even in panegyric we seek to win the favour of our hearers when our aim is praise pure and simple, and not the acquisition of any advantage. Aristotle, |
| 962 |
Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et a nostra et ab eius , qui dissentiet , persona duci frequenter in consiliis exordium , quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere , nonnunquam etiam , ut minor res maiorve videatur ; in demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat .
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it is true, holds, not without reason, that in deliberative speeches we may often begin with a reference either to ourselves or to our opponent, borrowing this practice from forensic oratory, and sometimes producing the impression that the subject is of greater or less importance than it actually is. On the other hand he thinks that in demonstrative oratory the exordium may be treated with the utmost freedom, |
| 963 |
Nam et longe a materia duci , ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit ; et ex aliqua rei vicinia , ut idem in Panegyrico , cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari ; et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos , qui primi tales instituerint conventus . Quos secutus videlicet C . Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est .
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since it is sometimes drawn from irrelevant material, as for example in Isocrates' Praise of Helen, or from something akin to the subject, as for instance in the Panegyricus of the same author, when he complains that more honour is given to physical than to moral excellence, or as Gorgias in his speech delivered at the Olympic games praises the founders of the great national games. Sallust seems to have imitated these authors in his Jugurthine War and in the introduction to his Catiline, which has no connection with his narrative. |
| 964 |
Sed nunc ad suasoriam , in qua , etiam cum prooemio utemur , breviore tamen et velut quodam capite tantum et initio debebimus esse contenti . Narrationem vero nunquam exigit privata deliberatio , eius duntaxat rei , de qua dicenda sententia est ; quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit .
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But it is time for me to return to deliberative oratory in which, even when we introduce an exordium, we must content ourselves with a brief prelude, which may amount to no more than a mere heading. As regards the statement of facts, this is never required in speeches on private subjects, at least as regards the subject on which an opinion has to be given, because everyone is acquainted with the question at issue. |
| 965 |
Extrinsecus possunt pertinentia ad deliberationem multa narrari . In contionibus saepe est etiam illa , quae ordinem rei docet , necessaria .
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Statements as to external matters which are relevant to the discussion may however frequently be introduced. In addressing public assemblies it will often be necessary to set forth the order of the points which have to be treated. |
| 966 |
Adfectus ut quae maxime postulat . Na M et concitanda et lenienda frequenter est ira , et ad metum , cupiditatem , odium , conciliationem impellendi animi . Nonnunquam etiam movenda miseratio , sive , ut auxilium obsessis feratur , suadere oportebit sive sociae civitatis eversionem deflebimus .
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As regards appeals to the emotions, these are especially necessary in deliberative oratory. Anger has frequently to be excited or assuaged and the minds of the audience have to be swayed to fear, ambition, hatred, reconciliation. At times again it is necessary to awaken pity, whether it is required, for instance, to urge that relief should be sent to a besieged city, or we are engaged in deploring the overthrow of an allied state. But what really carries greatest weight in deliberative speeches is the authority of the speaker. |
| 967 |
Valet autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum . Nam et prudentissimus esse haberique et optimus debet , qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit . In iudiciis enim vulgo fas habetur indulgere aliquid studio suo ; consilia nemo est qui neget secundum mores dari . Graecorum quidem plurimi omne hoc officium contionale esse iudicaverunt et in sola reipublicae administratione posuerunt .
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For he, who would have all men trust his judgment as to what is expedient and honourable, should both possess and be regarded as possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character. In forensic speeches the orator may, according to the generally received opinion, indulge his passion to some extent. But all will agree that the advice given by a speaker should be in keeping with his moral character. The majority of Greek writers have held that this kind of oratory is entirely concerned with addressing public assemblies and have restricted it to politics. |
| 968 |
Quin et Cicero in hac maxime parte versatur . Ideoque suasuris de pace , bello , copiis , operibus , vectigalibus haec duo esse praecipue nota voluit , vires civitatis et mores , ut ex natura cum ipsarum rerum tum audientium ratio suadendi duceretur .
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Even Cicero himself deals chiefly with this department. Consequently those who propose to offer advice upon peace, war, troops, public works or revenue must thoroughly acquaint themselves with two things, the resources of the state and the character of its people, so that the method employed in tendering their advice may be based at once on political realities and the nature of their hearers. |
| 969 |
Nobis maior in re videtur varietas , nam et consultantium et consiliorum plurima sunt genera . Quare in suadendo et dissuadendo tria primum spectanda erunt , quid sit de quo deliberetur , qui sint qui deliberent , qui sit qui suadeat .
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This type of oratory seems to me to offer a more varied field for eloquence, since both those who ask for advice and the answers given to them may easily present the greatest diversity. Consequently there are three points which must be specially borne in mind in advice or dissuasion: first the nature of the subject under discussion, secondly the nature of those who are engaged in the discussion, and thirdly the nature of the speaker who offers them advice. |
| 970 |
Rem , de qua deliberatur , aut certum est posse fieri aut incertum . Si incertum , haec erit quaestio sola aut potentissima ; saepe enim accidet , ut prius dicamus , ne si possit quidem fieri , esse faciendum , deinde fieri non posse . Cum autem de hoc quaeritur , coniectura est , an Isthmos intercidi , an siccari palus Pomptina , an portus fieri Ostiae possit , an Alexander terras ultra Oceanum sit inventurus .
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As to the subject under discussion its practicability is either certain or uncertain. In the latter case this will be the chief, if not the only point for consideration; for it will often happen that we shall assert first that something ought not to be done, even if it can be done, and secondly, that it cannot be done. Now when the question turns on such points as to whether the Isthmus can be cut through, the Pontine Marshes drained, or a harbour constructed at Ostia, or whether Alexander is likely to find land beyond the Ocean, we make use of conjecture. |
| 971 |
Sed in iis quoque quae constabit posse fieri , coniectura aliquando erit , si quaeretur , an utique futurum sit , ut Carthaginem superent Romani ; ut redeat Hannibal , si Scipio exercitum in Africam transtulerit ; ut servent fidem Samnites , si Romani arma deposuerint . Quaedam et fieri posse et futura esse credibile est , sed aut alio tempore aut alio loco aut alio modo .
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But even in connection with things that are undoubtedly feasible, there may at times be room for conjecture, as for instance in questions such as whether Rome is ever likely to conquer Carthage, whether Hannibal will return to Africa if Scipio transports his army thither, or whether the Samnites are likely to keep faith if the Romans lay down their arms. There are some things too which we may believe to be both feasible and likely to be carried into effect, but at another time or place or in another way. |
| 972 |
Ubi coniecturae non erit locus , alia sunt intuenda . Et primum aut propter ipsam rem , de qua sententiae rogantur , consultabitur aut propter alias intervenientes extrinsecus causas . Propter ipsam deliberant Patres conscripti , an stipendium militi constituant ?
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When there is no scope for conjecture, our attention will be fixed on other points. In the first place advice will be asked either on account of the actual thing on which the orator is required to express his views, or on account of other causes which affect it from without. It is on the actual thing that the senate for instance debates, when it discusses such questions as whether it is to vote pay for the troops. In this case the material is simple. |
| 973 |
Haec materia simplex erit . Accedunt causae aut faciendi , ut deliberant patres conscripti , an Fabios dedant Gallis bellum minitantibus ; aut non faciendi , ut deliberat C . Caesar , an perseveret in Germaniam ire , cum milites passim testamenta facerent .
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To this however may be added reasons for taking action or the reverse, as for example if the senate should discuss whether it should deliver the Fabii to the Gauls when the latter threaten war, or Gaius Caesar should deliberate whether he should persist in the invasion of Germany, when his soldiers on all sides are making their wills. These deliberative themes are of a twofold nature. |
| 974 |
Hae suasoriae duplices sunt . Nam et illic causa deliberandi est , quod bellum Galli minitentur ; esse tamen potest quaestio , dedendine fuerint etiam citra hanc denuntiationem , qui contra fas , cum legati missi essent , proelium inierint , regemque , ad quem mandata acceperant , trucidarint .
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In the first case the reason for deliberation is the Gallic threat of war, but there may still be a further question as to whether even without such threat of war they should surrender those who, contrary to the law of nations, took part in a battle when they had been sent out as ambassadors and killed the king with whom they had received instructions to treat. |
| 975 |
Et hic nihil Caesar sine dubio deliberaret nisi propter hanc militum perturbationem ; est tamen locus quaerendi , an citra hunc quoque casum penetrandum in Germaniam fuerit . Semper autem de eo prius loquemur , de quo deliberari etiam detractis sequentibus possit .
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In the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the question at all, but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers; but there is still room for enquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence it would be wise to penetrate into Germany. But it must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences. |
| 976 |
Partes suadendi quidam putaverunt honestum , utile , necessarium . Ego non invenio huic tertiae locum . Quantalibet enim vis ingruat , aliquid fortasse pati necesse sit , nihil facere ; de faciendo autem deliberatur .
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Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything. |
| 977 |
Quodsi hanc vocant necessitatem , in quam homines graviorum metu coguntur , utilitatis erit quaestio ; ut si obsessi et impares et aqua ciboque defecti de facienda ad hostem deditione deliberent et dicatur , necesse est ; nempe sequitur , ut hoc subiiciatur , alioqui pereundum est : ita propter id ipsum non est necesse , quia perire potius licet .
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Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words "otherwise we shall perish" must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium. |
| 978 |
Denique non fecerunt Saguntini nec in rate Opitergina circumventi . Igitur in his quoque causis aut de sola utilitate ambigetur aut quaestio inter utile atque honestum consistet . At enim si quis liberos procreare volet , necesse habet ducere uxorem .
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It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour. "But," it will be urged, "if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife." Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife. |
| 979 |
Quis dubitat ? sed ei , qui pater vult fieri , liqueat necesse est uxorem esse ducendam . Itaque mihi ne consilium quidem videtur , ubi necessitas est , non magis quam ubi constat , quid fieri non possit . Omnis enim deliberatio de dubiis est . Melius igitur , qui tertiam partem dixerunt δυνατόν quod nostri possibile nominant , quae ut dura videatur appellatio , tamen sola est .
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It appears to me, therefore, that where necessity exists, there is no room for deliberation, any more than where it is clear that a thing is not feasible. For deliberation is always concerned with questions where some doubt exists. Those therefore are wiser who make the third consideration for deliberative oratory to be τὸ δυνατόν or "possibility" as we translate it; the translation may seem clumsy, but it is the only word available. |
| 980 |
Quas partes non omnes in omnem cadere suasoriam manifestius est , quam ut docendum sit . Tamen apud plerosque earum numerus augetur , a quibus ponuntur ut partes , quae superiorum species sunt partium . Nam fas , iustum , pium , aequum , mansuetum quoque ( sic enim sunt interpretati τὸ ἥμερον ) et si qua adhuc adiicere quis eiusdem generis velit , subiici possunt honestati .
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That all these considerations need not necessarily obtrude themselves in every case is too obvious to need explanation. Most writers, however, say that there are more than three. But the further considerations which they would add are really but species of the three general considerations just mentioned. For right, justice, piety, equity and mercy (for thus they translate τὸ ἥμερον ), with any other virtues that anyone may be pleased to add, all come under the heading of that which is honourable. |
| 981 |
An sit autem facile , magnum , iucundum , sine periculo , ad quaestionem pertinet utilitatis . Qui loci oriuntur ex contradictione : Est quidem utile sed difficile , parvum , iniucundum , periculosum .
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On the other hand, if the question be whether a thing is easy, great, pleasant or free from danger, it comes under questions of expediency. Such topics arise from some contradiction; for example a thing is expedient, but difficult, or trivial, or unpleasant, or dangerous. |
| 982 |
Tamen quibusdam videtur esse nonnunquam de iucunditate sola consultatio , ut si de aedificando theatro , instituendis ludis deliberetur . Sed neminem adeo solutum luxu puto , ut nihil in causa suadendi sequatur praeter voluptatem .
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Some however hold that at times deliberation is concerned solely with the question whether a thing is pleasant, as for instance when discussion arises as to whether a theatre should be built or games instituted. But in my opinion you will never find any man such a slave to luxury as not to consider anything but pleasure when he delivers an advisory speech. |
| 983 |
Praecedat enim semper aliquid necesse est , ut in ludis honor deorum , in theatro non inutilis laborum remissio , deformis et incommoda turbae , si id non sit , conflictatio , et nihilominus eadem illa religio , cum theatrum veluti quoddam illius sacri templum vocabimus .
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For there must needs be something on every occasion that takes precedence of pleasure: in proposing the institution of public games there is the honour due to the gods; in proposing the erection of a theatre the orator will consider the advantages to be derived from relaxation from toil, and the unbecoming and undesirable struggle for places which will arise if there is no proper accommodation; religion, too, has its place in the discussion, for we shall describe the theatre as a kind of temple for the solemnization of a sacred feast. |
| 984 |
Saepe vero et utilitatem despiciendam esse dicimus , ut honesta faciamus , ut cum illis Opiterginis damus consilium , ne se hostibus dedant , quanquam perituri sint , nisi fecerint ; et utilia honestis praeferimus , ut cum suademus , ut bello Punico servi armentur .
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Often again we shall urge that honour must come before expediency; as for instance when we advise the men of Opitergium not to surrender to the enemy, even though refusal to do so means certain death. At times on the other hand we prefer expediency to honour, as when we advise the arming of slaves in the Punic War. |
| 985 |
Sed neque hic plane concedendum est esse id inhonestum , liberos enim natura omnes et eisdem constare elementis et fortasse antiquis etiam nobilibus ortos dici potest ; et illic , ubi manifestum periculum est , opponenda alia , ut crudelius etiam perituros adfirmemus , si se dediderint , sive hostis non servaverit fidem , sive Caesar vicerit , quod est vero similius .
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But even in this case we must not openly admit that such a course is dishonourable: we can point out that all men are free by nature and composed of the same elements, while the slaves in question may perhaps be sprung from some ancient and noble stock; and in the former case when the danger is so evident, we may add other arguments, such as that they would perish even more cruelly if they surrendered, should the enemy fail to keep faith, or Caesar (a more probable supposition) prove victorious. |
| 986 |
Haec autem , quae tantum inter se pugnant , plerumque nominibus deflecti solent . Nam et utilitas ipsa expugnatur ab iis , qui dicunt , non solum potiora esse honesta quam utilia , sed ne utilia quidem esse , quae non sint honesta ; et contra , quod nos honestum , illi vanum , ambitiosum , stolidum , verbis quam re probabilius vocant .
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But in such a conflict of principles it is usual to modify the names which we give them. For expediency is often ruled out by those who assert not merely that honour comes before expediency, but that nothing can be expedient that is not honourable, while others say that what we call honour is vanity, ambition and folly, as contemptible in substance as it is fair in sound. |
| 987 |
Nec tantum inutilibus comparantur utilia , sed inter se quoque ipsa , ut si ex duobus eligamus , in altero quid sit magis , in altero quid sit minus . Crescit hoc adhuc . Nam interim triplices etiam suasoriae incidunt : ut cum Pompeius deliberabat , Parthos an Africam an Aegyptum peteret . Ita non tantum , utrum melius sed quid sit optimum , quaeritur , itemque contra .
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Nor is expediency compared merely with inexpediency. At times we have to choose between two advantageous courses after comparison of their respective advantages. The problem may be still more complicated, as for instance when Pompey deliberated whether to go to Parthia, Africa or Egypt. In such a case the enquiry is not which of two courses is better or worse, but which of three or more. |
| 988 |
Nec unquam incidet in hoc genere materiae dubitatio rei , quae undique secundum nos sit . Nam ubi contradictioni locus non est , quae potest esse causa dubitandi ? Ita fere omnis suasoria nihil est aliud quam comparatio , videndumque , quid consecuturi simus et per quid , ut aestimari possit , plus in eo quod petimus sit commodi , an vero in eo per quod petimus incommodi .
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On the other hand in deliberative oratory there will never be any doubt about circumstances wholly in our favour. For there can clearly be no doubt about points against which there is nothing to be said. Consequently as a rule all deliberative speeches are based simply on comparison, and we must consider what we shall gain and by what means, that it may be possible to form an estimate whether there is more advantage in the aims we pursue or greater disadvantage in the means we employ to that end. |