Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 1483 |
et plura , de quibus alio loco . Illud quoque differens vocant , cum , genere in species diducto , species ipsa discernitur . Animal genus , morale species , terrenum vel bipes differens ; nondum enim proprium est sed iam differt a marino vel quadripede ; quod non tam ad argumentum pertinet quam ad diligentem finitionis comprehensionem .
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Again, the term difference is applied in cases when the genus is divided into species and one species is subdivided. Animal, for instance, is a genus, mortal a species, while terrestrial or biped is a difference: for they are not actually properties, but serve to show the difference between such animals and quadrupeds or creatures of the sea. This distinction, however, comes under the province not so much of argument as of exact definition. Cicero separates genus and species, |
| 1484 |
Cicero genus et speciem , quam eandem formam vocat , a finitione deducit et iis , quae ad aliquid sunt , subiicit : ut , si is , cui argentum omne legatum est , petat signatum quoque , utatur genere ; at si quis , cum legatum sit ei , quae viro mater familias esset , neget deberi ei , quae in manum non convenerit , specie ; quoniam duae formae sint matrimoniorum .
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which latter he calls form, from definition and includes them under relation. For example, if a person to whom another man has left all his silver should claim all his silver money as well, he would base his claim upon genus; on the other hand if when a legacy has been left to a married woman holding the position of materfamilias, it should be maintained that the legacy is not due to a woman who never came into the power of her husband, the argument is based on species, since there are two kinds of marriage. Cicero |
| 1485 |
Division autem adiuvari finitionem docet , eamque differre a partitione , quod haec sit totius in partes , illa generis in formas ; partes incertas esse , ut Quibus constet respublica ; formas certas , ut Quot sint species rerum publicarum , quas tris accepimus , quae populi , quae paucorum , quae unius potestate regerentur .
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further shows that definition is assisted by division, which he distinguishes from partition, making the latter the dissection of a whole into its parts and the former the division of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for instance the elements of which a state consists; the forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance the number of forms of government, which we are told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. It is true that he does not use these illustrations, |
| 1486 |
Et ille quidem non iis exemplis utitur , quia scribens ad Trebatium ex iure ducere ea maluit ; ego apertiora posui . Propria vero ad coniecturae quoque pertinent partem : ut , quia proprium est boni recte facere , iracundi verbis aut manu male facere , facta haec ab ipsis esse credantur aut contra . Nam ut quaedam in quibusdam utique sunt , ita quaedam in quibusdam utique non sunt : et ratio , quamvis sit ex diverso , eadem est .
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since, as he was writing to Trebatius, he preferred to draw his examples from law. I have chosen my illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have relation to questions of fact as well; for instance, it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an angry man to be violent in speech or action, and consequently we believe that such acts are committed by persons of the appropriate character, or not committed by persons of inappropriate character. For just as certain persons possess certain qualities, so certain others do not possess certain qualities, and the argument is of precisely the same nature, though from opposite premises. |
| 1487 |
Divisio et ad probandum simili via valet et ad refellendum . Probationi interim satis est unum habere , hoc modo , Ut sit civis , aut natus sit oportet aut factus ; utrumque tollendum est , Nec natus nec factus est .
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In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing. "To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such." For refutation, both points must be disproved: "he was neither born nor made a citizen." |
| 1488 |
Fit hoc et multiplex , idque est argumentorum genus ex remotione , quo modo efficitur totum falsum , modo id , quod relinquitur , verum . Totum falsum est hoc modo , Pecuniam credidisse te dicis ; aut habuisti ipse aut ab aliquo accepisti aut invenisti aut surripuisti . Si neque domi habuisti neque ah aliquo accepisti aut cetera , non credidisti .
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This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be: " You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him. " |
| 1489 |
Reliquum fit verum sic , Hic servus , quem tibi vindicas , aut vernn tuus est aut emptus aut donatus aut testamento relictus aut ex hoste captus aut alienus ; deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus . Periculosum et cum cura intuendum genus , quia , si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus , cum risu quoque tota res solvitur .
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The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows: " This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another. " By the elimination of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another. This form of argument is risky and must be employed with care; for if, in setting forth the alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. It is safer to do what Cicero |
| 1490 |
Tutius , quod Cicero pro Caecina facit , cum interrogat , Si haec actio non sit , quae sit ? simul enim removentur omnia . Vel cum duo ponentur inter se contraria , quorum tenuisse utrumlibet sufficiat , quale Ciceronis est , Unum quidem certe , nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio , qui mihi non concedat ; si constet corruptum illud esse indicium , aut ab Habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum ; si doceo non ab Habito , vinco ab Oppianico ; si ostendo ab Oppianico , purgo Habitum .
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does in the pro Caecina, when he asks, "If this is not the point at issue, what is?" For thus all other points are eliminated at one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be advanced, either of which if established would suffice to prove the case. Take the following example from Cicero: " There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus. " |
| 1491 |
Fit etiam ex duobus , quorum necesse est alterum verum , eligendi adversario potestas , efficiturque , ut , utrum elegerit , noceat . Facit hoc Cicero pro Oppio : Utrum , cum Cottam appetisset , an cum ipse sese conaretur occidere , telum e manibus ereptum est ? et pro Vareno : Optio vobis datur , utrum velitis casu illo itinere Varenum usum esse an huius persuasu et inductu . Deinde utraque facit accusatori contraria .
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Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: " Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide? " and in the pro Vareno: " You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement. " He then shows that either admission tells against his opponent. Sometimes again, |
| 1492 |
Interim duo ita proponuntur , ut utrumlibet electum idem efficiat , quale est , Philosophandum est , etiamsi non est philosophandum . Et illud vulgatum , Quo schema , si intelligitur ? quo , si non intelligitur ? Et , Mentietur in tormentis , qui dolorem pati potest ; mentietur , qui non potest .
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two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence, "We must philosophise, even though we ought not," or as in the common dilemma, " What is the use of a figure, if its meaning is clear? And what is its use, if it is unintelligible? " or, " He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain. " |
| 1493 |
Ut sunt autem tria tempora , ita ordo rerum tribus momentis consertus est ; habent enim omnia initium , incrementum , summam , ut iurgium deinde pugna , tum caedes . Est ergo hic quoque argumentorum locus invicem probantium . Nam et ex initiis summa colligitur , quale est , Non possum togam praetextam sperare , cum exordium pullum videam ; et contra , non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse ,argumentum est dictatura deposita .
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As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which lend each other mutual support; for the conclusion is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following case: "I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black" ; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny. |
| 1494 |
Similiter ex incremento in utramque partem ducitur rei ratio cum in coniectura tum etiam in tractatu aequitatis , an ad initium summa referenda sit , id est , an ei caedes imputanda sit , a quo iurgium coepit .
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Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is, " Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended? " Arguments are also drawn from similarities: |
| 1495 |
Est argumentorum locus ex similibus : si continentia virtus , utique et abstinentia ; fidem debet tutor , et procurator .Hoc est ex eo genere , quod ἐπαγωγήν Graeci vocant , Cicero inductionem . Ex dissimilibus : Non , si laetitia bonum , et voluptas ; Non , quod mulieri , idem pupillo . Ex contrariis : Frugalitas bonum , luxuria enim malum ; Si malorum causa bellum est , erit emendatio pax ; Si veniam meretur , qui inprudens nocuit , non meretur praemium , qui imprudens profuit .
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"If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue. "If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent." To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes: "It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing" : " It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward. " Or from contraries: "Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing" : "If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy" : " If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward. " |
| 1496 |
Ex pugnantibus : Qui est sapiens , stultus non est . Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis : Si bonum iustitia , est recte iudicandum ; si malum perfidia , non est fallendum . Idem retro . Nec sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco subiicienda , cum et ipsa naturaliter congruant : Quod quis non habuit , non perdidit ; Quem quis amat , sciens non laedit ; Quem quis heredem suum esse voluit , carum habuit , habet , habebit . Sed cum sint indubitata , vim habent paene signorum immutabilium .
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Or from contradictions: "He who is wise is not a fool." Or from consequences necessary or probable : " If justice is a good thing, we must give right judgment " : "If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive." And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong: "A man has not lost what he never had" : "A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves" : " If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection. " However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. |
| 1497 |
Sed haec consequentia dico , ἀκόλουθα ; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas ; illa insequentia , παρεπόμενα , quae postea facta sunt aut futura . Nec sum de nominibus anxius ; vocet enim , ut voluerit quisque , dum vis rerum ipsa manifesta sit , appareatque hoc temporis , illud esse natura .
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These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things. |
| 1498 |
Itaque non dubito haec quoque vocare consequentia , quamvis ex prioribus dent argumentum ad ea quae sequuntur , quorum duas quidam species esse voluerunt : actionis , ut pro Oppio , Quos educere inuitos in provinciam non potuit , eos invitos retinere qui potuit ? temporis , in Verrem , Si finem praetoris edicto adferunt Kalendae Ian ., cur non initium quoque edicti nascatur a Kalendis Ian .?
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I have therefore no hesitation in calling the following forms of argument also consequential, although they argue from the past to the future: some however divide them into two classes, those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio, " How could he detain against their will those whom he was unable to take to the province against their will? " and those concerned with time, as in the Verrines, " If the first of January puts an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should the commencement of its authority not likewise date from the first of January? " |
| 1499 |
Quod utrumque exemplum tale est , ut idem in diversum , si retro agas , valeat . Consequens enim est , eos , qui inviti duci non potuerint , invitos non potuisse retineri .
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Both these instances are of such a nature that the argument is reversible. For it is a necessary consequence that those who could not be taken to the province against their will could not be retained against their will. |
| 1500 |
Illa quoque , quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur ( quae proprii generis videri quidam volant et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα , Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus ) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim : Si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est , et Hermocreonti conducere , et Quod discere honestum , et docere .
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So too I feel clear that we should rank as consequential arguments those derived from facts which lend each other mutual support and are by some regarded as forming a separate kind of argument, which they call ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, arguments from things mutually related, while Cicero styles them arguments drawn from things to which the same line of reasoning applies; take the following example : " If it is honourable for the Rhodians to let out their harbour dues, it is honourable likewise for Hermocreon to take the contract, " or "What it is honourable to learn, it is also honourable to teach." Such also is the fine sentence of Domitius Afer, |
| 1501 |
Unde illa non hac ratione dicta sed efficiens idem Domitii Afri sententia est pulchra : Ego accusavi , vos damnastis . Est invicem consequens et quod ex diversis idem ostendit ; ut , qui mundum nasci dicit , per hoc ipsum et deficere significet , quia deficit omne quod nascitur .
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which has the same effect, though it is not identical in form: "I accused, you condemned." Arguments which prove the same thing from opposites are also mutually consequential; for instance, we may argue that he who says that the world was created thereby implies that it is suffering decay, since this is the property of all created things. |
| 1502 |
Simillima est his argumentatio , qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur , aut contra , quod genus a causis vocant . Haec interim necessario fiunt , interim plerumque sed non necessario . Nam corpus in lumine utique umbram facit , et umbra , ubicunque est , ibi esse corpus ostendit .
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There is another very similar form of argument, which consists in the inference of facts from their efficient causes or the reverse, a process known as argument from causes. The conclusion is sometimes necessary, sometimes generally without being necessarily true. For instance, a body casts a shadow in the light, and the shadow wherever it falls indicates the presence of a body. |
| 1503 |
Alia sunt , ut dixi , non necessaria , vel utrinque vel ex altera parte : Sol colorat ; non utique , qui est coloratus , a sole est . Iter pulverulentum facit ; sed neque omne iter pulverem movet nec , quisquis est pulverulentus , ex itinere est .
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There are other conclusions which, as I have said, are not necessary, whether as regards both cause and effect or only one of the two. For instance, " the sun colours the skin, but not everyone that is coloured receives that colour from the sun; a journey makes the traveller dusty, but every journey does not produce dust, nor is everyone that is dusty just come from a journey. " |
| 1504 |
Quae utique fiunt , talia sunt : Si sapientia bonum virum facit , bonus vir est utique sapiens ; itemque Boni est honeste facere , mali turpiter ; et Qui honeste faciunt , boni , qui turpiter , mali iudicantur ; recte . At , Exercitatio plerumque robustum corpus facit ; sed non quisquis est robustus exercitatus , nec quisquis exercitatus robustus ; nec , quia fortitudo praestat ne mortem timeamus , quisquis mortem non timuerit , vir fortis erit existimandus ; nec , si capitis dolorem facit , inutilis hominibus sol est .
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As examples of necessary conclusions on the other hand I may cite the following: "If wisdom makes a man good, a good man must needs be wise" ; and again, "It is the part of a good man to act honourably, of a bad man to act dishonourably," or " Those who act honourably are considered good, those who act dishonourably are considered bad men. " In these cases the conclusion is correct. On the other hand, " though exercise generally makes the body robust, not everyone who is robust is given to exercise, nor is everyone that is addicted to exercise robust. Nor again, because courage prevents our fearing death, is every man who has no fear of death to be regarded as a brave man; nor is the sun useless to man because it sometimes gives him a headache. " |
| 1505 |
Haec ad hortativum maxime genus pertinent : Virtus facit laudem , sequenda igitur ; at voluptas infamiam , fugienda igitur . Recte autem monemur , causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas , ut Medea , Utinam ne in nemore Pelio ;
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Arguments such as the following belong in the main to the hortative department of oratory:— " Virtue brings renown, therefore it should be pursued; but the pursuit of pleasure brings ill-repute, therefore it should be shunned. " But the warning that we should not necessarily search for the originating cause is just: an example of such error is provided by the speech of Medea beginning |
| 1506 |
quasi vero id eam fecerit miseram aut nocentem , quod illic ceciderint abiegnae ad terram trabes ; et Philocteta Paridi , Si impar esses tibi , ego nunc non essem miser ; quo modo pervenire quolibet retro causas legentibus licet . Illud his adiicere ridiculum putarem ,
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"Ah! would that never there in Pelion's grove," as though her misery or guilt were due to the fact that there "The beams of fir had fallen to the ground" ; " or I might cite the words addressed by Philoctetes to Paris, "Hadst thou been other than thou art, then I Had ne'er been plunged in woe." By tracing back causes on lines such as these we may arrive anywhere. |
| 1507 |
nisi eo Cicero uteretur , quod coniugatum vocant , ut eos , qui rem iustam faciunt , iuste facere ( quod certe non eget probatione ) , quod compascuum est , compascere licere . Quidam haec ,
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But for the fact that Cicero has done so, I should regard it as absurd to add to these what is styled the conjugate argument, such as "Those who perform a just act, act justly," a self-evident fact requiring no proof; or again, "Every man has a common right to send his cattle to graze in a common pasture." |
| 1508 |
quae vel ex causis vel ex efficientibus diximus , alieno nomine uocant ἐκβάσεις id est exitus . Nam nec hic aliud tractatur quam quid ex quoque eveniat . Adposita vel comparativa dicuntur , quae minora ex maioribus , maiora ex minoribus , paria ex paribus
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Some call these arguments derived from causes or efficients by the Greek name ἐκβάσεις that is, results; for in such cases the only point considered is how one thing results from another. Those arguments which prove the lesser from the greater or the greater from the less or equals from equals are styled apposite or comparative. |
| 1509 |
probant . Confirmatur coniectura ex maiore , Si quis sacrilegium facit , faciet et furtum ; ex minore , Qui facile ac palam mentitur , peierabit ; ex pari , Qui ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepit , et ob dicendum falsum testimonium accipiet .
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A conjecture as to a fact is confirmed by argument from something greater in the following sentence: "If a man commit sacrilege, he will also commit theft" ; from something less, in a sentence such as "He who lies easily and openly will commit perjury" ; from something equal in a sentence such as " He who has taken a bribe to give a false verdict will take a bribe to give false witness. " |
| 1510 |
Iuris confirmatio huiusmodi est : ex maiore , Si adulterum occidere licet , et loris caedere ; ex minore , Si furem nocturnum occidere licet , quid latronem ? ex pari , Quae poena adversus interfectorem patris iusta est , eadem adversus matris ; quorum omnium tractatus versatur in syllogismis .
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Points of law may be proved in a similar manner; from something greater, as in the sentence "If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is lawful to scourge him" ; from something less, " If it is lawful to kill a man attempting theft by night, how much more lawful is it to kill one who attempts robbery with violence " ; from something equal, " The penalty which is just in the case of parricide is also just in the case of matricide. " In all these cases we follow the syllogistic method. |
| 1511 |
Ilia magis finitionibus aut qualitatibus prosunt , Si robur corporibus bonum est , non minus sanitas ; Si furtum scelus , magis sacrilegium ; Si abstinentia virus , et continentia ; Si mundus providentia regitur , administranda respublica ; Si domus aedificari sine ratione non potest , quid urbs agenda ? Si agenda est navalium cura , et armorum .Ac mihi quidem sufficeret hoc genus ,
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The following type of argument on the other hand is more serviceable in questions turning on definition or quality. "If strength is good for the body, health is no less good. "If theft is a crime, sacrilege is a greater crime. "If abstinence is a virtue, so is self-control. "If the world is governed by providence, the state also requires a government. "If a house cannot be built without a plan, what of a whole city? "If naval stores require careful supervision, so also do arms." |
| 1512 |
sed in species secatur . Nam ex pluribus ad unum et ex uno ad plura ( unde est Quod semel , et saepius ) ,et ex parte ad totum et ex genere ad speciem , et ex eo quod continet ad id quod continetur , aut ex difficilioribus ad faciliora et ex longe positis ad propiora et ad omnia , quae contra haec sunt , eadem ratione argumenta ducuntur .
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I am content to treat this type of argument as a genus without going further; others however divide it into species. For we may argue from several things to one or from one thing to several; hence arguments such as "What has happened once may happen often." We may also argue from a part to a whole, from genus to species, from that which contains to that which is contained, from the difficult to the easy, from the remote to the near, and similarly from the opposites of all these to their opposites. |
| 1513 |
Sunt enim et haec maiora et minora aut certe vim similem obtinent , quae si persequamur , nullus erit ea concidendi modus . Infinita est enim rerum comparatio , iucundiora , graviora , magis necessaria , honestiora , utiliora . Sed mittamus plura , ne in eam ipsam , quam vito , loquacitatem incidam .
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Now all these arguments deal with the greater or the less or else with things that are equal, and if we follow up such fine distinctions, there will be no limit to our division into species. For the comparison of things is infinite; things may be more pleasant, more serious, more necessary, more honourable, more useful. I say no more for fear of falling into that very garrulity which I deprecate. |
| 1514 |
Exemplorum quoque ad haec infinitus est numerus , sed paucissima attingam . Ex maiore pro Caecina , Quod exercitus armatos movet , id advocationem togatorum non videbitur movisse ? Ex faciliore in Clodium et Curionem , Ac vide , an facile fieri tu potueris , cum is factus non sit , cui tu concessisti .
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The number of examples of these arguments which I might quote is likewise infinite, but I will only deal with a very few. As an example of argument from something greater take the following example from the pro Caecina " Shall we suppose that that which alarms whole armies caused no alarm to a peaceful company of lawyers? " As an instance of argument from something easier, take this passage from the speech against Clodius and Curio: " Consider whether it would have been easy for you to secure the praetorship, when he in whose favour you withdrew failed to secure election? " |
| 1515 |
Ex difficiliore , Vide quaeso , Tubero , ut , qui de meo facto non dubitem , de Ligarii audeam dicere . Et ibi , An sperandi Ligario casa non sit , cum mihi apud te locus sit etiam pro altero deprecandi ? Ex minore pro Caecina , Itane scire esse armatos sat est , ut vim factam probes ;
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The following provides an example of argument from something more difficult: " I beg you, Tubero, to remark that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own deed, venture to speak of that performed by Ligarius " ; and again, "Has not Ligarius reason for hope, when I am permitted to intercede with you for another?" For an argument drawn from something less take this passage from the pro Caecinaa : " Really! Is the knowledge that the men were armed sufficient to prove that violence was offered, and the fact that he fell into their hands insufficient? |
| 1516 |
in manus eorum incidere non est satis ?Ergo , ut breviter contraham summam , ducuntur argumenta a personis , causis , locis , tempore ( cuius tres partes diximus , praecedens , coniunctum , insequens ) , facultatibus ( quibus instrumentum subiecimus ) , modo ( id est , ut quidque sit factum ) , finitione , genere , specie , differentibus , propriis , remotione , divisione , initio , incrementis , summa , similibus , dissimilibus , pugnantibus , consequentibus , efficientibus , effectis , eventis , comparatione , quae in plures diducitur species .
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" Well, then, to give a brief summary of the whole question, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary and subsequent), from resources (under which we include instruments), from manner (that is, how a thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, difference, property, elimination, division, beginnings, increase, consummation, likes, unlikes, contradictions, consequents, efficients, effects, results, and comparison, which is subdivided into several species. |
| 1517 |
Illud adiiciendum videtur , duci argumenta non a confessis tantum sed etiam a fictione , quod Graeci καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν vocant ; et quidem ex omnibus iisdem locis , quibus superiora , quia totidem species esse possunt fictae quot verae .
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I think I should also add that arguments are drawn not merely from admitted facts, but from fictitious suppositions, which the Greeks style καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν and that this latter type of argument falls into all the same divisions as those which I have mentioned above, since there may be as many species of fictitious arguments as there are of true arguments. |
| 1518 |
Nam fingere hoc loco hoc est proponere aliquid , quod , si verum sit , aut solvat quaestionem aut adiuvet ; deinde id , de quo quaeritur , facere illi simile . Id quo facilius accipiant iuvenes nondum scholam egressi , primo familiaribus magis ci aetati exemplis ostendam .
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When I speak of fictitious arguments I mean the proposition of something which, if true, would either solve a problem or contribute to its solution, and secondly the demonstration of the similarity of our hypothesis to the case under consideration. To make this the more readily intelligible to youths who have not yet left school, I will first of all illustrate it by examples of a kind familiar to the young. |
| 1519 |
Lex : Qui parentes non aluerit , vinciatur . Non alit aliquis , et vincula nihilominus recusat . Utitur fictione , si miles , si infans sit , si reipublicae causa absit . Et illa contra optionem fortium , si tyrannidem petas , si templorum eversionem .
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There is a law to the effect that "the man who refuses to support his parents is liable to imprisonment." A certain man fails to support his parents and none the less objects to going to prison. He advances the hypothesis that he would be exempt from such a penalty if he were a soldier, an infant. or if he were absent from home on the service of the state. Again in the case where a hero is allowed to choose his reward we might introduce the hypotheses of his desiring to make himself a tyrant or to overthrow the temples of the gods. |
| 1520 |
Plurimum ea res virium habet contra scriptum . Utitur his Cicero pro Caecina , unde tu aut familia aut procurator tuus . Si me villicus tuus solus deiecisset — Si vero ne habeas quidem servum praeter eum , qui me deiecerit , et alia in eodem libro plurima .
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Such arguments are specially useful when we are arguing against the letter of the law, and are thus employed by Cicero in the pro Caecina : " [The interdict contains the words,] ' whence you or your household or your agent had driven him.' If your steward alone had driven me out, [it would not, I suppose, be your household but a member of your household that had driven me out]. . . . If indeed you owned no slave except the one who drove me out, [you would cry, 'If I possess a household at all, I admit that my household drove you out']. " Many other examples might be quoted from the same work. |