Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1179	Erunt quaedam causae ( neque id raro ) crimine quidem , de quo cognitio est , faciles ad diluendum sed multis anteactae vitae flagitiis et gravibus oneratae ; quae prius amovenda sunt , ut propitius iudex defensionem ipsius negotii , cuius propria quaestio est , audiat : ut , si defendendus sit M . Caelius , nonne optime patronus occurrat prius conviciis luxuriae , petulantiae , impudicitiae quam veneficii , in quibus solis omnis Ciceronis versatur oratio ; tum deinde narret de bonis Pallae totamque de vi explicet causam , quae est ipsius actione defensa ?	There will also not infrequently be certain cases, in which it is easy to rebut the charge that is under trial, but the conduct of which is hampered by the past life of our client and the many and serious crimes which he has committed. We must dispose of these first, in order that the judge may give a favourable hearing to our defence of the actual facts which form the question at issue. For example, if we have to defend Marcus Caelius, the best course for his advocate to adopt will be to meet the imputations of luxury, wantonness and immorality which are made against him before we proceed to the actual charge of poisoning. It is with these points that the speech of Cicero in his defence is entirely concerned. Is he then to go on to make a statement about the property of Palla and explain the whole question of rioting, a charge against which Caelius has already defended himself in the speech which he delivered on his own behalf?
1180	Sed nos ducit scholarum consuetudo , in quibus certa quaedam ponuntur , quae themata dicimus , praeter quae nihil est diluendum , ideoque prooemio narratio semper subiungitur . Inde libertas declamatoribus , ut etiam secundo partis suae loco narrare videantur .	We however are the victims of the practice of the schools in accordance with which certain points or themes as we call them are put forward for discussion, outside which our refutation must not go, and consequently a statement of facts always follows the exordium. It is this too that leads declaimers to take the liberty of inserting a statement of facts even when they speak second for their side.
1181	Nam cum pro petitore dicunt et expositione , tanquam priores agant , uti solent et contradictione , tanquam respondeant , idque fit recte . Nam cum sit declamatio forensium actionum meditatio , cur non in utrumque protinus locum se exerceat ? Cuius rationis ignari ex more , cui adsueverunt , nihil in foro putant esse mutandum .	For when they speak for the prosecution they introduce both a statement of facts, as if they were speaking first, and a refutation of the arguments for the defence, as if they were replying: and they are right in so doing. For since declamation is merely an exercise in forensic pleading, why should they not qualify themselves to speak either first or second ? Those however who do not understand the reason for such a practice, think that when they appear in the courts they should stick to the custom of the schools with which they have become familiar.
1182	Sed in scholasticis quoque nonnunquam evenit , ut pro narratione sit propositio . Nam quid exponet , quae zelotypum malae tractationis accusat , aut qui Cynicum apud censores reum de moribus facit ? cum totum crimen uno verbo in qualibet actionis parte posito satis indicetur . Sed haec hactenus .	But even scholastic rhetoricians occasionally substitute a brief summary for the full statement of the facts. For what statement of the case can be made when a wife is accusing a jealous husband of maltreating her, or a father is indicting his son turned Cynic before the censors for indecent behaviour ? In both cases the charge can be sufficiently indicated by one word placed in any part of the speech. But enough of these points.
1183	Nunc , quae sit narrandi ratio , subiungam . Narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio , vel ( ut Apollodorus finit ) oratio docens auditorem , quid in controversia sit . Eam plerique scriptores , maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate , volunt esse lucidam , brevem , verisimilem . Neque enim refert , an pro lucida perspicuam , pro verisimili probabilem credibilemve dicamus .	I will now proceed to the method to be adopted in making our statement of facts. The statement of facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done, or, to quote the definition given by Apollodorus, is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute. Most writers, more especially those of the Isocratean school, hold that it should be lucid, brief and plausible (for it is of no importance if we substitute clear for lucid, or credible or probable for plausible).
1184	Eadem nobis placet divisio ; quanquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate parte in una dissenserit praeceptum brevitatis irridens , tanquam necesse sit longam esse aut brevem expositionem nec liceat ire per medium , Theodorei quoque solam relinquant ultimam partem , quia nec breviter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere .	I agree with this classification of its qualities, although Aristotle disagrees with Isocrates on one point, and pours scorn on his injunction to be brief, as though it were necessary that a statement should be either long or short and it were impossible to hit the happy mean. The followers of Theodorus on the other hand recognise only plausibility on the ground that it is not always expedient that our exposition should be either short or clear.
1185	Quo diligentius distinguenda sunt singula , ut quid quoque loco prosit ostendam . Narratio est aut tota pro nobis aut tota pro adversariis aut mixta ex utrisque . Si erit tota pro nobis , contenti sumus his tribus partibus per quas efficitur , quo facilius iudex intelligat , meminerit , credat .	It will be necessary therefore for me to devote some care to the differentiation of the various features of this portion of a speech, in order that I may show under what circumstances each is specially useful. The statement will be either wholly in our favour or wholly in that of our opponent or a mixture of both. If it is entirely in our own favour, we may rest content with the three qualities just mentioned, the result of which is to make it easier for the judge to understand, remember and believe what we say.
1186	Nec quisquam reprehensione dignum putet , quod proposuerim eam , quae sit tota pro nobis , debere esse verisimilem , cum vera sit . Sunt enim plurima uera quidem , sed parum credibilia , sicut falsa quoque frequenter verisimilia . Quare non minus laborandum est , ut iudex , quae vere dicimus quam quae fingimus , credat .	Now I should regret that anyone should censure my conduct in suggesting that a statement which is wholly in our favour should be plausible, when as a matter of fact it is true. There are many things which are true, but scarcely credible, just as there are many things which are plausible though false. It will therefore require just as much exertion on our part to make the judge believe what we say when it is true as it will when it is fictitious.
1187	Sunt quidem hae , quas supra retuli , virtutes aliarum quoque partium . Nam et per totam actionem vitanda est obscuritas et modus ubique custodiendus , et credibilia esse omnia oportet quae dicuntur . Maxime tamen haec in ea parte custodienda sunt , quae prima iudicem docet ; in qua si acciderit , ut aut non intelligat aut non meminerit aut non credat , frustra in reliquis laborabimus .	These good qualities, which I have mentioned above, do not indeed cease to be virtues in other portions of the speech; for it is our duty to avoid obscurity in every part of our pleading, to preserve due proportion throughout and to say nothing save what is likely to win belief. But they require special observance in that portion of the speech which is the first from which the judge can learn the nature of the case: if at this stage of the proceedings he fails to understand, remember or believe what we say, our labour is but lost in the remainder of the speech.
1188	Erit autem narratio aperta atque dilucida , si fuerit primum exposita verbis propriis et significantibus et non sordidis quidem , non tamen exquisitis et ab usu remotis , tum distincta rebus , personis , temporibus , locis , causis , ipsa etiam pronuntiatione in hoc accommodata , ut iudex quae dicentur quam facillime accipiat .	We shall achieve lucidity and clearness in our statement of facts, first by setting forth our story in words which are appropriate, significant and free from any taint of meanness, but not on the other hand farfetched or unusual, and secondly by giving a distinct account of facts, persons, times, places and causes, while our delivery must be adapted to our matter, so that the judge will take in what we say with the utmost readiness.
1189	Quae quidem virtus negligitur a plurimis , qui ad clamorem dispositae vel etiam forte circumfusae multitudinis compositi non ferunt illud intentionis silentium nec sibi diserti videntur , nisi omnia tumultu et vociferatione concusserint ; rem indicate sermonis cotidiani et in quemcumque etiam indoctorum cadentis existimant , cum interim , quod tanquam facile contemnunt , nescias , praestare minus velint an possint .	This latter virtue is disregarded by the majority of speakers who are used to the noisy applause of a large audience, whether it be a chance gathering or an assembly of claqueurs, and consequently are unnerved by the attentive silence of the courts. They feel that they have fallen short of eloquence, if they do not make everything echo with noise and clamour; they think that to state a matter simply is suited only to everyday speech such as falls within the capacity of any uneducated man, while all the time it is hard to say whether they are less willing or less capable of performing a task which they despise on account of its supposed easiness.
1190	Neque enim aliud in eloquentia , cuncta experti , difficilius reperient quam id , quod se fuisse dicturos omnes putant , postquam audierunt , quia non bona iudicant esse illa , sed vera . Tum autem optime dicit orator , cum videtur vera dicere . At nunc ,	For even when they have tried everything, they will never find anything more difficult in the whole range of oratory than that which, once heard, all think they would have said,— a delusion due to the fact that they regard what has been said as having no merit save that of truth. But it is just when an orator gives the impression of absolute truth that he is speaking best.
1191	velut campum nacti expositionis , hic potissimum et vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt et brachium in latus iactant totoque et rerum et verborum et compositionis genere lasciviunt ; deinde , quod sit monstro simile , placet actio , causa non intelligitur . Verum haec omittamus , ne minus gratiae praecipiendo recta quam offensae reprehendendo prava mereamur .	As it is, when such persons as these get a fair field for stating their case, they select this as the precise occasion for affected modulations of the voice, throwing back their heads, thumping their sides and indulging in every kind of extravagance of statement, language and style. As a result, while the speech, from its very monstrosity, meets with applause, the case remains unintelligible. However, let us pass to another subject; my aim is to win favour for pointing out the right road rather than to give offence by rebuking such perversity.
1192	Brevis erit narratio ante omnia , si inde coeperimus rem exponere , unde ad iudicem pertinet ; deinde , si nihil extra causam dixerimus ; tum etiam , si reciderimus omnia , quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quidquam neque utilitati detrahatur .	The statement of facts will be brief, if in the first place we start at that point of the case at which it begins to concern the judge, secondly avoid irrelevance, and finally cut out everything the removal of which neither hampers the activities of the judge nor harms our own case.
1193	Solet enim quaedam esse partium brevitas , quae longam tamen efficit summam . In portum veni , navem prospexi , quanti veheret interrogavi , de pretio convenit , conscendi , sublatae sunt ancorae , solvimus oram , profecti sumus . Nihil horum dici celerius potest , sed sufficit dicere e portu navigavi . Et quotiens exitus rei satis ostendit priora , debemus hoc esse contenti , quo reliqua intelliguntur . Quare ,	For frequently conciseness of detail is not inconsistent with length in the whole. Take for instance such a statement as the following: " I came to the harbour, I saw a ship, I asked the cost of a passage, the price was agreed, I went on board, the anchor was weighed, we loosed our cable and set out. " Nothing could be terser than these assertions, but it would have been quite sufficient to say "I sailed from the harbour." And whenever the conclusion gives a sufficiently clear idea of the premisses, we must be content with having given a hint which will enable our audience to understand what we have left unsaid.
1194	cum dicere liceat , Est mihi filius iuvenis , omnia illa supervacua : Cupidus ego liberorum uxorem duxi , natum filium sustuli , educavi , in adolescentiam perduxi . Ideoque Graecorum aliqui aliud circumcisam expositionem , id est σύντομον , aliud brevem putaverunt , quod illa supervacuis careret , haec posset aliquid ex necessariis desiderare .	Consequently when it is possible to say "I have a young son," it is quite superfluous to say, " Being desirous of children I took a wife, a son was born whom I acknowledged and reared and brought up to manhood. " For this reason some of the Greeks draw a distinction between a concise statement (the word they use is σύντομος ) and a brief statement, the former being free from all superfluous matter, while the latter may conceivably omit something that requires to be stated.
1195	Nos autem brevitatem in hoc ponimus , non ut minus , sed ne plus dicatur quam oporteat . Nam iterationes quidem et ταυτολογίας et περισσολογίας , quas in narratione vitandas quidam scriptores artium tradiderunt , transeo ; sunt enim haec vitia non tantum brevitatis gratia refugienda .	Personally, when I use the word brevity, I mean not saying less, but not saying more than occasion demands. As for repetitions and tautologies and diffuseness, which some writers of textbooks tell us we must avoid, I pass them by; they are faults which we should shun for other reasons beside our desire for brevity.
1196	Non minus autem cavenda erit , quae nimium corripientes omnia sequitur , obscuritas , satiusque est aliquid narrationi superesse quam deesse . Nam supervacua cum taedio dicuntur , necessaria cum periculo subtrahuntur .	But we must be equally on our guard against the obscurity which results from excessive abridgment, and it is better to say a little more than is necessary than a little less. For though a diffuse irrelevance is tedious, the omission of what is necessary is positively dangerous.
1197	Quare vitanda est etiam illa Sallustiana , quanquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum , brevitas et abruptum sermonis genus , quod otiosum fortasse lectorem minus fallat , audientem transvolat nec dum repetatur exspectat , cum praesertim lector non fere sit nisi eruditus , iudicem rura plerumque in decurias mittant de eo pronuntiaturum quod intellexerit ; ut fortasse ubicunque , in narratione tamen praecipue , media haec tenenda sit via dicendi quantum opus est et quantum satis est .	We must therefore avoid even tile famous terseness of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again; and whereas the reader is almost always a man of learning, the judge often comes to his panel from the country side and is expected to give a decision on what he can understand. Consequently we must aim, perhaps everywhere, but above all in our statement of facts, at striking the happy mean in our language, and the happy mean may be defined as saving just what is necessary and just what is sufficient.
1198	Quantum opus est autem non ita solum accipi volo , quantum ad indicandum sufficit , quia non inornata debet esse brevitas , alioqui sit indocta ; nam et fallit voluptas et minus longa quae delectant videntur , ut amoenum ac molle iter , etiamsi est spatii amplioris , minus fatigat quam durum aridumque compendium .	By "just what is necessary" I mean not the bare minimum necessary to convey our meaning; for our brevity must not be devoid of elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth: pleasure beguiles the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a difficult short cut through an arid waste.
1199	Neque mihi unquam tanta fuerit cura brevitatis , ut non ea , quae credibilem faciunt expositionem , inseri velim . Simplex enim et undique praecisa non tam narratio vocari potest quam confessio . Sunt porro multae condicione ipsa rei longae narrationes , quibus extrema ( ut praecepi ) prooemii parte ad intentionem praeparandus est iudex ; deinde curandum , ut omni arte vel ex spatio eius detrahamus aliquid vel ex taedio .	And I would never carry my desire for brevity so far as to refuse admission to details which may contribute to the plausibility of our narrative. Simplify and curtail your statement of facts in every direction and you will turn it into something more like a confession. Moreover, the circumstances of the case will often necessitate a long statement of facts, in which case, as I have already enjoined, the judge should be prepared for it at the conclusion of the exordium. Next we must put forth all our art either to shorten it or to render it less tedious.
1200	Ut minus longa sit , efficiemus quae poterimus differendo , non tamen sine mentione eorum , quae differemus : Quas causas occidendi habuerit , quos adsumpserit conscios , quemadmodum disposuerit insidias , probationis loco dicam .	We must do what we can to make it less long by postponing some points, taking care however to mention what it is that we propose to postpone. Take the following as an example. " As regards his motives for killing him, his accomplices and the manner in which he disposed his ambush, I will speak when I come to the proof.
1201	Quaedam vero ex ordine praetermittenda , quale est apud Ciceronem : Moritur Fulcinius ; multa enim , quae sunt in re , quia remota sunt a causa , praetermittam . Et partitio taedium levat : Dicam quae acta sint ante ipsum rei contractum , dicam quae in re ipsa , dicam quae postea .	" Some things indeed may be omitted altogether from our marshalling of the facts, witness the following example from Cicero, " Fulcinius died; there are many circumstances which attended that event, but as they have little bearing on this case, I shall pass them by. " Division of our statement into its various heads is another method of avoiding tedium: for example, " I will tell you first what preceded this affair, then what occurred in its actual development, and finally you shall hear its sequel. "
1202	Ita tres potius modicae narrationes videbuntur quam una longa . Interim expediet expositiones brevi interfatione distinguere : Audistis quae ante acta sunt , accipite nunc quae insequuntur . Reficietur enim iudex priorum fine et se velut ad novum rursus initium praeparabit .	Such a division will give the impression of three short statements rather than of one long one. At times it will be well to interrupt our narrative by interjecting some brief remark like the following: "You have heard what happened before: now learn what follows." The judge will be refreshed by the fact that we have brought our previous remarks to a close and will prepare himself for what may be regarded as a fresh start.
1203	Si tamen adhibitis quoque his artibus in longum exierit ordo rerum , erit non inutilis in extrema parte commonitio ; quod Cicero etiam in brevi narratione fecit : Adhuc , Caesar , Q . Ligarius omni culpa caret ; domo est egressus non modo nullum ad bellum sed ne ad minimum i quidem belli suspicionem et cetera .	If however after employing all these artifices our array of facts is still long, it will not be without advantage to append a summary at the end of it as a reminder: Cicero does this even at the close of a brief statement of facts in the pro Ligario: " To this day, Caesar, Quintus Ligarius is free from all blame: he left his home not merely without the least intention of joining in any war, but when there was not the least suspicion of any war etc. "
1204	Credibilis autem erit narratio ante omnia , si prius consuluerimus nostrum animum , ne quid naturae dicamus adversum , deinde si causas ac rationes factis praeposuerimus , non omnibus sed de quibus quaeritur , si personas convenientes iis , quae facta credi volemus , constituerimus , ut furti reum cupidum , adulterii libidinosum , homicidii temerarium , vel his contraria , si defendemus ; praeterea loca , tempora et similia .	The statement of fact will be credible, if in the first place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns (it is unnecessary to do so with the subsidiary facts as well), and if we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed: we shall for instance represent a person accused of theft as covetous, accused of adultery as lustful, accused of homicide as rash, or attribute the opposite qualities to these persons if we are defending them: further we must do the same with place, time and the like.
1205	Est autem quidam et ductus rei credibilis , qualis in comoediis etiam et in minis . Aliqua enim naturaliter sequuntur et cohaerent ut , si priora bene narraveris , iudex ipse quod postea sis narraturus exspectet .	It is also possible to treat the subject in such a way as to give it an air of credibility, as is done in comedy and farce. For some things have such natural sequence and coherence that, if only the first portion of your statement is satisfactory, the judge will himself anticipate what you have got to say in the later part.
1206	Ne illud quidem fuerit inutile , semina quaedam probationum spargere , verum sic ut narrationem esse meminerimus non probationem . Nonnunquam tamen etiam argumento aliquo confirmabimus , quod proposuerimus , sed simplici et brevi , ut in veneficiis : Sanus bibit , statim concidit , livor ac tumor confestim est insecutus .	It will also be useful to scatter some hints of our proofs here and there, but in such a way that it is never forgotten that we are making a statement of facts and not a proof. Sometimes, however, we must also support our assertions by a certain amount of argument, though this must be short and simple: for instance in a case of poisoning we shall say, " He was perfectly well when he drank, he fell suddenly to the ground, and blackness and swelling of the body immediately supervened. "
1207	Hoc faciunt et illae praeparationes , cum reus dicitur robustus , armatus contra infirmos , inermes , securos . Omnia denique , quae probation tractaturi sumus , personam , causam , locum , tempus , instrumentum , occasionem , narratione delibabimus .	The same result is produced by preparatory remarks such as the following: " The accused is a strong man and was fully armed, while his opponents were weak, unarmed and suspecting no evil. " We may in fact touch on everything that we propose to produce in our proof; while making our statement of facts, as for instance points connected with persons, cause, place, time, the instrument and occasion employed.
1208	Aliquando , si destituti fuerimus his , etiam fatebimur vix esse credibile , sed verum et hoc maius habendum scelus ; nescire nos quomodo factum sit aut quare , mirari sed probaturos .	Sometimes, when this resource is unavailable, we may even confess that the charge, though true, is scarcely credible, and that therefore it must be regarded as all the more atrocious; that we do not know how the deed was done or why, that we are filled with amazement, but will prove our case.
1209	Optimae vero praeparationes erunt quae latuerint , it a Cicerone sunt quidem utilissime praedicta omnia , per quae Miloni Clodius non Clodio Milo insidiatus esse videatur ; plurimum tamen facit illa callidissima simplicitatis imitatio : Milo autem , cum in senate fuisset eo die , ( quoad senatus est dimissus , domum venit , calceos et vestimenta mutauit , paulisper , dum se uxor , ut fit , comparat , commoratus est .	The best kind of preparatory remarks are those which cannot be recognised as such: Cicero, for instance, is extraordinarily happy in the way he mentions in advance everything that shows that Clodius lay in wait for Milo and not Milo for Clodius. The most effective stroke of all is his cunning feint of simplicity: " Milo, on the other hand, having been in the senate all day till the house rose, went home, changed his shoes and clothes, and waited for a short time, while his wife was getting ready, as is the way with women. "
1210	Quam nihil festinato , nihil praeparato fecisse videtur Milo ! Quod non solum rebus ipsis vir eloquentissimus , quibus moras et lentum profectionis ordinem ducit , sed verbis etiam vulgaribus et cotidianis et arte occulta consecutus est ; quae si aliter dicta essent , strepitu ipso iudicem ad custodiendum patronum excitassent .	What an absence of haste and premeditation this gives to Milo's proceedings. And the great orator secures this effect not merely by producing facts which indicate the slow and tardy nature of Milo's departure, but by the use of the ordinary language of everyday speech and a careful concealment of his art. Had he spoken otherwise, his words would by their very sound have warned the judge to keep an eye on the advocate.
1211	Frigere videntur ista plerisque , sed hoc ipso manifestum est , quomodo iudicem fefellerit , quod vix a lectore deprehenditur . Haec sunt quae credibilem faciant expositionem .	The majority of readers regard this passage as lacking in distinction, but this very fact merely serves to show how the art which is scarce detected by a reader succeeded in hoodwinking the judge. It is qualities of this kind that make the statement of facts credible.
1212	Nam id quidem , ne qua contraria aut sibi repugnantia in narratione dicamus , si cui praecipiendum est , is reliqua frustra docetur , etiamsi quidam scriptores artium hoc quoque tanquam occultum et a se prudenter erutum tradunt .	If a student requires to be told that we must avoid contradiction and inconsistency in our statement of facts, it will be vain to attempt to instruct him on the remaining points, although some writers of text-books produce this precept as if it were a mystery only discovered by their own personal penetration.
1213	His tribus narrandi virtutibus adiiciunt quidam magnificentiam , quam μεγαλοπρέπειαν vocant , quae neque in omnes causas cadit ( nam quid in plerisque iudiciis privatis , de certa credita , locato et conducto , interdictis habere loci potest supra modum se tollens oratio ? ) neque semper est utilis , velut proximo exemplo Miloniano patet .	To these three qualities some add magnificence of diction or μεγαλοπρέπεια as they call it this quality is not, however, suitable to all cases. For what place has language that rises above the ordinary level in the majority of private suits dealing with loans, letting and hiring and interdicts? Nor yet is it always expedient, as may be inferred from the passage just cited from the pro Milone.
1214	Et meminerimus multas esse causas , in quibus confitendum , excusandum , summittendum sit quod exponimus ; quibus omnibus aliena est illa magnificentiae virtus . Quare non magis proprium narrationis est magnifice dicere quam miserabiliter , invidiose , graviter , dulciter , urbane ; quae , cum suo quoque loco sint laudabilia , non sunt huic parti proprie adsignata et velut dedita .	We must remember, too, that there are many cases in which confession, excuse or modification are necessary with regard to our statements: and magnificence is a quality wholly out of keeping with such procedure. Magnificence of diction is therefore no more specially appropriate to the statement of facts than language calculated to excite pity or hatred, or characterised by dignity, charm or wit. Each of these qualities is admirable in its proper place, but none can be regarded as the peculiar and inalienable property of this portion of the speech.
1215	Illa quoque ut narrationi apta , ita ceteris quoque partibus communis est virtus , quam Theodectes huic uni proprie dedit ; non enim magnificam modo vult esse , verum etiam iucundam expositionem . Sunt qui adiiciant his evidentiam , quae ἐνάργεια Graece vocatur .	Theodectes asserts that the statement of facts should not merely be magnificent, but attractive in style. But this quality again though suitable enough to the statement of facts, is equally so in other portions of the speech. There are others who add palpability, which the Greeks call ἐνάργεια.
1216	Neque ego quemquam deceperim , ut dissimulem Ciceroni quoque plures partes placere . Nam praeterquam planam et brevem et credibilem vult esse evidentem , moratam cum dignitate . Sed in oratione morata debent esse omnia cum dignitate , quae poterunt . Evidentia in narratione , quantum ego intelligo , est quidem magna virtus , cum quid veri non dicendum , sed quodammodo etiam ostendendum est ; sed subiici perspicuitati potest , quam quidam etiam contrariam interim putaverunt , quia in quibusdam causis obscuranda veritas esset ; quod est ridiculum .	And I will not conceal the fact that Cicero himself holds that more qualities are required. For in addition to demanding that it should be plain, brief and credible, he would have it clear, characteristic and worthy of the occasion. But everything in a speech should be characteristic and worthy of the occasion as far as possible. Palpalility, as far as I understand the term, is no doubt a great virtue, when a truth requires not merely to be told, but to some extent obtruded, still it may be included under lucidity. Some, however, regard this quality as actually being injurious at times, on the ground that in certain cases it is desirable to obscure the truth. This contention is, however, absurd.