Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
761	Nam et Isocratis praestantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni studiorum genere , eoque iam seniore ( octavum enim et nonagesimum implevit annum ) postmeridianis scholis Aristoteles praecipere artem oratoriam coepit , noto quidem illo ( ut traditur ) versu ex Philocteta frequenter usus : Turpe esse tacere et Isocraten pati dicere . ars est utriusque , sed pluribus eam libris Aristoteles complexus est . Eodem tempore Theodectes fuit , de cuius opere supra dictum est .	From this point the roads begin to part. The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study, and when he was already advanced in years (and he lived to the age of ninety-eight), Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures, in which he frequently quoted the wel-known line from the Philoctetes in the form "Isocrates still speaks. 'Twere shame should I Sit silent." Both Aristotle and Isocrates left text-books on rhetoric, but that by Aristotle is the larger and contains more books. Theodectes, whose work I mentioned above,
762	Theophrastus quoque Aristotelis discipulus de rhetorice diligenter scripsit , atque hinc vel studiosius philosophi quam rhetores praecipueque Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes .	also lived about the same period: while Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, produced some careful work on rhetoric. After him we may note that the philosophers, more especially the leaders of the Stoic and Peripatetic schools, surpassed even the rhetoricians in the zeal which they devoted to the subject.
763	Fecit deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam , quam plurimi sunt secuti ; cui maxime par atque aemulus videtur Athenaeus fuisse . Multa post Apollonius Molon , multa Areus , multa Caecilius et Halicarnasseus Dionysius .	Hermagoras next carved out a path of his own, which numbers have followed: of his rivals Athenaeus seems to have approached him most nearly. Later still much work was done by Apollonius Molon, Areus, Caecilius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
764	Praecipue tamen in se converterunt studia Apollodorus Pergamenus , qui praeceptor Apolloniae Caesaris Augusti fuit , et Theodorus Gadareus , qui se dici maluit Rhodium , quem studiose audisse , cum in eam insulam secessisset , dicitur Tiberius Caesar .	But the rhetoricians who attracted the most enthusiastic following were Apollodorus of Pergamus, who was the instructor of Augustus Caesar at Apollonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called Theodorus of Rhodes: it is said that Tiberius Caesar during his retirement in that island was a constant attendant at his lectures.
765	Hi diversas opiniones tradiderunt , appellatique inde Apollodorei ac Theodorei ad morem certas in philosophia sectas sequendi . Sed Apollodori praecepta magis ex discipulis cognoscas , quorum diligentissimus in tradendo fuit Latine Gaius Valgius , Graece Atticus . Nam ipsius sola videtur Ars edita ad Matium , quia ceteras missa ad Domitium epistula non agnoscit . Plura scripsit Theodorus , cuius auditorem Hermagoran sunt qui viderint .	These rhetoricians taught different systems, and two schools have arisen known as the Apollodoreans and the Theodoreans, these names being modelled on the fashion of nomenclature in vogue with certain schools of philosophy. The doctrines of Apollodorus are best learned from his pupils, among whom Cains Valgius was the best interpreter of his master's views in Latin, Atticus in Greek. The only text-book by Apollodorus himself seems to be that addressed to Matius, as his letter to Domitius does not acknowledge the other works attributed to him. The writings of Theodorus were more numerous, and there are some still living who have seen his pupil Herinagoras.
766	Romanorum primus ( quantum ego quidem sciam ) condidit aliqua in hanc materiam M . Cato ille censorius , post M . Antonius inchoavit ; nam hoc solum opus eius atque id ipsum imperfectum manet . Secuti minus celebres ; quorum memoriam , si quo loco res poscet , non omittam .	The first Roman to handle the subject was, to the best of my belief, Marcus Cato, the famous censor, while after him Marcus Antonius began a treatise on rhetoric: I say "began," because only this one work of his survives, and that is incomplete. he was followed by others of less note, whose names I will not omit to mention, should occasion demand.
767	Praecipuum vero lumen sicut eloquentiae ita praeceptis quoque eius dedit , unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes , M . Tullius ; post quem tacere modestissimum foret , nisi et rhetoricos suos ipse adulescenti sibi elapsos diceret , et in oratoriis haec minora , quae plerumque desiderantur , sciens omisisset .	But it was Cicero who shed the greatest light not only on the practice but on the theory of oratory; for he stands alone among Romans as combining the gift of actual eloquence with that of teaching the art. With him for predecessor it would be more modest to be silent, but for the fact that he himself describes his Rhetorica as a youthful indiscreition, while in his later works on oratory he deliberately omitted the discussion of certain minor points, on which instruction is generally desired.
768	Scripsit de eadem materia non pauca Cornificius , aliqua Stertinius , nonnihil paler ( Gallio ; accuratius vero priores Gallione Celsus et Laenas et aetatis nostrae Verginius, Plinius , Tutilius . Sunt et hodie clari eiusdem operis auctores , qui si omnia complexi forent , consuluissent labori meo ; sed parco nominibus viventium ; ueniet eorum laudi suum tempus , ad posteros enim virtus durabit , non perveniet invidia .	Cornificius wrote a good deal, Stertinius something, and the elder Gallio a little on the same subject. But Gallio's predecessors, Celsus and Laenas, and in our own day Verginius, Pliny and Tutilius, have treated rhetoric with greater accuracy. Even to-day we have some distinguished writers on oratory who, if they had dealt with the subject more comprehensively, would have saved me the trouble of writing this book. But I will spare the names of the living. The time will come when they will reap their meed of praise; for their merits will endure to after generations, while the calunmies of envy will perish utterly.
769	Non tamen post tot ac tantos auctores pigebit meam quibusdam locis posuisse sententiam . Neque enim me cuiusquam sectae velut quadam superstitione imbutus addixi , et electuris quae volent facienda copia fuit , sicut ipse plurium in unum confero inventa , ubicunque ingenio non erit locus , curae testimonium meruisse contentus .	Still, although so many writers have preceded me, I shall not shrink from expressing my own opinion on certain points. I am not a superstitious adherent of any school, and as this book will contain a collection of the opinions of many different authurs, it was desirable to leave it to my readers to selcet what they will. I shall be content if they praise me for my industry, wherever there is no scope for originality.
770	Nec diu nos moretur quaestio , quae rhetorices origo sit . Nam cui dubium est , quia ; sermonem ab ipsa rerum natura geniti protinus homines acceperint ( quod certe principium est eius rei ) , huic studium et incrementum dederit utilitas , summam ratio et exercitatio ?	The question as to the origin of rhetoric need not keep us long. For who can doubt that mankind received the gift of speech from nature at its birth (for we can hardly go further back than that), while the usefulness of speech brought improvement and study, and finally method and exercise gave perfection?
771	Nec video , quare curam dicendi patent quidam inde coepisse , quod ii , qui in discrimen aliquod vocabantur , accuratius loqui defendendi sui gratia instituerint . Haec enim ut honestior causa , ita non utique prior est , cum praesertim accusatio praecedat defensionem ; nisi quis dicet , etiam gladium fabricatum ab eo prius , qui ferrum in tutelam sui quam qui in perniciem alterius compararit .	I cannot understand why some hold that the elaboration of speech originated in the fact that those who were in peril owing to some accusation being made against them, set themselves to speak with studied care for the purpose of their own defence. This, however, though a more honourable origin, cannot possibly be the earlier, for accusation necessarily precedes defence. You might as well assert that the sword was invented for the purpose of self-defence and not for aggression.
772	Initium ergo dicendi dedit natura , initium artis observatio . Homines enim , sicuti in medicina , cum viderent alia salubria , alia insalubria , ex observatione eorum effecerunt artem , ita , cum in dicendo alia utilia , alia inutilia deprehenderent , notarunt ea ad imitandum vitandumque , et quaedam secundum rationem eorum adiecerunt ipsi quoque ; haec confirmata sunt usu , tum quae sciebat quisque docuit .	It was, then, nature that created speech, and observation that originated the art of speaking. Just as men discovered the art of medicine by observing that some things were healthy and some the reverse, so they observed that some things were useful and some useless in speaking, and noted them for imitation or avoidance, while they added certain other precepts according as their nature suggested. These observations were confirmed by experience and each man proceeded to teach what he knew.
773	Cicero quidem initium orandi conditoribus urbium ac legum latoribus dedit , in quibus fuisse vim dicendi necesse est ; cur tamen hanc primam originem putet , non video , cum sint adhuc quaedam vagae et sine urbibus ac sine legibus gentes , et tamen qui sunt in iis nati et legationibus fungantur et accusent aliqua atque defendant et denique alium alio melius loqui credant .	Cicero, it is true, attributes the origin of oratory to the founders of cities and the makers of laws, who must needs have possessed the gift of eloquence. But why he thinks this the actual origin, I cannot understand, since there still exist certain nomad peoples without cities or laws, and yet members of these peoples perform the duties of ambassadors, accuse and defend, and regard one man as a better speaker than another.
774	Omnis autem orandi ratio , ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt , quinque partibus constat , inventione , dispositione , elocutione , memoria , pronuntiatione sive actione , utroque enim modo dicitur . Omnis vero sermo , quo quidem voluntas aliqua enuntiatur , habeat necesse est rem et verba .	The art of oratory, as taught by most authorities, and those the best, consists of five parts:- invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action (the two latter terms being used synonymously). But all speech expressive of purpose involves also a subject and words.
775	Ac si est brevis et una conclusione finitus , nihil fortasse ultra desideret ; at oratio longior plura exigit . Non tantum enim refert , quid et quo modo dicamus , sed etiam quo loco ; opus ergo est et dispositione . Sed neque omnia , quae res postulat , dicere neque suo quaeque loco poterimus nisi adiuvante memoria ; quapropter ea quoque pars quarta erit .	If such expression is brief and contained within the limits of one sentence, it may demand nothing more, but longer speeches require much more. For not only what we say and how we say it is of importance, but also the circumstances under which we say it. It is here that the need of arrangement comes in. But it will be impossible to say everything demanded by the subject, putting each thing in its proper place, without the aid of memory.
776	Verum haec cuncta corrumpit ac propemodum perdit indecora vel voce vel gestu pronuntiatio . Huic quoque igitur tribuendus est necessario quintus locus .	It is for this reason that memory forms the fourth department. But a delivery, which is rendered unbecoming cither by voice or gesture, spoils everything and almost entirely destroys the effect of what is said. Delivery therefore must be assigned the fifth place.
777	Nec audiendi quidam , quorum est Albucius , qui tris modo primas esse partes volunt , quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contigant: quarum nos praecepta suo loco dabimus ; licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit .	Those (and Albutins is among them), who maintain that there are only three departments on the ground that memory and delivery (for which I shall give instructions in their proper place ) are given us by nature not by art, may be disregarded, although Thrasymachus held the same views as regards delivery.
778	His adiecerunt quidam sextam partem , ita ut inventioni iudicium subnecterent , quia primum esset invenire , deinde iudicare . Ego porro ne invenisse quidem credo eum , qui non iudicavit ; neque enim contraria , communia , stulta invenisse dicitur quisquam , sed non vitasse .	Some have added a sixth department, subjoining judgment to invention, on the ground that it is necessary first to invented and then to exercise our judgment. For my own part I do not believe that invention can exist apart from judgement, since we do not say that a speaker has invented incousistent, two-edged or foolish arguments, but merely that he has failed to avoid them. It is true that Cicero in his Rhetorica
779	Et Cicero quidem in Rhetoricis iudicium subiecit invention ; mihi autem adeo tribus primis partibus videtur esse permixtum ( nam neque dispositio sine eo neque elocutio fuerit ) , ut pronuntiationem quoque vel plurimum ex eo mutuari putem .	includes judgment under mention; but in my opinion judgment is so inextricably mingled with the first three departments of rhetoric (for without judgment neither expression nor arrangement are possible), that I think that even delivery owes much to it.
780	Quod hoc audacius dixerim , quod in Partitionibus oratoriis ad easdem , de quibus supra dictum est , quinque pervenit partes . Nam cum dupliciter primum divisisset in inventionem atque elocutionem , res ac dispositionem inventioni , verba et pronuntiationem elocutioni dedit quintamque constituit , communem ac velut custodem omnium , memoriam . Idem in Oratore quinque rebus constare eloquentiam dicit , in quibus postea scriptis certior eius sententia est .	I say this with all the greater confidence because Cicero in his Partitiones oratoriae arrives at the same five-fold division of which I have just spoken. For after an initial division of oratory into invention and expression, he assigns matter and arrangement to invention, words and delivery to expression, and makes memory a fifth department common to them all and acting as their guardian. Again in the Orator he states that eloquence consists of five things, and in view of the fact that this is a later work we may accept this as his more settled opinion.
781	Non minus mihi cupidi novitatis alicuius videntur fuisse , qui adiecerunt ordinem , cum dispositionem dixissent , quasi aliud sit dispositio quam rerum ordine quam optimo collocatio . Dion inventionem modo et dispositionem tradidit sed utramque duplicem , rerum et verborum , ut sit elocutio inventionis , pronuntiatio dispositionis , his quinta pars memoriae , accedat . Theodorei fere inventionem duplicem , rerum atque elocutionis , deinde tris ceteras partes .	Others, who seem to me to have been no less desirous than those mentioned above to introduce some novelty, have added order, although they had already mentioned arrangement, as though arrangement was anything else than the marshalling of arguments in the best possible order. Dion taught that oratory consisted only of invention and arrangement, but added that each of these departments was twofold in nature, being concerned with words and things, so that expression comes under invention, and delivery under arrangement, while memory must be added as a fifth department. The followers of Theodorus divide invention into two parts, the one concerned with matter and the other with expression, and then add the three remaining departments.
782	Hermagoras iudicium , partitionem , ordinem , quaeque sunt elocutionis , subiicit oeconomiae , quae Graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret .	Hermagoras places judgment, division, order and everything relating to expression under the heading of economy, a Greek word meaning the management of domestic affairs which is applied metaphorically to oratory and has no Latin equivalent.
783	Est et circa hoc quaestio , quod memoriam in ordine partium quidam inventioni , quidam dispositioni subiunxerunt ; nobis quartus eius locus maxime placet . Non enim tantum inventa tenere , ut disponamus , nec disposita , ut eloquamur , sed etiam verbis formata memoriae mandare debemus . Hac enim omnia , quaecunque in orationem collata sunt , continentur .	A further question arises at this point, since some make memory follow invention in the list of departments, while others make it follow arrangement. Personally I prefer to place it fourth. For we ought not merely to retain in our minds the fruits of our invention, in order that we may be able to arrange them, or to remember our arraangement in order that we may express it, but we must also commit to memory the words which we propose to use, since memory embraces everything that goes to the compposition of a speech.
784	Fuerunt etiam in hac opinione non pauci , ut has non rhetorices partes esse existimarent sed opera oratoris ; eius enim esse invenire , disponere , eloqui et cetera .	There are also not a few who have held that these are not parts of rhetoric, but rather duties to be observed by the orator. For it is his business to invent, arrange, express, etcetera. If, however, we accept this view, we leave nothing to art.
785	Quod si accipimus , nihil arti relinquemus . Nam bene dicere est oratoris , rhetorice tamen erit bene dicendi scientia ; vel , ut alii putant , artificis est persuadere , vis autem persuadendi artis . Ita invenire quidem et disponere oratoris , inventio autem et dispositio rhetorices propria videri potest .	For although the orator's task is to speak well, rhetoric is the science of speaking well. Or if we adopt another view, the task of the artist is to persuade, while the power of persuasion resides in the art. Consequently, while it is the duty of the orator to invent and arrange, intention and arrangement may be regarded as belonging to rhetoric.
786	In eo plures dissenserunt , utrumne hae partes essent rhetorices an eiusdem opera an , ut Athenaeus credit , elementa , quae vocant στοιχεῖα Sed neque elementa recte quis dixerit , alioqui tantum initia erunt , ut mundi vel umor vel ignis vel materia vel corpora insecabilia ; nec operum recte nomen accipient , quae non ab allis perficiuntur , sed aliud ipsa perficiunt : partes igitur .	At this point there has been much disagreement, as to whether these are parts or duties of rhetoric, or, as Athenaeus believes, elements of rhetoric, which the Greeks call στοιχεῖα But they cannot correctly be called elements. For in that case we should have to regard them merely as first-principles, like the moisture, fire, matter or atoms of which the universe is said to be composed. Nor is it correct to call them duties, since they are not preformed by others, but perform something themselves. We must therefore conclude that they are parts.
787	Nam cum sit ex his rhetorice , fieri non potest ut , cum totum ex partibus constet , non sint partes totius ex quibus constat . Videntur autem mihi , qui haec opera dixerunt , eo quoque moti , quod in alia rursus divisione nollent in idem nomen incidere , partes enim rhetorices esse dicebant laudativam , deliberativam , iudicialem . Quae si partes sunt , materiae sunt potius quam artis .	For since rhetoric is composed of them, it follows that:, since a whole consists of parts, these must be parts of the whole which they compose. Those who have called them duties seem to me to have been further influenced by the fact that they wished to reserve the name of parts for another division of rhetoric: for they asserted that the parts of rhetoric were, panegyric, deliberative and forensic oratory. But if these are parts, they are parts rather of the material than of the art.
788	Namque in his singulis rhetorice tota est , quia et inventionem et dispositionem et elocutionem et memoriam et pronuntiationem quaecunque earum desiderat . Itaque quidam genera tria rhetorices dicere maluerunt , optime autem ii , quos secutus est Cicero , genera causarum .	For each of them contains the whole of rhetoric, since each of them requires invention, arrangement, expression, memory and delivery. Consequently some writers have thought it better to say that there are three kinds of oratory; those whom Cicero has followed seem to me to have taken the wisest course in terming them kinds of causes.
789	Sed tria an plura sint , ambigitur . Nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelem secuti , qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat , hac partitione contenti fuerunt .	There is, however, a dispute as to whether there are three kinds or more. But it is quite certain that all the most eminent authorities among ancient writers, following Aristotle who merely substituted the term public for deliberative, have been content with the threefold division.
790	Verum et tum leviter est temptatum , cum apud Graecos quosdam tum apud Ciceronem in libris de Oratore , et nunc maximo temporum nostrorum auctore prope impulsum , ut non modo plura haec genera , sed paene innumerabilia videantur .	Still a feeble attempt has been made by certain Greeks and by Cicero in his de Oratore, to prove that there are not merely more than three, but that the number of kinds is almost past calculation: and this view has almost been thrust down our throats by the greatest authority of our own times.
791	Nam si laudandi ac vituperandi officium in parte tertia ponimus , in quo genere versari videbimur , cum querimur , consolamur , mitigamus , concitamus , terremus , confirmamus , praecipimus , obscure dicta interpretamur , narramus , deprecamur , gratias agimus , gratulamur , obiurgamus , maledicimus , describimus , mandamus , renuntiamus , optamus , opinamur , plurima alia ?	Indeed if we place the task of praise and denunciation in the third division, on what kind of oratory are we to consider ourselves to be employed, when we complain, console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage, instruct, explain obscurities, narrate, plead for mercy, thank, congratulate, reproach, abuse, describe, command, retract, express our desires and opinions, to mention no other of the many possibilities?
792	ut mihi in illa vetere persuasione permanenti velut petenda sit venia , quaerendunque , quo moti priores rem tam late fusam tam breviter astrinxerint . Quos qui errasse putant , hoc secutos arbitrantur , quod in his fere versari tum oratores videbant ;	As an adherent of the older view I must ask for indulgence and must enquire what was the reason that led earlier writers to restrict a subject of such variety to such narrow bounds. Those who think such authorities in error hold that they were influenced by the fact that these three subjects practically exhausted the range of ancient oratory.
793	nam et laudes ac vituperationes scribebantur , et ἐπιταφίους dicere erat moris , et plurimum in consiliis ac iudiciis insumebatur operae , ut scriptores artium pro solis comprehenderint frequentissima .	For it was customary to write panegyrics and denunciations and to deliver funeral orations, while the greater part of their activities was devoted to the law-courts and deliberative assemblies; as a result, they say, the old writers of text-books only included those kinds of oratory which were most in vogue.
794	Qui vero defendunt , tria faciunt genera auditorum , unum , quod ad delectationem conveniat , alterum , quod consilium accipiat , tertium , quod de causis iudicet . Mihi cuncta rimanti et talis quaedam ratio succurrit , quod omne orationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia .	The defenders of antiquity point out that there are three kinds of audience: one which comes simply for the sake of getting pleasure, a second which meets to receive advice, a third to give judgement on causes. In the course of a thorough enquiry into the question it has occurred to me that the tasks of oratory must either be concerned with the law-courts or with themes lying outside the law-courts.
795	Eorum , de quibus iudicio quaeritur , manifestum est genus ; ea , quae ad iudicem non veniunt , aut praeteritum habent tempus aut futurum ; praeterita laudamus aut vituperamus , de futuris deliberamus .	The nature of the questions into which enquiry is made in the courts is obvious. As regards those matters which do not come before a judge, they must necessarily be concerned either with the past or the future. We praise or denounce past actions, we deliberate about the future.
796	Item omnia , de quibus dicendum est , aut certa sint necesse est aut dubia . Certa , ut cuique est animus , laudat aut culpat ; ex dubiis partim nobis ipsis ad electionem sunt libera , de his deliberatur ; partim aliorum sententiae commissa , de his lite contenditur .	Again everything on which we have to speak must be either certain or doubtful. We praise or blame what is certain, as our inclination leads us: on the other hand where doubt exists, in some cases we are free to form our own views, and it is here that deliberation comes in, while in others, we leave the problem to the decision of others, and it is on these that litigation takes place.
797	Anaximenes iudicialem et contionalem generales partes esse voluit , septem autem species : hortandi , dehortandi , laudandi , vituperandi , accusandi , defendendi , exquirendi , quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit ; quarum duae primae deliberativi , duae sequentes demonstrativi , tres ultimae iudicialis generis sunt partes .	Anaximenes regarded forensic and public oratory as genera but held that there were seven species :— exhortation, dissuasion, praise, denunciation, accusation, defence, inquiry, or as he called it ἐξεταστικόν. The first two, however, clearly belong to deliberative, the next to demonstrative, the three last to forensic oratory.
798	Protagoran transeo , qui interrogandi , respondendi , mandandi , precandi , quod εὐχωλήν dixit , partes solas putat . Plato in Sophiste iudiciali et contionali tertiam adiecit προσομιλητικήν , quam sane permittamus nobis dicere sermocinatricem ; quae a forensi ratione diiungitur et est accommodata privatis disputationibus , cuius vis eadem profecto est quae dialecticae .	I say nothing of Protagoras, who held that oratory was to be divided only into the following heads: question and answer, command and entreaty, or as he calls it εὐχωλή. Plato in his Sophist in addition to public and forensic oratory introduces a third kind which he styles προσομιλητική, which I will permit myself to translate by "conversational." This is distinct from forensic oratory and is adapted for private discussions, and we may regard it as identical with dialectic.