Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
|
|
| 1293 |
Sed ut non semper est necessaria post narrationem illa procursio , ita frequenter utilis ante quaestionem praeparatio , utique si prima specie minus erit favorabilis , si legem asperam ac poenarias actiones tuebimur . Est hic locus velut sequentis exordii ad conciliandum probationibus nostris iudicem , mitigandum , concitandum . Quod liberius hic et vehementius fieri potest , quia iudici nota iam causa est .
|
But, though such digressions are not always necessary at the end of the statement, they may form a very useful preparation for the examination of the main question, more especially if at first sight it presents an aspect unfavourable to our case, if we have to support a harsh law or demand severe punishment. For this is the place for inserting what may be regarded as a second exordium with a view to exciting or mollifying the judge or disposing him to lend a favouring ear to our proofs. Moreover we can do this with all the greater freedom and vehemence at this stage of the proceedings since the case is already known to the judge. |
| 1294 |
His igitur velut fomentis , si quid erit asperum , praemolliemus , quo facilius aures iudicum quae post dicturi erimus admittant , ne ius nostrum oderint . Nihil enim facile persuadetur invitis .
|
We shall therefore employ such utterances as emollients to soften the harder elements of our statement, in order that the ears of the jury may be more ready to take in what we have to say in the sequel and to grant us the justice which we ask. For it is hard to persuade a man to do anything against the grain. |
| 1295 |
Quo loco iudicis quoque noscenda natura est , iuri magis an aequo sit appositus ; proinde enim magis aut minus erit hoc necessarium . Ceterum res eadem et post quaestionem perorationis vice fungitur .
|
It is also important on such occasions to know whether the judge prefers equity or a strict interpretation of the law, since the necessity for such digression will vary accordingly. |
| 1296 |
Hanc partem παρέκβασιν vocant Graeci , Latini egressum vel egressionem . Sed hae sunt plures , ut dixi , quae per totam causam varios habent excursus , ut laus hominum locorumque , ut descriptio regionum , expositio quarundam rerum gestarum , vel etiam fabulosarum .
|
Such passages may also serve as a kind of peroration after the main question. The Greeks call this παρέκβασις, the Romans egressus or egressio (digression). They may however, as I have said, be of various kinds and may deal with different themes in any portion of the speech. For instance we may extol persons or places, describe regions, record historical or even legendary occurrences. |
| 1297 |
Quo ex genere est in orationibus contra Verrem compositis Siciliae laus , Proserpinae raptus ; pro C . Cornelio popularis illa virtutum Cn . Pompei commemoratio , in quam ille divinus orator , velut nomine ipso ducis cursus dicendi teneretur , abrupto quem inchoaverat sermone devertit actutum .
|
As examples I may cite the praise of Sicily and the rape of Proserpine in the Verrines, or the famous recital of the virtues of Gneius Pompeius in the pro Cornelio, where the great orator as though the course of his eloquence had been broken by the mere mention of the general's name, interrupts the topic on which he had already embarked and digresses forthwith to sing his praises. |
| 1298 |
Παρέκβασις est , ut mea quidem fert opinio , alicuius rei , sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis extra ordinem excurrens tractatio . Quapropter non video cur hunc ei potissimum locum adsignent , qui rerum ordinem sequitur , non magis quam illud , cur hoc nomen ita demum proprium putent , si aliquid in digressu sit exponendum , cum tot modis a recto itinere declinet oratio .
|
παρέκβασις may, I think, be defined as the handling of some theme, which must however have some bearing on the case, in a passage that involves digression from the logical order of our speech. I do not see therefore why it should be assigned a special position immediately following on the statement of facts any more than I understand why they think that the name is applicable only to a digression where some statement has to be made, when there are so many different ways in which a speech may leave the direct route. |
| 1299 |
Nam quidquid dicitur praeter illas quinque quas fecimus partes , egressio est , indignatio , miseratio , invidia , convicium , excusatio , conciliatio , maledictorum refutatio . Similia his , quae non sunt in quaestione , omnis amplificatio , minutio , omne adfectus genus , et quae maxime iucundam et ornatam faciunt orationem , de luxuria , de avaritia , religione , officiis ; quae cum sint argumentis subiecta similium rerum , quia cohaerent , egredi non videntur .
|
For whatever we say that falls outside the five divisions of the speech already laid down is a digression, whether it express indignation, pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation or be designed to rebut invective. Other similar occasions for digression on points not involved by the question at issue arise when we amplify or abridge a topic, make any kind of emotional appeal or introduce any of those topics which add such charm and elegance to oratory, topics that is to say such as luxury, avarice, religion, duty: but these would hardly seem to be digressions as they are so closely attached to arguments on similar subjects that they form part of the texture of the speech. |
| 1300 |
Sed plurima sunt , quae rebus nihil secum cohaerentibus inseruntur , quibus iudex reficitur , admonetur , placatur , rogatur , laudatur . Innumerabilia sunt haec , quorum alia sic praeparata adferimus , quaedam ex occasione vel necessitate ducimus , si quid nobis agentibus novi accidit , interpellatio , interventus alicuius , tumultus .
|
There are however a number of topics which are inserted in the midst of matter which has no connexion with them, when for example we strive to excite, admonish, appease, entreat or praise the judge. Such passages are innumerable. Some will have been carefully prepared beforehand, while others will be produced to suit the occasion or the necessity of the moment, if anything extraordinary should occur in the course of our pleading, such as an interruption, the intervention of some individual or a disturbance. |
| 1301 |
Unde Ciceroni quoque in prooemio , cum diceret pro Milone , digredi fuit necesse , ut ipsa oratiuncula qua usus est patet . Potest autem paulo longius exire , qui praeparat aliquid ante quaestionem et qui finitae probationi velut commendationem adiicit At qui ex media erumpit , cito ad id redire debet unde devertit .
|
For example, this made it necessary for Cicero to digress even in the exordium when he was defending Milo, as is clear from the short speech which he made on that occasion. But the orator who makes some preface to the main question or proposes to follow up his proofs with a passage designed to commend them to the jury, may digress at some length. On the other hand, if he breaks as say in the middle of his speech, he should not be long in returning to the point from which he departed. |
| 1302 |
Sunt qui narrationi propositionem subiungant tanquam partem iudicialis materiae , cui opinioni respondimus . Mihi autem propositio videtur omnis confirmationis initium , quod non modo in ostendenda quaestione principali , sed nonnunquam etiam in singulis argumentis poni solet maximeque in iis quae ἐπιχειρήματα vocantur . Sed nunc de priore loquimur . Ea non semper uti necesse est .
|
IV. After the statement of facts some place the proposition which they regard as forming a division of a forensic speech. I have already expressed my opinion of this view. But it seems to me that the beginning of every proof is a proposition, such as often occurs in the demonstration of the main question and sometimes even in the enunciation of individual arguments, more especially of those which are called ἐπιχειρήματα But for the moment I shall speak of the first kind. It is not always necessary to employ it. |
| 1303 |
Aliquando enim sine propositione quoque satis manifestum est quid in quaestione versetur , utique si narratio ibi finem habet , ubi initium quaestio , adeo , ut aliquando subiungatur expositioni , quae solet in argumentis esse summa collectio : haec , sicut exposui , ita gesta sunt , iudices ; insidiator superatus est , vi victa vis vel potius oppressa vir tute audacia est .
|
The nature of the main question is sometimes sufficiently clear without any proposition, especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where the question begins. Consequently the recapitulation generally employed in the case of arguments is sometimes placed immediately after the statement of facts. " The affair took place, as I have described, gentlemen: he that laid the ambush was defeated, violence was conquered by violence, or rather I should say audacity was crushed by valour. " |
| 1304 |
Nonnunquam vero valde est utilis , ubi res defendi non potest et de fine quaeritur , ut pro eo , qui pecuniam privatam de templo sustulit , Sacrilegii agitur , de sacrilegio cognoscitis , ut iudex intelligat id unum esse officii sui , quaerere an id quod obiicitur sacrilegium sit .
|
Sometimes proposition is highly advantageous, more especially when the fact cannot be defended and the question turns on the definition of the fact; as for example in the case of the man who has taken the money of a private individual from a temple: we shall say, "My client is charged with sacrilege. It is for you to decide whether it was sacrilege, " so that the judge may understand that his sole duty is to decide whether the charge is tantamount to sacrilege. |
| 1305 |
Item in causis obscuris aut multiplicibus , nec semper propter hoc solum ut sit causa lucidior , sed aliquando etiam ut magis moveat . Movet autem , si protinus subtexantur aliqua , quae prosint . Lex aperte scripta est ut peregrinus qui murum ascenderit morte multetur ; peregrinum te esse cerium est ; quin ascenderis murum , non quaeritur ; quid superest , nisi ut te puniri oporteat ? Haec enim propositio confessionem adversarii premit et quodammodo iudicandi moram tollit , nec indicat quaestionem sed adiuvat .
|
The same method may be employed in obscure or complicated cases, not merely to make the case clearer, but sometimes also to make it more moving. This effect will be produced, if we at once support our pleading with some such words as the following: " It is expressly stated in the law that for any foreigner who goes up on to the wall the penalty is death. You are undoubtedly a foreigner, and there is no question but that you went up on to the wall. The conclusion is that you must submit to the penalty. " For this proposition forces a confession upon our opponent and to a certain extent accelerates the decision of the court. It does more than indicate the question, it contributes to its solution. |
| 1306 |
Sunt autem propositiones et simplices et duplices vel multiplices , quod accidit non uno modo . Nam et plura crimina iunguntur , ut cum Socrates accusatus est , quod corrumperet iuventutem et novas superstitiones introduceret ; et singula ex pluribus colliguntur , ut cum legatio male gesta obiicitur Aeschini , quod mentitus sit , quod nihil ex mandatis fecerit , quod moratus sit , quod munera acceperit .
|
Propositions may be single, double or manifold: this is due to more than one reason. For several charges may be combined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and of introducing new superstitions; while single propositions may be made up of a number of arguments, as for instance when Aeschines is accused of misconduct as an ambassador on the ground that he lied, failed to carry out his instructions, wasted time and accepted bribes. |
| 1307 |
Recusatio quoque plures interim propositiones habet , ut contra petitionem pecuniae : Male petis , procuratorem enim tibi esse non licuit , sed neque illi , cuius nomine litigas , habere procuratorem ; sed neque est heres eius , a quo accepisse mutuam dicor nec ipsi debui .
|
The defence may also contain several propositions: for instance against a claim for money we may urge, " Your claim is invalid; for you had no right to act as agent nor had the party whom you represent any right to employ an agent: further, he is not the heir of the man from whom it is asserted that I borrowed the money, nor am I his debtor. " |
| 1308 |
Multiplicari haec in quantum libet possunt , sed rem ostendisse satis est . Hae si ponantur singulae subiectis probationibus , plures sunt propositiones ; si coniungantur , in partitionem cadunt .
|
These propositions can be multiplied at pleasure, but it is sufficient to give an indication of my meaning. If propositions are put forward singly with the proofs appended, they will form several distinct propositions: if they are combined, they fall under the head of partition. |
| 1309 |
Est et nuda propositio , qualis fere in coniecturalibus , Caedis ago , furtum obiicio ; est ratione subiecta , ut Maiestatem minuit C . Cornelius ; nam codicem tribunus plebis ipse pro contione legit . Praeter haec utimur propositione aut nostra , ut Adulterium obiicio ; aut adversarii , ut Adulterii mecum agitur , aut communi , ut Inter me et adversarium quaestio est , uter sit intestato propior Nonnumquam diversas quoque iungimus : Ego hoc dico , adversarius hoc .
|
A proposition may also be put forward unsupported, as is generally done in conjectural cases: "The formal accusation is one of murder, but I also charge the accused with theft." Or it may be accompanied by a reason: " Gaius Cornelius is guilty of an offence against the state; for when he was tribune of the plebs, he himself read out his bill to the public assembly. " I In addition to these forms of proposition we can also introduce a proposition of our own, such as "I accuse him of adultery," or may use the proposition of our opponent, such as "The charge brought against me is one of adultery," or finally we may employ a proposition which is common to both sides, such as " The question in dispute between myself and my opponent is, which of the two is next-of-kin to the deceased who died intestate. " Sometimes we may even couple contradictory propositions, as for instance "I say this, my opponent says that." |
| 1310 |
Habet interim vim propositionis , etiamsi per se non est propositio , eum exposito rerum ordine subiicimus : De his cognoscetis , ut sit haec commonitio iudicis , quo se ad quaestionem acrius intendat et velut quodam tactu resuscitatus fine esse narrationis et initium probationis intelligat , et nobis confirmationem ingredientibus ipse quoque quodammodo novum audiendi sumat exordium .
|
We may at times produce the effect of a proposition, even though it is not in itself a proposition, by adding after the statement of facts some phrase such as the following: "These are the points on which you will give your decision," thereby reminding the judge to give special attention to the question and giving him a fillip to emphasise the point that we have finished the statement of facts and are beginning the proof, so that when we start to verify our statements he may realise that he has reached a fresh stage where he must begin to listen with renewed attention. |
| 1311 |
Partitio est nostrarum aut adversarii propositionum aut utrarumque ordine collocata enumeratio . Hac quidam utendum semper putant , quod ea fiat causa lucidior et iudex attentior ac docilior , si scierit et de quo dicamus et de quo dicturi postea simus .
|
V. Partition may be defined as the enumeration in order of our own propositions, those of our adversary or both. It is held by some that this is indispensable on the ground that it makes the case clearer and the judge more attentive and more ready to be instructed, if he knows what we are speaking about and what we are going subsequently to speak about. |
| 1312 |
Rursus quidam periculosum id oratori arbitrantur duabus ex causis : quod nonnunquam et excidere soleant quae promisimus et , si qua in partiendo praeterimus , occurrere ; quod quidem nemini accidet , nisi qui plane vel nullo fuerit ingenio vel ad agendum nihil cogitati praemeditatique detulerit .
|
Others, on the contrary, think that such a course is dangerous to the speaker on two grounds, namely that sometimes we may forget to perform what we have promised and may, on the other hand, come upon something which we have omitted in the partition. But this will never happen to anyone unless he is either a fool or has come into court without thinking out his speech in detail beforehand. |
| 1313 |
Alioqui quae tam manifesta et lucida est ratio quam rectae partitionis ? Sequitur enim naturam ducem adeo ut memoriae id maximum sit auxilium via dicendi non decedere . Quapropter ne illos quidem probaverim , qui partitionem vetant ultra tres propositiones extendere . Quae sine dubio , si nimium sit multiplex , fugiet memoriam iudicis et turbabit intentionem ; hoc tamen numero velut lege non est alliganda , cum possit causa plures desiderare .
|
Besides, what can be simpler or clearer than a straightforward partition ? It follows nature as a guide and the adhesion to a definite method is actually of the greatest assistance to the speaker's memory. Therefore I cannot approve the view even of those who lay down that partition should not extend beyond the length of three propositions. No doubt there is a danger, if our partition is too complicated, that it may slip the memory of the judge and disturb his attention. But that is no reason why it should be tied down to a definite number of propositions, since the case may quite conceivably require more. |
| 1314 |
Alia sunt magis , propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum : primum , quia pleraque gratiora sunt , si inventa subito nec domo adlata , sed inter dicendum ex re ipsa nata videantur , unde illa non iniucunda schemata , Paene excidit mihi , et Fugerat me , et Recte admones . Propositis enim probationibus omnis in reliquum gratia novitatis praecerpitur .
|
There are further reasons why we should sometimes dispense with partition. In the first place there are many points which can be produced in a more attractive manner, if they appear to be discovered on the spot and not to have been brought ready made from our study, but rather to have sprung from the requirements of the case itself while we were speaking. Thus we get those not unpleasing figures such as "It has almost escaped me, "I had forgotten," or "You do well to remind me." For if we set forth all that we propose to prove in advance, we shall deprive ourselves of the advantage springing from tile charm of novelty. |
| 1315 |
Interim vero etiam fallendus est iudex et variis artibus subeundus , ut aliud agi quam quod petimus putet . Nam est nonnunquam dura propositio , quod iudex si providit , non aliter praeformidat quam qui ferrum medici priusquam curetur aspexit ; at si re non ante proposita securum ac nulla denuntiatione in se conversum intrarit oratio , efficiet , quod promittenti non crederetur .
|
Sometimes we shall even have to hoodwink the judge and work upon him by various artifices so that he may think that our aim is other than what it really is. For there are cases when a proposition may be somewhat startling: if the judge foresees this, he will shrink from it in advance, like a patient who catches sight of the surgeon's knife before the operation. On the other hand, if we have given him no preliminary notice and our words take him unawares, without his interest in them having been previously roused by any warning, we shall gain a credence which we should not have secured had we stated that we were going to raise the point. |
| 1316 |
Interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est , sed omnino tractatio ; adfectibus turbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor . Non enim solum oratoris est docere , sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet . Cui rei contraria est maxime tenuis illa et scrupulose in partes secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre .
|
At times we must not merely avoid distinguishing between the various questions, but must omit them altogether, while our audience must be distracted by appeals to the emotion and their attention diverted. For the duty of the orator is not merely to instruct: the power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals. Now there is no room for passion if we devote our attention to minute and microscopic division at a time when we are seeking to mislead the judgment of the person who is trying the case. |
| 1317 |
Quid quod interim , quae per se levia sunt et infirma , turba valent ? Ideoque congerenda sunt potius et velut eruptione pugnandum ; quod tamen rarum esse debet et ex necessitate demum , cum hoc ipsum quod dissimile rationi est coegerit ratio .
|
Again, there are certain arguments which are weak and trivial when they stand alone, but which have great force when produced in a body. We must, therefore, concentrate such arguments, and our tactics should be those of a sudden charge in mass. This, however, is a practice which should be resorted to but rarely and only under extreme necessity when reason compels us to take a course which is apparently irrational. |
| 1318 |
Praeter haec in omni partitione est utique aliquid potentissimum , quod cum audivit iudex cetera tanquam supervacua gravari solet . Itaque si plura vel obiicienda sunt vel diluenda , et utilis et iucunda partitio est ut , quid quaque de re dicturi simus , ordine appareat ; at si unum crimen varie defendemus , supervacua .
|
In addition it must be pointed out that in any partition there is always some one point of such special importance, that when the judge has heard it he is impatient with the remainder, which he regards as superfluous. Consequently if we have to prove or refute a number of points partition will be both useful and attractive, since it will indicate in order what we propose to say on each subject. On the other hand, if we are defending one point on various grounds partition will be unnecessary. |
| 1319 |
Ut si illa partiamur , Dicam non talem esse hunc quem tueor reum , ut in eo credibile videri possit homicidium ; dicam occidendi causam huic non fuisse ; dicam hunc eo tempore quo homo occisus est trans mare fuisse , omnia , quae ante id quod ultimum est exsequeris , inania videri necesse est .
|
If you were to make a partition such as the following, " I will not say that the character of my client is such as to render him incapable of murder, I will only say that he had no motive for murder and that at the time when the deceased was killed he was overseas, " in that case all the proofs which you propose to bring before this, the final proof, must needs seem superfluous to the judge. |
| 1320 |
Festinat enim iudex ad id quod potentissimum est . et velut obligatum promisso patronum , si est patientior , tacitus appellat ; si vel occupatus vel in aliqua potestate vel etiam si moribus incompositus , cum convicio efflagitat .
|
For the judge is always in a hurry to reach the most important point. If he has a patient disposition he will merely make a silent appeal to the advocate, whom he will treat as bound by his promise. On the other hand, if he is busy, or holds exalted position, or is intolerant by nature, he will insist in no very courteous manner on his coming to the point. |
| 1321 |
Itaque non defuerunt , qui Ciceronis illam pro Cluentio partitionem improbarent , qua se dicturum esse promisit primum , neminem maioribus criminibus , gravioribus testibus , in iudicium vocatum quam Oppianicum ; deinde praeiudicia esse facta ab ipsis iudicibus , a quibus condemnatus sit ; postremo , iudicium pecunia temptatum non a Cluentio , sed contra Cluentium ; quia , si probari posset , quod est tertium ,
|
For these reasons there are some who disapprove of the partition adopted by Cicero in the pro Cluentio, where he premises that he is going to show, first, " that no man was ever arraigned for greater crimes or on stronger evidence than Oppianicus, " secondly, "that previous judgments had been passed by those very judges by whom he was condemned," and finally, "that Cluentius made no attempt to bribe the jury, but that his opponent did." They argue that if the third point can be proved, there is no need to have urged the two preceding. |
| 1322 |
nihil necesse fuerit dicere priora . Rursus nemo tam erit iniustus aut stultus , quin eum fateatur optime pro Murena esse partitum : Intelligo , indices , tris totius accusationis fuisse partis , et earum unam in reprehensione vitae , alteram in contentione dignitatis , tertiam in criminibus ambitus esse versatam . Nam sic et ostendit lucidissime causam et nihil fecit altero supervacuum .
|
On the other hand you will find no one so unreasonable or so foolish as to deny that the partition in the pro Murena is admirable. " I understand, gentlemen, that the accusation falls into three parts, the first aspersing my client's character, the second dealing with his candidature for the magistracy, and the third with charges of bribery. " These words make the case as clear as possible, and no one division renders any other superfluous. |
| 1323 |
De illo quoque genere defensionis plerique dubitant : Si occidi , recte feci ; sed non occidi ; quo enim prius pertinere , si sequens firmum sit ? haec invicem obstare , et utroque utentibus in neutro haberi fidem . Quod sane in parte verum est , et illo sequenti , si modo indubitabile est ,
|
There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may exemplify as follows: "If I murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him." What, they ask, is the value of the first part, if the second can be proved, since they are mutually inconsistent, and if anyone employs both arguments, we should believe neither? This contention is partially justified; we should employ the second alone only if the fact can be proved without a doubt. |
| 1324 |
sit solo utendum . At si quid in eo , quod est fortius , timebimus , utraque probatione nitemur . Alius enim alio moveri solet , et qui factum putavit , iustum credere potest ; qui tanquam iusto non movebitur , factum fortasse non credet . Ut certa manus uno telo possit esse contenta , incerta plura spargenda sunt ,
|
But if we have any doubts as to being able to prove the stronger argument, we shall do well to rely on both. Different arguments move different people. He who thinks that the act was committed may regard it as a just act, while he who is deaf to the plea that the act was just may perhaps believe that it was never committed: one who is confident of his powers as a marksman may be content with one shaft, whereas he who has no such confidence will do well to launch several and give fortune a chance to come to his assistance. |
| 1325 |
ut sit et fortunate locus . Egregie vero Cicero pro Milone insidiatorem primum Clodium ostendit , tum addidit ex abundanti , etiamsi id non fuisset , talem tamen civem cum summa virtute interfectoris et gloria necari potuisse .
|
Cicero in the pro Milone reveals the utmost skill in showing first that Clodius laid an ambush for Milo and then in adding as a supernumerary argument that, even if he had not done so, he was nevertheless so bad a citizen that his slaying could only have done credit to the patriotism of the slayer and redounded to his glory. |
| 1326 |
Neque illum tamen ordinem , de quo prius dixi , damnaverim ; quia quaedam , etiamsi ipsa sunt dura , in id tamen valent , ut ea molliant quae sequuntur . Nec omnino sine ratione est quod vulgo dicitur : Iniquum petendum , ut aequum feras .
|
I would not however entirely condemn the order mentioned above, since there are certain arguments which, though hard in themselves, may serve to soften those which come after. The proverb, "If you want to get your due, you must ask for something more," |
| 1327 |
Quod tamen nemo sic accipiat ut omnia credat audenda . Recte enim Graeci praecipiunt , Non temptanda , quae effici omnino non possint . Sed quotiens hac , de qua loquor , duplici defensione utemur , id laborandum est , ut in illam partem sequentem fides ex priore ducatur . Potest enim videri , qui tuto etiam confessurus fuit , mentiendi causam in negando non habere .
|
is not wholly unreasonable. Still no one should interpret it to mean that you must stop short of nothing. For the Greeks are right when they lay it down as a rule that we should not attempt the impossible. But whenever the double-barrelled defence of which I am speaking is employed, we must aim at making the first argument support the credibility of the second. For he who might without danger to himself have confessed to the commission of the act, can have no motive for lying when he denies the commission. |
| 1328 |
Et illud utique faciendum est , ut , quotiens suspicabimur a iudice aliam probationem desiderari quam de qua loquimur , promittamus nos plene et statim de eo satis esse facturos , praecipueque si de pudore agetur .
|
Above all it is important, whenever we suspect that the judge desires a proof other than that on which we are engaged, to promise that we will satisfy him on the point fully and without delay, more especially if the question is one of our client's honour. |
| 1329 |
Frequenter autem accidit , ut causa parum verecunda iure tuta sit ; de quo ne inviti iudices audiant et aversi , frequentius sunt admonendi , secuturam defensionem probitatis et dignitatis ; exspectent paulum et agi ordine sinant .
|
But it will often happen that a discreditable case has the law on its side, and to prevent the judges giving us only a grudging and reluctant hearing on the point of law, we shall have to warn them with some frequency that we shall shortly proceed to defend our client's honour and integrity, if they will only wait a little and allow us to follow the order of our proofs. |
| 1330 |
Quaedam interim nos invitis litigatoribus simulandum est dicere , quod Cicero pro Cluentio facit circa iudiciariam legem ; nonnunquam , quasi interpellemur ab iis , subsistere ; saepe convertenda ad ipsos oratio ; hortandi ut sinant nos uti nostro consilio . Ita surrepetur animo iudicis et , dum sperat probationem pudoris , asperioribus illis minus repugnabit .
|
We may also at times pretend to say certain things against the wishes of our clients, as Cicero does in the pro Cluentio when he discusses the law dealing with judicial corruption. Occasionally we may stop, as though interrupted by our clients, while often we shall address them and exhort them to let us act as we think best. Thus we shall make a gradual impression on the mind of the judge, and, buoyed up by the hope that we are going to clear our client's honour, he will be less ill-disposed toward the harder portions of our proof. And when he has accepted these, |