Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1787	Nam cum irasci , favere , odisse , misereri coeperunt , agi iam rem suam existimant ; et , sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt , quia sensum oculorum praecipit animus , ita omnem veritatis inquirendae rationem iudex omittit occupatus adfectibus ; aestu fertur et velut rapido flumini obsequitur .	For as soon as they begin to be angry, to feel favourably disposed, to hate or pity, they begin to take a personal interest in the case, and just as lovers are incapable of forming a reasoned judgment on the beauty of the object of their affections, because passion forestalls the sense of sight, so the judge, when overcome by his emotions, abandons all attempt to enquire into the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the tide of passion, and yields himself unquestioning to the torrent.
1788	Ita argumenta ac testes quid egerint , pronuntiatio ostendit ; commotus autem ab oratore iudex , quid sentiat , sedens adhuc atque audiens confitetur . An cum ille , qui plerisque perorationibus petitur , fletus erumpit , non palam dicta sententia est ? Huc igitur incumbat orator , hoc opus , hic labor est , sine quo cetera nuda , ieiuna , infirma , ingrata sint ; adeo velut spiritus operis huius atque animus est in adfectibus . Horum autem ,	Thus the verdict of the court shows how much weight has been carried by the arguments and the evidence; but when the judge has been really moved by the orator he reveals his feelings while he is still sitting and listening to the case. When those tears, which are the aim of most perorations, well forth from his eyes, is he not giving his verdict for all to see? It is to this, therefore, that the orator must devote all his powers, "There lie the task and toil!" Without this all else is bare and meagre, weak and devoid of charm. For it is in its power over the emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be found.
1789	sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus , duae sunt species : alteram Graeci πάθος vocant , quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus , alteram Ἦθος cuius nomine , ut ego quidem sentio , caret sermo Romanus ; mores appellantur , atque inde pars quoque illa philosophiae ἠθική moralis est dicta .	Emotions however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is called pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by adfectus (emotion): the other is called ethos, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent: it is however rendered by mores (morals) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us.
1790	Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur quam morum quaedam proprietas ; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus mentis continetur . Cautiores voluntatem complecti quam nomina interpretari maluerunt . Adfectus igitur πάθος concitatos , Ἦθος mites atque compositos esse dixerunt ; in altero vehementer commotos , in altero lenes ; denique hos imperare , illos persuadere ; hos ad perturbationem , illos ad benivolentiam praevalere .	But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects; for the term morals includes every attitude of the mind. The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill.
1791	Adiiciunt quidam ? Ἦθος perpetuum , πάθος temporale esse . Quod ut accidere frequentius fateor , ita nonnullas credo esse materias , quae continuum desiderent adfectum . Nec tamen minus artis aut usus hi leniores habent , virium atque impetus non tantundem exigunt . In causis vero etiam pluribus versantur , immo secundum quendam intellectum in omnibus .	Some add that ethos is continuous, while pathos is momentary. While admitting that this is usually the ease, I still hold that there are some subjects which demand that the more violent emotion should be continuous. But, although the gentler emotions require less force and impetus, they call for no less art and experience than the more vehement, and are demanded in a greater number of cases, indeed in a certain sense they are required in all.
1792	Nam cum ex illo ethico loco nihil non ab oratore tractetur , quidquid de honestis et utilibus , denique faciendis et non faciendis dicitur , Ἦθος vocari potest . Quidam commendationem atque excusationem propria huius officii putauerunt , nec abnuo esse ista in hac parte ; sed non concedo ut sola sint . Quin illud adhuc adiicio ,	For as everything treated by the orator may be regarded from the ethical standpoint, we may apply the word ethos whenever he speaks of what is honourable and expedient or of what ought or ought not to be done. Some regard commendation and excuse as the peculiar spheres of ethos, but while I admit that they do fall within its sphere, I do not regard them as being alone in so doing.
1793	πάθος atque Ἦθος esse interim ex eadem natura , ita ut illud maius sit , hoc minus , ut amor πάθος caritas Ἦθος interdum diversa inter se , sicut in epilogis , nam quae πάθος concitavit , Ἦθος solet mitigare . Proprie tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est , quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari videtur .	Indeed I would add that pathos and ethos are sometimes of the same nature, differing only in degree; love for instance comes under the head of pathos, affection of ethos; sometimes however they differ, a distinction which is important for the peroration, since ethos is generally employed to calm the storm aroused by pathos. I ought however to explain what is meant by ethos in greater detail, since the term is not in itself sufficiently expressive of its meaning.
1794	Ἦθος quod intelligimus quodque a dicentibus desideramus , id erit , quod ante omnia bonitate commendabitur , non solum mite ac placidum , sed plerumque blandum et humanum et audientibus amabile atque iucundum , in quo exprimendo summa virtus ea est , ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodammodo agnoscantur .	The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in an orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognise it.
1795	Quod est sine dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas , quotiens ferimus , ignoscimus , satisfacimus , monemus , procul ab ira , procul ab odio . Sed tamen alia patris adversus filium , tutoris adversus pupillum , mariti adversus uxorem moderatio est ( hi enim praeferunt eorum ipsorum , a quibus laeduntur , caritatem , neque alio modo invisos eos faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur ) , alia , cum senex adolescentis alieni convicium , honestus inferioris fert ; hic enim tantum concitari , illic etiam adfici debet .	This kind of ethos should be especially displayed in cases where the persons concerned are intimately connected, whenever we tolerate or pardon any act or offer satisfaction or admonition, in all of which cases there should be no trace of anger or hatred. On the other hand the moderation shown by a father to his son, a guardian to his ward or a husband to his wife will differ from that which is shown by an old man to a youthful stranger who has insulted him or by a man of high rank to his inferior, since in the former cases they emphasise their affection for the wrongdoer and there is no desire to do anything that will excite dislike against them save by the manifestation of the fact that they still love them; while in the one case the offended party should be no more than provoked, in the other he should he really deeply moved. Of the same character, though less violent,
1796	Sunt et illa ex eadem natura , sed notus adhuc minoris , veniam petere adulescentiae , defendere amores . Nonnunquam etiam lenis caloris alieni derisus ex hac forma venit , sed his non ex locis tantum . Verum aliquanto magis propria fuit virtus simulationis , satisfaciendi rogandi εἰρωνεία quae diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit .	is the emotion to be shown when we ask pardon for the errors of the young, or apologise for some youthful amour. Sometimes again gentle raillery of another's passion may derive its tone from ethos, though only to a partial extent. More closely dependent on ethos are the skilful exercise of feigned emotion or the employment of irony in making apologies or asking questions, irony being the term which is applied to words which mean something other than they seem to express.
1797	Hinc etiam ille maior ad concitandum odium nasci adfectus solet , cum hoc ipso , quod nos adversariis summittimus , intellegitur tacita impotentiae exprobratio . Namque eos graves et intolerabiles id ipsum demonstrat , quod cedimus , et ignorant cupidi maledicendi aut adfectatores libertatis plus invidiam quam convicium posse ; nam invidia adversarios , convicium nos invisos facit .	From the same source springs also that more powerful method of exciting hatred, when by a feigned submission to our opponents we pass silent censure on their violence. For the very fact of our yielding serves to demonstrate their insupportable arrogance, while orators who have a passion for abuse or are given to affect freedom of speech fail to realise that it is a far more effective course to make your antagonist unpopular than to abuse him. For the former course makes our antagonists disliked, the latter ourselves.
1798	Ille iam paene medius adfectus est ex amoribus et ex desideriis amicorum et necessariorum , nam et hoc maior est et illo minor . Non parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ἤθη dixerimus , quibus plerumque rusticos , superstitiosos , avaros , timidos secundum condicionem propositionum effingimus . Nam si ἤθη mores sunt cum hos imitamur , ex his ducimus orationem .	The emotion of love and longing for our friends and connexions is perhaps of an intermediate character, being stronger than ethos and weaker than pathos. There is also good reason for giving the name of ethos to those scholastic exercises in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards and superstitious persons according as our theme may require. For if ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is engaged in portraying such character.
1799	Denique Ἦθος omne bonum et comem virum poscit . Quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator , si fieri potest , approbare , utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur . Sic proderit plurimum causis , quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem . Nam qui , dum dicit , malus videtur , utique male dicit ; non enim videtur iusta dicere , alioqui Ἦθος videretur .	Finally ethos in all its forms requires the speaker to be a man of good character and courtesy. For it is most important that he should himself possess or be thought to possess those virtues for the possession of which it is his duty, if possible, to commend his client as well, while the excellence of his own character will make his pleading all the more convincing and will be of the utmost service to the cases which he undertakes. For the orator who gives the impression of being a bad man while he is speaking, is actually speaking badly, since his words seem to be insincere owing to the absence of ethos which would otherwise have revealed itself.
1800	Quare ipsum etiam dicendi genus in hoc placidum debet esse ac mite ; nihil superbum , nihil elatum saltem ac sublime desiderat ; proprie , iucunde , credibiliter dicere sat est , ideoque et medius ille orationis modus maxime convenit .	Consequently the style of oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and persuasively, and therefore the intermediate style of oratory is most suitable.
1801	Diversum est huic , quod πάθος dicitur , quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus ; et , ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem , illud comoediae , hoc tragoediae magis simile . Haec pars circa iram , odium , metum , invidiam , miserationem fere tota versatur . Quae quibus ex locis ducenda sint , et manifestum omnibus et a nobis in ratione prooemii atque epilogi dictum est . Et metum tamen duplicem intelligi volo ,	The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by emotion, is of a different character, and I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate to such appeals and I have already spoken on the subject in discussing the exordium and the peroration.
1802	quem patimur et quem facimus , et invidiam ; namque altera invidum , altera invidiosum facit . Hoc autem hominis , illud rei est ; in quo et plus habet operis oratio . Nam quaedam videntur gravia per se , parricidium , caedes , veneficium ;	I wish however to point out that fear is of two kinds, that which we feel and that which we cause in others. Similarly there are two kinds of invidia (hatred, envy), to which the two adjectives invidus (envious) and invidious (invidious, hateful) correspond. The first supplies an epithet for persons, the second for things, and it is in this latter connexion that the orator's task is even more onerous. For though some things are hateful in themselves such as parricide, murder, poisoning, other things have to be made to seem hateful.
1803	quaedam efficienda sunt . Id autem contingit , cum magnis alioqui malis gravius esse id quod passi sumus , ostenditur ; quale est apud Virgilium : " O felix una ante alias Priameïa virgo , Hostilem ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altis Iussa mori — " ( quam miser enim casus Andromachae , si comparata ei felix Polyxena ) ;	This latter contingency arises when we attempt to shew that what we have suffered is of a more horrible nature than what are usually regarded as great evils. Vergil will provide an example in the lines :— "blest beyond all maidens Priam's child, Beneath Troy's lofty bulwarks doomed to die Upon the tomb of him that was thy foe." For how wretched was the lot of Andromache, if Polyxena be accounted happy in comparison with her!
1804	aut cum ita exaggeramus iniuriam nostram , ut etiam quae multo minora sunt intoleranda dicamus : Si pulsasses , defendi non poteras ; vulnerasti . Sed haec diligentius , cum de amplificatione dicemus . Interim notasse contentus sum , non id solum agere adfectus , ut , quae sunt , ostendantur acerba ac luctuosa , sed etiam ut , quae toleranda haberi solent , gravia videantur : ut cum in maledicto plus iniuriae quam in manu , in infamia plus poenae dicimus quam in morte .	Again the same problem arises when we endeavour to magnify our wrongs by saying that other far lesser ills are intolerable; e.g. " If you had merely struck him, your conduct would have been indefensible. But you did more, you wounded him. " However I will deal with this subject more fully when I come to speak of amplification. Meanwhile I will content myself with the observation that the aim of appeals to the emotion is not merely to slew the bitter and grievous nature of ills that actually are so, but also to make ills which are usually regarded as tolerable seem unendurable, as for instance when we represent insulting words as inflicting more grievous injury than an actual blow or represent disgrace as being worse than death.
1805	Namque in hoc eloquentiae vis est , ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat , in quod ipsa rei natura ducetur , sed aut , qui non est , aut maiorem quam est , faciat adfectum . Haec est illa , quae δείνωσις vocatur , rebus indignis , asperis , invidiosis addens vim oratio ; qua virtute praeter alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit .	For the force of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of the facts lead him, but awakens emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest. This is known as deriosis, that is to say, language giving additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful, an accomplishment in which Demosthenes created immense and special effect.
1806	Quodsi tradita mihi sequi praecepta sufficeret satisfeceram huic parti , nihil eorum quae legi vel didici , quod modo probabile fuit , omittendo ; sed eruere in animo est quae latent , et penitus ipsa huius loci aperire penetralia , quae quidem non aliquo tradente , sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi . Summa enim ,	If I thought it sufficient to follow traditional rules, I should regard it as adequate treatment for this topic to omit nothing that I have read or been taught, provided that it be reasonably sound. But my design is to bring to light the secret principles of this art, and to open up the inmost recesses of the subject, giving the result not of teaching received from others, but of my own experience and the guidance of nature herself.
1807	quantum ego quidem sentio , circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est , ut moveamur ipsi . Nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio , si verba vultumque tantum , non etiam animum accommodarimus . Quid enim aliud est causae , ut lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare videantur et ira nonnunquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat , quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum ? Quare in iis ,	The prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel those emotions oneself. It is sometimes positively ridiculous to counterfeit grief, anger and indignation, if we content ourselves with accommodating our words and looks and make no attempt to adapt our own feelings to the emotions to be expressed. What other reason is there for the eloquence with which mourners express their grief; or for the fluency which anger lends even to the uneducated, save the fact that their minds are stirred to power by the depth and sincerity of their feelings? Consequently,
1808	quae esse verisimilia volemus , simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur adfectibus , et a tali animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudicem volet . An ille dolebit , qui audiet me , qui in hoc dicam , non dolentem ? irascetur , si nihil ipse , qui in iram concitat se idque exigit , similia patietur ? siccis agentis oculis lacrimas dabit ? Fieri non potest .	if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge. Will he grieve who can find no trace of grief in the words with which I seek to move him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring under the emotion which he demands from his audience? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eyes are dry? It is utterly impossible.
1809	Nec incendit nisi ignis nec madescimus nisi humore nec res ulla dat alteri colorem quem non ipsa habet . Primum est igitur , ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud iudicem volumus , adficiamurque antequam adficere conemur .	Fire alone can kindle, and moisture alone can wet, nor can one thing impart any colour to another save that which it possesses itself. Accordingly, the first essential is that those feelings should prevail with us that we wish to prevail with the judge, and that we should be moved ourselves before we attempt to move others.
1810	At quomodo fiet , ut adficiamur ? neque enim sunt motus in nostra potestate . Temptabo etiam de hoc dicere . Quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant , nos sane visiones appellemus , per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo , ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur .	But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There are certain experiences which the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes.
1811	Has quisquis bene conceperit , is erit in adfectibus potentissimus . Hunc quidam dicunt εὐφαντασίωτον , qui sibi res , voces , actus secundum verum optime finget ; quod quidem nobis volentibus facile continget . Nisi vero inter otia animorum et spes inanes et velut somnia quaedam vigilantium ita nos hae de quibus loquor imagines prosequuntur , ut peregrinari , navigare , proeliari , populos alloqui , divitiarum , quas non habemus , usum videamur disponere , nec cogitare sed facere : hoc animi vitium ad utilitatem non transferemus ?	It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word εὐφαντασίωτος and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or daydreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it may be possible to turn this form of hallucination to some profit.
1812	At hominem occisum queror ; non omnia , quae in re praesenti accidisse credibile est , in oculis habebo ? non percussor ille subitus erumpet ? non expavescet circumventus ? exclamabit vel rogabit vel fugiet ? non ferientem , non concidentem videbo ? non animo sanguis et pallor et gemitus extremus , denique exspirantis hiatus insidet ?	I am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connexion? Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy, or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken body fall? Will not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death-rattle, be indelibly impressed upon my mind?
1813	Insequitur ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur , quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere ; et adfectus non aliter , quam si rebus ipsis intersimus , sequentur . An non ex his visionibus illa sunt ; Excussi manibus radii , revolutaque pensa ?	From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write— "Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall And all the thread was spilled," Or,
1814	Levique patens in pectore vulnus ? equus ille in funere Pallantis ,— positis insignibus ? Quid ? non idem poeta penitus ultimi fati concepit imaginem , ut diceret :	"In his smooth breast the gaping wound" or the description of the horse at the funeral of Pallas, "his trappings laid aside" ? And how vivid was the image of death conceived by the poet when he wrote- "And dying sees his own dear Argive home" ? Again, when we desire to awaken pity,
1815	Et dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos ? Ubi vero miseratione opus erit , nobis ea , de quibus queremur , accidisse credamus atque id animo nostro persuadeamus . Nos illi simus , quos gravia , indigna , tristia passos queremur , nec agamus rem quasi alienam , sed adsumamus parumper illum dolorem . Ita dicemus , quae in nostro simili casu dicturi fuissemus .	we must actually believe that the ills of which we complain have befallen our own selves, and must persuade our minds that this is really the case. We must identify ourselves with the persons of whom we complain that they have suffered grievous, unmerited and bitter misfortune, and must plead their case and for a brief space feel their suffering as though it were our own, while our words must be such as we should use if we stood in their shoes.
1816	Vidi ego saepe histriones atque comoedos , cum ex aliquo graviore actu personam deposuissent , flentes adhuc egredi . Quodsi in alienis scriptis sola pronuntiatio ita falsis accendit adfectibus , quid nos faciemus , qui ilia cogitare debemus ut moveri periclitantium vice possimus ?	I have often seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, leave the theatre still drowned in tears after concluding the performance of some moving role. But if the mere delivery of words written by another has the power to set our souls on fire with fictitious emotions, what will the orator do whose duty it is to picture to himself the facts and who has it in his power to feel the same emotion as his client whose interests are at stake?
1817	Sed in schola quoque rebus ipsis adfici convenit easque veras sibi fingere , hoc magis quod illic ut litigatores loquimur frequentius quam ut advocati . Orbum agimus et naufragum et periclitantem , quorum induere personas quid attinet , nisi adfectus adsumimus ? Haec dissimulanda mihi non fuerunt , quibus ipse , quantuscunque sum aut fui , pervenisse me ad aliquod nomen ingenii credo ; frequenter motus sum , ut me non lacrimae solum deprehenderent , sed pallor et veri similis dolor .	Even in the schools it is desirable that the student should be moved by his theme, and should imagine it to be true; indeed, it is all the more desirable then, since, as a rule in scholastic declamations, the speaker more often appears as the actual litigant than as his advocate. Suppose we are impersonating an orphan, a shipwrecked man, or one in grave peril. What profit is there in assuming such a rôle unless we also assume the emotions which it involves? I have thought it necessary not to conceal these considerations from my reader, since they have contributed to the acquisition of such reputation for talent as I possess or once possessed. I have frequently been so much moved while speaking, that I have not merely been wrought upon to tears, but have turned pale and shown all the symptoms of genuine grief.
1818	Huic diversa virtus , quae risum iudicis movendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat . Quanta sit autem in ea difficultas , vel duo maxime oratores , alter Graecae alter Latinae eloquentiae principes , docent .	I now turn to a very different talent, namely that which dispels the graver emotions of the judge by exciting his laughter, frequently diverts his attention from the facts of the case, and sometimes even refreshes him and revives him when he has begun to be bored or wearied by the case. How hard it is to attain success in this connexion is shown by the cases of the two great masters of Greek and Roman oratory.
1819	Nam plerique Demostheni facultatem defuisse huius rei credunt , Ciceroni modum . Nec videri potest noluisse Demosthenes , cuius pauca admodum dicta nec sane ceteris eius virtutibus respondentia palam ostendunt , non displicuisse illi iocos ,	For many think that Demosthenes was deficient in this faculty, and that Cicero used it without discrimination. Indeed, it is impossible to suppose that Demosthenes deliberately avoided all display of humour, since his few jests are so unworthy of his other excellences that they clearly show that he lacked the power, not merely that he disliked to use it.
1820	sed non contigisse . Noster vero non solum extra iudicia , sed in ipsis etiam orationibus habitus est nimius risus adfectator . Mihi quidem , sive id recte iudico sive amore immodico praecipui in eloquentia viri labor , mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas .	Cicero, on the other hand, was regarded as being unduly addicted to jests, not merely outside the courts, but in his actual speeches as well. Personally (though whether I am right in this view, or have been led astray by an exaggerated admiration for the prince of orators, I cannot say), I regard him as being the possessor of a remarkable turn of wit. For his daily speech was full of humour,
1821	Nam et in sermone cotidiano multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam quisquam dixit facete , et ipsa ilia , quae sunt in Verrem dicta frigidius , aliis adsignavit et testimonii loco posuit ; ut , quo sunt magis vulgaria , eo sit credibilius ilia ab oratore non ficta sed passim esse iactata .	while in his disputes in court and in his examination of witnesses he produced more good jests than any other, while the somewhat insipid jokes which he launches against Verres are always attributed by him to others and produced as evidence: wherefore, the more vulgar they are, the more probable is it that they are not the invention of the orator, but were current as public property. I wish, however,
1822	Utinamque libertus eius Tiro aut alius , quisquis fuit , qui tris hac de re libros edidit , parcius dictorum numero indulsissent et plus iudicii in eligendis quam in congerendis studii adhibuissent : minus obiectus calumniantibus foret , qui tamen nunc quoque , ut in omni eius ingenio , facilius , quod reici quam quod adiici possit , invenient .	that Tiro, or whoever it may have been that published the three books of Cicero's jests, had restricted their number and had shown more judgment in selecting than zeal in collecting them. For he would then have been less exposed to the censure of his calumniators, although the latter will, in any case, as in regard to all the manifestations of his genius, find it easier to detect superfluities than deficiencies.
1823	Adfert autem summam rei difficultatem primum , quod ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est ( hoc semper humile ) , saepe ex industria depravatum , praeterea nunquam honorificum ; tum varia hominum iudicia in eo , quod non ratione aliqua sed motu animi quodam nescio an enarrabili iudicatur .	The chief difficulty which confronts the orator in this connexion lies in the fact that sayings designed to raise a laugh are generally untrue (and falsehood always involves a certain meanness), and are often deliberately distorted, and, further, never complimentary: while the judgments formed by the audience on such jests will necessarily vary, since the effect of a jest depends not on the reason, but on an emotion which it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe.
1824	Neque enim ab ullo satis explicari puto , licet multi temptaverint , unde risus , qui non solum facto aliquo dictove , sed interdum quodam etiam corporis tacta lacessitur . Praeterea non una ratione moveri solet , neque enim acute tantum ac venuste sed stulte , iracunde , timide dicta aut facta ridentur ; ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est , quod a derisu non procul abest risus .	For I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation, though many have attempted to do so, of the cause of laughter, which is excited not merely by words or deeds, but sometimes even by touch. Moreover, there is great variety in the things which raise a laugh, since we laugh not merely at those words or actions which are smart or witty, but also at those which reveal folly, anger or fear. Consequently, the cause of laughter is uncertain, since laughter is never far removed from derision.