Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

[Close]

	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
875	Alii sex status putant , coniecturam , quam γένεσιν vocant , et qualitatem , et proprietatem , id est μετάστασις quo verbo finitio ostenditur , et quantitatem , quam μετάστασις ; dicunt , et comparationem , et translationem , cuius adhuc novum nomen inventum est μετάστασις novum , inquam , in statu , alioqui ab Hermagora inter species iuridiciales usitatum .	Others hold that there are six bases: conjecture or γένεσις, quality, particularity or ἰδιότης by which word they mean definition, quantity or ἀξία, comparison and competence, for which a new term has been found in μετάστασις I call it new when applied to a basis, for Hermagoras employs it to describe a species of juridical question.
876	Aliis septem esse placuit ; a quibus nec translatio nec quantitas nec comparatio recepta est , sed in horum trium locum subditae quattuor legales adiectaeque tribus illis rationalibus .	Others think there are seven, while refusing to recognise competence, quantity or comparison, in place of which they substitute four legal bases, completing the seven by the addition of those three which they call rational.
877	Alii pervenerunt usque ad octo , translatione ad septem superiores adiecta . A quibusdam deinde divisa ratio est , ut status rationales appellarent , quaestiones ( quemadmodum supra dixi ) legales , ut in illis de re , in his de scripto quaereretur . Quidam in diversum hos status esse ,	Others again make eight by the addition of competence to the above-mentioned seven. Some on the other hand have introduced a fresh method of division, reserving the name of bases for the rational, and giving the name of questions to the legal, as I mentioned above, since in the former the problem is concerned with facts, in the latter with the letter of the law. Some on the contrary reverse this nomenclature calling the legal questions bases and the rational grounds questions.
878	illas quaestiones maluerunt . Sed alii rationales tres putaverunt , An sit ? Quid sit ? Quale sit ? Hermagoras solus quattuor , coniecturam , proprietatem , translationem , qualitatem , quam per accidentia , id est κατὰ συμβεβηκός vocat , hac interpretatione , an illi accidat viro bono esse , vel malo . Hanc ita dividit , de appetendis et fugiendis , quae est pars deliberativa ;	But others have thought that there are only three rational bases, covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, and of what kind it is? Hermagoras is alone in thinking that there are four, namely conjecture, particularity, competence, and quality: to the latter he appends the phrase κατὰ συμβεβηκός "according to its accidents," illustrating his meaning by putting a case where it is enquired whether a man happen to be good or bad. He then subdivides quality into four species: first that which is concerned with things to he sought or avoided, which belongs to deliberative oratory:
879	de persona , ea ostenditur laudativa ; negotialem , quam πραγματικήν vocat , in qua de rebus ipsis quaeritur , remoto personarum complexu , ut , Sitne liber qui est in assertione , an divitiae superbiam pariant , an iustum quid , an bonum sit . Iuridicialem , in qua fere eadem sed certis destinatisque personis quaerantur : an ille iuste hoc fecerit , vel bene	secondly those concerned with persons, by which he indicates panegyric: thirdly the practical or pragmatic, which is concerned with things in general without reference to persons, and may be illustrated by questions such as whether he is free who is claimed as a slave and waiting the trial of his case, whether riches beget insolence, and whether a thing is just or good; lastly there is the juridical species, under which practically the same questions arise, but in relation to certain definite persons, as for instance when it is asked whether that particular man has done well or ill.
880	Nec me fallit , in primo Ciceronis rhetorico aliam esse loci negotialis interpretationem , cum ita scriptum sit : Negotialis est , in qua , quid iris ex civili more et aequitate sit , consideratur ; cui diligentiae praeesse apud nos iurisconsulti existimantur .	I am aware that another explanation is given by Cicero in the first book of his Rhetorica of the species known as practical, where he says that it is " the department under which we consider what is right according to civil usage and equity: this department is regarded by us as the special sphere of the lawyer. "
881	Sed quod ipsius de his libris iudicium fuerit , supra dixi . Sunt enim velut regestae in hos commentarios , quos adolescens deduxerat , scholae , et si qua est in his culpa , tradentis est , sive eum movit id , quod Hermagoras prima in hoc loco posuit exempla ex quaestionibus iuris , sive quod Graeci πραγματικούς vocant iuris interpretes .	But I have already mentioned what his opinion was about this particular work. The Rhetorica are simply a collection of school-notes on rhetoric which he worked up into this treatise while quite a young man. Such faults as they possess are due to his instructor. In the present instance he may have been influenced by the fact that the first examples given by Hermagoras of this species are drawn from legal questions, or by the fact that the Greeks call interpreters of the law πραγματικοί.
882	Sed Cicero quidem his pulcherrimos illos de Oratore substituit , ideoque culpari , tanquam falsa praecipiat , non potest . Nos ad Hermagoran . Trans lationem hic primus omnium tradidit , quanquam semina eius quaedam citra nomen ipsum apud Aristotelen reperiuntur .	But for these early efforts Cicero substituted his splendid de Oratore and therefore cannot be blamed for giving false instruction. I will now return to Hermagoras. He was the first rhetorician to teach that there was a basis concerned with competence, although the elements of this doctrine are found in Aristotle, without however any mention of the name.
883	Legales autem quaestiones has fecit , scripti et voluntatis ( quam ipse vocat κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ ὑπεξαίρεσιν , id est dictum et exceptionem , quorum prius ei cum omnibus commune est , exceptionis nomen minus usitatum ) , ratiocinativum , ambiguitatis , legum contrariarum .	The legal questions were according to Hermagoras of five kinds. First the letter of the law and its intention; the names which he gives to these are κατὰ ῥητόν and ὑπεξαίρεσις, that is to say the letter of the law and the exceptions thereto: the first of these classes is found in all writers, but the term exception is less in use. The number is completed by the ratiocinative basis and those dealing with ambiguity and contradictory laws.
884	Albutius eadem divisione usus detrahit translationem , subiiciens eam iuridiciali . In legalibus quoque quaestionibus nullum putat esse , qui dicatur ratiocinativus . Scio plura inventuros adhuc , qui legere antiquos studiosius volent , sed ne haec quoque excesserint modum vereor .	Albutius adopts this classification, but eliminates competence, including it under the juridical basis. Further he holds that in legal questions there is no ratiocinative basis. I know that those who are prepared to read ancient writers on rhetoric more carefully than I have, will be able to discover yet more on this subject, but I fear that I may have been too lengthy even in saying what I have said.
885	Ipse me paulum in alia , quam prius habuerim , opinione nunc esse confiteor . Et fortasse tutissimum erat famae modo studenti nihil ex eo mutare , quod multis annis non sensissem modo , verum etiam approbassem .	I must admit that I am now inclined to take a different view from that which I once held. It would perhaps be safer for my reputation if I were to make no modification in views which I not only held for so many years, but of which I expressed my open approbation.
886	Sed non sustineo esse conscius mihi dissimulati ( in eo praesertim opere , quod ad bonorum iuvenum aliquam utilitatem componimus ) in ulla parte iudicii mei . Nam et Hippocrates , clarus arte medicinae , videtur honestissime fecisse , quod quosdam errores suos , ne posteri errarent , confessus est ; et M . Tullius non dubitavit aliquos iam editos libros aliis postea scriptis ipse damnare , sicut Catulum atque Lucullum et hos ipsos , de quibus modo sum locutus , artis rhetoricae .	But I cannot bear to be thought guilty of concealment of the truth as regards any portion of my views, more especially in a work designed for the profit of young men of sound disposition. For Hippocrates, the great physician, in my opinion took the most honourable course in acknowledging some of his errors to prevent those who came after from being led astray, while Cicero had no hesitation about condemning some of his earlier works in books which he published later: I refer to his condemnation of his Lucullus and Catulus and the books on rhetoric which I have already mentioned.
887	Etenim supervacuus foret in studiis longior labor , si nihil liceret melius invenire praeteritis . Neque tamen quidquam ex iis , quae tum praecepi , supervacuum fuit ; ad easdem enim particulas haec quoque , quae nunc praecipiam , revertentur ; ita neminem didicisse paeniteat , colligere tantum eadem ac disponere paulo significantius conor . Omnibus autem satisfactum volo , non me hoc serius demonstrare aliis , quam mihi ipse persuaserim .	Indeed we should have no justification for protracting our studies if we were forbidden to improve upon our original views. Still none of my past teaching was superfluous: for the views which I am now going to produce will be found to be based on the same principles, and consequently no one need be sorry to have attended my lectures, since all that I am now attempting to do is to collect and rearrange my original views so that they may be somewhat more instructive. But I wish to satisfy everybody and not to lay myself open to the accusation that I have allowed a long time to elapse between the formation and publication of my views.
888	Secundum plurimos auctores servabam tris rationales status , coniecturam , qualitatem , finitionem , unum legalem . Hi mihi status generales erant . Legalem in quinque species partiebar , scripti et voluntatis , legum contrariarum , collectivum , ambiguitatis , translationis .	I used to follow the majority of authorities in adhering to three rational bases, the conjectural, qualitative and definitive, and to one legal basis. These were my general bases. The legal basis I divided into five species, dealing with the letter of the law and intention, contradictory laws, the syllogism, ambiguity and competence.
889	Nunc quartum ex generalibus intelligo posse removeri ; sufficit enim prima divisio , qua diximus alios rationales , alios legales esse ; ita non erit status , sed quaestionum genus ; alioqui et rationalis status esset .	It is now clear to me that the fourth of the general bases may be removed, since the original division which I made into rational and legal bases is sufficient. The fourth therefore will not be a basis, but a kind of question; if it were not, it would form one of the rational bases.
890	Ex iis etiam , quos speciales vocabam , removi translationem , frequenter quidem ( sicut omnes qui me secuti sunt meminisse possunt ) testatus et in ipsis etiam illis sermonibus me nolente vulgatis hoc tamen complexus , vix in ulla controversia translationis statum posse reperiri , ut non et alius in eadem recte dici videretur , ideoque a quibusdam eum exclusum .	Further I have removed competence from those which I called species. For I often asserted, as all who have attended my lectures will remember, and even those discourses which were published against my will included the statement, that the basis concerned with competence hardly ever occurs in any dispute under such circumstances that it cannot more correctly be given some other name, and that consequently some rhetoricians exclude it from their list of bases.
891	ferri , cum in omnibus fere causis , in quibus cecidisse quis formula dicitur , hae sint quaestiones , an huic , an cum hoc , an hac lege , an apud hunc , an hoc tempore liceat agere ?	I am, however, well aware that the point of competence is raised in many cases, since in practically every case in which a party is said to have been ruled out of court through some error of form, questions such as the following arise: whether it was lawful for this person to bring an action, or to bring it against some particular person, or under a given law, or in such a court, or at such a time, and so on
892	et si qua sunt talia . Sed personae , tempora , actiones ceteraque propter aliquam causam transferuntur ; ita non est in translatione quaestio sed in eo , propter quod transferuntur : " Non debes apud praetorem petere fidei commissum , sed apud consules , maior enim praetoria cognitione summa est . " Quaeritur , an maior summa sit , facti controversia est .	But the question of competence as regards persons, times, legal actions and the rest originates in some pre-existent cause: the question turns therefore not on competence itself, but on the cause with which the point of competence originates. " You ought to demand the return of a deposit not before the praetor but before the consuls, as the sum is too large to come under the praetor's jurisdiction. " The question then arises whether the sum is too large, and the dispute is one
893	" Non licet tibi agere mecum , cognitor enim fieri non potuisti : " iudicatio , an potuerit . " Non debuisti interdicere sed petere : " an recte interdictum sit , ambigitur . Quae omnia succedunt legitimis quaestionibus .	of fact. " You have no right to bring an action against me, as it is impossible for you to have been appointed to represent the actual plaintiff. " It then has to be decided whether he could have been so appointed. " You ought not to have proceeded by interdict, but to have put in a plea for possession. " The point in doubt is whether the interdict is legal. All these points fall under the head of legal questions.
894	An non praescriptiones ( etiam in quibus maxime videtur manifesta translatio ) easdem omnes species habent , quas eae leges , quibus agitur , ut aut de nomine aut scripto et sententia vel ratiocinatione quaeratur ? Deinde status ex quaestione oritur ; translatio non habet quaestionem , de qua contendit orator , sed propter quam contendit .	not even those special pleas, in which questions of competence make themselves most evident, give rise to the same species of question as those laws under which the action is brought, so that the enquiry is really concerned with the name of a given act, with the letter of the law and its meaning, or with something that requires to be settled by argument? The basis originates from the question, and in cases of competence it is not the question concerning which the advocate argues that is involved, but the question on account of which he argues.
895	Hoc apertius , " Occidisti hominem " , " Non occidi ; " quaestio , an occiderit , status coniectura . Non est tale , " Habeo ius actionis " , " Non habes , " ut sit quaestio , an habeat , et inde status . Accipiat enim actionem necne , ad eventum pertinet , non ad causam , et ad id , quod pronuntiat iudex , non id , propter quod pronuntiat .	An example will make this clearer. "You have killed a man. "I did not kill him." The question is whether he has killed him; the basis is the conjectural. But the following case is very different. "I have the right to bring this action. "You have not the right." The question is whether he has the right, and it is from this that we derive the basis. For whether he is allowed the right or not depends on the event, not on the cause itself, and on the decision of the judge, not on that on account of which he gives such a decision.
896	Hoc illi simile est , " Puniendus es " , " Non sum ; " videbit iudex , an puniendus sit . Sed non hic erit quaestio nec hic status . Ubi ergo ? " Puniendus es , hominem occidisti " ; " Non occidi : " An occiderit . " Honorandus sum " , " Non es ; " num statum habet ? non , ut puto . " Honorandus sum , quia tyrannum occidi " ; " Non occidisti ; " quaestio et status .	The following is a similar example. "You ought to be punished. "I ought not." The judge will decide whether he should be punished, but it is not with this that the question or the basis is concerned. Where then does the question lie? "You ought to be punished, for you have killed a man. "I did not kill him." The question is whether he killed him. "I ought to receive some honour. "You ought not." Does this involve a basis? I think not. "I ought to receive some honour for killing a tyrant. "You did not kill him." Here there is a question and a basis as well.
897	Similiter , " Non recte agis " , " Recte ago " non habet statum . Ubi est ergo ? " Non recte agis ignominiosus . " Quaeritur , an ignominiosus sit ; aut , an agere ignominioso liceat ; quaestiones et status . Ergo translativum genus causae ut comparativum et mutuae accusationis .	So, too, "You are not entitled to bring this action, "I have," involves no basis. Where then is it to be found? "You have no right to bring this action, because you have been deprived of civil rights." In this case the question is whether he has been so deprived, or whether loss of civil rights debars a person from bringing an action. Here on the other hand we find both questions and bases. It is therefore to kinds of causes, not to bases that the term competence applies: other kinds of cause are the comparative and the recriminatory.
898	At enim simile est illi " Habeo ius " , " Non habes , " Occidisti " , " Recte occidi . " Non nego , sed nec haec res status facit . Non enim sunt hae propositiones ( alioqui causa non explicabitur ) , sed , cum suis rationibus . " Scelus commisit Horatius , sororem enim occidit . Non commisit , debuit enim occidere eam , quae hostis mortem maerebat . " Quaestio , an haec iusta causa ; ita qualitas .	"But," it is urged, " the case 'I have a right,' 'You have not,' is similar to 'You have killed a man,' 'I was justified in so doing.' " I do not deny it, but this does not make it a basis. For these statements are not propositions until the reasons for them are added. If they were propositions as they stand, the case could not proceed. "Horatius has committed a crime, for he has killed his sister. " He has not committed a crime, since it was his duty to kill her for mourning the death of an enemy. " The question is whether this was a justifiable reason, and the basis is one of quality. So too as regards competence.
899	Et similiter in translatione , " Non habes ius abdicandi , quia ignominioso non est actio . Habeo ius , quia abdicatio actio non est . " Quaeritur , quid sit actio : finiemus " Non licet abdicare filium " syllogismo . Item cetera per omnes et rationales et legales status .	" You have no right to disinherit, since a person who has been deprived of civil rights is not allowed to take legal action. "I have the right, since disinheriting is not legal action." The question here is what is legal action. And we shall arrive at the conclusion that the son's disinheritance is unlawful, by use of the syllogism. The case will be similar with all the rational and legal bases.
900	Nec ignoro fuisse quosdam , qui translationem in rationali quoque genere ponerent hoc nodo , " Hominem occidi , iussus ab imperatore . Dona templi cogenti tyranno dedi . Deserui tempestatibus , luminibus , valetudine impeditus . " Id est , non per me stetit , sed per illud . A quibus etiam liberius dissentio .	I am aware that there have been some who placed competence among rational bases, using as illustrations cases such as, "I killed a man under orders from my general, "I gave the votive offerings in a temple to a tyrant under compulsion, " I deserted owing to the fact that storms or floods or ill health prevented me from rejoining. " That is to say it was not due to me, but some external cause.
901	Non enim actio transfertur sed causa facti , quod accidit paene in omni defensione . Deinde is , qui tali utitur patrocinio , non recedit a forma qualitatis , dicit enim , se culpa vacare ; ut magis qualitatis duplex ratio facienda sit , altera qua et factum defenditur , altera qua tantum reus .	From these writers I differ even more widely: for it is not the nature of the legal action itself which is involved in the question of competence, but the cause of the act; and this is the case in almost every defence. Finally he who adopts this line of defence, does not thereby abandon the qualitative basis; for he states that he himself is free from blame, so that we really should differentiate between two kinds of quality one of which comes into play when both the accused person and his act are defended, and the other when the accused person alone is defended.
902	Credendum est igitur his , quorum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero , tria esse , quae in omni disputatione quaerantur , an sit , quid sit , quale sit ? quod ipsa nobis etiam natura praescribit . Nam primum oportet subesse aliquid , de quo ambigitur ; quod , quid sit et quale sit , certe non potest aestimari , nisi prius esse constiterit , ideoque ea prima quaestio .	We must therefore accept the view of the authorities followed by Cicero, to the effect that there are three things on which enquiry is made in every case: we ask whether a thing is, that it is, and of that kind it is. Nature herself imposes this upon us. For first of all there must be some subject for the question, since we cannot possibly determine what a thing is, or of what kind it is, until we have first ascertained whether it is, and therefore the first question raised is whether it is. But even when it is clear that a thing is,
903	Sed non statim , quod esse manifestum est , etiam quid sit , apparet . Hoc quoque constituto novissima qualitas superest , neque his exploratis aliud est ultra . His infinitae quaestiones , his finitae continentur ; horum aliqua in demonstrativa , deliberativa , iudiciali materia utique tractatur .	it is not immediately obvious what it is. And when we have decided what it is, there remains the question of its quality. These three points once ascertained, there is no further question to ask. These heads cover both definite and indefinite questions. One or more of them is discussed in every demonstrative, deliberative or forensic theme.
904	Haec rursus iudiciales causas et rationali parte et legali continent ; neque enim ulla iuris disceptatio nisi finitione , qualitate , coniectura potest explicari .	These heads again cover all cases in the courts, whether we regard them from the point of view of rational or legal questions. For no legal problem can be settled save by the aid of definition, quality and conjecture.
905	Sed instituentibus rudes non erit inutilis latius primo fusa ratio et , si non statim rectissima linea tensa , facilior tamen et apertior via . Discant igitur ante omnia quadripertitam in omnibus causis esse rationem , quam primam intueri debeat qui acturus est . Nam , ut a defensore potissimum incipiam , longe fortissima tuendi se ratio est , si quod obiicitur negari potest ; proxima , si non id , quod obiicitur , factum esse dicitur ; tertia honestissima , qua recte factum defenditur . Quibus si deficiamur , ultima quidem sed iam sola superest salus aliquo iuris adiutorio elabendi ex crimine , quod neque negari neque defendi potest , ut non videatur iure actio intendi .	Those, however, who are engaged in instructing the ignorant will find it useful at first to adopt a slightly less rigid method: the road will not be absolutely straight to begin with, but it will be more open and will provide easier going. I would have them therefore learn above all things that there are four different methods which may be employed in every case, and he who is going to plead should study them as first essentials. For, to begin with the defendant, far the strongest method of self-defence is, if possible, to deny the charge. The second best is when it is possible to reply that the particular act with which you are charged was never committed. The third and most honourable is to maintain that the act was justifiable. If none of these lines of defence are feasible, there remains the last and only hope of safety: if it is impossible either to deny the charge or justify the act, we must evade the charge with the aid of some point of law, making it appear that the action has been brought against us illegally
906	Hinc illae quaestiones sive actiones sive translationes . Sunt enim quaedam non laudabilia non natura sed iure concessa , ut in XII tabulis debitoris corpus inter creditores dividi licuit , quam legem mos publicus repudiavit ; et aliquid aequum sed prohibitum iure , ut libertas testamentorum .	Hence arise those questions of legal action or competence. For there are some things, which, although not laudable in themselves, are yet permitted by law; witness the passage in the Twelve Tables authorising creditors to divide up a debtor's body amongst themselves, a law which is repudiated by public custom. There are also certain things which although equitable are prohibited by law; witness the restrictions placed on testamentary disposition.
907	Accusatori nihilo plura intuenda sunt , ut probet factum esse , hoc esse factum , non recte factum , iure se intendere . Ita circa species easdem lis omnis versabitur translatis tantum aliquando partibus , ut in causis , quibus de praemio agitur , recte factum petitor probat .	The accuser likewise has four things which he must keep in mind: he must prove that something was done, that a particular act was done, that it was wrongly done, and that he brings his charge according to law. Thus every cause will turn on the same sorts of questions, though the parts of plaintiff and defendant will sometimes be interchanged: for instance in the case of a claim for a reward, it will be the plaintiffs task to show that what was done was right.
908	Haec quattuor velut proposita formaeque actionis , quae tum generales status vocabam , in duo ( ut ostendi ) genera discedunt rationale et legale . Rationale simplicius est , quia ipsius tantum naturae contemplatione constat . Itaque in eo satis est ostendisse coniecturam , finitionem , qualitatem .	These four schemes or forms of action which I then called general bases fall into two classes as I have shown, namely, the rational and the legal. The rational is the simpler, as it involves nothing more than the consideration of the nature of things. In this connection, therefore, a mere mention of conjeclure, definition and quality will suffice.
909	Legalium plures sint species necesse est , propterea quod multae sunt leges et varias habent formas . Alia est cuius verbis nitimur , alia cuius voluntate , alias nobis , cum ipsi nullam habeamus , adiungimus , alias inter se comparamus , alias in diversum interpretamur .	Legal questions necessarily have a larger number of species, since there are many laws and a variety of forms. In the case of one law we rely on the letter, in others on the spirit. Some laws we force to serve our turn, when we can find no law to support our case, others we compare with one another, and on others we put some novel interpretation.
910	Sic nascuntur haec velut simulacra ex illis tribus , interim simplicia , interim et mixta , propriam tamen faciem ostendentia , ut scripti et voluntatis , quae sine dubio aut qualitate aut coniectura continentur , et syllogismos , qui est maxime qualitatis , et leges contrariae , quae iisdem , quibus scriptum et voluntas , constant , et ἀμφιβολία , quae semper coniectura explicatur .	Thus from these three bases we get three resemblances of bases: sometimes simple, sometimes complex, but all having a character of their own, as, for instance, when questions of the letter of the law and its intention are involved, for these clearly come under conjecture or quality; or again where the syllogism is involved, for this is specially connected with quality; or where contradictory laws are involved, for these are on the same footing as the letter of the law and intention; or yet again in cases of ambiguity, which is always resolved by conjecture.
911	Finitio quoque utrique generi , quodque rerum quodque scripti contemplatione constat , communis est . Haec omnia , etiamsi in illos tres status veniunt , tamen , quia ( ut dixi ) habent aliquid velut proprium , videntur demonstranda discentibus , et permittendum ea dicere vel status legales vel quaestiones vel capita quaedam minora , dum sciant , nihil ne in his quidem praeter tria , quae praediximus , quaeri .	Definition also belongs to both classes of question, namely those concerned with the consideration of facts and those concerned with the letter of the law. All these questions, although they come under the three bases, yet since, as I have mentioned, they have certain characteristic features of their own, require to be pointed out to learners; and we must allow them to be called legal bases or questions or minor heads, as long as it is clearly understood that none of them involve any other questions than the three I have mentioned.
912	At " Quantum ? " et " Quam multum ? " et " Ad aliquid " et , ut nonnulli putarunt , comparativus non eandem rationem habent ; sunt enim haec non ad varietatem iuris sed ad solam rationem referenda , ideoque semper in parte aut coniecturae aut qualitatis ponenda sunt , ut " Qua mente ? " et " Quo tempore ? " et " Quo loco ? "	As regards questions of quantity, number, relation, and, as some have thought, comparison, the case is different. For these have no connexion with the complexities of the law, but are concerned with reason only. Consequently they must always be regarded as coming under conjecture or quality, as, for instance, when we ask with what purpose, or at what time, or place something was done.