Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
3535	Quanquam enim stetisse ipsum in fastigio eloquentiae fateor , ac vix , quid adiici potuerit , inuenio , fortasse inventurus , quod adhuc abscisurum putem fuisse ( nam fere sic docti iudicaverunt , plurimum in eo virtutum , nonnihil fuisse vitiorum , et se ipse multa ex illa iuvenili abundantia coercuisse testatur ) , tamen , quando nec sapientis sibi nomen , minime sui contemptor , asseruit et melius dicere , certe data longiore vita et tempore ad componendum securiore , potuisset , non maligne crediderim defuisse ei summam illam , ad quam nemo propius accessit .	For while I admit that he stood on the loftiest pinnacle of eloquence, and can discover scarcely a single deficiency in him, although I might perhaps discover certain superfluities which I think he would have pruned away (for the general view of the learned is that he possessed many virtues and a few faults, and he himself states that he has succeeded in suppressing much of his youthful exuberance), none the less, in view of the fact that, although he had by no means a low opinion of himself, he never claimed to be the perfect sage, and, had he been granted longer life and less troubled conditions for the composition of his works, would doubtless have spoken better still, I shall not lay myself open to the charge of ungenerous criticism, if I say that I believe that he failed actually to achieve that perfection to the attainment of which none have approached more nearly,
3536	Et licebat , si aliter sentirem , fortius id liberiusque defendere . An vero M . Antonius neminem a se visum eloquentem , quod tanto minus erat , professus est ; ipse etiam M . Tullius quaerit adhuc eum et tantum imaginatur ac fingit , ego non audeam dicere , aliquid in hac , quae superest , aeternitate inveniri posse eo , quod fuerit , perfectius ?	and indeed had I felt otherwise in this connexion, I might have defended my point with greater boldness and freedom. Marcus Antonius declared that he had seen no man who was genuinely eloquent (and to be eloquent is a far less achievement than to be an orator), while Cicero himself has failed to find his orator in actual life and merely imagines and strives to depict the ideal. Shall I then be afraid to say that in the eternity of time that is yet to be, something more perfect may be found than has yet existed?
3537	Transeo illos , qui Ciceroni ac Demostheni ne in eloquentia quidem satis tribuunt ; quanquam neque ipsi Ciceroni Demosthenes videatur satis esse perfectus , quem dormitare interim dicit , nec Cicero Bruto Calvoque , qui certe compositionem illius etiam apud ipsum reprehendunt , nec Asinio utrique , qui vitia orationis eius etiam inimice pluribus locis insequuntur .	I say nothing of those critics who will not allow sufficient credit even for eloquence to Cicero and Demosthenes, although Cicero himself does not regard Demosthenes as flawless, but asserts that he sometimes nods, while even Cicero fails to satisfy Brutus and Calvus (at any rate they criticised his style to his face), or to win the complete approval of either of the Asinii, who in various passages attack the faults of his oratory in language which is positively hosthe.
3538	Concedamus sane , quod minime natura patitur , repertum esse aliquem malum virum summe disertum : nihilo tamen minus oratorem eum negabo . Nam nec omnibus , qui fuerint manu prompti , viri fortis nomen concesserim , quia sine virtute intelligi non potest fortitudo .	However, let us fly in the face of nature and assume that a bad man has been discovered who is endowed with the highest eloquence. I shall none the less deny that he is an orator. For I should not allow that every man who has shown himself ready with his hands was necessarily a brave man, because true courage cannot be conceived of without the accompaniment of virtue.
3539	An ei , qui ad defendendas causas advocatur , non est opus fide , quam nec cupiditas corrumpat nec gratia avertat nec metus frangat ; sed proditorem , transfugam , praevaricatorem donabimus oratoris illo sacro nomine ? Quodsi mediocribus etiam patronis convenit haec , quae vulgo dicitur , bonitas , cur non orator ille , qui nondum fuit , sed potest esse , tam sit moribus quam dicendi virtute perfectus ?	Surely the advocate who is called to defend the accused requires to be a man of honour, honour which greed cannot corrupt, influence seduce, or fear dismay. Shall we then dignify the traitor, the deserter, the turncoat with the sacred name of orator? But if the quality which is usually termed goodness is to be found even in quite ordinary advocates, why should not the orator, who has not yet existed, but may still be born, be no less perfect in character than in excellence of speech?
3540	Non enim forensem quandam instituimus operam nec mercennariam vocem nec , ut asperioribus verbis parcamus , non inutilem sane litium advocatum , quem denique causidicum vulgo vocant , sed virum cum ingenii natura praestantem tum vero tot pulcherrimas artes penitus mente complexum , datum tandem rebus humanis , qualem nulla antea vetustas cognoverit , singularem perfectumque undique , optima sentientem optimeque dicentem .	It is no hack-advocate, no hireling pleader, nor yet, to use no harser term, a serviceable attorney of the class generally known as causidici, that I am seeking to form, but rather a man who to extraordinary natural gifts has added a thorough mastery of all the fairest branches of knowledge, a man sent by heaven to be the blessing of mankind, one to whom all history can find no parallel, uniquely perfect in every detail and utterly noble alike in thought and speech.
3541	In hoc quota pars erit , quod aut innocentes tuebitur aut improborum scelera compescet , aut in pecuniariis quaestionibus veritati contra calumniam aderit ? Summus ille quidem in his quoque operibus fuerit , sed maioribus clarius elucebit , cum regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad meliora ducendus .	How small a portion of all these abilities will be required for the defence of the innocent, the repression of crime or the support of truth against falsehood in suits involving questions of money? It is true that our supreme orator will bear his part in such tasks, but his powers will be displayed with brighter splendour in greater matters than these, when he is called upon to direct the counsels of the senate and guide the people from the paths of error to better things.
3542	An non talem quendam videtur finxisse Vergilius , quem in seditione vulgi iam faces et saxa iaculantis moderatorem dedit : " Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem Conspexere , silent arrectisque auribus adstant ? " Habemus igitur ante omnia virum bonum , post haec adiiciet dicendi peritum : " Ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet . " Quid ?	Was not this the man conceived by Virgil and described as quelling a riot when torches and stones have begun to fly: "Then, if before their eyes some statesman grave Stand forth, with virtue and high service crowned, Straight are they dumb and stand intent to hear." Here then we have one who is before all else a good man, and it is only after this that the poet adds that he is skilled in speaking: "His words their minds control, their passions soothe." Again,
3543	non in bellis quoque idem ille vir , quem instituimus , si sit ad proelium miles cohortandus , ex mediis sapientiae praeceptis orationem trahet ? Nam quomodo pugnam ineuntibus tot simul metus laboris , dolorum , postremo mortis ipsius exciderint , nisi in eorum locum pietas et fortitudo et honesti praesens imago successerit ?	will not this same man, whom we are striving to form, if in time of war he be called upon to inspire his soldiers with courage for the fray, draw for his eloquence on the innermost precepts of philosophy? For how can men who stand upon the verge of battle banish all the crowding fears of hardship, pain and death from their minds, unless those fears be replaced by the sense of the duty that they owe their country, by courage and the lively image of a soldier's honour?
3544	Quae certe melius persuadebit aliis qui prius persuaserit sibi . Prodit enim se , quamlibet custodiatur , simulatio , nec unquam tanta fuerit loquendi facultas , ut non titubet atque haereat , quotiens ab animo verba dissentiunt . Vir autem malus aliud dicat necesse est quam sentit .	And assuredly the man who will best inspire such feelings in others is he who has first inspired them in himself. For however we strive to conceal it, insincerity will always betray itself, and there was never in any man so great eloquence as would not begin to stumble and hesitate so soon as his words ran counter to his inmost thoughts.
3545	Bonos nunquam honestus sermo deficiet , nunquam rerum optimarum ( nam iidem etiam prudentes erunt ) inventio ; quae etiamsi lenociniis destituta sit , satis tamen natura sua ornatur nec quidquam non diserte , quod honeste , dicitur .	Now: a bad man cannot help speaking things other than he feels. On the other land, the good will never be at a loss for honourable words or fail to find matter full of virtue for utterance, since among his virtues practical wisdom will be one. And even though his imagination lacks artifice to lend it charm, its own nature will be ornament enough, for if honour dictate the words, we shall find eloquence there as well.
3546	Quare , iuventus , immo omnes aetates , ( neque enim rectae voluntati serum est tempus ullum ) totis mentibus huc tendamus , in hoc elaboremus ; forsan et consummare contingat . Nam si natura non prohibet et esse virum bonum et esse dicendi peritum , cur non aliquis etiam unus utrumque consequi possit ? cur autem non se quisque speret fore illum aliquem ?	Therefore, let those that are young, or rather let all of us, whatever our age, since it is never too late to resolve to follow what is right, strive with all our hearts and devote all our efforts to the pursuit of virtue and eloquence; and perchance it may be granted to us to attain to the perfection that we seek. For since nature does not forbid the attainment of either, why should not someone succeed in attaining both together? And why should not each of us hope to be that happy man?
3547	Ad quod si vires ingenii non suffecerint , tamen ad quem usque modum processerimus , meliores erimus ex utroque . Hoc certe procul eximatur animo , rerum pulcherrimam eloquentiam cum vitiis mentis posse misceri . Facultas dicendi , si in malos incidit , et ipsa iudicanda est malum ; peiores enim illos facit , quibus contigit .	But if our powers are inadequate to such achievement, we shall still be the better for the double effort in proportion to the distance which we have advanced toward either goal. At any rate let us banish from our hearts the delusion that eloquence, the fairest of all things, can be combined with vice. The power of speaking is even to be accounted an evil when it is found in evil men; for it makes its possessors yet worse than they were before.
3548	Videor mihi audire quosdam ( neque enim deerunt unquam , qui diserti esse quam boni malint ) illa dicentes : Quid ergo tantum est artis in eloquentia ? cur tu de coloribus et difficilium causarum defensione , nonnihil etiam de confessione locutus es , nisi aliquando vis ac facultas dicendi expugnat ipsam veritatem ? Bonus enim vir non agit nisi bonas causas , eas porro etiam sine doctrina satis per se tuetur veritas ipsa .	I think I hear certain persons (for there will always be some who had rather be eloquent than good) asking, " Why then is there so much art in connexion with eloquence? Why have you talked so much of 'glosses,' the methods of defence to be employed in difficult cases, and sometimes even of actual confession of guilt, unless it is the case that the power and force of speech at times triumphs over truth itself? For a good man will only plead good cases, and those might safely be left to truth to support without the aid of learning. "
3549	Quibus ego , cum de meo primum opere respondero , etiam pro boni viri officio , si quando eum ad defensionem nocentium ratio duxerit , satisfaciam . Pertractare enim , quomodo aut pro falsis aut etiam pro iniustis aliquando dicatur , non est inutile , vel propter hoc solum , ut ea facilius et deprehendamus et refellamus ; quemadmodum remedia melius adhibebit , cui nota quae nocent fuerint .	Now, though my reply to these critics will in the first place be a defence of my own work, it will also explain what I consider to be the duty of a good man on occasions when circumstances have caused him to undertake the defence of the guilty. For it is by no means useless to consider how at times we should speak in defence of falsehood or even of injustice, if only for this reason, that such an investigation will enable us to detect and defeat them with the greater ease, just as the physician who has a thorough knowledge of all that can injure the health will be all the more skilful in the prescription of remedies.
3550	Neque enim Academici , cum in utramque disserunt partem , non secundum alteram vivunt , nec Carneades ille , qui Romae audiente Censorio Catone non minoribus viribus contra iustitiam dicitur disseruisse quam pridie pro iustitia dixerat , iniustus ipse vir fuit . Verum et virtus quid sit , adversa ei malitia detegit , et aequitas fit ex iniqui contemplatione manifestior , et plurima contrariis probantur . Debent ergo oratori sic esse adversariorum nota consilia ut hostium imperatori .	For the Academicians, although they will argue on either side of a question, do not thereby commit themselves to taking one of these two views as their guide in life to the exclusion of the other, while the famous Carneades, who is said to have spoken at Rome in the presence of Cato the Censor, and to have argued against justice with no less vigour than he had argued for justice on the preceding day, was not himself an unjust man. But the nature of virtue is revealed by vice, its opposite, justice becomes yet more manifest from the contemplation of injustice, and there are many other things that are proved by their contraries. Consequently the schemes of his adversaries should be no less well known to the orator than those of the enemy to a commander in the field.
3551	Verum et illud , quod prima proposition durum videtur , potest adferre ratio , ut vir bonus in defensione causae velit auferre aliquando iudici veritatem . Quod si quis a me proponi mirabitur , ( quanquam non est haec mea proprie sententia , sed eorum , quos grauissimos sapientiae magistros aetas vetus credidit ) sic iudicet , pleraque esse , quae non tam factis quam causis eorum vel honesta fiant vel turpia .	But it is even true, although at first sight it seems hard to believe, that there may be sound reason why at times a good man who is appearing for the defence should attempt to conceal the truth from the judge. If any of my readers is surprised at my making such a statement (although this opinion is not of my own invention, but is derived from those whom antiquity regarded as the greatest teachers of wisdom), I would have him reflect that there are many things which are made honourable or the reverse not by the nature of the facts, but by the causes from which they spring.
3552	Nam si hominem occidere saepe virtus , liberos necare nonnunquam pulcherrimum est , asperiora quaedam adhuc dictu , si communis utilitas exegerit , facere conceditur , ne hoc quidem nudum est intuendum , qualem causam vir bonus , sed etiam quare et qua mente defendat .	For if to slay a man is often a virtue and to put one's own children to death is at times the noblest of deeds, and if it is permissible in the public interest to do deeds yet more horrible to relate than these, we should assuredly take into consideration not solely and simply what is the nature of the case which the good man undertakes to defend, but what is his reason and what his purpose in so doing.
3553	Ac primum concedant mihi omnes oportet , quod Stoicorum quoque asperrimi confitentur , facturum aliquando virum bonum ut mendacium dicat , et quidem nonnunquam levioribus causis , ut in pueris aegrotantibus utilitatis eorum gratia multa fingimus , multa non facturi promittimus ;	And first of all everyone must allow, what even the sternest of the Stoics admit, that the good man will sometimes tell a lie, and further that he will sometimes do so for comparatively trivial reasons; for example we tell countless lies to sick children for their good and make many promises to them which we do not intend to perform.
3554	nedum si ab homine occidendo grassator avertendus sit aut hostis pro salute patriae fallendus ; ut hoc , quod alias in servis quoque reprehendendum est , sit alias in ipso sapiente laudandum . Id si constiterit , multa iam video posse evenire , propter quae orator bene suscipiat tale causae genus , quale remota ratione honesta non recepisset .	And there is clearly far more justification for lying when it is a question of diverting an assassin from his victim or deceiving an enemy to save our country. Consequently a practice which is at times reprehensible even in slaves, may on other occasions be praiseworthy even in a wise man. If this be granted, I can see that there will be many possible emergencies such as to justify an orator in undertaking cases of a kind which, in the absence of any honourable reason, he would have refused to touch.
3555	Nec hoc dico ( quia severiores sequi placet leges ) pro patre , fratre , amico periclitantibus , tametsi non mediocris haesitatio est , hinc iustitiae proposita imagine , inde pietatis . Nihil dubii relinquamus . Sit aliquis insidiatus tyranno atque ob id reus : utrumne salvum eum nolet is , qui a nobis finitur , orator ? an , si tuendum susceperit , non tam falsis defendet , quam qui apud iudices malam causam tuetur ?	In saying this I do not mean that we should be ready under any circumstances to defend our father, brother or friend when in peril (since I hold that we should be guided by stricter rules in such matters), although such contingencies may well cause us no little perplexity, when we have to decide between the rival claims of justice and natural affection. But let us put the problem beyond all question of doubt. Suppose a man to have plotted against a tyrant and to be accused of having done so. Which of the two will the orator, as defined by us, desire to save? And if he undertakes the defence of the accused, will he not employ falsehood with no less readiness than the advocate who is defending a bad case before a jury?
3556	Quid si quaedam bene facta damnaturus est iudex , nisi ea non esse facta convicerimus , non vel hoc modo servabit orator non innocentem modo , sed etiam laudabilem civem ? Quid si quaedam iusta natura , sed condicione temporum inutilia civitati sciemus , nonne utemur arte dicendi bona quidem , sed malis artibus simili ?	Again, suppose that the judge is likely to condemn acts which were rightly done, unless we can convince him that they were never done. Is not this another case where the orator will not shrink even from lies, if so he may save one who is not merely innocent, but a praiseworthy citizen? Again, suppose that we realise that certain acts are just in themselves, though prejudicial to the state under existing circumstances. Shall we not then employ methods of speaking which, despite the excellence of their intention, bear a close resemblance to fraud.
3557	Ad hoc nemo dubitabit , quin , si nocentes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo modo possint , sicut posse conceditur , salvos esse eos magis e re publica sit quam puniri . Si liqueat igitur oratori futurum bonum virum , cui vera obicientur , non id aget , ut salvus sit ?	Further, no one will hesitate for a moment to hold the view that it is in the interests of the commonwealth that guilty persons should be acquitted rather than punished, if it be possible thereby to convert them to a better state of mind, a possibility which is generally conceded. If then it is clear to an orator that a man who is guilty of the offences laid to his charge will become a good man, will he not strive to secure his acquittal?
3558	Da nunc , ut crimine manifesto prematur dux bonus et sine quo vincere hostem civitas non possit : nonne ei communis utilitas oratorem advocabit ? Certe Fabricius Cornelium Rufinum , et alioqui malum civem et sibi inimicum , tamen , quia utilem sciebat ducem , imminente bello , palam consulem suffragio suo fecit atque id mirantibus quibusdam respondit , a cive se spoliari malle quam ab hoste venire . Ita , si fuisset orator , non defendisset eundem Rufinum vel manifesti peculatus reum ?	Imagine for example that a skilful commander, without whose aid the state cannot hope to crush its enemies, is labouring under a charge which is obviously true: will not the common interest irresistibly summon our orator to defend him? We know at any rate that Fabricius publicly voted for and secured the election to the consulate of Cornelius Rufinus, despite the tact that he was a bad citizen and his personal enemy, merely because he knew that he was a capable general and the state was threatened with war. And when certain persons expressed their surprise at his conduct, he replied that he had rather be robbed by a fellow-citizen than be sold as a slave by the enemy. Well then, had Fabricius been an orator, would he not have defended Rufinus against a charge of peculation, even though his guilt were as clear as day?
3559	Multa dici possunt similia , sed vel unum ex iis quodlibet sufficit . Non enim hoc agimus , ut istud illi , quem formamus , viro saepe sit faciendum ; sed ut , si talis coegerit ratio , sit tamen vera finitio , oratorem esse virum bonum dicendi peritum .	I might produce many other similar examples, but one of them taken at random is enough. For my purpose is not to assert that such tasks will often be incumbent on the orator whom I desire to form, but merely to show that, in the event of his being compelled to take such action, it will not invalidate our definition of an orator as a "good man, skilled in speaking."
3560	Praecipere vero ac discere , quomodo etiam probatione difficilia tractentur , necessarium est . Nam frequenter etiam optimae causae similes sunt malis , et innocens reus multis veri similibus premitur ; quo fit , ut eadem actionis ratione defendendus sit , qua si nocens esset . Iam innumerabilia sunt bonis causis malisque communia , testes , litterae , suspiciones , opiniones . Non aliter autem verisimilia quam vera et confirmantur et refelluntur . Quapropter , ut res feret , flectetur oratio manente honesta voluntate .	And it is necessary also both to teach and learn how to establish difficult cases by proof. For often even the best cases have a resemblance to bad and, the charges which tell heavily against an innocent person frequently have a strong resemblance to the truth. Consequently, the same methods of defence have to be employed that would be used if he were guilty. Further, there are countless elements which are common to both good cases and bad, such as oral and documentary evidence, suspicions and opinions, all of which have to be established or disposed of in the same way, whether they be true or merely resemble the truth. Therefore, while maintaining his integrity of purpose, the orator will modify his pleading to suit the circumstances.
3561	Quando igitur orator est vir bonus , is autem citra virtutem intelligi non potest , virtus , etiamsi quosdam impetus ex natura sumit , tamen perficienda doctrina est : mores ante omnia oratori studiis erunt excolendi atque omnis honesti iustique disciplina pertractanda , sine qua nemo nec vir bonus esse nec dicendi peritus potest .	Since then the orator is a good man, and such goodness cannot be conceived as existing apart from virtue, virtue, despite the fact that it is in part derived from certain natural impulses, will require to be perfected by instruction. The orator must above all things devote his attention to the formation of moral character and must acquire a complete knowledge of all that is just and honourable. For without this knowledge no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking,
3562	Nisi forte accedemus iis , qui natura constare mores et nihil adiuvari disciplina putant ; scilicet ut ea quidem , quae manu fiunt , atque eorum etiam contemptissima confiteantur egere doctoribus , virtutem vero , qua nihil homini , quo ad deos immortales propius accederet , datum est , obviam et illaboratam , tantum quia nati simus , habeamus . Abstinens erit qui id ipsum , quid sit abstinentia , ignoret ?	unless indeed we agree with those who regard morality as intuitive and as owing nothing to instruction: indeed they go so far as to acknowledge that handicrafts, not excluding even those which are most despised among them, can only be acquired by the result of teaching, whereas virtue, which of all gifts to man is that which makes him most near akin to the immortal gods, comes to him without search or effort, as a natural concomitant of birth. But can the man who does not know what abstinence is, claim to be truly abstinent?
3563	Et fortis qui metus doloris , mortis , superstitionis nulla ratione purgaverit ? Et iustus qui aequi bonique tractatum , qui leges , quaeque natura sunt omnibus datae quaeque propriae populis et gentibus constitutae , nunquam eruditiore aliquo sermone tractarit ? O quam istud parvum putant , quibus tam facile videtur !	or brave, if he has never purged his soul of the fears of pain, death and superstition? or just, it he has never, in language approaching that of philosophy, discussed the nature of virtue and justice, or of the laws that have been given to mankind by nature or established among individual peoples and nations? What a contempt it argues for such themes to regard them as being so easy of comprehension!
3564	Sed hoc transeo , de quo neminem , qui litteras vel primis , ut aiunt , labris degustarit , dubitaturum puto . Ad illud sequens praevertar , ne dicendi quidem satis peritum fore , qui non et naturae vim omnem penitus perspexerit et mores praeceptis ac ratione formarit .	However, I pass this by; for I am sure that no one with the least smattering of literary culture will have the slightest hesitation in agreeing with me. I will proceed to my next point, that no one will achieve sufficient skill even in speaking, unless he makes a thorough study of all the workings of nature and forms his character on the precepts of philosophy and the dictates of reason.
3565	Neque enim frustra in tertio de Oratore libro L . Crassus cuncta , quae de aequo , iusto , vero , bono deque iis , quae sunt contra posita , dicantur , propria esse oratoris adfirmat , ac philosophos , cum ea dicendi viribus tuentur , uti rhetorum armis , non suis . Idem tamen confitetur , ea iam esse a philosophia petenda , videlicet quia magis haec illi videtur in possessione earum rerum fuisse .	For it is with good cause that Lucius Crassus, in the third book of the de Oratore, affirms that all that is said concerning equity, justice, truth and the good, and their opposites, forms part of the studies of an orator, and that the philosophers, when they exert their powers of speaking to defend these virtues, are using the weapons of rhetoric, not their own. But he also confesses that the knowledge of these subjects must be sought from the philosophers for the reason that, in his opinion, philosophy has more effective possession of them.
3566	Hinc etiam illud est , quod Cicero pluribus libris et epistolis testatur dicendi facultatem ex intimis sapientiae fontibus fluere , ideoque aliquamdiu praeceptores eosdem fuisse morum atque dicendi . Quapropter haec exhortatio mea non eo pertinet ut esse oratorem philosophum velim , quando non alia vitae secta longius a civilibus officiis atque ab omni munere oratoris recessit .	And it is for the same reason that Cicero in several of his books and letters proclaims that eloquence has its fountain-head in the most secret springs of wisdom, and that consequently for a considerable time the instructors of morals and of eloquence were identical. Accordingly this exhortation of mine must not be taken to mean that I wish the orator to be a philosopher, since there is no other way of life that is further removed from the duties of a statesman and the tasks of an orator.
3567	Nam quis philosophorum aut in iudiciis frequens aut clarus in contionibus fuit ? Quis denique in ipsa , quam maxime plerique praecipiunt , rei publicae administratione versatus est ? Atqui ego illum , quem instituo , Romanum quendam velim esse sapientem , qui non secretis disputationibus , sed rerum experimentis atque operibus vere civilem virum exhibeat .	For what philosopher has ever been a frequent speaker in the courts or won renown in public assemblies? Nay, what philosopher has ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state, which forms the most frequent theme of their instructions? None the less I desire that he, whose character I am seeking to mould, should be a "wise man" in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.
3568	Sed quia deserta ab his , qui se ad eloquentiam contulerunt , studia sapientiae non iam in actu suo atque in hac fori luce versantur , sed in porticus et in gymnasia primum , mox in conventus scholarum recesserunt : id , quod est oratori necessarium nec a dicendi praeceptoribus traditur , ab iis petere nimirum necesse est , apud quos remansit , evolvendi penitus auctores , qui de virtute praecipiunt , ut oratoris vita cum scientia diuinarum rerum sit humanarumque coniuncta .	But inasmuch as the study of philosophy has been deserted by those who have turned to the pursuit of eloquence, and since philosophy no longer moves in its true sphere of action and in the broad daylight of the forum, but has retired first to porches and gymnasia and finally to the gatherings of the schools, all that is essential for an orator, and yet is not taught by the professors of eloquence, must undoubtedly be sought from those persons in whose possession it has remained. The authors who have discoursed on the nature of virtue must be read through and through, that the life of the orator may be wedded to the knowledge of things human and divine.
3569	Quae ipsae quanto maiores ac pulchriores viderentur , si illas ii docerent , qui etiam eloqui praestantissime possent ? Utinamque sit tempus unquam , quo perfectus aliquis , qualem optamus , orator hanc artem superbo nomine et vitiis quorundam bona eius corrumpentium invisam vindicet sibi ac , velut rebus repetitis , in corpus eloquentiae adducat .	But how much greater and fairer would such subjects appear if those who taught them were also those who could give them most eloquent expression! O that the day may dawn when the perfect orator of our heart's desire shall claim for his own possession that science that has lost the affection of mankind through the arrogance of its claims and the vices of some that have brought disgrace upon its virtues, and shall restore it to its place in the domain of eloquence, as though he had been victorious in a trial for the restoration of stolen goods!
3570	Quae quidem cum sit in tris divisa partes , naturalem , moralem , rationalem , qua tandem non est cum oratoris opere coniuncta ? Nam ut ordinem retro agamus , de ultima illa , quae tota versatur in verbis , nemo dubitaverit , si et proprietates vocis cuiusque nosse et ambigua aperire et perplexa discernere et de falsis iudicare et colligere ac resoluere quae velis oratorum est .	And since philosophy falls into three divisions, physics, ethics and dialectic, which, I ask you, of these departments is not closely connected with the task of the orator? Let us reverse the order just given and deal first with the third department which is entirely concerned with words. If it be true that to know the properties of each word, to clear away ambiguities, to unravel perplexities, to distinguish between truth and falsehood, to prove or to refute as may be desired, all form part of the functions of an orator, who is there that can doubt the truth of my contention?
3571	Quanquam ea non tam est minute atque concise in actionibus utendum quam in disputationibus , quia non docere modo , sed movere etiam ac delectare audientes debet orator , ad quod impetu quoque ac viribus et decore est opus ; ut vis amnium maior est altis ripis multoque gurgitis tractu fluentium quam tenuis aquae et obiectu lapillorum resultantis .	I grant that we shall not have to employ dialectic with such minute attention to detail when we are pleading in the courts as when we are engaged in philosophical debate, since the orator's duty is not merely to instruct, but also to move and delight his audience; and to succeed in doing this he needs a strength, impetuosity and grace as well. For oratory is like a river: the current is stronger when it flows within deep banks and with a mighty flood, than when the waters are shallow and broken by the pebbles that bar their way.
3572	Et ut palaestrici doctores illos , quos numeros vocant , non idcirco discentibus tradunt , ut iis omnibus ii , qui didicerint , in ipso luctandi certamine utantur ( plus enim pondere et firmitate et spiritu agitur ) , sed ut subsit copia illa , ex qua unum aut alterum , cuius se occasio dederit ,	And just as the trainers of the wrestling school do not impart the various throws to their pupils that those who have learnt them may make use of all of them in actual wrestling matches (for weight and strength and wind count for more than these), but that they may have a store from which to draw one or two of such tricks, as occasion may offer;