Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
|
|
1103 |
Sed ex iis quoque , quae non sunt personarum nec causarum , verum adiuncta personis et causis , duci prooemia solent . Personis applicantur non pignora modo , de quibus supra dixi , sed propinquitates , amicitiae , interim regiones etiam civitatesque , et si quid aliud eius quem defendimus casu laedi potest .
|
But exordia are often drawn from matters which do not, strictly speaking, concern either cases or the persons involved, though not unrelated to either. In such relation to persons stand not only wives and children of whom I have just spoken, but also relations, friends, and at times districts and states together with anything else that is like to suffer injury from the fall of the client whom we defend. |
1104 |
Ad causam extra pertinent tempus , unde principium pro Caelio ; locus , unde pro Deiotaro ; habitus , unde pro Milone ; opinio , unde in Verrem ; deinceps , ne omnia enumerem , infamia iudiciorum , exspectatio vulgi ; nihil enim horum in causa est , ad causam tamen pertinent .
|
As regards external circumstances which have a bearing on the case, I may mention time, which is introduced in the exordium of the pro Caelio, place (in the pro Deiotaro ),the appearance of the court (in the pro Milone ),public opinion (in the Verrines ),and finally, as I cannot mention all, the ill-repute of the law courts and the popular expectation excited by the case. None of these actually belong to the case, but all have some bearing on it. |
1105 |
Adiicit Theophrastus ab oratione principium , quale videtur esse Demosthenis pro Ctesiphonte , ut sibi dicere suo potius arbitrio liceat rogantis quam eo modo , quem actione accusator praescripserit .
|
Theophrastus adds that the exordium may be drawn from the speech of one's opponent, as that of the pro Ctesiphonte of Demosthenes appears to be, where he asks that he may be allowed to speak as he pleases and not to be restricted to the form laid down by the accuser in his speech. |
1106 |
Fiducia ipsa solet opinione arrogantiae laborare . Faciunt favorem et ilia paene communia non tamen omittenda , vel ideo ne occupentur , optare , abominari , rogare , sollicitum agere ; quia plerumque attentum iudicem facit , si res agi videtur nova , magna , atrox , pertinens ad exemplum , praecipue tamen , si index aut sua vice aut reipublicae commovetur , cuius animus spe , metu , admonitione , precibus , vanitate denique , si id profuturum credimus , agitandus est .
|
Confidence often labours under the disadvantage of being regarded as arrogance. But there are certain tricks for acquiring good-will, which though almost universal, are by no means to be neglected, if only to prevent their being first employed against ourselves. I refer to rhetorical expressions of wishing, detestation, entreaty, or anxiety. For it keeps the judge's attention on the alert, if he is led to think the case novel, important, scandalous, or likely to set a precedent, still more if he is excited by concern for himself or the common weal, when his mind must be stirred by hope, fear, admonition, entreaty and even by falsehood, if it seems to us that it is likely to advance our case. |
1107 |
Sunt et illa excitandis ad audiendum non inutilia , si nos neque diu moraturos neque extra causam dicturos existiment . Docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio ; sed et illud , si breviter et dilucide summam rei , de qua cognoscere debeat , indicaverimus , quod Homerus atque Vergilius operum suorum principiis faciunt .
|
We shall also find it a useful device for wakening the attention of our audience to create the impression that we shall not keep them long and intend to stick closely to the point. The mere fact of such attention undoubtedly makes the judge ready to receive instruction from us, but we shall contribute still more to this effect if we give a brief and lucid summary of the case which he has to try; in so doing we shall be following the method adopted by Homer and Virgil at the beginning of their poems. |
1108 |
Nam is eius rei modus est , ut propositioni similior sit quam expositioni , nec quomodo quidque sit actum , sed de quibus dicturus sit orator ostendat . Nec video , quod huius rei possit apud oratores reperiri melius exemplum quam Ciceronis pro A .
|
For as regards the length of the exordium, it should propound rather than expound, and should not describe how each thing occurred, but simply indicate the points on which the orator proposes to speak. I do not think a better example of this can be found than the exordium to the pro Cluentio of Cicero. |
1109 |
Cluentio : Animadverti , iudices , omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse pares ; quarum altera mihi inniti et magnopere confidere videbatur invidia iam inveterata iudicii Iuniani , altera tantum modo consuetudinis causa timide et diffidenter attingere rationem veneficii criminum , qua de re lege est haec quaestio constituta . Id tamen totum respondenti facilius est quam proponenti , quia hic admonendus iudex , illic docendus est .
|
" I have noted, judges, that the speech for the prosecution was divided into two parts: of these, the first seemed to rest and in the main to rely on the odium, now inveterate, arising from the trial before Junius, while the other appeared to touch, merely as a matter of form, and with a certain timidity and diffidence, on the question of the charge of poisoning, though it is to try this point that the present court has been constituted in accordance with the law. " All this, however, is easier for the defender than the prosecutor, since the latter has merely to remind the judge, while the former has to instruct him. |
1110 |
Nec me quanquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint , ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim ; non quia nesciam , id quod ab illis dicitur , esse pro mala causa , qualis ea sit non intelligi , verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit ,
|
Nor shall any authority, however great, induce me to abandon my opinion that it is always desirable to render the judge attentive and ready to receive instruction. I am well aware that those who disagree with me urge that it is to the advantage of a bad case that its nature should not be understood; but such lack of understanding arises not from inattention on the part of the judge, but from his being deceived. |
1111 |
sed errore . Dixit enim adversarius et fortasse persuasit ; nobis opus est eius diversa opinione , quae mutari non potest , nisi illi fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docile et intentum . Quid ergo est ? Imminuenda quaedam et levanda et quasi contemnenda esse consentio ad remittendam intentionem iudicis , quam adversario praestat , ut fecit pro Ligario Cicero .
|
Our opponent has spoken and perhaps convinced him; we must alter his opinion, and this we cannot do unless we render him attentive to what we have to say and ready to be instructed. What are we to do then? I agree to the view that we should cut down, depreciate and deride some of our opponent's arguments with a view to lessening the attention shown him by the judge, as Cicero did in the pro Ligario. |
1112 |
Quid enim agebat aliud ironia illa , quam ut Caesar minus se in rem tanquam non novam intenderet ? Quid pro Caelio , quam ut res exspectatione minor videretur ? Verum ex iis , quae proposuimus , aliud in alio genere causae desiderari palam est .
|
For what was the purpose of Cicero's irony save that Caesar should be induced to regard the case as presenting only old familiar features and consequently to give it less attention? What was his purpose in the pro Caelio save to make the case seem far more trivial than had been anticipated? It is, however, obvious that of the rules which I have laid down, some will be applicable to one case and some to another. |
1113 |
Genera porro causarum plurimi quinque fecerunt , honestum , humile , dubium vel anceps , admirabile , obscurum : id est ἔνδοξον , ἄδοξον , ἀμφίδοξον , παράδοξον , δυσπαρακολούθητον .Sunt quibus recte videtur adiici turpe , quod alii humili , alii admirabili subiiciunt .
|
The majority of writers consider that there are five kinds of causes, the honourable, the mean, the doubtful or ambiguous, the extraordinary and the obscure, or as they are called in Greek, ἔνδοξον, ἄδοξον, ἀμφίδοξον, παράδοξον and δυσπαρακολούθητον. To these some would add a sixth, the scandalous, which some again include under the heading of the mean, others under the extraordinary. |
1114 |
Admirabile autem vocant , quod est praeter opinionem hominum constitutum . In ancipiti maxime benevolum iudicem , in obscuro docilem , in humili attentum parare debemus . Nam honestum quidem ad conciliationem satis per se valet , admirabili et turpi remediis opus est .
|
The latter name is given to cases which are contrary to ordinary expectation. In ambiguous cases it is specially important to secure the good-will of the judge, in the obscure to render him ready to receive instruction, in the mean to excite his attention. As regards the honourable the very nature of the case is sufficient to win the approval of the judge; in the scandalous and extraordinary some kind of palliation is required. |
1115 |
Eo quidam exordium in duas dividunt partes , principium et insinuationem , ut sit in principiis recta benevolentiae et attentionis postulatio ; quae quia esse in turpi causae genere non possit , insinuatio surrepat animis , maxime ubi frons causae non satis honesta est , vel quia res sit improba vel quia hominibus parum probetur , aut si facie quoque ipsa premitur vel invidiosa consistentis ex diverso patroni aut patris vel miserabili senis , caeci , infantis .
|
Some therefore divide the exordium into two parts, the introduction and the insinuation, making the former contain a direct appeal to the good-will and attention of the judge. But as this is impossible in scandalous cases, they would have the orator on such occasions insinuate himself little by little into the minds of his judges, especially when the features of the case which meet the eye are discreditable, or because the subject is disgraceful or such as to meet with popular disapproval, or again if the outward circumstances of the case are such as to handicap it or excite odium (as for instance when a patron appears against a client or a father against a son), or pity (as when our opponent is an old or blind man or a child). |
1116 |
Et quidem quibus adversus haec modis sit medendum , verbosius tradunt materiasque sibi ipsi fingunt et ad morem actionum persequuntur ; sed hae cum oriantur ex causis , quarum species consequi omnes non possumus , nisi generaliter comprehenduntur , in infinitum sunt extrahendae .
|
To save the situation the rhetoricians lay down a number of rules at quite inordinate length: they invent fictitious cases and treat them realistically on the lines which would be followed in actual pleading. But these peculiar circumstances arise from such a variety of causes as to render classification by species impossible, and their enumeration save under the most general heads would be interminable. |
1117 |
Quare singulis consilium ex propria ratione nascetur . Illud in universum praeceperim , ut ab his quae laedunt ad ea quae prosunt refugiamus . Si causa laborabimus , persona subveniat ; si persona , causa ; si nihil quod nos adiuvet erit , quaeramus quid adversarium laedat ; nam ut optabile est plus favoris mereri , sic proximum odii minus .
|
The line to be adopted will therefore depend on the individual nature of each case. As a general principle, however, I should advise the avoidance of points which tell against us and concentrate on those which are likely to be of service. If the case itself is weak, we may derive help from the character of our client; if his character is doubtful, we may find salvation in the nature of the case. If both are hopeless, we must look out for something that will damage our opponent. For though it is desirable to secure as much positive good-will as possible, the next best thing is to incur the minimum of actual dislike. |
1118 |
In iis , quae negari non potuerint , elaborandum , ut aut minora quam dictum est aut alia mente facta aut nihil ad praesentem quaestionem pertinere aut emendari posse paenitentia aut satis iam punita videantur . Ideoque agere advocato quam litigatori facilius , quia et laudat sine arrogantiae crimine et aliquando utiliter etiam reprehendere potest .
|
Where we cannot deny the truth of facts that are urged against us, we must try to show that their significance has been exaggerated or that the purpose of the act was not what is alleged or that the facts are irrelevant or that what was done may be atoned for by penitence or has already been sufficiently punished. It is consequently easier for an advocate to put forward such pleas than for his client, since the former can praise without laying himself open to the charge of arrogance and may sometimes even reprove him with advantage to the case. |
1119 |
Nam se quoque moveri interim finget , ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero , dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat et auctoritatem induat vera sentientis , quo magis credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti . Ideoque hoc primum intuebimur , litigatoris an advocati persona sit utendum , quotiens utrumque fieri potest ; nam id in schola liberum est , in foro rarum , ut sit idoneus suae rei quisque defensor .
|
At times, like Cicero in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, he will pretend that he himself is strongly moved, in order to win the ear of the judge and to give the impression of one who is absolutely convinced of the truth of his cause, that so his statements may find all the readier credence whether he defends or denies the actions attributed to his client. Consequently it is of the first importance, wherever the alternative is open to us, to consider whether we are to adopt the character of a party to the suit or of an advocate. In the schools, of course, we have a free choice in the matter, but it is only on rare occasions that a man is capable of pleading his own case in the actual courts. |
1120 |
Declamaturus autem maxime positas in adfectibus causas propriis personis debet induere . Hi sunt enim , qui mandari non possunt , nec eadem vi profertur alieni animi qua sui motus .
|
When we are going to deliver a declamation on a theme that turns largely on its emotional features, we must give it a dramatic character suited to the persons concerned. For emotions are not transferable at will, nor can we give the same forcible expression to another man's emotions that we should give to our own. |
1121 |
His etiam de causis insinuatione videtur opus esse , si adversarii actio iudicum animos occupavit , si dicendum apud fatigatos est ; quorum alterum promittendo nostras probationes et adversas eludendo vitabimus , alterum et spe brevitatis et iis , quibus attentum fieri iudicem docuimus .
|
The circumstances which call for insinuation arise also in cases where the pleading of our opponent has made a powerful impression on the minds of the judges, or where the audience whom we have to address are tired. The first difficulty we shall evade by promising to produce our own proofs and by eluding the arguments of our opponents, the second by holding out hopes that we shall be brief and by the methods already mentioned for capturing the attention of the judges. |
1122 |
Et urbanitas opportuna reficit animos et undecunque petita iudicis voluptas levat taedium . Non inutilis etiam est ratio occupandi quae videntur obstare , ut Cicero dicit , scire se mirari quosdam , quod is , qui per tot annos defenderit multos , laeserit neminem , ad accusandum Verrem descenderit ; deinde ostendit , hanc ipsam esse sociorum defensionem ; quod schema πρόλημψις dicitur .
|
Again an opportune display of wit will often restore their flagging spirits and we may alleviate their boredom by the introduction of entertaining matter derived from any source that may be available. It will also be found advantageous to anticipate the objections that may be raised by our opponent, as Cicero does when he says " I know that some persons are surprised that one, who for such a number of years has defended so many and attacked none, should have come forward as the accuser of Verres, " he then goes on to show that the accusation which he has undertaken is really a defence of the allies, an artifice known as πρόληψις or anticipation. |
1123 |
Id cum sit utile aliquando , nunc a declamatoribus quibusdam paene semper adsumitur , qui fas non putant nisi a contrario incipere . Negant Apollodorum secuti tris esse , de quibus supra diximus , praeparandi iudicis partes ; sed multas species enumerant , ut ex moribus iudicis , ex opinionibus ad causam extra pertinentibus , ex opinione de ipsa causa , quae sunt prope infinitae , tum iis , ex quibus omnes controversiae constant , personis , factis , dictis , causis , temporibus , locis , occasionibus , ceteris . Quas veras esse fateor , sed in haec genera recidere .
|
Although this is at times a useful device, some of our declaimers employ it on practically every occasion, on the assumption that one should always start with the order thus reversed. The adherents of Apollodorus reject the view stated above to the effect that there are only three respects in which the mind of the judge requires to be prepared, and enumerate many others, relating to the character of the judge, to opinions regarding matters which though outside the case have still some bearing on it, to the opinion current as to the case itself, and so on ad infinitum: to these they add others relating to the elements of which every dispute is composed, such as persons, deeds, words, motives, time and place, occasions and the like. Such views are, I admit, perfectly correct, |
1124 |
Nam si iudicem benevolum , attentum , docilem habeo , quid amplius debeam optare , non reperio ; cum metus ipse , qui maxime videtur esse extra haec , et attentum iudicem faciat et ab adverso favore deterreat .
|
but are covered by one or other of the three classes which I have mentioned. For if I can secure good-will, attention and readiness to learn on the part of my judge, I cannot see what else I ought to require; even fear, which perhaps may be thought more than anything else to lie outside the considerations I have mentioned, secures the attention of the judge and deters him from favouring our opponent. |
1125 |
Verum quoniam non est satis demonstrare discentibus , quae sint in ratione prooemii , sed dicendum etiam , quomodo perfici facillime possint , hoc adiicio , ut dicturus intueatur , quid , apud quem , pro quo , contra quem , quo tempore , quo loco , quo rerum statu , qua vulgi fama dicendum sit , quid iudicem sentire credibile sit , antequam incipimus , tum quid aut desideremus aut deprecemur . Ipsa illum natura eo ducet , ut sciat , quid primum dicendum sit .
|
It is not, however, sufficient to explain the nature of the exordium to our pupils. We must also indicate the easiest method of composing an exordium. I would therefore add that he who has a speech to make should consider what he has to say; before whom, in whose defence, against whom, at what time and place, under what circumstances he has to speak; what is the popular opinion on the subject, and what the prepossessions of the judge are likely to be; and finally of what we should express our deprecation or desire. Nature herself will give him the knowledge of what he ought to say first. |
1126 |
At nunc omne , quo coeperunt , prooemium putant et , ut quidque succurrit , utique si aliqua sententia blandiatur , exordium . Multa autem sine dubio sunt et aliis partibus causae communia , nihil tamen in quaque melius dicitur , quam quod aeque bene dici alibi non possit . Multum gratiae exordio est ,
|
Nowadays, however, speakers think that anything with which they choose to start is a proem and that whatever occurs to them, especially if it be a reflexion that catches their fancy, is an exordium. There are, no doubt, many points that can be introduced into an exordium which are common to other parts of a speech, but the best test of the appropriateness of a point to any part of a speech is to consider whether it would lose effect by being placed elsewhere. |
1127 |
quod ab actione diversae partis materiam trahit , hoc ipso , quod non compositum domi , sed ibi atque ex re natum , et facilitate famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex proximo sermonis fidem quoque adquirit ; adeo ut , etiamsi reliqua scripta atque elaborata sint , tamen plerumque videatur tota extemporalis oratio , cuius initium nihil praeparati habuisse manifestum est .
|
A most attractive form of exordium is that which draws its material from the speech of our opponent, if only for the reason that the fact of its not having been composed at home, but having been improvised on the spot to meet the needs of the case increases the orator's reputation for natural talent by the readiness with which it is produced and carries conviction owing to the simple and ordinary language in which it is clothed. As a result, even although the rest of the speech has been committed to writing and carefully elaborated, the whole of the speech will often be regarded as extempore, simply because its commencement is clearly not the result of previous study. |
1128 |
Frequentissime vero prooemium decebit et sententiarum et compositionis et vocis et vultus modestia , adeo ut in genere causae etiam indubitabili fiducia se ipsa nimium exserere non debeat . Odit enim iudex fere litigantis securitatem , cumque ius suum intelligat , tacitus reverentiam postulat .
|
Indeed a certain simplicity in the thoughts, style, voice and look of the speaker will often produce so pleasing an effect in the exordium that even in a case where there is no room for doubt the confidence of the speaker should not reveal itself too openly. For as a rule the judge dislikes self-confidence in a pleader, and conscious of his rights tacitly demands the respectful deference of the orator. |
1129 |
Nec minus diligenter ne suspecti simus illa parte vitandum est , propter quod minime ostentari debet in principiis cura , quia videtur ars omnis dicentis contra iudicem adhiberi .
|
No less care must be taken to avoid exciting any suspicion in this portion of our speech, and we should therefore give no hint of elaboration in the exordium, since any art that the orator may employ at this point seems to be directed solely at the judge. |
1130 |
Sed ipsum istud evitare summae artis est . Nam id sine dubio ab omnibus et quidem optime praeceptum est , verum aliquatenus temporum condicione mutatur , quia iam quibusdam in iudiciis maximeque capitalibus aut apud centumviros ipsi iudices exigunt sollicitas et accuratas actiones , contemnique se , nisi in dicendo etiam diligentia appareat , credunt , nec doceri tantum sed etiam delectari volunt .
|
But to avoid all display of art in itself requires consummate art: this admirable canon has been insisted on by all writers, though its force has been somewhat impaired by present conditions, since in certain trials, more especially those brought on capital charges or in the centumviral court, the judges themselves demand the most finished and elaborate speeches, think themselves insulted, unless the orator shows signs of having exercised the utmost diligence in the preparation of his speech, and desire not merely to be instructed, but to be charmed. |
1131 |
Et est difficilis huius rei moderatio , quae tamen temperari ita potest , ut videamur accurate non callide dicere . Illud ex praeceptis veteribus manet , ne quod insoles verbum , ne audacius translatum , ne aut ab obsoleta vetustate aut poetica licentia sumptum in principio deprehendatur .
|
It is difficult to preserve the happy mean in carrying this precept into effect: but by a skilful compromise it will be possible to give the impression of speaking with care but without elaborate design. The old rule still holds good that no unusual word, no overbold metaphor, no phrase derived from the lumber-rooms of antiquity or from poetic licence should be detected in the exordium. |
1132 |
Nondum enim recepti sumus , et custodit nos recens audientium intentio ; magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus haec libertas feretur , maximeque cum in locos fuerimus ingressi , quorum naturalis ubertas licentiam verbi notari circumfuso nitore non patitur .
|
For our position is not yet established, the attention of the audience is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us: as soon as we have won their good-will and kindled their interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more especially when we have reached topics whose natural richness prevents any licence of expression being noticed in the midst of the prevailing splendour of the passage. |
1133 |
Nec argumentis autem nec locis nec narrationi similis esse in prooemio debet oratio , neque tamen deducta semper atque circumlita , sed saepe simplici atque illaboratae similis , nec verbis vultuque nimia promittens . Dissimulata enim et , ut Graeci dicunt , ἀνεπίφαντος actio melius saepe surrepit . Sed haec , prout formari animum iudicum expediet .
|
The style of the exrordiumn should not resemble that of our purple patches nor that of the argumentative and narrative portions of the speech, nor yet should it be prolix or continuously ornate: it should rather seem simple and unpremeditated, while neither our words nor our looks should promise too much. For a method of pleading which conceals its art and makes no vain display, being as the Greeks say ἀνεπίφατος will often be best adapted to insinuate its way into the minds of our hearers. But in all this we must be guided by the extent to which it is expedient to impress the minds of the judges. |
1134 |
Turbari memoria vel continuandi verba facultate destitui nusquam turpius , cum vitiosum prooemium possit videri cicatricosa facies , et pessimus certe gubernator qui navem , dum portu egreditur , impegit .
|
There is no point in the whole speech where confusion of memory or loss of fluency has a worse effect, for a faulty exordium is like a face seamed with scars; and he who runs his ship ashore while leaving port is certainly the least efficient of pilots. |
1135 |
Modus autem principii pro causa . Nam breve simplices , longius perplexae suspectaeque et infames desiderant . Ridendi vero , qui velut legem prooemiis omnibus dederunt , ut intra quattuor sensus terminarentur . Nec minus evitanda est immodica eius longitudo , ne in caput excrevisse videatur et quo praeparare debet fatiget .
|
The length of the exordium will be determined by the case; simple cases require a short introduction only, longer exordia being best suited to cases which are complicated, suspect or unpopular. As for those who have laid it down as a law applying to all exordia that they should not be more than four sentences long, they are merely absurd. On the other hand undue length is equally to be avoided, lest the head should seem to have grown out of all proportion to the body and the judge should be wearied by that which ought to prepare him for what is to follow. |
1136 |
Sermonem a persona iudicis aversum , quae ἀποστροφή dicitur , quidam in totum a prooemio summouent , nonnulla quidem in hanc persuasionem ratione ducti . Nam prorsus esse hoc magis secundum naturam confitendum est , ut eos alloquamur potissimum , quos conciliare nobis studemus .
|
The figure which the Greeks call apostrophe, by which is meant the diversion of our words to address some person other than the judge, is entirely banned by some rhetoricians as far as the exordium is concerned, and for this they have some reason, since it would certainly seem to be more natural that we should specially address ourselves to those whose favour we desire to win. |
1137 |
Interim tamen et est prooemio necessarius sensus aliquis , et hic acrior fit atque vehementior ad personam derectus alterius . Quod si accidat . quo iure aut qua tanta superstitione prohibeamur dare per hanc figuram sententiae vires ?
|
Occasionally however some striking expression of thought is necessary in the exordium which can be given greater point and vehemence if addressed to some person other than the judge. In such a case what law or what preposterous superstition is to prevent us from adding force to such expression of our thought by the use of this figure? |
1138 |
Neque enim istud scriptores artium , quia non liceat , sed quia non putent utile , vetant . Ita si vincet utilitas , propter eandem causam facere debebimus propter quam vetamur .
|
For the writers of text-books do not forbid it because they regard it as illicit, but because they think it useless. Consequently if its utility be proved, we shall have to employ it for the very reason for which we are now forbidden to do so. |
1139 |
Et Demosthenes autem ad Aeschinen orationem in prooemio convertit , et M . Tullius , cum pro aliis quibusdam , ad quos ei visum est , tum pro Ligario ad Tuberonem ;
|
Moreover Demosthenes turns to address Aeschines in his exordium, while Cicero adopts the same device in several of his speeches, but more especially in the pro Ligario, where he turns to address Tubero. |
1140 |
nam erat multo futura languidior , si esset aliter figurata . Quod facilius cognoscet , si quis totam illam partem vehementissimam , cuius haec forma est , Habes igitur , Tubero , quod est accusatori maxime optandum , et cetera convertat ad iudicem ; tum enim vere aversa videatur oratio et languescat vis omnis , dicentibus nobis Habet igitur Tubero , quod est accusatori maxime optandum . Illo enim modo pressit atque institit ,
|
His speech would have been much less effective, if any other figure had been used, as will be all the more clearly realised, if the whole of that most vigorous passage " You are, then, in possession, Tubero, of the most valuable advantage that can fall to an accuser etc. " be altered so as to be addressed to the judge. For it is a real and most unnatural diversion of the passage, which destroys its whole force, if we say "Tubero is then in possession of the most valuable advantage that can fall to an accuser." |