Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 609 |
Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate ( si tamen re vera Ars , quae circumfertur , eius est ) duxit . Qui , cum longe sit a voluntate infamantium oratoris officia , finem artis temere comprehendit , dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem , id est πειθοῦς δημιουργόν ; neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione , qua Ennius M . Cethegum Suadae medullam vocat .
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This view is derived from Isocrates, if indeed the treatise on rhetoric which circulates under his name is really from his hand. He, although far from agreeing with those whose aim is to disparage the duties of an orator, somewhat rashly defined rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, the "worker of persuasion" : for I cannot bring myself to use the peculiar derivative which Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus in the phrase suadae medulla, the "marrow of persuasion." |
| 610 |
Apud Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro , qui nomine eius inscriptus est , idem fere dicit ; sed hanc Plato illius opinionem vult accipi non suam . Cicero pluribus locis scripsit , officium oratoris esse dicere apposite ad persuadendum .
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Again Gorgias, in the dialogue of Plato that takes its title from his name, says practically the same thing, but Plato intends it to be taken as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero in more than one passage defined the duty of an orator as "speaking in a persuasive manner." |
| 611 |
In rhetoricis etiam , quos sine dubio ipse non probat , finem facit persuadere . Verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas , postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine voce , quo vel recordatio meritorum cuiusque vel facies aliqua miserabilis vel formae pulchritudo sententiam dictat .
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In his Rhelorica too, a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he makes the end to be persuasion. But many other things have the power of persuasion, such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual's great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person. |
| 612 |
Nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius , cum scissa veste cicatrices , quas is pro patria pectore adverso suscepisset , ostendit , non orationis habuit fiduciam sed oculis populi Romani vim attulit , quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc , ut absolveret reum , creditum est .
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Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence of Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honourable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused. |
| 613 |
Servium quidem Galbam miseratione sola , qua non suos modo liberos parvulos in contione produxerat , sed Galli etiam Sulpicii filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat , elapsum esse , cum aliorum monumentis tum Catonis oratione testatum est .
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Again there is a speech of Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by the pity which he aroused not only by producing his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpicius Gallus. |
| 614 |
Et Phrynen non Hyperidis actione , quanquam admirabili , sed conspectu corporis , quod illa speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudaverat tunica , putant periculo liberatam . Quae si omnia persuadent , non est hic , de quo locuti sumus , idoneus finis .
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So also according to general opinion Phryne was saved not by the eloquence of Hyperides, admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed by drawing aside her tunic. And if all these have power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing, cannot adequately be defined as persuasion. |
| 615 |
Ideoque diligentiores sibi sunt visi , qui , cum de rhetorice idem sentirent , existimaverunt eam vim dicendo persuadendi . Quem finem Gorgias in eodem , de quo supra diximus , libro , velut coactus a Socrate facit ; a quo non dissentit Theodectes , sive ipsius id opus est , quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur , sive , ut creditum est , Aristotelis , in quo est , finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id , quod actor velit .
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Consequently those who, although holding the same general view of rhetoric, have regarded it as the power of persuasion by speaking, pride themselves on their greater exactness of language. This definition is given by Gorgias, in the dialogue mentioned above, under compulsion from the inexorable logic of Socrates. Theodectes agrees with him, whether the treatise on rhetoric which has come down to us under his name is really by him or, as is generally believed, by Aristotle. In that work the end of rhetoric is defined as the leading of men by the power of speech to the conclusion desired by the orator. |
| 616 |
Sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum ; persuadent enim dicendo vel ducunt in id quod volunt alii quoque , ut meretrices , adulatores , corruptores . At contra non persuadet semper orator ; ut interim non sit proprius hic finis eius , interim sit communis cum iis , qui ab oratore procul absunt .
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But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by speaking or lead others to the conclusion desired, as for example harlots, flatterers and seducers. On the other hand the orator is not always engaged on persuasion, so that sometimes persuasion is not his special object, while sometimes it is shared by others who are far removed from being orators. |
| 617 |
Atqui non multum ab hoc fine abest Apollodorus , dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id , quod velit ; nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subiicit , ut , si non persuaserit , nomen suum retinere non possit .
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And yet Apollodorus is not very far off this definition when he asserts that the first and all-important task of forensic oratory is to persuade the judge and lead his mind to the conclusions desired by the speaker. For even Apollodorus makes the orator the sport of fortune by refusing him leave to retain his title if he fails to persuade. |
| 618 |
Quidam recesserunt ab eventu , sicut Aristoteles dicit : rhetorice est vis inveniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia .Qui finis et illud vitium , de quo supra diximus , habet et insuper quod nihil nisi inventionem complectitur , quae sine elocutione non est oratio .
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Some on the other hand pay no attention to results, as for example Aristotle, who says "rhetoric is the power of discovering all means of persuading by speech." This definition has not merely the fault already mentioned, but the additional defect of including merely the power of invention, which without style cannot possibly constitute oratory. |
| 619 |
Hermagorae , qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere , et aliis , qui eandem sententiam non iisdem tantum verbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum , satis responsum est , cum persuadere non tantum oratoris esse convicimus .
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Hermagoras, who asserts that its end is to speak persuasively, and others who express the same opinion, though in different words, and inform us that the end is to say everything which ought to be said with a view to persuasion, have been sufficiently answered above, when I proved that persuasion was not the privilege of the orator alone. |
| 620 |
Addita sunt his alia varie . Quidam enim circa res omnes , quidam circa civiles modo versari rhetoricen putaverunt ; quorum verius utrum sit , in eo loco , qui huius quaestionis proprius est , dicam .
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Various additions have been made to these definitions. For some hold that rhetoric is concerned with everything, while some restrict its activity to politics. The question as to which of these views is the nearer to the truth shall be discussed later in its appropriate place. |
| 621 |
Omnia subiecisse oratori videtur Aristoteles , cum dixit vim esse videndi , quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile . Et Patrocles , qui non quidem adiicit in quaque re , sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit ; vim enim vocat inveniendi , quod sit in oratione persuasibile ; qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inventionem . Quod vitium fugiens Theodorus vim putat inveniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione .
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Aristotle seems to have implied that the sphere of the orator was all-inclusive when he defined rhetoric as the power to detect every element in any given subject which might conduce to persuasion; so too does Patrocles who omits the words in any given subject, but since he excludes nothing, shows that his view is identical. For he defines rhetoric as the power to discover whatever is persuasive in speech. These definitions like that quoted above include no more than the power of invention alone. Theodorus avoids this fault and holds that it is the power to discover and to utter forth in elegant language whatever is credible in every subject of oratory. |
| 622 |
Sed cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inveniat , adiiciendo in omni oratione magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae rei nomen .
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But, while others besides orators may discover what is credible as well as persuasive, by adding the words in every subject he, to a greater extent than the others, concedes the fairest name in all the world to those who use their gifts as an incitement to crime |
| 623 |
Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait , de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare ; cui Socrates persuadendi , non docendi concedit facultatem .
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. Plato makes Gorgias say that he is a master of persuasion in the law-courts and other assemblies, and that his themes are justice and injustice, while in reply Socrates allows him the power of persuading, but not of teaching. |
| 624 |
Qui vero non omnia subiiciebant oratori , sollicitius ac verbosius , ut necesse erat , adhibuerunt discrimina ; quorum fuit Ariston , Critolai Peripatetici discipulus , cuius hic finis est , scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis . Hic scientiam ,
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Those who refused to make the sphere of oratory allinclusive, have been obliged to make somewhat forced and long-winded distinctions: among these I may mention Ariston, the pupil of the Peripatetic Critolaus, who produced the following definition, " Rhetoric is the science of seeing and uttering what ought to be said on political questions in language that is likely to prove persuasive to the people. " |
| 625 |
quia Peripateticus est , non , ut Stoici , virtutis loco ponit ; popularem autem comprehendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est adversus artem orandi , quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram . Illud de omnibus , qui circa civiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant versari , dictum sit , excludi ab his plurima oratoris officia , illam certe laudativam totam , quae est rhetorices pars tertia .
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Being a Peripatetic he regards it as a science, not, like the Stoics, as a virtue, while in adding the words "likely to prove persuasie to the people" he inflicts a positive insult on oratory, in implying that it is not likely to persuade the learned. The same criticism will apply to all those who restrict oratory to political questions, for they exclude thereby a large number of the duties of an orator, as for example panegyric, the third department of oratory, which is entirely ignored. |
| 626 |
Cautius Theodorus Gadareus , ut iam ad eos veniamus , qui artem quidem esse eam sed non virtutem putaverunt . Ita enim dicit ( ut ipsis eorum verbis utar , qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt ) , Ars inventrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix decenti ornatu secundum mensionem eius , quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile , in materia civili .
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Turning to those who regard rhetoric as an art, but not as a virtue, we find that Theodorus of Gadara is more cautious. For he says (I quote the words of his translators), " rhetoric is the art which discovers and judges and expresses, mith an elegance duly proportioned to the importance of all such elements of persuasion as may exist in any subject in the field of politics. " |
| 627 |
Itemque Cornelius Celsus , qui finem rhetorices ait dicere persuasibiliter in dubia civili materia . Quibus sunt non dissimiles , qui ab aliis traduntur ; qualis est ille , Vis videndi et eloquendi de rebus civilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et eorum , quae dicet , pronuntiatione .
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Similarly Cornelius Celsus defines the end of rhetoric as to speak persuasively on any doubtful subject within the field of politics. Similar definitions are given by others, such for instance as the following:— " rhetoric is the power of judging and holding forth on such political subjects as come before it with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body and delivery of the words. " |
| 628 |
Mille alia , sed aut eadem aut ex eisdem composita ; quibus item , cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit , respondebimus . Quidam eam neque vim neque scientiam neque artem putaverunt , sed Critolaus usum dicendi ( nam hoc τριβή significat ) , Athenaeus fallendi artem .
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There are countless other definitions, either identical with this or composed of the same elements, which I shall deal with when I come to the questions concerned with the subject matter of rhetoric. Some regard it as neither a power, a science or an art; Critolaus calls it the practice of speaking (for this is the meaning of τριβή ), Athenaeus styles it the art of deceiving, |
| 629 |
Plerique autem , dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti neque hoc totum neque alia eius volumina evolvunt , in maximum errorem inciderunt , creduntque eum in hac esse opinione , ut rhetoricen non artem sed peritiam quandam gratiae ac voluptatis existimet ;
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while the majority, content with reading a few passages from the Gorgias of Plato, unskilfully excerpted by earlier writers, refrain from studying that dialogue and the remainder of Plato's writings, and thereby fall into serious error. For they believe that in Plato's view rhetoric was not an art, but a certain adroitness in the production of delight and gratification, |
| 630 |
et alio loco civilitatis particulae simulacrum et quartam partem adulationis , quod duas partes civilitatis corpori adsignet , medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem , duas animo , legalem atque iustitiam ; adulationem autem medicinae vocet cocorum artificium , exercitatricis mangonum , qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur , legalis cavillatricem , iustitiae rhetoricen .
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or with reference to another passage the shadow of a small part of politics and the fourth department of flattery. For Plato assigns two departments of politics to the body, namely medicine and gymnastic, and two to the soul, namely law and justice, while he styles the art of cookery a form of flattery of medicine, the art of the slave-dealer a flattery of gymnastic, for they produce a false complexion by the use of paint and a false robustness by puffing them out with fat: sophistry he calls a dishonest counterfeit of legal science, and rhetoric of justice. |
| 631 |
Quae omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate , cuius persona videtur Plato significare quid sentiat ; sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos , qui contra disputant , compositi , quos ἐλεγκτικούς vocant , alii ad praecipiendum , qui δογματικοί appellantur .
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All these statements occur in the Gorgias and are uttered by Socrates who appears to be the mouthpiece of the views held by Plato. But some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute his opponents and are styled refutative, while others are for the purpose of teaching and are called doctrinal. |
| 632 |
Socrates autem seu Plato eam quidem , quae tum exercebatur , rhetoricen talem putat , nam et dicit his verbis τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον , ὃν ὑμεῖς πολιτεύεσθε , veram autem et honestam intelligit . Itaque disputatio ilia contra Gorgian ita clauditur , οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι , τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν ;
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Now it is only rhetoric as practised in their own day that is condemned by Plato or Socrates, for he speaks of it as "the manner in which you engage in public affairs" : rhetoric in itself he regards as a genuine and honourable thing, and consequently the controversy with Gorgias ends with the words, "The rhetorician therefore must be just and the just man desirous to do what is just." |
| 633 |
Ad quod ille quidem conticescit , sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuvenili calore inconsideratior , contra quem illa de simulacro et adulatione dicuntur . Tum Callicles adhuc concitatior , qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam , τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι , δίκαιον ἄνδρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων ; ut appareat , Platoni non rhetoricen videri malum , sed eam veram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere .
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To this Gorgias makes no reply, but the argument is taken up by Polus, a hot-headed and headstrong young fellow, and it is to him that Socrates makes his remarks about "shadows" and "forms of flattery." Then Callicles, who is even more hot-headed, intervenes, but is reduced to the conclusion that "he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and possess a knowledge of justice." It is clear therefore that Plato does not regard rhetoric as an evil, but holds that true rhetoric is impossible for any save a just and good man. In the Phaedrus |
| 634 |
Adhuc autem in Phaedro manifestius facit , hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse ; cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus . An aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum , qui pro patria ceciderant , laudem scripsisset ?
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he makes it even clearer that the complete attainment of this art is impossible without the knowledge of justice, an opinion in which I heartily concur. Had this not been his view, would he have ever written the Apology of Socrates or the Funeral Oration in praise of those who had died in battle for their country, both of them works falling within the sphere of oratory. |
| 635 |
quae certe sunt oratoris opera . Sed in illud hominum genus , quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur , invectus est . Nam et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem , quam ei Lysias reo composuerat ; et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus , quae illi pro se ipsi dicerent , erat moris , atque ita iuri , quo non licebat pro altero agere , fraus adhibebatur .
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It was against the class of men who employed their glibness of speech for evil purposes that he directed his denunciations. Similarly Socrates thought it incompatible with his honour to make use of the speech which Lysias composed for his defence, although it was the usual practice in those days to write speeches for the parties concerned to speak in the courts on their own behalf, a device designed to circumvent the law which forbade the employment of advocates. |
| 636 |
Doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni videbantur , qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et veris credibilia praeferrent ; nam id quoque dicit in Phaedro .
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Further the teachers of rhetoric were regarded by Plato as quite unsuited to their professed task. For they divorced rhetoric from justice and preferred plausibility to truth, as he states in the Phaedrus. |
| 637 |
Consensisse autem illis superioribus videri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus , cuius haec verba sunt : Orator simile tantum veri petit . Deinde paulo post : Non enim bona conscientia sed victoria litigantis est praemium . Quae si vera essent , pessimorum hominum foret , haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuvare . Sed illi rationem opinionis suae viderint .
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Cornelius Celsus seems to have agreed with these early rhetoricians, for he writes "The orator only aims at the semblance of truth," and again a little later "The reward of the party to a suit is not a good conscience, but victory." If this were true, only the worst of men would place such dangerous weapons at the disposal of criminals or employ the precepts of their art for the assistance of wickedness. However I will leave those who maintain these views to consider what ground they have for so doing. |
| 638 |
Nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem , quem in primis esse virum bonum volumus , ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt , revertamur . Rhetoricen autem quidam eandem civilitatem esse iudicaverunt ; Cicero scientiae civilis partem vocat ( civilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est ) ; quidam eandem philosophiam ,
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For my part, I have undertaken the task of moulding the ideal orator, and as my first desire is that he should be a good man, I will return to those who have sounder opinions on the subject. Some however identify rhetoric with politics, Cicero calls it a department of the science of politics (and science of politics and philosophy are identical terms), while others again call it a branch of philosophy, among them Isocrates. |
| 639 |
quorum est Isocrates . Huic eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio , rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam . Nam et orationis omnes virtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris , cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus .
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The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself. |
| 640 |
Idem valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe scientia recte dicendi . Sunt plures eiusdem , sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent . Idem sentit et finis hoc modo comprehensus , persuadere quod oporteat , nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat .
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The definition given by Chrysippus, who derived it from Cleanthes, to the effect that it is the science of speaking rightly, amounts to the same thing. The same philosopher also gives other definitions, but they concern problems of a different character from that on which we are now engaged. Another definition defines oratory as the power of persuading men to do what ought to be done, and yields practically the same sense save that it limits the art to the result which it produces. |
| 641 |
At bene Areus dicere secundum virtutem orationis . Excludunt a rhetorice malos et illi , qui scientiam civilium officiorum eam putaverunt , si scientiam virtutem iudicant ; sed anguste intra civiles quaestiones coercent . Albucius , non obscurus professor atque auctor , scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit , sed exceptionibus peccat adiiciendo circa civiles quaestiones et credibiliter ; quarum utrique iam responsum est .
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Areus again defines it well as speaking according to the excellence of speech. Those who regard it as the science of political obligations, also exclude men of bad character from the title of orator, if by science they mean virtue, but restrict it overmuch by confining it to political problems. Albutius, a distinguished author and professor of rhetoric, agrees that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, but makes a mistake in imposing restrictions by the addition of the words on political questions and with credibility; with both of these restrictions I have already dealt. |
| 642 |
Probabilis et illi voluntatis , qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putaverunt . Hi sunt fere fines maxime illustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur . Nam omnes quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum , cum pravum quoddam , ut arbitror , studium circa scriptores artium extiterit , nihil eisdem verbis , quae prior aliquis occupasset , finiendi , quae ambitio procul aberit a me .
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Finally those critics who hold that the aim of rhetoric is to think and speak rightly, were on the correct track. These are practically all the most celebrated and most discussed definitions of rhetoric. It would be both irrelevant and beyond my power to deal with all. For I strongly disapprove of the custom which has come to prevail among writers of text-books of refusing to define anything in the same terms as have been employed by some previous writer. I will have nothing to do with such ostentation. |
| 643 |
Dicam enim non utique quae invenero sed quae placebunt , sicut hoc , rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam ; cum reperto quod est optimum , qui quaerit aliud , peius velit . His approbatis , simul manifestum est illud quoque , quem finem vel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice , quod τέλος dicitur , ad quod omnis ars tendit ; nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia , finis eius et summum est bene dicere .
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What I say will not necessarily be my own invention, but it will be what I believe to be the right view, as for instance that oratory is the science of speaking well. For when the most satisfactory definition has been found, he who seeks another, is merely looking for a worse one. Thus much being admitted we are now in a position to see clearly what is the end, the highest aim, the ultimate goal of rhetoric, that τέλος in fact which every art must possess. For if rhetoric is the science of speaking well, its end and highest aim is to speak well. |
| 644 |
Sequitur quaestio , an utilis rhetorice . Nam quidam vehementer in eam invehi solent , et , quod sit indignissimum , in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi viribus :
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There follows the question as to whether rhetoric is useful. Some are in the habit of denouncing it most violently and of shamelessly employing the powers of oratory to accuse oratory itself. |
| 645 |
eloquentiam esse , quae poenis eripiat scelestos , cuius fraude damnentur interim boni , consilia ducantur in peius , nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur ; cuius denique tum maximus sit usus , cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet .
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"It is eloquence" they say " that snatches criminals from the penalties of the law, eloquence that from time to time secures the condemnation of the innocent and leads deliberation astray, eloquence that stirs up not merely sedition and popular tumult, but wars beyond all expiation, and that is most effective when it makes falsehood prevail over the truth. " |
| 646 |
Nam et Socrati obiiciunt comici docere eum , quomodo peiorem causam meliorem faciat , et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato .
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The comic poets even accuse Socrates of teaching how to make the worse cause seem the better, while Plato says that Gorgias and Tisias made similar professions. |