Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1407	Omnis igitur probatio artificialis constat aut signis aut argumentis aut exemplis . Nec ignoro plerisque videri signa partem argumentorum . Quae mihi separandi ratio haec fuit prima , quod sunt paene ex illis inartificialibus ; cruenta enim vestis et clamor et livor et talia sunt instrumenta , qualia tabulae , rumores , testes ; nec inveniuntur ab oratore , sed ad eum cum ipsa causa deferuntur ;	Every artificial proof consists either of indications, arguments or examples. I am well aware that many consider indications to form part of the arguments. My reasons for distinguishing them are twofold. In the first place indications as a rule come under the head of inartificial proofs: for a bloodstained garment, a shriek, a dark blotch and the like are all evidence analogous to documentary or oral evidence and rumours; they are not discovered by the orator, but are given him with the case itself.
1408	altera , quod signa , sive indubitata sunt , non sunt argumenta , quia , ubi ilia sunt , quaestio non est , argumento autem nisi in re controversa locus esse non potest ; sive dubia , non sunt argumenta sed ipsa argumentis egent .	My second reason was that indications, if indubitable, are not arguments, since they leave no room for question, while arguments are only possible in controversial matters. If on the other hand they are doubtful, they are not arguments, but require arguments to support them.
1409	Dividuntur autem in has duas primas species , quod eorum alia sunt , ut dixi , quae necessaria sunt , alia quae non necessaria . Priora illa sunt quae aliter habere se non possunt , quae Graeci vocant τεκμήρια , quia sunt ἄλυτα σημεῖα , quae mihi vix pertinere ad praecepta artis videntur ; nam ubi est signum insolubile , ibi ne lis quidem est .	The two first species into which artificial proofs may be divided are, as I have already said, those which involve a conclusion and those which do not. The former are those which cannot be otherwise and are called τεκμήρια, by the Greeks, because they are indications from which there is no getting away. These however seem to me scarcely to come under the rules of art. For where an indication is irrefutable, there can be no dispute as to facts.
1410	Id autem accidit , cum quid aut necesse est fieri factumve esse aut omnino non potest fieri vel esse factum ; quo in causis posito non est lis facti . Hoc genus per omnia tempora perpendi solet .	This happens whenever there can be no doubt that something is being or has been done, or when it is impossible for it to be or have been done. In such cases there can be no dispute as to the fact. This kind of proof may be considered in connexion with past, present or future time.
1411	Nam et coisse eam cum viro , quae peperit , quod est praeteriti , et fluctus esse , cum magna vis venti in mare incubuit , quod coniuncti , et eum mori , cuius cor est vulneratum , quod futuri , necesse est . Nec fieri potest , ut ibi messis sit , ubi satum non est , ut quis Romae sit , cum est Athenis , ut sit ferro vulneratus , qui sine cicatrice est .	For example, a woman who is delivered of a child must have had intercourse with a man, and the reference is to the past. When there is a high wind at sea, there must be waves, and the reference is to the present. When a man has received a wound in the heart, he is bound to die, and the reference is to the future. Nor again can there be a harvest where no seed has been sown, nor can a man be at Rome when he is at Athens, nor have been wounded by a sword when he has no scar. Some have the same force when reversed:
1412	Sed quaedam et retrorsum idem valent , ut vivere hominem qui spirat , et spirare qui vivit . Quaedam in contrarium non recurrent ; nec enim , quia movetur qui ingreditur , etiam ingreditur qui movetur .	a man who breathes is alive, and a man who is alive breathes. Some again cannot be reversed: because he who walks moves it does not follow that he who moves walks.
1413	Quare potest et coisse cum viro , quae non peperit , et non esse ventus in mari , cum est fluctus , neque utique cor eius vulneratum esse , qui perit . Ac similiter satum fuisse potest , ubi non fuit messis , nec fuisse Romae , qui non fuit Athenis , nec fuisse ferro vulneratus , qui habet cicatricem .	So too a woman, who has not been delivered of a child, may have had intercourse with a man, there may be waves without a high wind, and a man may die without having received a wound in the heart. Similarly seed may be sown without a harvest resulting, a man, who was never at Athens, may never have been at Rome, and a man who has a scar may not have received a sword-wound.
1414	Alia sunt signa non necessaria , quae εἰκότα Graeci vocant ; quae etiamsi ad tollendam dubitationem sola non sufficiunt , tamen adiuncta ceteris plurimum valent .	There are other indications or εἰκότα, that is probabilities, as the Greeks call them, which do not involve a necessary conclusion. These may not be sufficient in themselves to remove doubt, but may yet be of the greatest value when taken in conjunction with other indications.
1415	Signum vocatur , ut dixi , σημεῖον quamquam id quidam indicium quidam vestigium nominaverunt , per quod alia res intellegitur , ut per sanguinem caedes . At sanguis vel ex hostia respersisse uestem potest vel e naribus profluxisse : non utique , qui vestem cruentam habuerit , homicidium fecerit .	The Latin equivalent of the Greek σημεῖον is signum, a sign, though some have called it indicium, an indication, or vestigium, a trace. Such signs or indications enable us to infer that something else has happened; blood for instance may lead us to infer that a murder has taken place. But bloodstains on a garment may be the result of the slaying of a victim at a sacrifice or of bleeding at the nose. Everyone who has a bloodstain on his clothes is not necessarily a murderer.
1416	Sed ut per se non sufficit , ita ceteris adiunctum testimonii loco ducitur , si inimicus , si minatus ante , si eodem in loco fuit ; quibus signum cum accessit , efficit ut , quae suspecta erant , certa videantur .	But although such an indication may not amount to proof in itself, yet it may be produced as evidence in conjunction with other indications, such for instance as the fact that the man with the bloodstain was the enemy of the murdered man, had threatened him previously or was in the same place with him. Add the indication in question to these, and what was previously only a suspicion may become a certainty.
1417	Alioqui sunt quaedam signa utrique parti communia , ut livores , tumores ( nam videri possunt et veneficii et cruditatis ) et vulnus in pectore sua manu et aliena perisse dicentibus , in quo est . Haec proinde firma habentur atque extrinsecus adiuvantur .	On the other hand there are indications which may be made to serve either party, such as livid spots, swellings which may be regarded as symptoms either of poisoning or of bad health, or a wound in the breast which may be treated as a proof of murder or of suicide. The force of such indications depends on the amount of extraneous support which they receive.
1418	Eorum autem , quae signa sunt quidem , sed non necessaria , genus Hermagoras putat , non esse virginem Atalantam , quia cum iuvenibus per silvas vagetur . Quod si receperimus , vereor , ne omnia quae ex facto ducuntur signa faciamus . Eadem tamen ratione qua signa tractantur .	Hermagoras would include among such indications as do not involve a necessary conclusion, an argument such as the following, " Atalanta cannot be a virgin, as she has been roaming the woods in the company of young men. " If we accept this view, I fear that we shall come to treat all inferences from a fact as indications. None the less such arguments are in practice treated exactly as if they were indications.
1419	Nec mihi videntur Areopagitae , cum damnaverint puerum coturnicum oculos eruentem , aliud iudicasse quam id signum esse perniciosissimae mentis multisque malo futurae , si adolevisset . Unde Spurii Maelii Marcique Manlii popularitas signum adfectati regni est existimatum .	Nor do the Areopagites, when they condemned a boy for plucking out the eyes of quails, seem to have had anything else in their mind than the consideration that such conduct was an indication of a perverted character which might prove hurtful to many, if he had been allowed to grow up. So, too, the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded as an indication that they were aiming at supreme power.
1420	Sed vereor , ne longe nimium nos ducat haec via . Nam si est signum adulterae lavari cum viris , erit et convivere cum adolescentibus , deinde etiam familiariter alicuius amicitia uti ; fortasse corpus vulsum , fractum incessum , vestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum viri signa , si cui ( cum signum id proprie sit , quod ex eo , de quo quaeritur , natum sub oculos venit ) ut sanguis e caede , ita illa ex impudicitia fluere videantur .	However, I fear that this line of reasoning will carry us too far. For if it is an indication of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the fact that she revels with young men or even an intimate friendship will also be indications of the same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous gait, or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of effeminacy and unmanliness by anyone who thinks that such symptoms are the result of an immoral character, just as blood is the result of a wound: for anything, that springs from the matter under investigation and comes to our notice, may properly be called an indication.
1421	Ea quoque quae , quia plerumque observata sunt , vulgo signa creduntur , ut prognostica . Vento rubet aurea Phoebe et Cornix plena pluviam vocat improba voce , si causas ex qualitate caeli trahunt , sane ita appellentur .	Similarly it is also usual to give the names of signs to frequently observed phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which we may illustrate by the Vergilian "For wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy gold" and "The crow With full voice, good-for-naught, invites the rain." If these phenomena are caused by the state of the atmosphere, such an appellation is correct enough.
1422	Nam si vento rubet luna , signum venti est rubor . Et si , ut idem poeta colligit , densatus et laxatus aer facit , ut sit inde ille avium concentus , idem sentiemus . Sunt autem signa etiam parva magnorum , ut vel haec ipsa cornix ; nam maiora minorum esse , nemo miratur .	For if tile moon turns red owing to the wind, her hue is certainly a sign of wind. And if, as the same poet infers, the condensation and rarification of the atmosphere causes that "concert of bird-voices" of which he speaks, we may agree in regarding it as a sign. We may further note that great things are sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the Vergilian crow; that trivial events should be indicated by signs of greater importance is of course no matter for wonder.
1423	Nunc de argumentis . Hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia , quae Graeci ἐνθυμήματα , ἐπιχειρήματα , ἀποδείξεις , vocant , quanquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia , etiamsi vis eodem fere tendit . Nam enthymema ( quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemur , quia aliter non possumus , Graeco melius usuri ) unum intellectum habet , quo omnia mente concepta significat ( sed nunc non de eo loquimur ) ; alterum , quo sententiam cum ratione ;	I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, and ἀποδείξεις of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of their difference, have much the same meaning. For the enthymeme (which we translate by commentun or commentatio, there being no alternative, though we should be wiser to use the Greek name) has three meanings: firstly it means anything conceived in the mind (this is not however the sense of which I am now speaking);
1424	tertium , quo certam quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus , quanquam de hoc parum convenit . Sunt enim , qui illud prius epichirema dicant , pluresque invenias in ea opinione , ut id demum , quod pugna constat , enthymema accipi velint , et ideo illud Cornificius contrarium appellat .	secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or from incompatibles ; although there is some controversy on this point. For there are some who style a conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it will be found that the majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a conclusion from incompatibles: wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argument from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical
1425	Hunc alii rhetoricum syllogismum , alii imperfectum syllogismum vocaverunt , quia nec distinctis nec totidem partibus concluderetur ; quod sane non utique ab oratore desideratur .	syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism, since such precision is not specially required by the orator. Valgius translates ἐπιχείρημα by aggressio,
1426	Epichirema Valgius aggressionem vocat ; verius autem iudico , non nostram administrationem sed ipsam rem quam aggredimur , id est argumentum , quo aliquid probaturi sumus , etiamsi nondum verbis explanatum , iam tamen mente conceptum , epichirema dici .	that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which should be called an ἐπιχείρημα, that is to say the argument by which we try to prove something and which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many words, has been clearly conceived by the mind.
1427	Aliis videtur non destinata vel inchoata , sed perfecta probatio hoc nomen accipere , ultima specie ; ideoque propria eius appellatio et maxime in usu est posita , qua significatur certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio , quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat .	Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect proof, but a complete proof, falling under the most special species of proof; consequently, according to its proper and most generally received appellation it must be understood in the sense of a definite conception of some thought consisting of at least three parts. Some call an ἐπιχείρημα a reason,
1428	Quidam epichirema rationem appellarunt , Cicero melius ratiocinationem , quanquam et ille nomen hoc duxisse magis a syllogismo videtur . Nam et statum syllogisticum ratiocinativum appellat , exemplisque utitur philosophorum . Et quoniam est quaedam inter syllogismum et epichirema vicinitas , potest videri hoc nomine recte abusus .	but Cicero is more correct in calling it a reasoning, although he too seems to derive this name from the syllogism rather than anything else; for he calls the syllogistic basis a ratiocinative basis and quotes philosophers to support him. And since there is a certain kinship between a syllogism and an epicheireme, it may be thought that he was justified in his use of the latter term.
1429	Ἀπόδειξις est evidens probatio , ideoque apud Geometras γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις dicuntur Hanc et ab epichiremate Caecilius putat differre solo genere conclusionis et esse apodixin imperfectum epichirema eadem causa , qua diximus enthymema syllogismo distare . Nam et epichirema syllogismi pars est . Quidam inesse epichiremati apodixin putant et esse partem eius confirmantem .	An ἀπόδεξις is a clear proof; hence the use of the term γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις, "linear demonstrations" by the geometricians. Caecilius holds that it differs from the epicheireme solely in the kind of conclusion arrived at and that an apodeixis is simply an incomplete epicheireme for the same reason that we said an enthymeme differed from a syllogism. For an epicheireme is also part of a syllogism. Some think that an apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme, namely the part containing the proof.
1430	Utrumque autem quanquam diversi auctores eodem modo finiunt , ut sit ratio per ea , quae certa sunt , fidem dubiis adferens ; quae natura est omnium argumentorum , neque enim certa incertis declarantur . Haec omnia generaliter πίστεις appellant , quod etiamsi propria interpretatione dicere fidem possumus , apertius tamen probationem interpretabimur . Sed argumentum quoque plura significat .	But all authorities, however much they may differ on other points, define both in the same way, in so far as they call both a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain. Indeed this is the nature of all arguments, for what is certain cannot be proved by what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the name of πίστεις , a term which, though the literal translation is fides "a warrant of credibility," is best translated by probatio "proof." But argument has several other meanings.
1431	Nam et fabulae ad actum scenarum compositae argumenta dicuntur , et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens Pedianus , Argumentum , inquit , tale est ; et ipse Cicero ad Brutum ita scribit : ueritus fortasse , ne nos in Catonem nostrum transferremus illinc aliquid , etsi argumentum simile non erat . Quo apparet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari .	For the plots of plays composed for acting in the theatre are called arguments, while Pedianus, when explaining the themes of the speeches of Cicero, says The argument is as follows. Cicero himself in writing to Brutus says, Fearing that I might transfer something from that source to my Cato, although the argument is quite different. It is thus clear that all subjects for writing are so called.
1432	Nec mirum , cum id inter opifices quoque vulgatum sit , unde Vergilius , Argumentum ingens ; vulgoque paulo numerosius opus dicitur argumentosum . Sed nunc de eo dicendum argumento est , quod probationem praestat . Celsus quidem probationem , indicium , fidem , adgressionem eiusdem rei nomina facit , parum distincte , ut arbitror .	Nor is this to be wondered at, since the term is also in common use among artists; hence the Vergilian phrase A mighty argument. Again a work which deals with a number of different themes is called "rich in argument." But the sense with which we are now concerned is that which provides proof Celsus indeed treats the terms, proof, indication, credibility, attempt, simply as different names for the same things, in which, to my thinking, he betrays a certain confusion of thought.
1433	Nam probatio et fides efficitur non tantum per haec quae sunt rationis , sed etiam per inartificialia . Signum autem , quod ille indicium vocat , ab argumentis iam separavi . Ergo , cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans , qua colligitur aliud per aliud , et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat , necesse est esse aliquid in causa , quod probatione non egeat .	For proof and credibility are not merely the result of logical processes, but may equally be secured by inartificial arguments. Now I have already distinguished signs or, as he prefers to call them, indications from arguments. Consequently, since an argument is a process of reasoning which provides proof and enables one thing to be inferred from another and confirms facts which are uncertain by reference to facts which are certain, there must needs be something in every case which requires no proof.
1434	Alioqui nihil erit quo probemus , nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur , ex quo dubiis fides fiat . Pro certis autem habemus primum , quae sensibus percipiuntur , ut quae uidemus , audimus , qualia sunt signa ; deinde ea , in quae communi opinione consensum est , deos esse ,	Otherwise there will be nothing by which we can prove anything; there must be something which either is or is believed to be true, by means of which doubtful things may be rendered credible. We may regard as certainties, first, those things which we perceive by the senses, things for instance that we hear or see, such as signs or indications; secondly, those things about which there is general agreement, such as the existence of the gods or the duty of loving one's parents;
1435	praestandam pietatem parentibus ; praeterea , quae legibus cauta sunt , quae persuasione etiamsi non omnium hominum , eius tamen civitatis aut gentis , in qua res agitur , in mores recepta sunt , ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant ; si quid inter utramque partem convenit , si quid probatum est , denique cuicunque adversarius non contradicit . Sic enim fiet argumentum ,	thirdly, those things which are established by law or have passed into current usage, if not throughout the whole world, at any rate in the nation or state where the case is being pleaded—there are for instance many rights which rest not on law, but on custom; finally, there are the things which are admitted by either party, and whatever has already been proved or is not disputed by our adversary.
1436	Cum providentia mundus regatur , administranda respublica est ; sequitur ut administranda respublica sit , si liquebit mundum prouidentia regi .	Thus for instance it may be argued that since the world is governed by providence, the state should similarly be governed by some controlling power: it follows that the state must be so governed, once it is clear that the world is governed by providence.
1437	Debet etiam nota esse recte argumenta tractaturo vis et natura omnium rerum , et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat ; hinc enim sunt , quae εἰκότα dicuntur .	Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments or εἰκότα as the Greeks call them.
1438	Credibilium autem genera sunt tria : unum firmissimum , quia fere accidit , ut liberos a parentibus amari ; alterum velut propensius , eum qui recte valeat in crastinum perventurum ; tertium tantum non repugnans , in domo furtum factum ab eo qui domi fuit .	With regard to credibility there are three degrees. First, the highest, based on what usually happens, as for instance the assumption that children are loved by their parents. Secondly, there is the highly probable, as for instance the assumption that a man in the enjoyment of good health will probably live till to-morrow. The third degree is found where there is nothing absolutely against an assumption, such as that a theft committed in a house was the work of one of the household.
1439	Ideoque Aristoteles in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro diligentissime est exsecutus , quid cuique rei et quid cuique homini soleret accidere , et quas res quosque homines quibus rebus aut hominibus vel conciliasset vel alienasset ipsa natura : ut divitias quid sequatur aut ambitum aut superstitionem , quid boni probent , quid mali petant , quid milites , quid rustici , quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat . Verum hoc exsequi mitto ;	Consequently Aristotle in the second book of his Rhetoric has made a careful examination of all that commonly happens to things and persons, and what things and persons are naturally adverse or friendly to other things or persons, as for instance, what is the natural result of wealth or ambition or superstition, what meets with the approval of good men, what is the object of a soldier's or a farmer's desires, and by what means everything is sought or shunned.
1440	non enim longum tantum , sed etiam impossibile aut potius infinitum est , praeterea positum in communi omnium intellectu . Si quis tamen desideraverit , a quo peteret , ostendi . Omnia autem credibilia ,	For my part I do not propose to pursue this subject. It is not merely a long, but an impossible or rather an infinite task; moreover it is within the compass of the common understanding of mankind. If, however, anyone wishes to pursue the subject, I have indicated where he may apply.
1441	in quibus pars maxima consistit argumentationis , ex huiusmodi fontibus fluunt : an credibile sit a filio patrem occisum , incestum cum filia commissum ; et contra , veneficium in noverca , adulterium in luxurioso ; illa quoque , an scelus palam factum , an falsum propter exiguam summam , quia suos quidque horum velut mores habet , plerumque tamen , non semper ; alioqui indubitata essent , non argumenta .	But all credibility, and it is with credibility that the great majority of arguments are concerned, turns on questions such as the following: whether it is credible that a father has been killed by his son, or that a father has committed incest with his daughter, or to take questions of an opposite character, whether it is credible that a stepmother has poisoned her stepchild, or that a man of luxurious life has committed adultery; or again whether a crime has been openly committed, or false evidence given for a small bribe, since each of these crimes is the result of a special cast of character as a rule, though not always; if it were always so, there would be no room for doubt, and no argument.
1442	Excutiamus nunc argumentorum locos ; quanquam quibusdam hi quoque , de quibus supra dixi , videntur . Locos appello non , ut vulgo nunc intelliguntur , in luxuriam et adulterium et similia ; sed sedes argumentorum , in quibus latent , ex quibus sunt petenda . Nam ,	Let us now turn to consider the "places" of arguments, although some hold that they are identical with the topics which I have already discussed above. But I do not use this term in its usual acceptance, namely, commonplaces directed against luxury, adultery, and the like, but in the sense of the secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth.
1443	ut in terra non omni generantur omnia , nec avem aut feram reperias , ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat ignarus , et piscium quoque genera alia planis gaudent alia saxosis , regionibus etiam litoribusque discreta sunt , nec helopem nostro mari aut scarum ducas , ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est .	For just as all kinds of produce are not provided by every country, and as you will not succeed in finding a particular bird or beast, if you are ignorant of the localities where it has its usual haunts or birthplace, as even the various kinds of fish flourish in different surroundings, some preferring a smooth and others a rocky bottom, and are found on different shores and in divers regions (you will for instance never catch a sturgeon or wrasse in Italian waters), so not every kind of argument can be derived from every circumstance, and consequently our search requires discrimination.
1444	Multus alioqui error est ; exhausto labore , quod non ratione scrutabimur , non poterimus invenire nisi casu . At si scierimus , ubi quodque nascatur , cum ad locum ventum erit , facile quod in eo est pervidebimus .	Otherwise we shall fall into serious error, and after wasting our labour through lack of method we shall fail to discover the argument which we desire, unless assisted by some happy chance. But if we know the circumstances which give rise to each kind of argument, we shall easily see, when we come to a particular "place," what arguments it contains.