Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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837 |
Mea tamen sententia varium id est , et accidit pro condicione causarum , quia et videri potest propositio aliquando statum facere , ut in coniecturalibus causis ; utitur enim coniectura magis qui agit , ( quo moti quidam eundem a reo infitialem esse dixerunt ) et in syllogismo tota ratiocinatio ab eo est qui intendit .
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But in my opinion the origin of the basis varies and depends on the circumstances of the individual case. For instance in conjectural causes the affirmation may be regarded as determining the basis, since conjecture is employed by the plaintiff rather than the defendant, and consequently some have styled the basis originated by the latter negative. Again in any syllogism the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms. |
838 |
Sed quia videtur illic quoque necessitatem hos status exsequendi facere qui negat , ( is enim si dicat , non feci , coget adversarium coniectura uti ; et si dicat , non habes legem , syllogismo ) concedamus ex depulsione nasci statum . Nihilominus enim res eo revertetur , ut modo is qui agit , modo is cum quo agitur , statum faciat .
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But on the other hand he who in such cases denies appears to impose the burden of dealing with such bases upon his opponent. For if he says "I did not do it," he will force his opponent to make use of con- jecture, and again, if he says "The law is against you," he will force him to employ the syllogism. Therefore we must admit that a basis can originate in denial. All the same we are left with our previous conclusion that the basis is determined in some cases by the plaintiff, in some by the defendant. |
839 |
Sit enim accusatoris intentio , Hominem occidisti . Si negat reus , faciat statum qui negat . Quid si confitetur , sed iure a se adulterum dicit occisum ? nempe legem esse certum est quae permittat . Nisi aliquid accusator respondet , nulla lis est . Non fuit , inquit , adulter ; ergo depulsio incipit esse actoris , ille statum faciet . Ita erit quidem status ex prima depulsione , sed ea fiet ab accusatore non a reo .
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Suppose the accuser to affirm that the accused is guilty of homicide: if the accused denies the charge, it is he who will determine the basis. Or again, if he admits that he has killed a man, but states that the victim was an adulterer and justifiably killed (and we know that the law permits homicide under these circumstances), there is no matter in dispute, unless the accuser has some answer to make. Suppose the accuser does answer however and deny that the victim was guilty of adultery, it will be the accuser that denies, and it is by him that the basis is determined. The basis, then, will originate in the first denial of facts, but that denial is made by the accuser and not the accused. |
840 |
Quid ? quod eadem quaestio potest eundem vel accusatorem facere vel reum : Qui artem ludicram exercuerit , in quattuordecim primis ordinibus ne sedeat ; qui se praetori in hortis ostenderat neque erat productus , sedit in quattuordecim ordinibus .
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Again the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused. " He who has exercised the profession of an actor, is under no circumstances to be allowed a seat in the first fourteen rows of the theatre. " An individual who had performed before the praetor in his private gardens, but had never been presented on the public stage, has taken his seat in one of the fourteen rows. |
841 |
Nempe intentio est : Artem ludicram exercuisti ; depulsio : Non exercui artem ludicram ; quaestio : Quid sit artem ludicram exercere ? Si accusabitur theatrali lege , depulsio erit rei ; si excitatus fuerit de spectaculis et aget iniuriarum , depulsio erit accusatoris .
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The accuser of course affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor: the accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question then arises as to the meaning of the "exercise of the profession of actor." If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused; if on the other hand he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser. |
842 |
Frequentius tamen illud accidet , quod est a plurimis traditum . Effugerunt has quaestiones qui dixerunt , status esse id , quod appareat ex intentione et depulsione , ut Fecisti , Non feci aut Recte feci .
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The view of the majority of writers on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as "You did it, "I did not do it," or "I was justified in doing it." |
843 |
Viderimus tamen , utrum id sit status an in eo status . Hermagoras statum vocat , per quem subiecta res intelligatur et ad quem probationes etiam partium referantur . Nostra opinio semper haec fuit : cum essent frequenter in causa diversi quaestionum status , in eo credere status causae , quod esset in ea potentissimum et in quo maxime res verteretur . Id si quis generalem quaestionem vel caput generale dicere malet cum hoc mihi non erit pugna , non magis , quam si aliud adhuc , quo idem intelligatur , eius rei nomen invenerit , quanquam tota volumina in hanc disputationem impendisse multos sciam ; nobis statum dici placet .
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But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagoras calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the parties concerned will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that, whereas there are frequently different bases of questions in connexion with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call that the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him, any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing, although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer however to call it the basis. |
844 |
Sed cum in aliis omnibus inter scriptores summa dissensio est , tum in hoc praecipue videtur mihi studium quoque diversa tradendi fuisse ; adeo , nec qui sit numerus nec quae nomina nec qui generales quive speciales sint status , convenit .
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There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else, but in this case as elsewhere they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow-teachers. As a result there is still no agreement as to the number and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special. To begin with Aristotle lays down that there are ten categories on which every question seems to turn. |
845 |
Ac primum Aristoteles elementa decem constituit , circa quae versari videatur omnis quaestio . οὐσίαν , quam Plautus essentiam vocat , neque sane aliud est eius nomen Latinum ; sed ea quaeritur , an sit . Qualitatem , cuius apertus intellectus est . Quantitatem , quae dupliciter a posterioribus divisa est , quam magnum et quam multum sit ? Ad aliquid , unde ducta est translatio et comparatio .
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First there is οὐσία which Plautus calls essence, the only available translation: under this category we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next relation, involving questions of competence and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering and possessing, |
846 |
Post haec " Ubi " et " Quando " ; deinde " Facere " , " Pati " , " Habere " , quod est quasi armatum esse , vestitum esse . Novissime κεῖσθαι , quod est compositum esse quodam modo , ut calere , stare , irasci . Sed ex iis omnibus prima quattuor ad status pertinere , cetera ad quosdam locos argumentorum videntur .
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which for example are concerned with a person's being armed or clothed. Lastly comes κεῖσθαι or position, which means to be in a certain position, such for instance as being warm, standing or angry. Of these categories the first four concern bases, the remainder concern only certain topics for argument. |
847 |
Alii novem elementa posuerunt , Personam , in qua de animo , corpore , extra positis quaeratur , quod pertinere ad coniecturae et qualitatis instrumenta video . Tempus , quod χρόνον vocant , ex quo quaestio , an is quem , dum addicta est , mater peperit , servus sit natus . Locum , unde controversia videtur , an fas fuerit tyrannum in templo occidere . An exulaverit , qui domi latuit . Tempus iterum , quod καιρόν appellant ;
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Others make the number of categories to be nine. Person, involving questions concerning the mind, body or external circumstances, which clearly has reference to the means by which we establish conjecture or quality. Time, or χρόνος, from which we get questions such as whether a child is born a slave, if his mother is delivered of him while assigned to her creditors. Place, from which we get such disputes as to whether it is permissible to kill a tyrant in a temple, or whether one who has hidden himself at home can be regarded as an exile. |
848 |
hanc autem videri volunt speciem illius temporis , ut aestatem vel hiemem ; huic subiicitur ille in pestilentia comissator . Actum , id est πρῆξιν , quod eo referunt , sciens commiserit an insciens ? necessitate an casu ? et talia . Numerum , qui cadit in speciem quantitatis , an Thrasybulo triginta praemia debeantur , quia tot tyrannos sustulerit ?
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Then comes time in another sense, called καιρός by the Greeks, by which they refer to a period of time, such as summer or winter; under this heading come problems such as that about the man who held high revel in a time of pestilence. Action or πρᾶξις, to which they refer questions as to whether an act was committed wittingly or unwittingly, by accident or under compulsion and the like. Number, which falls under the category of quantity, under which come questions such as whether the state owes Thrasybulus thirty talents for ridding it of the same number of tyrants. |
849 |
Causam , cui plurimae subiacent lites , quotiens factum non negatur , sed quia iusta ratione sit factum , defenditur . τρόπον , cum id , quod alio modo fieri licet , alio dicitur factum ; hinc est adulter loris caesus vel fame necatus . Occasionem factorum , quod est apertius , quam ut vel interpretandum vel exemplo sit demonstrandum , tamen ἀφορμὰς ἔργων vocant .
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Cause, under which heading come a large number of disputes, whenever a fact is not denied, but the defence pleads that the act was just and reasonable. τρόπος or manner, which is involved when a thing is said to have been done in one way when it might have been done in another: under this category come cases of such as that of the adulterer who is scourged with thongs or starved to death. Opportunity for action, the meaning of which is too obvious to need explanation or illustration: the Greeks however call it ἔργων ἀφορμαί |
850 |
Hi quoque nullam quaestionem extra haec putant . Quidam detrahunt duas partes , numerum et occasionem , et pro illo quod dixi actum subiiciunt res , id est πράγματα .Quae ne praeterisse viderer , satis habui attingere . Ceterum his nec status satis ostendi nec omnes contineri locos credo , quod apparebit diligentius legentibus , quae de utraque re dicam . Erunt enim plura multo , quam quae his elementis comprehenduntur .
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These authorities like Aristotle hold that no question can arise which does not come under one of these heads. Some subtract two of them, namely number and opportunity, and substitute for what I have called action, things, or in Greek πράγματα. I have thought it sufficient to notice these doctrines, for fear someone might complain of their omission. Still I do not consider that bases are sufficiently determined by these categories, nor that the latter cover every possible kind of topic, as will be clear to any that read carefully what I have to say on both points. For there will be found to be many topics that are not covered by these categories. |
851 |
Apud plures auctores legi , placuisse quibusdam , unum omnino statum esse coniecturalem . Sed quibus placuerit , neque illi tradiderunt neque ego usquam reperire potui . Rationem tamen hanc secuti dicuntur , quod res omnis signis colligeretur . Quo modo licet qualitatis quoque solum statum faciant , quia ubique , qualis sit cuiusque rei natura , quaeri potest . Sed utrocunque modo sequetur summa confusio .
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I find it stated in many authors that some rhetoricians only recognise one kind of basis, the con- jectural. But they have not mentioned who these rhetoricians are nor have I been able to discover. They are however stated to have taken this view on the ground that all our knowledge is a matter of inference from indications. On this line of reasoning they might regard all bases as qualitative, because we inquire into the nature of the subject in every case. But the adoption of either view leads to inextricable confusion. |
852 |
Neque interest , unum quis statum faciat an nullum , si omnes causae sunt condicionis eiusdem . Coniectura dicta est a coniectu , id est directione quadam rationis ad veritatem , unde etiam somniorum atque ominum interpretes coniectores vocantur . Appellatum tamen est hoc genus varie , sicut sequentibus apparebit .
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Nor does it matter whether one recognises only one kind of basis or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. Coniectura is derived from conicere "to throw together, " because it implies the concentration of the reason on the truth. For this reason interpreters of dreams and all other phenomena are called coniectores "conjecturers." But the conjectural basis has received more names than one, as will appear in the sequel. |
853 |
Fuerunt , qui duos status facerent : Archedemus coniecturalem et finitivum , exclusa qualitate , quia sic de ea quaeri existimabat , quid esset iniquum , quid iniustum , quid dicto audientem non esse ; quod vocat de eodem et alio .
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Some have recognised only two bases. Archedemus for instance admits only the conjectural and definitive and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of "What is unfair? what is unjust? what is disobedience?" which he terms questions about identity and difference. |
854 |
Huic diversa sententia eorum fuit , qui duos quidem status esse voluerunt , sed unum infitialem , alterum iuridicialem . Infitialis est , quem dicimus coniecturalem , cui ab infitiando nomen alii in totum dederunt , alii in partem , quia accusatorem coniectura , reum infitiatione uti putaverunt .
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A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two bases, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused. |
855 |
Iuridicialis est qui Graece dicitur δικαιολογικός Sed quemadmodum ab Archedemo qualitas exclusa est , sic ab his repudiata finitio . Nam subiiciunt eam iuridiciali , quaerendumque arbitrantur iustumne sit , sacrilegium appellari quod obiiciatur vel furtum vel amentiam .
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The juridical is that known in Greek as δικαιολογικός But just as Archedemus would not recognise the qualitative basis, so these reject the definitive which they include in the juridical, holding that in these questions we have to enquire whether it is just that the act with which the accused is charged should be called sacrilege or theft or madness. |
856 |
Qua in opinione Pamphilus fuit , sed qualitatem in plura partitus est ; plurimi deinceps , mutatis tantum nominibus , in rem de qua constet , et in rem de qua non constet . Nam est verum nec aliter fieri potest , quam ut aut certum sit factum esse quid aut non sit ; si non est certum , coniectura sit , si certum est , reliqui status .
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Pamplihlus held this opinion but subdivided quality into several different species. The majority of later writers have classified bases as follows, involving however no more than a change of names:— those dealing with ascertained facts and those dealing with matters where there is a doubt. For a thing must either be certain or uncertain: if it is uncertain, the basis will be conjectural; if certain, it will be some one of the other bases. |
857 |
Nam idem dicit Apollodorus , cum quaestionem aut in rebus extra positis , quibus coniectura explicatur , aut in nostris opinionibus existimat positam , quorum illud πραγματικόν , hoc περὶ ἐννοίας vocat ; idem , qui ἀπρόληπτον et προλημπτικόν dicunt , id est dubium et praesumptum , quo significatur de quo liquet .
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Apollodorus says the same thing when he states that a question must either lie in things external, which give play to conjecture, or in our own opinions: the former he calls πραγματικός the latter περὶ ἐννοίας The same is said by those who employ the terms ἀπροληπτὸς and προληπτικός, that is to say doubtful and presumptive, by this latter term meaning those facts which are beyond a doubt. |
858 |
Idem Theodorus , qui de eo , " an sit " , et de accidentibus ei quod esse constat , id est περὶ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκότων existimat quaeri . Nam in his omnibus prius genus coniecturam habet , sequens reliqua . Sed haec reliqua Apollodorus duo vult esse , qualitatem et de nomine , id est finitivam ; Theodorus , quid , quale , quantum , ad aliquid .
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Theodorus agrees with them, for he holds that the question is either as to whether such and such a thing is really so, or is concerned with the accidents of something which is an admitted fact: that is to say it is either περὶ οὐσίας or περὶ συμβεβηκότων For in all these cases the first basis is conjectural, while the second belongs to one of the other classes. As for these other classes of basis, Apollodorus holds that there are two, one concerned with quality and the other with the names of things, that is to say a definitive basis. Theodorus makes them four, concerned with existence, quality, quantity and relation. |
859 |
Sunt et qui de eodem et de alio modo qualitatem esse modo finitionem velint . In duo et Posidonius dividit , vocem et res . In voce quaeri putat an significet , quid , quam multa , quo modo ? in rebus coniecturam , quod κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν vocat , et qualitatem , et finitionem , cui nomen dat κατ᾽ ἔννοιαν , et ad aliquid . Unde et illa divisio est , alia esse scripta , alia inscripta .
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There are some too who make questions of identity and difference come under the head of quality, others who place it under the head of definition. Posidonius divides them into two classes, those concerned with words and those concerned with things. In the first case he thinks that the question is whether a word has any meaning; if so, what is its meaning, how many meanings has it, and how does it come to mean what it means? In the latter case, we employ conjecture, which he calls κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν, or inference from perception, quality, definition which he calls κατ᾽ ἔννοιαν, or rational inference, and relation. Hence also comes the division into things written and unwritten. |
860 |
Celsus Cornelius duos et ipse fecit status generales , an sit ? quale sit ? Priori subiecit finitionem , quia aeque quaeratur an sit sacrilegus , qui nihil se sustulisse de templo dicit et qui privatam pecuniam confitetur sustulisse . Qualitatem in rem et scriptum dividit . Scripto quattuor partes legales , exclusa translatione ; quantitatem et mentis quaestionem coniecturae subiecit .
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Even Cornelius Celsus stated that there were two general bases, one concerned with the question whether a thing is, the other with the question of what kind it is. He included definition under the first of these, because enquiry may equally be made as to whether sacrilege has been committed, when a man denies that he has stolen anything from a temple, and when he admits that he has stolen private money from a temple. He divides quality into fact and the letter of the law. Under the head of the letter of the law he places four classes, excluding questions of competence: quantity and intention he places under the head of conjecture. |
861 |
Est etiam alia in duos dividendi status ratio , quae docet , aut de substantia controversiam esse , aut de qualitate ; ipsam porro qualitatem aut in summo genere consistere aut in succedentibus .
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There is also another method of dividing bases into two classes: according to this disputes are either about substance or quality, while quality is treated either in its most general sense or in its special senses. |
862 |
De substantia est coniectura . Quaestio enim tractatur rei , an facta sit ? an fiat ? an futura sit ? interdum etiam mentis ; idque melius , quam quod iis placuit , qui statum eundem facti nominaverunt , tanquam de praeterito tantum et tantum de facto quaereretur .
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Substance is dealt with by conjecture: for in enquiring into anything, we ask whether it has been done, is being done, or is likely to be done, and sometimes also consider its intention: this method is preferable to that adopted by those who style the conjectural basis a basis of fact, as though we only enquired into the past and what has actually been done. |
863 |
Pars qualitatis , quae est de summo genere , raro in iudicium venit , quale est , idne sit honestum , quod vulgo laudatur ; succedentium autem aliae de communi appellatione , ut sitne sacrilegus , qui pecuniam privatam ex templo furatus est ; aut de re denominata , ubi et factum esse certum est nec dubitatur , quid sit quod factum est . Cui subiacent omnes de honestis , iustis , utilibus quaestiones .
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The consideration of quality under its most general aspect rarely comes up in the courts; I refer to questions such as "whether that is honourable which is generally praised." With regard to the special aspects of quality, questions sometimes occur about some common term, such as whether sacrilege has been committed when a man has stolen private money from a temple, or about some act with a definite name, when there is no doubt either as to the commission or the nature of the act. Under this heading come all questions about what is honourable, just or expedient. |
864 |
His etiam ceteri status contineri dicuntur , quia et quantitas modo ad coniecturam referatur , ut maiorne sol quam terra ? modo ad qualitatem , quanta poena quempiam quantove praemio sit affici iustum ? et translatio versetur circa qualitatem , et definitio pars sit translationis ;
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These bases are said to contain others as well, because quantity is sometimes concerned with conjectural bases, as in the question whether the sun is bigger than the earth, and sometimes with qualitative bases, as in the question what reward or punishment it would be just to assign to some particular person, while questions of competence undoubtedly are concerned with quality, and definition with questions of competence. |
865 |
quin et contrariae leges et ratiocinativus status , id est syllogismos , et plerumque scripti et voluntatis aequo nitantur ( nisi quod hic tertius aliquando coniecturam accipit , quid senserit legis constitutor ) ; ambiguitatem vero semper coniectura explicari necesse sit , quia , cum sit manifestum , verborum intellectum esse duplicem , de sola quaeritur voluntate .
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ratiocinative basis or syllogism and the majority of questions dealing with the letter of the law and intention are based on equity, with the exception that this last question sometimes admits of conjecture as, for instance, concerning the intentions of the legislator: ambiguity, however, must always be explained by conjecture, because as it is clear that the words admit of two interpretations the only question is as to the intention. |
866 |
A plurimis tres sunt facti generales status , quibus et Cicero in Oratore utitur , et omnia , quae aut in controversiam aut in contentionem veniant , contineri putat , Sitne ? Quid sit ? Quale sit ? quorum nomina apertiora sunt , quam ut dicenda sint .
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A large number of writers recognise general bases; Cicero adopts them in his Orator, and holds that everything that can form the subject of dispute or discussion is covered by the three questions, whether it is, what it is, and of what kind it is. The names of these three bases are too obvious for mention. The same view is asserted by Patrocles. |
867 |
Idem Patrocles sentit . Tres fecit et M . Antonius his quidem verbis : Paucae res sunt , quibus ex rebus omnes orationes nascuntur , factum non factum , ius iniuria , bonum malum . Sed quoniam , quod iure dicimur fecisse , non hunc solum intellectum habet , ut lege , sed illum quoque , ut iuste fecisse videamur , secuti Antonium apertius voluerunt eosdem status distinguere . Itaque dixerunt coniecturalem , legalem , iuridicialem ; qui et Verginio placent .
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Marcus Antonius stated that there were three bases in the following words:— " The things which form the ground of every speech are few and are as follows:—' Was a thing done or not done? 'Was it just or unjust?' 'Was it good or bad?' " But since, when we are said to have been justified in doing anything, this does not merely mean that our action was legal, but further implies that it was just, those who follow Antonius attempt to differentiate these bases with greater exactness. They therefore called them conjectural, legal and juridical, a division which meets with the approval of Verginius as well. |
868 |
Horum deinde fecerunt species , ita ut legali subiicerent finitionem et alios , qui ex scripto ducuntur , legum contrariarum , quae ἀντινομία dicitur , et scripti et sententiae vel voluntatis , id est κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν et μετάλημψιν , quam nos varie translativam , transumptivam , transpositivam vocamus , συλλογισμόν quem accipimus ratiocinativum vel collectivum , ambiguitatis , quae ἀμφιβολία nominatur ; quos posui , quia et ipsi a plerisque status appellantur , cum quibusdam legales potius quaestiones eas dici placuerit .
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These they then subdivided into species, placing definition under the head of the legal basis, together with all others which are concerned with the letter of the law: such as that of contradictory laws, or ἀντινομία that which rests on the letter of the law and on meaning or intention (which the Greeks call κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν and μετάληψις to which latter we give various names, styling it the translative, transumptive or transpositive basis ; the syllogism, which we call the ratiocinative or deductive basis; and those which turn on ambiguity or ἀμφιβολία. I mention these because they are called bases by most writers, though some prefer to call them legal questions. |
869 |
Quattuor fecit Athenaeus , προτρεπτικὴν στάσιν vel παρορμητικήν , id est exhortativum , qui suasoriae est proprius ; συντελικήν , qua coniecturam significari magis ex his , quae sequuntur , quam ex ipso nomine apparet ; ὑπαλλακτικήν ea finitio est , mutatione enim nominis constat ; iuridicialem , eadem appellatione Graeca qua ceteri usus . Nam est , ut dixi , multa in nominibus differentia .
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Athenaeus laid down that there were four bases: the προτρεπτικὴ or παρορμητική, that is, the hortative, which is peculiar to deliberative themes; the συντελική which is shown to be the conjectural, not so much from the name itself, but from what follows; the ὑπαλλακτική or definitive, for it consists in a change of terms. ; and the juridical to which he gives the name employed by other Greek writers. |
870 |
Sunt qui ὑπαλλακτικήν translationem esse existiment , secuti hanc mutationis significationem . Fecerunt alii totidem status , sed alios , " An sit ? " Quid sit ? " Quale sit ? " Quantum sit ? " ut Caecilius et Theon .
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For, as I have said, there is a great variety in the names employed. There are some who, arguing from its meaning of change, hold that ὑπαλλακτική is the translative basis, which is concerned with competence. Others, Caecilius and Theon for instance, hold that there are the same number of bases, but make them of a different kind, namely, those covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is and how great it is. |
871 |
Aristoteles in rhetoricis , " An sit " , " Quale " , " Quantum " , et " Quam multum sit ? " quaerendum putat . Quodam tamen loco finitionis quoque vim intelligit , quo dicit quaedam sic defendi , Sustuli , sed non furtum feci ; Percussi , sed non iniuriam feci .
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Aristotle in his Rhetoric states that all enquiry turns on the questions whether a thing is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and of how many parts it consists. In one place however he recognises the force of definition as well, saying that certain points are defended on the following lines:— "I took it, but did not steal it. "I struck him, but did not commit an assault." |
872 |
Posuerat et Cicero in libris rhetoricis , facti , nominis , generis , actionis ; ut in facto coniectura , in nomine finitio , in genere qualitas , in actione ius intelligeretur . iuri subiecerat translationem . Verum hic legales quoque quaestiones alio loco tractat ut species actionis .
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Cicero again in his Rhetorica makes the number of bases to be four, namely those concerned with fact, names, kinds, and legal action, that is to say conjecture is concerned with fact, definition with names, quality with kinds, and law with action: under this latter head of law he included questions of competence. But in another passage he treats legal questions as a species of action. Some writers have held that there are five bases: |
873 |
Fuerunt qui facerent quinque , coniecturam , finitionem , qualitatem , quantitatem , ad aliquid . Theodorus quoque , ut dixi , iisdem generalibus capitibus utitur . An sit ? Quid sit ? Quale sit ? Quantum sit ? Ad aliquid . Hoc ultimum maxime in comparativo genere versari putat , quoniam melius ac peius , maius et minus nisi alio relata non intelliguntur .
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the conjectural, definitive, qualitative, quantitative and relative. Theodorus, also, as I have said, adopts the same number of general heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and to what it refers. The last he considers to be chiefly concerned with comparison, since better and worse, greater and less are meaningless terms unless referred to some standard. |
874 |
Sed in illas quoque translativas , ut supra significavi , quaestiones incidit , An huic ius agendi sit ? vel , facere aliquid conveniat ? An contra hunc ? An hoc tempore ? An sic ? omnia enim ista referri ad aliquid necesse est .
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But questions of relation, as I have already pointed out, enter also into translative questions, that is, questions of competence, since in cases such as "Has this man a right to bring an action?" or " Is it fitting that he should do such and such a thing, or against this man, or at this time, or in this manner? " For all these questions must be referred to a certain standard. |