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Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)
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Institutio Oratoria

Author: Quintilian
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
837
Mea
tamen
sententia
varium
id
est
,
et
accidit
pro
condicione
causarum
,
quia
et
videri
potest
propositio
aliquando
statum
facere
,
ut
in
coniecturalibus
causis
;
utitur
enim
coniectura
magis
qui
agit
, (
quo
moti
quidam
eundem
a
reo
infitialem
esse
dixerunt
)
et
in
syllogismo
tota
ratiocinatio
ab
eo
est
qui
intendit
.
But in my opinion the origin of the basis varies and depends on the circumstances of the individual case. For instance in conjectural causes the affirmation may be regarded as determining the basis, since conjecture is employed by the plaintiff rather than the defendant, and consequently some have styled the basis originated by the latter negative. Again in any syllogism the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms.
838
Sed
quia
videtur
illic
quoque
necessitatem
hos
status
exsequendi
facere
qui
negat
, (
is
enim
si
dicat
,
non
feci
,
coget
adversarium
coniectura
uti
;
et
si
dicat
,
non
habes
legem
,
syllogismo
)
concedamus
ex
depulsione
nasci
statum
.
Nihilominus
enim
res
eo
revertetur
,
ut
modo
is
qui
agit
,
modo
is
cum
quo
agitur
,
statum
faciat
.
But on the other hand he who in such cases denies appears to impose the burden of dealing with such bases upon his opponent. For if he says "I did not do it," he will force his opponent to make use of con- jecture, and again, if he says "The law is against you," he will force him to employ the syllogism. Therefore we must admit that a basis can originate in denial. All the same we are left with our previous conclusion that the basis is determined in some cases by the plaintiff, in some by the defendant.
839
Sit
enim
accusatoris
intentio
,
Hominem
occidisti
.
Si
negat
reus
,
faciat
statum
qui
negat
.
Quid
si
confitetur
,
sed
iure
a
se
adulterum
dicit
occisum
?
nempe
legem
esse
certum
est
quae
permittat
.
Nisi
aliquid
accusator
respondet
,
nulla
lis
est
.
Non
fuit
,
inquit
,
adulter
;
ergo
depulsio
incipit
esse
actoris
,
ille
statum
faciet
.
Ita
erit
quidem
status
ex
prima
depulsione
,
sed
ea
fiet
ab
accusatore
non
a
reo
.
Suppose the accuser to affirm that the accused is guilty of homicide: if the accused denies the charge, it is he who will determine the basis. Or again, if he admits that he has killed a man, but states that the victim was an adulterer and justifiably killed (and we know that the law permits homicide under these circumstances), there is no matter in dispute, unless the accuser has some answer to make. Suppose the accuser does answer however and deny that the victim was guilty of adultery, it will be the accuser that denies, and it is by him that the basis is determined. The basis, then, will originate in the first denial of facts, but that denial is made by the accuser and not the accused.
840
Quid
?
quod
eadem
quaestio
potest
eundem
vel
accusatorem
facere
vel
reum
:
Qui
artem
ludicram
exercuerit
,
in
quattuordecim
primis
ordinibus
ne
sedeat
;
qui
se
praetori
in
hortis
ostenderat
neque
erat
productus
,
sedit
in
quattuordecim
ordinibus
.
Again the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused. " He who has exercised the profession of an actor, is under no circumstances to be allowed a seat in the first fourteen rows of the theatre. " An individual who had performed before the praetor in his private gardens, but had never been presented on the public stage, has taken his seat in one of the fourteen rows.
841
Nempe
intentio
est
:
Artem
ludicram
exercuisti
;
depulsio
:
Non
exercui
artem
ludicram
;
quaestio
:
Quid
sit
artem
ludicram
exercere
?
Si
accusabitur
theatrali
lege
,
depulsio
erit
rei
;
si
excitatus
fuerit
de
spectaculis
et
aget
iniuriarum
,
depulsio
erit
accusatoris
.
The accuser of course affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor: the accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question then arises as to the meaning of the "exercise of the profession of actor." If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused; if on the other hand he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser.
842
Frequentius
tamen
illud
accidet
,
quod
est
a
plurimis
traditum
.
Effugerunt
has
quaestiones
qui
dixerunt
,
status
esse
id
,
quod
appareat
ex
intentione
et
depulsione
,
ut
Fecisti
,
Non
feci
aut
Recte
feci
.
The view of the majority of writers on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as "You did it, "I did not do it," or "I was justified in doing it."
843
Viderimus
tamen
,
utrum
id
sit
status
an
in
eo
status
.
Hermagoras
statum
vocat
,
per
quem
subiecta
res
intelligatur
et
ad
quem
probationes
etiam
partium
referantur
.
Nostra
opinio
semper
haec
fuit
:
cum
essent
frequenter
in
causa
diversi
quaestionum
status
,
in
eo
credere
status
causae
,
quod
esset
in
ea
potentissimum
et
in
quo
maxime
res
verteretur
.
Id
si
quis
generalem
quaestionem
vel
caput
generale
dicere
malet
cum
hoc
mihi
non
erit
pugna
,
non
magis
,
quam
si
aliud
adhuc
,
quo
idem
intelligatur
,
eius
rei
nomen
invenerit
,
quanquam
tota
volumina
in
hanc
disputationem
impendisse
multos
sciam
;
nobis
statum
dici
placet
.
But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagoras calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the parties concerned will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that, whereas there are frequently different bases of questions in connexion with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call that the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him, any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing, although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer however to call it the basis.
844
Sed
cum
in
aliis
omnibus
inter
scriptores
summa
dissensio
est
,
tum
in
hoc
praecipue
videtur
mihi
studium
quoque
diversa
tradendi
fuisse
;
adeo
,
nec
qui
sit
numerus
nec
quae
nomina
nec
qui
generales
quive
speciales
sint
status
,
convenit
.
There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else, but in this case as elsewhere they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow-teachers. As a result there is still no agreement as to the number and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special. To begin with Aristotle lays down that there are ten categories on which every question seems to turn.
845
Ac
primum
Aristoteles
elementa
decem
constituit
,
circa
quae
versari
videatur
omnis
quaestio
.
οὐσίαν
,
quam
Plautus
essentiam
vocat
,
neque
sane
aliud
est
eius
nomen
Latinum
;
sed
ea
quaeritur
,
an
sit
.
Qualitatem
,
cuius
apertus
intellectus
est
.
Quantitatem
,
quae
dupliciter
a
posterioribus
divisa
est
,
quam
magnum
et
quam
multum
sit
?
Ad
aliquid
,
unde
ducta
est
translatio
et
comparatio
.
First there is οὐσία which Plautus calls essence, the only available translation: under this category we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next relation, involving questions of competence and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering and possessing,
846
Post
haec
"
Ubi
"
et
"
Quando
" ;
deinde
"
Facere
" , "
Pati
" , "
Habere
" ,
quod
est
quasi
armatum
esse
,
vestitum
esse
.
Novissime
κεῖσθαι
,
quod
est
compositum
esse
quodam
modo
,
ut
calere
,
stare
,
irasci
.
Sed
ex
iis
omnibus
prima
quattuor
ad
status
pertinere
,
cetera
ad
quosdam
locos
argumentorum
videntur
.
which for example are concerned with a person's being armed or clothed. Lastly comes κεῖσθαι or position, which means to be in a certain position, such for instance as being warm, standing or angry. Of these categories the first four concern bases, the remainder concern only certain topics for argument.
847
Alii
novem
elementa
posuerunt
,
Personam
,
in
qua
de
animo
,
corpore
,
extra
positis
quaeratur
,
quod
pertinere
ad
coniecturae
et
qualitatis
instrumenta
video
.
Tempus
,
quod
χρόνον
vocant
,
ex
quo
quaestio
,
an
is
quem
,
dum
addicta
est
,
mater
peperit
,
servus
sit
natus
.
Locum
,
unde
controversia
videtur
,
an
fas
fuerit
tyrannum
in
templo
occidere
.
An
exulaverit
,
qui
domi
latuit
.
Tempus
iterum
,
quod
καιρόν
appellant
;
Others make the number of categories to be nine. Person, involving questions concerning the mind, body or external circumstances, which clearly has reference to the means by which we establish conjecture or quality. Time, or χρόνος, from which we get questions such as whether a child is born a slave, if his mother is delivered of him while assigned to her creditors. Place, from which we get such disputes as to whether it is permissible to kill a tyrant in a temple, or whether one who has hidden himself at home can be regarded as an exile.
848
hanc
autem
videri
volunt
speciem
illius
temporis
,
ut
aestatem
vel
hiemem
;
huic
subiicitur
ille
in
pestilentia
comissator
.
Actum
,
id
est
πρῆξιν
,
quod
eo
referunt
,
sciens
commiserit
an
insciens
?
necessitate
an
casu
?
et
talia
.
Numerum
,
qui
cadit
in
speciem
quantitatis
,
an
Thrasybulo
triginta
praemia
debeantur
,
quia
tot
tyrannos
sustulerit
?
Then comes time in another sense, called καιρός by the Greeks, by which they refer to a period of time, such as summer or winter; under this heading come problems such as that about the man who held high revel in a time of pestilence. Action or πρᾶξις, to which they refer questions as to whether an act was committed wittingly or unwittingly, by accident or under compulsion and the like. Number, which falls under the category of quantity, under which come questions such as whether the state owes Thrasybulus thirty talents for ridding it of the same number of tyrants.
849
Causam
,
cui
plurimae
subiacent
lites
,
quotiens
factum
non
negatur
,
sed
quia
iusta
ratione
sit
factum
,
defenditur
.
τρόπον
,
cum
id
,
quod
alio
modo
fieri
licet
,
alio
dicitur
factum
;
hinc
est
adulter
loris
caesus
vel
fame
necatus
.
Occasionem
factorum
,
quod
est
apertius
,
quam
ut
vel
interpretandum
vel
exemplo
sit
demonstrandum
,
tamen
ἀφορμὰς
ἔργων
vocant
.
Cause, under which heading come a large number of disputes, whenever a fact is not denied, but the defence pleads that the act was just and reasonable. τρόπος or manner, which is involved when a thing is said to have been done in one way when it might have been done in another: under this category come cases of such as that of the adulterer who is scourged with thongs or starved to death. Opportunity for action, the meaning of which is too obvious to need explanation or illustration: the Greeks however call it ἔργων ἀφορμαί
850
Hi
quoque
nullam
quaestionem
extra
haec
putant
.
Quidam
detrahunt
duas
partes
,
numerum
et
occasionem
,
et
pro
illo
quod
dixi
actum
subiiciunt
res
,
id
est
πράγματα
.
Quae
ne
praeterisse
viderer
,
satis
habui
attingere
.
Ceterum
his
nec
status
satis
ostendi
nec
omnes
contineri
locos
credo
,
quod
apparebit
diligentius
legentibus
,
quae
de
utraque
re
dicam
.
Erunt
enim
plura
multo
,
quam
quae
his
elementis
comprehenduntur
.
These authorities like Aristotle hold that no question can arise which does not come under one of these heads. Some subtract two of them, namely number and opportunity, and substitute for what I have called action, things, or in Greek πράγματα. I have thought it sufficient to notice these doctrines, for fear someone might complain of their omission. Still I do not consider that bases are sufficiently determined by these categories, nor that the latter cover every possible kind of topic, as will be clear to any that read carefully what I have to say on both points. For there will be found to be many topics that are not covered by these categories.
851
Apud
plures
auctores
legi
,
placuisse
quibusdam
,
unum
omnino
statum
esse
coniecturalem
.
Sed
quibus
placuerit
,
neque
illi
tradiderunt
neque
ego
usquam
reperire
potui
.
Rationem
tamen
hanc
secuti
dicuntur
,
quod
res
omnis
signis
colligeretur
.
Quo
modo
licet
qualitatis
quoque
solum
statum
faciant
,
quia
ubique
,
qualis
sit
cuiusque
rei
natura
,
quaeri
potest
.
Sed
utrocunque
modo
sequetur
summa
confusio
.
I find it stated in many authors that some rhetoricians only recognise one kind of basis, the con- jectural. But they have not mentioned who these rhetoricians are nor have I been able to discover. They are however stated to have taken this view on the ground that all our knowledge is a matter of inference from indications. On this line of reasoning they might regard all bases as qualitative, because we inquire into the nature of the subject in every case. But the adoption of either view leads to inextricable confusion.
852
Neque
interest
,
unum
quis
statum
faciat
an
nullum
,
si
omnes
causae
sunt
condicionis
eiusdem
.
Coniectura
dicta
est
a
coniectu
,
id
est
directione
quadam
rationis
ad
veritatem
,
unde
etiam
somniorum
atque
ominum
interpretes
coniectores
vocantur
.
Appellatum
tamen
est
hoc
genus
varie
,
sicut
sequentibus
apparebit
.
Nor does it matter whether one recognises only one kind of basis or none at all, if all causes are of the same nature. Coniectura is derived from conicere "to throw together, " because it implies the concentration of the reason on the truth. For this reason interpreters of dreams and all other phenomena are called coniectores "conjecturers." But the conjectural basis has received more names than one, as will appear in the sequel.
853
Fuerunt
,
qui
duos
status
facerent
:
Archedemus
coniecturalem
et
finitivum
,
exclusa
qualitate
,
quia
sic
de
ea
quaeri
existimabat
,
quid
esset
iniquum
,
quid
iniustum
,
quid
dicto
audientem
non
esse
;
quod
vocat
de
eodem
et
alio
.
Some have recognised only two bases. Archedemus for instance admits only the conjectural and definitive and refuses to admit the qualitative, since he held that questions of quality take the form of "What is unfair? what is unjust? what is disobedience?" which he terms questions about identity and difference.
854
Huic
diversa
sententia
eorum
fuit
,
qui
duos
quidem
status
esse
voluerunt
,
sed
unum
infitialem
,
alterum
iuridicialem
.
Infitialis
est
,
quem
dicimus
coniecturalem
,
cui
ab
infitiando
nomen
alii
in
totum
dederunt
,
alii
in
partem
,
quia
accusatorem
coniectura
,
reum
infitiatione
uti
putaverunt
.
A different view was held by those who likewise only admitted two bases, but made them the negative and juridical. The negative basis is identical with that which we call the conjectural, to which some give the name of negative absolutely, others only in part, these latter holding that conjecture is employed by the accuser, denial only by the accused.
855
Iuridicialis
est
qui
Graece
dicitur
δικαιολογικός
Sed
quemadmodum
ab
Archedemo
qualitas
exclusa
est
,
sic
ab
his
repudiata
finitio
.
Nam
subiiciunt
eam
iuridiciali
,
quaerendumque
arbitrantur
iustumne
sit
,
sacrilegium
appellari
quod
obiiciatur
vel
furtum
vel
amentiam
.
The juridical is that known in Greek as δικαιολογικός But just as Archedemus would not recognise the qualitative basis, so these reject the definitive which they include in the juridical, holding that in these questions we have to enquire whether it is just that the act with which the accused is charged should be called sacrilege or theft or madness.
856
Qua
in
opinione
Pamphilus
fuit
,
sed
qualitatem
in
plura
partitus
est
;
plurimi
deinceps
,
mutatis
tantum
nominibus
,
in
rem
de
qua
constet
,
et
in
rem
de
qua
non
constet
.
Nam
est
verum
nec
aliter
fieri
potest
,
quam
ut
aut
certum
sit
factum
esse
quid
aut
non
sit
;
si
non
est
certum
,
coniectura
sit
,
si
certum
est
,
reliqui
status
.
Pamplihlus held this opinion but subdivided quality into several different species. The majority of later writers have classified bases as follows, involving however no more than a change of names:— those dealing with ascertained facts and those dealing with matters where there is a doubt. For a thing must either be certain or uncertain: if it is uncertain, the basis will be conjectural; if certain, it will be some one of the other bases.
857
Nam
idem
dicit
Apollodorus
,
cum
quaestionem
aut
in
rebus
extra
positis
,
quibus
coniectura
explicatur
,
aut
in
nostris
opinionibus
existimat
positam
,
quorum
illud
πραγματικόν
,
hoc
περὶ
ἐννοίας
vocat
;
idem
,
qui
ἀπρόληπτον
et
προλημπτικόν
dicunt
,
id
est
dubium
et
praesumptum
,
quo
significatur
de
quo
liquet
.
Apollodorus says the same thing when he states that a question must either lie in things external, which give play to conjecture, or in our own opinions: the former he calls πραγματικός the latter περὶ ἐννοίας The same is said by those who employ the terms ἀπροληπτὸς and προληπτικός, that is to say doubtful and presumptive, by this latter term meaning those facts which are beyond a doubt.
858
Idem
Theodorus
,
qui
de
eo
, "
an
sit
" ,
et
de
accidentibus
ei
quod
esse
constat
,
id
est
περὶ
οὐσίας
καὶ
συμβεβηκότων
existimat
quaeri
.
Nam
in
his
omnibus
prius
genus
coniecturam
habet
,
sequens
reliqua
.
Sed
haec
reliqua
Apollodorus
duo
vult
esse
,
qualitatem
et
de
nomine
,
id
est
finitivam
;
Theodorus
,
quid
,
quale
,
quantum
,
ad
aliquid
.
Theodorus agrees with them, for he holds that the question is either as to whether such and such a thing is really so, or is concerned with the accidents of something which is an admitted fact: that is to say it is either περὶ οὐσίας or περὶ συμβεβηκότων For in all these cases the first basis is conjectural, while the second belongs to one of the other classes. As for these other classes of basis, Apollodorus holds that there are two, one concerned with quality and the other with the names of things, that is to say a definitive basis. Theodorus makes them four, concerned with existence, quality, quantity and relation.
859
Sunt
et
qui
de
eodem
et
de
alio
modo
qualitatem
esse
modo
finitionem
velint
.
In
duo
et
Posidonius
dividit
,
vocem
et
res
.
In
voce
quaeri
putat
an
significet
,
quid
,
quam
multa
,
quo
modo
?
in
rebus
coniecturam
,
quod
κατ᾽
αἴσθησιν
vocat
,
et
qualitatem
,
et
finitionem
,
cui
nomen
dat
κατ᾽
ἔννοιαν
,
et
ad
aliquid
.
Unde
et
illa
divisio
est
,
alia
esse
scripta
,
alia
inscripta
.
There are some too who make questions of identity and difference come under the head of quality, others who place it under the head of definition. Posidonius divides them into two classes, those concerned with words and those concerned with things. In the first case he thinks that the question is whether a word has any meaning; if so, what is its meaning, how many meanings has it, and how does it come to mean what it means? In the latter case, we employ conjecture, which he calls κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν, or inference from perception, quality, definition which he calls κατ᾽ ἔννοιαν, or rational inference, and relation. Hence also comes the division into things written and unwritten.
860
Celsus
Cornelius
duos
et
ipse
fecit
status
generales
,
an
sit
?
quale
sit
?
Priori
subiecit
finitionem
,
quia
aeque
quaeratur
an
sit
sacrilegus
,
qui
nihil
se
sustulisse
de
templo
dicit
et
qui
privatam
pecuniam
confitetur
sustulisse
.
Qualitatem
in
rem
et
scriptum
dividit
.
Scripto
quattuor
partes
legales
,
exclusa
translatione
;
quantitatem
et
mentis
quaestionem
coniecturae
subiecit
.
Even Cornelius Celsus stated that there were two general bases, one concerned with the question whether a thing is, the other with the question of what kind it is. He included definition under the first of these, because enquiry may equally be made as to whether sacrilege has been committed, when a man denies that he has stolen anything from a temple, and when he admits that he has stolen private money from a temple. He divides quality into fact and the letter of the law. Under the head of the letter of the law he places four classes, excluding questions of competence: quantity and intention he places under the head of conjecture.
861
Est
etiam
alia
in
duos
dividendi
status
ratio
,
quae
docet
,
aut
de
substantia
controversiam
esse
,
aut
de
qualitate
;
ipsam
porro
qualitatem
aut
in
summo
genere
consistere
aut
in
succedentibus
.
There is also another method of dividing bases into two classes: according to this disputes are either about substance or quality, while quality is treated either in its most general sense or in its special senses.
862
De
substantia
est
coniectura
.
Quaestio
enim
tractatur
rei
,
an
facta
sit
?
an
fiat
?
an
futura
sit
?
interdum
etiam
mentis
;
idque
melius
,
quam
quod
iis
placuit
,
qui
statum
eundem
facti
nominaverunt
,
tanquam
de
praeterito
tantum
et
tantum
de
facto
quaereretur
.
Substance is dealt with by conjecture: for in enquiring into anything, we ask whether it has been done, is being done, or is likely to be done, and sometimes also consider its intention: this method is preferable to that adopted by those who style the conjectural basis a basis of fact, as though we only enquired into the past and what has actually been done.
863
Pars
qualitatis
,
quae
est
de
summo
genere
,
raro
in
iudicium
venit
,
quale
est
,
idne
sit
honestum
,
quod
vulgo
laudatur
;
succedentium
autem
aliae
de
communi
appellatione
,
ut
sitne
sacrilegus
,
qui
pecuniam
privatam
ex
templo
furatus
est
;
aut
de
re
denominata
,
ubi
et
factum
esse
certum
est
nec
dubitatur
,
quid
sit
quod
factum
est
.
Cui
subiacent
omnes
de
honestis
,
iustis
,
utilibus
quaestiones
.
The consideration of quality under its most general aspect rarely comes up in the courts; I refer to questions such as "whether that is honourable which is generally praised." With regard to the special aspects of quality, questions sometimes occur about some common term, such as whether sacrilege has been committed when a man has stolen private money from a temple, or about some act with a definite name, when there is no doubt either as to the commission or the nature of the act. Under this heading come all questions about what is honourable, just or expedient.
864
His
etiam
ceteri
status
contineri
dicuntur
,
quia
et
quantitas
modo
ad
coniecturam
referatur
,
ut
maiorne
sol
quam
terra
?
modo
ad
qualitatem
,
quanta
poena
quempiam
quantove
praemio
sit
affici
iustum
?
et
translatio
versetur
circa
qualitatem
,
et
definitio
pars
sit
translationis
;
These bases are said to contain others as well, because quantity is sometimes concerned with conjectural bases, as in the question whether the sun is bigger than the earth, and sometimes with qualitative bases, as in the question what reward or punishment it would be just to assign to some particular person, while questions of competence undoubtedly are concerned with quality, and definition with questions of competence.
865
quin
et
contrariae
leges
et
ratiocinativus
status
,
id
est
syllogismos
,
et
plerumque
scripti
et
voluntatis
aequo
nitantur
(
nisi
quod
hic
tertius
aliquando
coniecturam
accipit
,
quid
senserit
legis
constitutor
) ;
ambiguitatem
vero
semper
coniectura
explicari
necesse
sit
,
quia
,
cum
sit
manifestum
,
verborum
intellectum
esse
duplicem
,
de
sola
quaeritur
voluntate
.
ratiocinative basis or syllogism and the majority of questions dealing with the letter of the law and intention are based on equity, with the exception that this last question sometimes admits of conjecture as, for instance, concerning the intentions of the legislator: ambiguity, however, must always be explained by conjecture, because as it is clear that the words admit of two interpretations the only question is as to the intention.
866
A
plurimis
tres
sunt
facti
generales
status
,
quibus
et
Cicero
in
Oratore
utitur
,
et
omnia
,
quae
aut
in
controversiam
aut
in
contentionem
veniant
,
contineri
putat
,
Sitne
?
Quid
sit
?
Quale
sit
?
quorum
nomina
apertiora
sunt
,
quam
ut
dicenda
sint
.
A large number of writers recognise general bases; Cicero adopts them in his Orator, and holds that everything that can form the subject of dispute or discussion is covered by the three questions, whether it is, what it is, and of what kind it is. The names of these three bases are too obvious for mention. The same view is asserted by Patrocles.
867
Idem
Patrocles
sentit
.
Tres
fecit
et
M
.
Antonius
his
quidem
verbis
:
Paucae
res
sunt
,
quibus
ex
rebus
omnes
orationes
nascuntur
,
factum
non
factum
,
ius
iniuria
,
bonum
malum
.
Sed
quoniam
,
quod
iure
dicimur
fecisse
,
non
hunc
solum
intellectum
habet
,
ut
lege
,
sed
illum
quoque
,
ut
iuste
fecisse
videamur
,
secuti
Antonium
apertius
voluerunt
eosdem
status
distinguere
.
Itaque
dixerunt
coniecturalem
,
legalem
,
iuridicialem
;
qui
et
Verginio
placent
.
Marcus Antonius stated that there were three bases in the following words:— " The things which form the ground of every speech are few and are as follows:—' Was a thing done or not done? 'Was it just or unjust?' 'Was it good or bad?' " But since, when we are said to have been justified in doing anything, this does not merely mean that our action was legal, but further implies that it was just, those who follow Antonius attempt to differentiate these bases with greater exactness. They therefore called them conjectural, legal and juridical, a division which meets with the approval of Verginius as well.
868
Horum
deinde
fecerunt
species
,
ita
ut
legali
subiicerent
finitionem
et
alios
,
qui
ex
scripto
ducuntur
,
legum
contrariarum
,
quae
ἀντινομία
dicitur
,
et
scripti
et
sententiae
vel
voluntatis
,
id
est
κατὰ
ῥητὸν
καὶ
διάνοιαν
et
μετάλημψιν
,
quam
nos
varie
translativam
,
transumptivam
,
transpositivam
vocamus
,
συλλογισμόν
quem
accipimus
ratiocinativum
vel
collectivum
,
ambiguitatis
,
quae
ἀμφιβολία
nominatur
;
quos
posui
,
quia
et
ipsi
a
plerisque
status
appellantur
,
cum
quibusdam
legales
potius
quaestiones
eas
dici
placuerit
.
These they then subdivided into species, placing definition under the head of the legal basis, together with all others which are concerned with the letter of the law: such as that of contradictory laws, or ἀντινομία that which rests on the letter of the law and on meaning or intention (which the Greeks call κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοιαν and μετάληψις to which latter we give various names, styling it the translative, transumptive or transpositive basis ; the syllogism, which we call the ratiocinative or deductive basis; and those which turn on ambiguity or ἀμφιβολία. I mention these because they are called bases by most writers, though some prefer to call them legal questions.
869
Quattuor
fecit
Athenaeus
,
προτρεπτικὴν
στάσιν
vel
παρορμητικήν
,
id
est
exhortativum
,
qui
suasoriae
est
proprius
;
συντελικήν
,
qua
coniecturam
significari
magis
ex
his
,
quae
sequuntur
,
quam
ex
ipso
nomine
apparet
;
ὑπαλλακτικήν
ea
finitio
est
,
mutatione
enim
nominis
constat
;
iuridicialem
,
eadem
appellatione
Graeca
qua
ceteri
usus
.
Nam
est
,
ut
dixi
,
multa
in
nominibus
differentia
.
Athenaeus laid down that there were four bases: the προτρεπτικὴ or παρορμητική, that is, the hortative, which is peculiar to deliberative themes; the συντελική which is shown to be the conjectural, not so much from the name itself, but from what follows; the ὑπαλλακτική or definitive, for it consists in a change of terms. ; and the juridical to which he gives the name employed by other Greek writers.
870
Sunt
qui
ὑπαλλακτικήν
translationem
esse
existiment
,
secuti
hanc
mutationis
significationem
.
Fecerunt
alii
totidem
status
,
sed
alios
, "
An
sit
? "
Quid
sit
? "
Quale
sit
? "
Quantum
sit
? "
ut
Caecilius
et
Theon
.
For, as I have said, there is a great variety in the names employed. There are some who, arguing from its meaning of change, hold that ὑπαλλακτική is the translative basis, which is concerned with competence. Others, Caecilius and Theon for instance, hold that there are the same number of bases, but make them of a different kind, namely, those covered by the questions whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is and how great it is.
871
Aristoteles
in
rhetoricis
, "
An
sit
" , "
Quale
" , "
Quantum
" ,
et
"
Quam
multum
sit
? "
quaerendum
putat
.
Quodam
tamen
loco
finitionis
quoque
vim
intelligit
,
quo
dicit
quaedam
sic
defendi
,
Sustuli
,
sed
non
furtum
feci
;
Percussi
,
sed
non
iniuriam
feci
.
Aristotle in his Rhetoric states that all enquiry turns on the questions whether a thing is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and of how many parts it consists. In one place however he recognises the force of definition as well, saying that certain points are defended on the following lines:— "I took it, but did not steal it. "I struck him, but did not commit an assault."
872
Posuerat
et
Cicero
in
libris
rhetoricis
,
facti
,
nominis
,
generis
,
actionis
;
ut
in
facto
coniectura
,
in
nomine
finitio
,
in
genere
qualitas
,
in
actione
ius
intelligeretur
.
iuri
subiecerat
translationem
.
Verum
hic
legales
quoque
quaestiones
alio
loco
tractat
ut
species
actionis
.
Cicero again in his Rhetorica makes the number of bases to be four, namely those concerned with fact, names, kinds, and legal action, that is to say conjecture is concerned with fact, definition with names, quality with kinds, and law with action: under this latter head of law he included questions of competence. But in another passage he treats legal questions as a species of action. Some writers have held that there are five bases:
873
Fuerunt
qui
facerent
quinque
,
coniecturam
,
finitionem
,
qualitatem
,
quantitatem
,
ad
aliquid
.
Theodorus
quoque
,
ut
dixi
,
iisdem
generalibus
capitibus
utitur
.
An
sit
?
Quid
sit
?
Quale
sit
?
Quantum
sit
?
Ad
aliquid
.
Hoc
ultimum
maxime
in
comparativo
genere
versari
putat
,
quoniam
melius
ac
peius
,
maius
et
minus
nisi
alio
relata
non
intelliguntur
.
the conjectural, definitive, qualitative, quantitative and relative. Theodorus, also, as I have said, adopts the same number of general heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what kind it is, how great it is, and to what it refers. The last he considers to be chiefly concerned with comparison, since better and worse, greater and less are meaningless terms unless referred to some standard.
874
Sed
in
illas
quoque
translativas
,
ut
supra
significavi
,
quaestiones
incidit
,
An
huic
ius
agendi
sit
?
vel
,
facere
aliquid
conveniat
?
An
contra
hunc
?
An
hoc
tempore
?
An
sic
?
omnia
enim
ista
referri
ad
aliquid
necesse
est
.
But questions of relation, as I have already pointed out, enter also into translative questions, that is, questions of competence, since in cases such as "Has this man a right to bring an action?" or " Is it fitting that he should do such and such a thing, or against this man, or at this time, or in this manner? " For all these questions must be referred to a certain standard.