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Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)
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Institutio Oratoria

Author: Quintilian
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
723
At
prooemium
aliquando
ac
narrationem
dicet
malus
homo
et
argumenta
,
sic
ut
nihil
sit
in
iis
requirendum
.
Nam
et
latro
pugnabit
acriter
,
virtus
tamen
erit
fortitudo
;
et
tormenta
sine
gemitu
feret
malus
servus
,
tolerantia
tamen
doloris
laude
sua
non
carebit
.
Multa
fiunt
eadem
sed
aliter
.
Sufficiant
igitur
haec
,
quia
de
utilitate
supra
tractavimus
.
"But," it may be urged, " a bad man will at times produce an exordium or a statement of facts, and will argue a case in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired. " No doubt; even a robber may fight bravely without courage ceasing to be a virtue; even a wicked slave may bear torture without a groan, and we may still continue to regard endurance of pain as worthy of praise. We can point to many acts which are identical with those of virtue, but spring from other sources. However, what I have said here must suffice, as I have already dealt with the question of the usefulness of oratory.
724
Materiam
rhetorices
quidam
dixerunt
esse
orationem
,
qua
in
sententia
ponitur
apud
Platonem
Gorgias
.
Quae
si
ita
accipitur
,
ut
sermo
quacunque
de
re
compositus
dicatur
oratio
,
non
materia
sed
opus
est
,
ut
statuarii
statua
;
nam
et
oratio
efficitur
arte
sicut
statua
.
Sin
hac
appellatione
verba
ipsa
significari
putamus
,
nihil
haec
sine
rerum
substantia
faciunt
.
As to the material of oratory, some have asserted that it is speech, as for instance Gorgias in the dialogue of Plato. If this view be accepted in the sense that the word "speech" is used of a discourse composed on any subject, then it is not the material, but the work, just as a statue is the work of the sculptor. For speeches like statues require art for their production. If on the other hand we interpret "speech" as indicating the words themselves, they can do nothing unless they are related to facts. Some again hold that the material consists of persuasive arguments. But they form part of the work, are produced by art and require material themselves.
725
Quidam
argumenta
persuasibilia
;
quae
et
ipsa
in
parte
sunt
operis
et
arte
fiunt
et
materia
egent
.
Quidam
civiles
quaestiones
;
quorum
opinio
non
qualitate
sed
modo
erravit
,
est
enim
haec
materia
rhetorices
sed
non
sola
.
Some say that political questions provide the material. The mistake made by these lies not in the quality of their opinion but in its limitation. For political questions are material for eloquence but not the only material.
726
Quidam
,
quia
virtus
sit
rhetorice
,
materiam
eius
totam
vitam
vocant
.
Alii
,
quia
non
omnium
virtutum
materia
sit
tota
vita
,
sed
pleraeque
earum
versentur
in
partibus
,
sicut
iustitia
,
fortitudo
,
continentia
propriis
officiis
et
suo
fine
intelliguntur
,
rhetoricen
quoque
dicunt
in
una
aliqua
parte
ponendam
,
eique
locum
in
ethice
negotialem
adsignant
id
est
πραγματικόν
.
Some, on the ground that rhetoric is a virtue, make the material with which it deals to be the whole of life. Others, on the ground that life regarded as a whole does not provide material for every virtue, since most of them are concerned only with departments of life (justice, courage and self-control each having their own duties and their own end), would consequently restrict oratory to one particular department of life and place it in the practical or pragmatic department of ethics, that is to say the department of morals which deals with the business of life.
727
Ego
(
neque
id
sine
auctoribus
)
materiam
esse
rhetorices
iudico
omnes
res
quaecunque
ei
ad
dicendum
subiectae
erunt
.
Nam
Socrates
apud
Platonem
dicere
Gorgiae
videtur
,
non
in
verbis
esse
materiam
sed
in
rebus
.
Et
in
Phaedro
palam
,
non
in
iudiciis
modo
et
contionibus
,
sed
in
rebus
etiam
privatis
ac
domesticis
rhetoricen
esse
demonstrat
.
For my own part, and I have authority to support me, I hold that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that may be placed before it as a subject for speech. Plato, if I read him aright, makes Socrates say to Gorgias that its material is to be found in things not words; while in the Phaedrus he clearly proves that rhetoric is concerned not merely with law-courts and public assemblies, but with private and domestic affairs as well: from which it is obvious that this was the view of Plato himself.
728
Quo
manifestum
est
hanc
opinionem
ipsius
Platonis
fuisse
.
Et
Cicero
quodam
loco
materiam
rhetorices
vocat
res
,
quae
subiectae
sint
ei
,
sed
certas
demum
putat
esse
subiectas
.
Alio
vero
de
omnibus
rebus
oratori
dicendum
arbitratur
his
quidem
verbis
:
Quanquam
vis
oratoris
professioque
ipsa
bene
dicendi
hoc
suscipere
ac
polliceri
videtur
,
ut
omni
de
re
,
quaecunque
sit
proposita
,
ornate
ab
eo
copioseque
dicatur
.
Cicero also in a passage of one of his works, states that the material of rhetoric is composed of the things which are brought before it, but makes certain restrictions as to the nature of these things. In another passage, however, he expresses his opinion that the orator has to speak about all kinds of things; I will quote his actual words: " although the very meaning of the name of orator and the fact that he professes to speak well seem to imply a promise and undertaking that the orator will speak with elegance and fullness on any subject that may be put before him. "
729
Atque
adhuc
alibi
:
Vero
enim
oratori
,
quae
sunt
in
hominum
vita
,
quandoquidem
in
ea
versatur
orator
atque
ea
est
ei
subiecta
materies
,
omnia
quaesita
,
audita
,
lecta
,
disputata
,
tractata
,
agitata
esse
debent
.
And in another passage he says, " It is the duty of the true orator to seek out, hear, read, discuss, handle and ponder everything that befalls in the life of man, since it is with this that the orator is concerned and this that forms the material with which he has to deal. "
730
hanc
autem
,
quam
nos
materiam
vocamus
,
id
est
res
subiectas
,
quidam
modo
infinitam
modo
non
propriam
rhetorices
esse
dixerunt
,
eamque
artem
circumcurrentem
vocaverunt
,
quod
in
omni
materia
diceret
,
cum
quibus
mihi
minima
pugna
est
.
But this material, as we call it, that is to say the things brought before it, has been criticised by some, at times on the ground that it is limitless, and sometimes on the ground that it is not peculiar to oratory, which they have therefore dubbed a discursive art, because all is grist that comes to its mill.
731
Nam
de
omni
materia
dicere
eam
fatentur
;
propriam
habere
materiam
,
quia
multiplicem
habeat
,
negant
.
Sed
neque
infinita
est
,
etiamsi
est
multiplex
;
et
aliae
quoque
artes
minores
habent
multiplicem
materiam
,
velut
architectonice
,
namque
ea
in
omnibus
,
quae
sunt
aedificio
utilia
,
versatur
,
et
caelatura
,
quae
auro
,
argento
,
aere
,
ferro
opera
efficit
.
I have no serious quarrel with these critics, for they acknowledge that rhetoric is concerned with every kind of material, though they deny that it has any peculiar material just because of that material's multiplicity. But in spite of this multiplicity, rhetoric is not unlimited in scope, and there are other minor arts whose material is characterised by the same multiplicity: such for instance is architecture, which deals with everything that is useful for the purpose of building: such too is the engraver's art which works on gold, silver, bronze, iron.
732
Nam
sculptura
etiam
lignum
,
ebur
,
marmor
,
vitrum
,
gemmas
praeter
ea
quae
supra
dixi
complectitur
.
As for sculpture, its activity extends to wood, ivory, marble, glass and precious stones in addition to the materials already mentioned.
733
Neque
protinus
non
est
materia
rhetorices
,
si
in
eadem
versatur
et
alius
.
Nam
si
quaeram
,
quae
sit
materia
statuarii
,
dicetur
aes
;
si
quaeram
quae
sit
excusoris
,
id
est
fabricae
eius
quam
Graeci
χαλκευτικήν
vocant
,
similiter
aes
esse
respondeant
.
Atqui
plurimum
statuis
differunt
vasa
.
And things which form the material for other artists, do not for that reason cease forthwith to be material for rhetoric. For if I ask what is the material of the sculptor, I shall be told bronze; and if I ask what is the material of the maker of vessels (I refer to the craft styled χαλκευτική by the Greeks), the answer will again be bronze: and yet there is all the difference in the world between vessels and statues.
734
Nec
medicina
ideo
non
erit
ars
,
quia
unctio
et
exercitatio
cum
palaestrica
,
ciborum
vero
qualitas
etiam
cum
cocorum
ei
sit
arte
communis
.
Similarly medicine will not cease to be an art, because, like the art of the gymnast, it prescribes rubbing with oil and exercise, or because it deals with diet like the art of cookery.
735
Quod
vero
de
bono
,
utili
,
iusto
disserere
philosophiae
officium
esse
dicunt
,
non
obstat
.
Nam
cum
philosophum
dicunt
,
hoc
accipi
volunt
virum
bonum
.
Quare
igitur
oratorem
,
quem
a
bono
viro
non
separo
,
in
eadem
materia
versari
mirer
?
Again, the objection that to discourse of what is good, expedient or just is the duty of philosophy presents no difficulty. For when such critics speak of a philosopher, they mean a good man. Why then should I feel surprised to find that the orator whom I identify with the good man deals with the same material?
736
cum
praesertim
primo
libro
iam
ostenderim
,
philosophos
omissam
hanc
ab
oratoribus
partem
occupasse
,
quae
rhetorices
propria
semper
fuisset
,
ut
illi
potius
in
nostra
materia
versentur
.
Denique
cum
sit
dialectices
materia
de
rebus
subiectis
disputare
,
sit
autem
dialectice
oratio
concisa
,
cur
non
eadem
perpetuae
quoque
materia
videatur
?
There is all the less reason, since I have already shown in the first book that philosophers only usurped this department of knowledge after it had been abandoned by the orators: it was always the peculiar property of rhetoric and the philosophers are really trespassers. Finally, since the discussion of whatever is brought before it is the task of dialectic, which is really a concise form of oratory, why should not this task be regarded as also being the appropriate material for continuous oratory? There is a further objection made by certain critics, who say " Well then,
737
Solet
a
quibusdam
et
illud
opponi
:
Omnium
igitur
artium
peritus
erit
orator
,
si
de
omnibus
ei
dicendum
est
.
Possem
hic
Ciceronis
respondere
verbis
,
apud
quem
hoc
invenio
:
Mea
quidem
sententia
nemo
esse
poterit
omni
laude
cumulatus
orator
,
nisi
erit
omnium
rerum
magnarum
atque
artium
scientiam
consecutus
;
sed
mihi
satis
est
eius
esse
oratorem
rei
de
qua
dicet
non
inscium
.
if an orator has to speak on every subject, he must be the master of all the arts. " I might answer this criticism in the words of Cicero, in whom I find the following passage:— " In my opinion no one can be an absolutely perfect orator unless he has acquired a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. " I however regard it as sufficient that an orator should not be actually ignorant of the subject on which he has to speak.
738
Neque
enim
omnes
causas
novit
,
et
debet
posse
de
omnibus
dicere
.
De
quibus
ergo
dicet
?
De
quibus
didicit
.
Similiter
de
artibus
quoque
,
de
quibus
dicendum
erit
,
interim
discet
;
et
de
quibus
didicerit
dicet
.
For he cannot have a knowledge of all causes, and yet he should be able to speak on all. On what then will he speak? On those which he has studied. Similarly as regards the arts, he will study those concerning which he has to speak, as occasion may demand, and will speak on those which he has studied.
739
Quid
ergo
?
non
faber
de
fabrica
melius
aut
de
musice
musicus
?
Si
nesciat
orator
,
quid
sit
,
de
quo
quaeratur
,
plane
melius
.
Nam
et
litigator
rusticus
illitteratusque
de
causa
sua
melius
,
quam
orator
,
qui
nesciet
quid
in
lite
sit
;
sed
accepta
a
musico
,
a
fabro
,
sicut
a
litigatore
melius
orator
quam
ipse
qui
docuerit
.
What then?—I am asked—will not a builder speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music? Certainly, if the orator does not know what is the question at issue. Even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be. But on the other hand if the orator receive instruction from the builder or the musician, he will put forward what he has thus learned better than either, just as he will plead a case better than his client, once he has been instructed in it.
740
Verum
et
faber
,
cum
de
fabrica
,
et
musicus
,
cum
de
musica
,
si
quid
confirmationem
desideraverit
,
dicet
.
Non
quidem
erit
orator
,
sed
faciet
illud
quasi
orator
,
sicut
cum
vulnus
imperitus
deligabit
,
non
erit
medicus
,
sed
faciet
ut
medicus
.
The builder and the musician will, however, speak on the subject of their respective arts, if there should be any technical point which requires to be established. Neither will be an orator, but he will perform his task like an orator, just as when an untrained person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting as one.
741
An
huiusmodi
res
neque
in
laudem
neque
in
deliberationem
neque
in
iudicium
veniunt
?
Ergo
cum
de
faciendo
portu
Ostiensi
deliberatum
est
,
non
debuit
sententiam
dicere
orator
?
atqui
opus
erat
ratione
architectorum
.
Is it suggested that such topics never crop up in panegyric, deliberative or forensic oratory? When the question of the construction of a port at Ostia came up for discussion, had not the orator to state his views? And yet it was a subject requiring the technical knowledge of the architect.
742
Livores
et
tumores
in
corpore
cruditatis
an
veneni
signa
sint
,
non
tractat
orator
?
at
est
id
ex
ratione
medicinae
.
Circa
mensuras
et
numeros
non
versabitur
?
dicamus
has
geometriae
esse
partes
.
Equidem
omnia
fere
credo
posse
casu
aliquo
venire
in
officium
oratoris
;
quod
si
non
accidet
,
non
erunt
ei
subiecta
.
Does not the orator discuss the question whether livid spots and swellings on the body are symptomatic of ill-health or poison? And yet that is a question for the qualified physician. Will he not deal with measurements and figures? And yet we must admit that they form part of mathematics. For my part I hold that practically all subjects are under certain circumstances liable to come up for treatment by the orator. If the circumstances do not occur, the subjects will not concern him.
743
Ita
sic
quoque
recte
diximus
,
materiam
rhetorices
esse
omnes
res
ad
dicendum
ei
subiectas
;
quod
quidem
probat
etiam
sermo
communis
.
Nam
cum
aliquid
,
de
quo
dicamus
,
accepimus
,
positam
nobis
esse
materiam
frequenter
etiam
praefatione
testamur
.
We were therefore right in asserting that the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment, an assertion which is confirmed by the practice of everyday speech. For when we have been given a subject on which to speak, we often preface our remarks by calling attention to the fact that the matter has been laid before us.
744
Gorgias
quidem
adeo
rhetori
de
omnibus
rebus
putavit
esse
dicendum
,
ut
se
in
auditoriis
interrogari
pateretur
,
qua
quisque
de
re
vellet
.
Hermagoras
quoque
,
dicendo
materiam
esse
in
causa
et
in
quaestionibus
,
omnes
res
subiectas
erat
complexus
.
Gorgias indeed felt so strongly that it was the orator's duty to speak on every subject, that he used to allow those who attended his lectures to ask him questions on any subject they pleased. Hermagoras also asserted that the material of oratory lay in the cause and the questions it involved, thereby including every subject that can be brought before it.
745
Sed
quaestiones
si
negat
ad
rhetoricen
pertinere
,
dissentit
a
nobis
;
si
autem
ad
rhetoricen
pertinent
,
ab
hoc
quoque
adiuvamur
.
Nihil
est
enim
,
quod
non
in
causam
aut
quaestionem
cadat
.
If he denies that general questions are the concern of oratory, he disagrees with me: but if they do concern rhetoric, that supports my contention. For there is nothing which may not crop up in a cause or appear as a question for discussion.
746
Aristoteles
tres
faciendo
partes
orationis
,
iudicialem
,
deliberativam
,
demonstrativam
,
paene
et
ipse
oratori
subiecit
omnia
;
nihil
enim
non
in
haec
cadit
.
Aristotle himself also by his tripartite division of oratory, into forensic, deliberative and demonstrative, practically brought everything into the orator's domain, since there is nothing that may not come up for treatment by one of these three kinds of rhetoric.
747
Quaesitum
a
paucissimis
et
de
instrumento
est
.
Instrumentum
voco
,
sine
quo
formari
materia
in
id
quod
velimus
effici
opus
non
possit
.
Verum
hoc
ego
non
artem
credo
egere
sed
artifice
.
Neque
enim
scientia
desiderat
instrumentum
,
quae
potest
esse
consummata
,
etiamsi
nihil
faciat
,
sed
ille
artifex
,
ut
caelator
caelum
et
pictor
penicilla
.
Itaque
haec
in
eum
locum
,
quo
de
oratore
dicturi
sumus
,
differamus
.
A very few critics have raised the question as to what may be the instrument of oratory. My definition of an instrument is that without which the material cannot be brought into the shape necessary for the effecting of our object. But it is not the art which requires an instrument, but the artist. Knowledge needs no instruments, for it may be complete although it produces nothing, but the artist must have them. The engraver cannot work without his chisel nor the painter without his brush. I shall therefore defer this question until I come to treat of the orator as distinct from his art.
748
Liber
III

quoniam
in
libro
secundo
quaesitum
est
,
quid
esset
rhetorice
et
quis
finis
eius
,
artem
quoque
esse
eam
et
utilem
et
virtutem
,
ut
vires
nostrae
tulerunt
,
ostendimus
,
materiamque
ei
res
omnes
,
de
quibus
dicere
oporteret
,
subiecimus
:
iam
hinc
,
unde
coeperit
,
quibus
constet
,
quo
quaeque
in
ea
modo
invenienda
atque
tractanda
sint
,
exsequar
;
intra
quem
modum
plerique
scriptores
artium
constiterunt
,
adeo
ut
Apollodorus
contentus
solis
iudicialibus
fuerit
.

Book III
IN the second book the subject of inquiry was the nature and the end of rhetoric, and I proved to the best of my ability that it was an art, that it was useful, that it was a virtue and that its material was all and every subject that might come up for treatment. I shall now discuss its origin, its component parts, and the method to be adopted in handling and forming our conception of each. For most authors of text-books have stopped short of this, indeed Apollodorus confines himself solely to forensic oratory.
749
Nec
sum
ignarus
,
hoc
a
me
praecipue
,
quod
hic
liber
inchoat
,
opus
studiosos
eius
desiderasse
,
ut
inquisitione
opinionum
,
quae
diversissimae
fuerunt
,
longe
difficillimum
,
ita
nescio
an
minimae
legentibus
futurum
voluptati
,
quippe
quod
prope
nudam
praeceptorum
traditionem
desideret
.
I know that those who asked me to write this work were specially interested in that portion on which I am now entering, and which, owing to the necessity of examining a great diversity of opinions, at once forms by far the most difficult section of this work, and also, I fear, may be the least attractive to my readers, since it necessitates a dry exposition of rules.
750
In
ceteris
enim
admiscere
temptauimus
aliquid
nitoris
,
non
iactandi
ingenii
gratia
(
namque
in
id
eligi
materia
poterat
uberior
) ,
sed
ut
hoc
ipso
adliceremus
magis
iuventutem
ad
cognitionem
eorum
,
quae
necessaria
studiis
arbitrabamur
,
si
ducti
iucunditate
aliqua
lectionis
libentius
discerent
ea
,
quorum
ne
ieiuna
atque
arida
traditio
averteret
animos
et
aures
praesertim
tam
delicatas
raderet
uerebamur
.
In other portions of this work I have attempted to introduce a certain amount of ornateness, not, I may say, to advertise my style (if I had wished to do that, I could have chosen a more fertile theme), but in order that I might thus do something to lure our young men to make themselves acquainted with those principles which I regarded as necessary to the study of rhetoric: for I hoped that by giving them something which was not unpleasant to read I might induce a greater readiness to learn those rules which I feared might, by the dryness and aridity which must necessarily characterise their exposition, revolt their minds and offend their ears which are nowadays grown somewhat over-sensitive.
751
Qua
ratione
se
Lucretius
dicit
praecepta
philosophiae
carmine
esse
complexum
;
namque
hac
,
ut
est
notum
,
similitudine
utitur
:
"
Ac
veluti
pueris
absinthia
taetra
medentes

Cum
dare
conantur
,
prius
oras
pocula
circum

Aspirant
mellis
dulci
flauoque
liquore
, "
et
quae
sequuntur
.
Lucretilus has the same object in mind when he states that he has set forth his philosophical system in verse; for you will remember the well known simile which he uses :—
"And as physicians when they seek to give
A draught of bitter wormwood to a child,
First smear along the edge that rims the cup
The liquid sweets of honey, golden-hued,"
and the rest.
752
Sed
nos
ueremur
,
ne
parum
hic
liber
mellis
et
absinthi
multum
habere
videatur
,
sitque
salubrior
studiis
quam
dulcior
.
Quin
etiam
hoc
timeo
,
ne
ex
eo
minorem
gratiam
ineat
,
quod
pleraque
non
inventa
per
me
sed
ab
aliis
tradita
continebit
,
habeat
etiam
quosdam
,
qui
contra
sentiant
et
adversentur
,
propterea
quod
plurimi
auctores
,
quamvis
eodem
tenderent
,
diversas
tamen
vias
muniverunt
atque
in
suam
quisque
induxit
sequentes
.
But I fear that this book will have too little honey and too much wormwood, and that though the student may find it a healthy draught, it will be far from agreeable. I am also haunted by the further fear that it will be all the less attractive from the fact that most of the precepts which it contains are not original, but derived from others, and because it is likely to rouse the opposition of certain persons who do not share my views. For there are a large number of writers, who though they are all moving toward the same goal, have constructed different roads to it and each drawn their followers into their own.
753
Illi
autem
probant
qualecunque
ingressi
sunt
iter
,
nec
facile
inculcatas
pueris
persuasiones
mutaveris
,
quia
nemo
non
didicisse
mavult
quam
discere
.
The latter, however, approve of the path on which they have been launched whatever its nature, and it is difficult to change the convictions implantted in boyhood, for the excellent reason that everybody prefers to have learned rather than to be in process of learning.
754
Est
autem
,
ut
procedente
libro
patebit
,
infinita
dissensio
auctorum
,
primo
ad
ea
,
quae
rudia
atque
inperfecta
adhuc
erant
,
adiicientibus
quod
inuenissent
scriptoribus
,
mox
,
ut
aliquid
sui
viderentur
adferre
,
etiam
recta
mutantibus
.
But, as will appear in the course of this book, there is an infinite diversity of opinions among writers on [his subject, since some have added their own discoveries to those portions of the art which were still shapeless and unformed, and subsequently have altered even what was perfectly sound in order to establish a claim to originality.
755
Nam
primus
post
eos
,
quos
poetae
tradiderunt
,
movisse
aliqua
circa
rhetoricen
Empedocles
dicitur
.
Artium
autem
scriptores
antiquissimi
Corax
et
Tisias
Siculi
,
quos
insecutus
est
vir
eiusdem
insulae
Gorgias
Leontinus
,
Empedoclis
,
ut
traditur
,
discipulus
.
The first writer after those recorded by the poets who is said to have taken any steps in the direction of rhetoric is Empedocles. But the earliest writers of text-books are the Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, who were followed by another from the same island, namely Gorgias of Leontini, whom tradition asserts to have been the pupil of Empedocles.
756
Is
beneficio
longissimae
aetatis
(
nam
centum
et
novem
vixit
annos
)
cum
multis
simul
floruit
,
ideoque
et
illorum
,
de
quibus
supra
dixi
,
fuit
aemulus
et
ultra
Socraten
usque
duravit
.
He, thanks to his length of days, for he lived to a hundred and nine, flourished as the contemporary of many rhetoricians, was consequently the rival of those whom I have just mentioned, and lived on to survive Socrates.
757
Thrasymachus
Chalcedonius
cum
hoc
et
Prodicus
Cius
et
Abderites
Protagoras
,
a
quo
decem
milibus
denariorum
didicisse
artem
,
quam
edidit
,
Euathlus
dicitur
,
et
Hippias
Elius
et
,
quem
Palameden
Plato
appellat
,
Alcidamas
Elaïtes
.
In the same period flourished Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Prodicus of Ceos, Protagoras of Abdera, for whose instructions, which he afterwards published in a text-book, Euathlus is said to have paid 10,000 denarii, Hippias of Elis and Alcidamas of Elaea whom Plato calls Palamedes.
758
Antiphon
quoque
et
orationem
primus
omnium
scripsit
et
nihilo
minus
et
artem
ipse
composuit
et
pro
se
dixisse
optime
est
creditus
,
etiam
Polycrates
,
a
quo
scriptam
in
Socraten
diximus
orationem
,
et
Theodorus
Byzantius
ex
iis
et
ipse
,
quos
Plato
appellat
λογοδαιδάλους
There was Antiphon also, who was the first to write speeches and who also wrote a text-book and is said to have spoken most eloquently in his own defence; Polycrates, who, as have already said, wrote a speech against Socrates, and Theodorus of Byzantium, who was one of those called "word-artificers" by Plato.
759
Horum
primi
communes
locos
tractasse
dicuntur
Protagoras
,
Gorgias
,
adfectus
Prodicus
et
Hippias
et
idem
Protagoras
et
Thrasymachus
.
Cicero
in
Bruto
negat
ante
Periclea
scriptum
quidquam
,
quod
ornatum
oratorium
habeat
;
eius
aliqua
ferri
.
Equidem
non
reperio
quidquam
tanta
eloquentiae
fama
dignum
;
ideoque
minus
miror
esse
,
qui
nihil
ab
eo
scriptum
patent
,
haec
autem
,
quae
feruntur
,
ab
alis
esse
composite
.
Of these Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to treat commonplaces, Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus the first to handle emotional themes. Cicero in the Brutus states that nothing in the ornate rhetorical style was ever committed to writing before Pericles, and that certain of his speeches are still extant. For my part I have been unable to discover anything in the least worthy of his great reputation for eloquence, and am consequently the less surprised that there should be some who hold that he never committed anything to writing, and that the writings circulating under his name are the works of others.
760
His
successere
multi
,
sed
clarissimus
Gorgiae
auditorum
Isocrates
,
quanquam
de
praeceptore
eius
inter
auctores
non
convenit
;
nos
autem
Aristoteli
credimus
.
Hinc
velut
diversae
secari
coeperunt
viae
.
These rhetoricias had many successors, but the most famous of (Gorgias' pupils was Isocrates, although our authorities are not agreed as to who was his teacher: I however accept the statement of Aristotle on the subject.