Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
2167	Qui neque fecisse se negabit neque aliud esse quod fecerit dicet neque factum defendet , necesse est in suo iure consistat , in quo plerumque actionis est quaestio .	V. He who neither denies nor defends his act nor asserts that it was of a different nature from that alleged, must take his stand on some point of law that tells in his favour, a form of defence which generally turns on the legality of the action brought against him.
2168	Ea non semper , ut quidam putaverunt , iudicium antecedit , qualia sunt praetorum curiosa consilia , cum de iure accusatoris ambigitur ; sed in ipsis iudiciis frequentissime versatur . Est autem duplex eius disceptationis condicio , quod aut intentio aut praescriptio habet controversiam . Ac fuerunt , qui praescriptionis statum facerent , tanquam ea non iisdem omnibus quibus ceterae leges quaestionibus contineretur .	This question is not, however, as some have held, always raised before the commencement of the trial, like the elaborate deliberations of the praetor when there is a doubt as to whether the prosecutor has any legal standing, but frequently comes up during the course of the actual trial. Such discussions fall into two classes, according as the point in dispute arises from an argument advanced by the prosecution or from some prescription (or demurrer) put forward by the defence. There have indeed been some writers who have held that there is a special prescriptive basis; but prescription is covered by precisely the same questions that cover all other laws.
2169	Cum ex praescriptione lis pendet , de ipsa re quaeri non est necesse . Ignominioso filius praescribit : de eo solo iudicatio est , an liceat . Quotiens tamen poterimus , efficiendum est , ut de re quoque iudex bene sentiat ; sic enim iuri nostro libentius indulgebit , ut in sponsionibus , quae ex interdictis fiunt , etiam si non proprietatis est quaestio sed tantum possessionis , tamen non solum possedisse nos , sed etiam nostrum possedisse docere oportebit . Sed frequentius etiam quaeritur de intentione .	When the dispute turns on prescription, there is no need to enquire into the facts of the case itself. For example, a son puts forward a demurrer against his father on the ground that his father has forfeited his civil rights. The only point which has to be decided is whether the demurrer can stand. Still, wherever possible, we should attempt to create a favourable impression in the judge as to the facts of the case as well, since, if this be done, he will be all the more disposed to give an indulgent hearing to our point of law: for example, in actions taking the form of a wager and arising out of interdicts, even though the question is concerned solely with actual possession, the question as to tile right to possession not being raised, it will be desirable to prove not merely that the property was actually in our possession, but that it was ours to possess.
2170	Vir fortis optet , quod volet . Nego illi dandum , quidquid optaverit : non habeo praescriptionem , sed tamen voluntate contra verba praescriptionis nodo utor . In utroque autem genere status iidem sunt .	On tile other hand, the question more frequently turns on intention. Take the law "Let a hero choose what reward he will." I deny that he is entitled to receive whatever he chooses. I cannot put forward any formal demurrer, but none the less I use the intention as against the letter of the law just as I should use a demurrer. In both cases the basis is the same.
2171	Porro lex omnis aut tribuit aut adimit aut punit aut iubet aut vetat aut permittit . Litem habet aut propter se ipsam aut propter alteram , quaestionem aut in scripto aut in voluntate .	Moreover every law either gives or takes away punishes or commands, forbids or permits, and involves a dispute either on its own account or on account of another law, while the question which it involves will turn either on the letter or the intention. The letter is either clear or obscure or ambiguous.
2172	Scriptum aut apertum est aut obscurum aut ambiguum . Quod de legibus dico , idem accipi volo de testamentis , pactis , stipulationibus , omni denique scripto , idem de voce . Et quoniam quattuor eius generis quaestiones vel status facimus , singulos percurram .	And what I say with reference to laws will apply equally to wills, agreements, contracts and every form of document; nay, it will apply even to verbal agreements. And since I have classified such cases under four questions or bases, I will deal with each in turn.
2173	Scripti et voluntatis frequentissima inter consultos quaestio est , et pars magna controversi iuris hinc pendet ; quo minus id accidere in scholis mirum est , ubi etiam ex industria fingitur . Eius genus unum est , in quo et de scripto et de voluntate quaeritur .	Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention of the law, in fact a large proportion of legal disputes turn on these points. We need not therefore be surprised that such questions occur in the schools as well, where they are often invented with this special purpose. One form of this kind of question is found in cases where tile enquiry turns both on the letter and the spirit of a law.
2174	Id tum accidit , cum est in lege aliqua obscuritas . In ea aut uterque suam interpretationem confirmat , adversarii subvertit : ut hic , Fur quadruplum solvat . Duo surripuerunt pariter decem milia ; petuntur ab utroque quadragena ; illi postulant , ut vicena conferant ; nam et actor dicit hoc esse quadruplum quod petat , et rei hoc quod offerant ; voluntas quoque utrinque defenditur .	Such questions arise when the law presents some obscurity. Under these circumstances both parties will seek to establish their own interpretation of the passage and to overthrow that advanced by their opponent. Take for example the following case. " A thief shall refund four times the amount of his theft. Two thieves have jointly stolen 10,000 sesterces. 40,000 are claimed from each. They claim that they are liable only to pay 20,000 each. " The accuser will urge that the sum which he claims is fourfold the amount stolen; the accused will urge that the sum which they offer to pay is fourfold. The intention of the law will be pleaded by both parties.
2175	Aut , cum de altero intellectu certum est , de altero dubium : Ex meretrice natus ne contionetur . Quae filium habebat , prostare coepit : prohibetur adolescens contione . Nam de eius filio , quae ante partum meretrix fuit , certum est : an eadem huius causa sit , dubium est , quia ex hac natus est , antequam meretrix esset .	On the other hand, the dispute may turn on a passage of the law which is clear in one sense and doubtful in another. " The son of a harlot shall not address the people. A woman who had a son became a prostitute. The youth is forbidden to address the people. " Here there is no doubt about the son of one who was a prostitute before his birth, but it is doubtful whether the law applies to the case of one born before his mother became a prostitute.
2176	Solet et illud quaeri , quo referatur , quod scriptum est , Bis de eadem re ne sit actio ; id est , hoc bis ad actorem an ad actionem ? Haec ex iure obscuro . Alterum genus est ex manifesto ; quod qui solum viderunt , hunc statum plani et voluntatis appellarunt . In hoc altera pars scripto nititur , altera voluntate . Sed contra scriptum tribus generibus occurritur .	Another question which is not infrequently raised is as to the interpretation of the law forbidding an action to be brought twice on the same dispute, the problem being whether the word twice refers to the prosecutor or the prosecution. Such are the points arising out of the obscurity of the law. A second form of question turns on some passage where the meaning is clear. Those who have given exclusive attention to this class of question call it the basis concerned with the obvious expression of the law and its intention. In such circumstances one party will rest their case on the letter, the other on the intention of the law.
2177	Unum est , in quo ipso patet , semper id servari non posse : Liberi parentis alant ad vinciantur ; non enim adligabitur infans . Hic erit ad alia transitus , et divisio , num quisquis non aluerit , num hic propter hoc .	There are three different methods in which we may combat the letter. The first comes into play where it is clear that it is impossible always to observe the letter of the law. "Children shall support their parents under penalty of imprisonment." It is clear, in the first place, that this cannot apply to an infant. At this point we shall turn to other possible exceptions and distinguish as follows. " Does this apply to everyone who refuses to support his parent? Has this particular individual incurred the penalty by this particular act? "
2178	Secundum tale genus controversiarum , in quo nullum argumentum est , quod ex lege ipsa peti possit , sed de eo tantum , de quo lis est , quaerendum est . Peregrinus , si murum ascenderit , capite puniatur . Cum hostes murum ascendissent , peregrinus eos depulit ; petitur ad supplicium .	The second arises in scholastic themes where no argument can be drawn from the particular law, but the question is concerned solely with the subject of the dispute. " A foreigner who goes up on to the wall shall be liable to capital punishment. The enemy had scaled the wall and were driven back by a foreigner. His punishment is demanded. "
2179	Non erunt hic separatae quaestiones , an quisquis , an hic , quia nullum potest adferri argumentum contra scriptum vehementius eo quod in lite est ; sed hoc tantum , an ne servandae quidem civitatis causa . Ergo aequitate et voluntate pugnandum . Fieri tamen potest , ut ex aliis legibus exempla ducamus , per quae appareat semper stari scripto non posse , ut Cicero pro Caecina fecit .	In this case we shall not have two separate questions, namely, whether every foreigner who goes up on the wall is liable to the penalty, and whether this particular foreigner is liable, since no more forcible argument can be brought against the application of the letter of the law than the fact in dispute, but the only question to be raised will be whether a foreigner may not go on to the wall even for the purpose of saving the city. Therefore we shall rest our case on equity and the intention of the law. It is, however, sometimes possible to draw examples from other laws to show that we cannot always stand by the letter, as Cicero did in his defence of Caecina.
2180	Tertium , cum in ipsis verbis legis reperimus aliquid , per quod probemus aliud legumlatorem voluisse , ut in hac controversia : Qui nocte cum ferro deprehensus fuerit , adligetur . Cum anulo ferreo inuentum magistratus adligavit . Hic quia est verbum in lege deprehensus , satis etiam significatum videtur , non contineri lege nisi noxium ferrum .	The third method becomes operative when we find something in the actual words of the law which enables us to prove that the intention of the legislator was different. The following theme will provide an example. " Anyone who is caught at night with steel in his hands shall be thrown into prison. A man is found wearing a steel ring, and is imprisoned by the magistrate. " In this case the use of the word caught is sufficient proof that the word steel was only intended by the law in the sense of a weapon of offence.
2181	Sed ut qui voluntate nitetur scriptum , quotiens poterit , infirmare debebit , ita , qui scriptum tuebitur , adiuvare se etiam voluntate temptabit . In testamentis et illa accidunt , ut voluntas manifesta sit , scriptum nihil sit : ut in iudicio Curiano , in quo nota L . Crassi et Scaevolae fuit contentio .	But just as the advocate who rests his case on the intention of the law must wherever possible impugn the letter of the law, so he who defends the letter of the law must also seek to gain support from the intention. Again, in cases concerned with wills it sometimes happens that the intention of the testator is clear, though it has not been expressed in writing: an example of this occurs in the trial of Curius, which gave rise to the well-known argument between Lucius Crassus and Scaevola.
2182	Substitutus heres erat , si postumus ante tutelae annos decessisset . Non est natus . Propinqui bona sibi vindicabant . Quis dubitaret , quin ea voluntas fuisset testantis , ut is non nato filio heres esset , qui mortuo ? sed hoc non scripserat .	A second heir had been appointed in the event of a posthumous son dying while a minor. No posthumous son was born. The next of kin claimed the property. Who could doubt that the intention of the testator was that the same man should inherit in the event of the son not being born who would have inherited in the event of his death? But he had not written this in his will.
2183	Id quoque , quod huic contrarium est , accidit nuper , ut esset scriptum , quod appareret scriptorem noluisse . Qui sestertium nummum quinque milia legaverat , cum emendaret testamentum , sublatis sestertiis nummis , argenti pondo posuit , quinque milia manserunt . Apparuit tamen , quinque pondo dari voluisse , quia ille in argento legati modus et inauditus erat et incredibilis .	Again, the opposite case, that is to say, when what is written is obviously contrary to tile intention of the writer, occurred quite recently. A man who had made a bequest of 5000 sesterces, on altering his will erased the word sesterces and inserted pounds of silver. But it was clear that he had meant not 5000 but 5 pounds of silver, because the weight of silver mentioned in the bequest was unparalleled and incredible.
2184	Sub hoc statu generales sunt quaestiones , scripto an voluntate standum sit , quae fuerit scribentis voluntas ; tractatus omnes qualitatis aut coniecturae , de quibus satis dictum arbitror .	The same basis includes such general questions as to whether we should stand by the letter or the intention of the document, and what was the purpose of the writer, while for the treatment of such questions we must have recourse to quality or conjecture, with which I think I have dealt in sufficient detail.
2185	Proximum est de legibus contrariis dicere , quia inter omnes artium scriptores constitit , in antinomia duos esse scripti et voluntatis status ; neque immerito ; quia , cum lex legi obstat , et utrinque contra scriptum dicitur et quaestio est de voluntate ; in utraque id ambigitur , an utique illa lege sit utendum .	The next subject which comes up for discussion is that of contrary laws. For all writers of text-books are agreed that in such cases there are two bases involving the letter and the intention of the law respectively. This view is justified by the fact that, when one law contradicts another, both parties attack the letter and raise the question of intention, while the point in dispute, as regards each law, is whether we should be guided by it at all.
2186	Omnibus autem manifestum est nunquam esse legem legi contrariam iure ipso , quia , si diversum ius esset , alterum altero abrogaretur , sed eas casu collidi et eventu .	But it is clear to everybody that one law cannot contradict another in principle (since if there were two different principles, one law would cancel the other), and that the laws in question are brought into collision purely by the accidents of chance. When two laws clash, they may be of a similar nature, as for instance if we have to compare two cases in which a tyrannicide and a brave man are given the choice of their reward, both being granted the privilege of choosing whatever they desire. In such a case we compare the deserts of the claimants, the occasions of the respective acts and the nature of the rewards claimed.
2187	Colliduntur autem aut pares inter se , ut si optio tyrannicidae et viri fortis comparentur , utrique data quod velit petendi potestate ; hic meritorum , temporis , praemii collatio est ; aut secum ipsae , ut duorum fortium , duorum tyrannicidarum , duarum raptarum , in quibus non potest esse alia quaestio , quam temporis , utra prior sit , aut qualitatis , utra iustior sit petitio .	Or the same law may be in conflict with itself, as in the case where we have two brave men, two tyrannicides or two ravished women, when the question must turn either on time (that is, whose claim has priority) or on quality (that is, whose claim is the more just). Again, we may have a conflict between diverse, similar or dissimilar laws.
2188	Diversae quoque leges confligunt aut similes aut impares . Diversae , quibus etiam citra adversam legem contradici possit , ut in hac controversia : Magistratus ab arce ne discedat ; vir fortis optet quod volet : impunitatem magistratus petit . vel alia nulla obstante quaeri potest , vir fortis an , quidquid optarit , accipere debeat . Et in legem magistratus multa dicentur , quibus scriptum expugnatur ; si incendium in arce fuerit , si in hostes decurrendum .	Diverse laws are those against which arguments may be brought without reference to any contradictory law. The following theme will provide an example. " A magistrate shall not quit the citadel. One who has rendered heroic service to his country may choose what reward he pleases. A magistrate who left his post and saved his country, demands an amnesty for his conduct. " In this case, even though there be no other law covering the case, we may raise the question whether a hero ought to be granted anything he chooses to claim. Again, many conclusive arguments may be brought against the letter of the law restricting the movements of the magistrate: for example, a fire may have broken out in the citadel, or a sally against the enemy may have been necessary.
2189	Similes , contra quas nihil opponi potest nisi lex altera : Tyrannicidae imago in gymnasio ponatur ; contra , Mulieris imago in gymnasio ne ponatur . Mulier tyrannum occidit . Nam neque mulieris imago ullo alio casu poni potest nec tyrannicidae ullo alio casu summoveri .	Laws are styled similar when nothing can be opposed to one except the other. " Tyrannicides shall have their statues set up in the gymnasium. A statue of a woman shall not be set up in the gymnasium. A woman killed a tyrant. " Here are two conflicting laws: for a woman's statue cannot under any other circumstances be erected in the gymnasium, while there is no other circumstance which can bar the erection of the statue of a tyrannicide in the gymnasium.
2190	Impares sunt , cum alteri multa opponi possunt , alteri nihil nisi quod in lite est : ut cum vir fortis impunitatem desertoris petit . Nam contra legem viri fortis , ut supra ostendi , multa dicuntur ; adversus desertores scripta non potest nisi optione subverti .	Laws are styled dissimilar when many arguments can be urged against one, while the only point which can be urged against the other is the actual subject of dispute. An example is provided by the case in which a brave man demands the pardon of a deserter as his reward. For there are many arguments, as I have shown above, which can be urged against the law permitting a hero to choose whatever reward he will, but the letter of the law dealing with the crime of desertion cannot be overthrown under any circumstances save the choice of rewards to which I have just referred.
2191	Item aut confessum ex utraque parte ius est aut dubium . Si confessum est , haec fere quaeruntur , utra lex potentior ; ad deos pertineat an ad homines , rem publicam an privatos , de honore an de poena , de magnis rebus an de parvis ; permittat an vetet an imperet .	Again, the point of law is either admitted by both parties or disputed. If it be admitted, the questions which are raised will as a rule be such as the following. Which of the two laws is the most stringent? Does it concern gods or men, the state or private individuals, reward or punishment, great things or small? Does it permit, forbid or command?
2192	Solet tractari et , utra sit antiquior , sed velut potentissimum , utra minus perdat ; ut in desertore et viro forti , quod illo non occiso lex tota tollatur , occiso , sit reliqua viro forti alia optio . Plurimum tamen est in hoc , utrum fieri sit melius atque aequius ; de quo nihil praecipi nisi proposita materia potest .	Another common question is which of the two laws is the oldest; but the most important question is which of the two laws will suffer less by its contravention, as for example in the case of the hero and the deserter just mentioned, in which case, if the deserter is not put to death, the whole law is ignored, whereas, if he be put to death, the hero will still have another choice left open to him. It is, however, of the utmost importance to consider which course is best from the point of view of morality and justice, a problem for the solution of which no general rules can be laid down, as it will depend on the special circumstances of the case.
2193	Si dubium , aut alteri aut invicem utrique de iure fit controversia , ut in re tali : Patri in filium , patrono in libertum manus iniectio sit ; liberti heredem sequantur . Liberti filium quidam fecit heredem : invicem petitur manus iniectio ; et pater dicit sibi ius in filium esse , et patronus negat ius patris illi fuisse , quia ipse in manu patroni fuerit .	If, on the other hand, the point of law is disputed, either one party or both in turn will argue the point. Take the following case as an example. " A father shall be empowered to arrest his son, and a patron to arrest his freedman. Freedmen shall be transferred to their patron's heir. A certain man appointed the son of a freedman as his heir. The son of the freedman and the freedman himself both claim the right to arrest the other. " Here the father claims his right over the son, while the son, in virtue of his new position as patron, denies that his father possessed the rights of a father, because he was in the power of his patron.
2194	Duplices leges sicut duae colliduntur : ut Nothus ante legitimum natus , legitimus sit ; post legitimum , tantum civis . Quod de legibus , idem de senatus consultis dictum ; quae si aut inter se pugnent aut obstent legibus , non tamen aliud sit eius status nomen .	Laws containing two provisions may conflict with themselves in exactly the same way as two laws may conflict. The following will serve as an illustration. " The bastard born before a legitimate son shall rank as legitimate, the bastard born after the legitimate son shall only rank as a citizen. " All that I have said about laws will also apply to decrees of the senate. If decrees of the senate conflict with one another or with the laws, the basis will be the same as if laws only were concerned.
2195	Syllogismus habet aliquid simile scripto et voluntati , quia semper pars in eo altera scripto nititur , sed hoc interest , quod illic dicitur contra scriptum , hic supra scriptum ; illic qui verba defendit , hoc agit ut fiat utique quod scriptum est ; hic , ne aliud quam scriptum est . Ei nonnulla etiam cum finitione coniunctio : nam saepe , si finitio infirma est , in syllogismum delabitur .	The syllogistic basis has some resemblance to the basis concerned with the letter and intention of the law, since whenever it comes into play, one party rests his case on the letter: there is, however, this difference between the two bases, that in the latter we argue against the letter, in the present beyond the letter, while in the latter the party defending the letter aims at securing that in any case the letter may be carried into effect, whereas in the present his aim will be to prevent anything except the letter being carried into effect. The syllogism is sometimes employed in conjunction with definition: for often if the definition be weak it takes refuge in the syllogism. Assume a law to run as follows: " A woman who is
2196	Sit enim lex : Venefica capite puniatur . Saepe se verberanti marito uxor amatorium dedit ; eundem repudiavit ; per propinquos rogata ut rediret non est reversa ; suspendit se maritus . Mulier veneficii rea est . Fortissima est actio dicentis amatorium venenum esse . Id erit finitio ; quod si parum valebit , fiet syllogismus , ad quem , velut remissa priore contentione , veniemus , an proinde puniri debeat , ac si virum veneno necasset ?	a poisoner shall be liable to capital punishment. A wife gave her husband a love-potion to cure him of his habit of beating her. She also divorced him. On being asked by her relatives to return to him, she refused. The husband hung himself. The woman is accused of poisoning. " The strongest line for the accuser to take will be to assert that the love-potion was a poison. This involves definition. If it proves weak, we shall have recourse to the syllogism, to which we shall proceed after virtually dropping our previous argument, and which we shall employ to decide the question whether she does not deserve to be punished for administering the lovepotion no less than if she had caused her husband's death by poison.
2197	Ergo hic status ducit ex eo quod scriptum est id quod incertum est ; quod quoniam ratione colligitur , ratiocinativus dicitur . In has autem fere species venit an , quod semel ius est , idem et saepius . Incesti damnata et praecipitata de saxo vixit ; repetitur . An , quod in uno , et in pluribus . Qui duos uno tempore tyrannos occidit , duo praemia petit . An quod ante , et postea .	The syllogistic basis, then, deduces from the letter of the law that which is uncertain; and since this conclusion is arrived at by reason, the basis is called ratiocinative. It may be subdivided into the following species of question. If it is right to do a thing once, is it right to do it often? Example: " A priestess found guilty of unchastity is thrown from the Tarpeian rock and survives. It is demanded that she shall be thrown down again. " If the law grants a privilege with reference to one thing, does it grant it with reference to a number? Example: "A man kills two tyrants together and claims two rewards."
2198	Raptor profugit , rapta nupsit , reverso illo petit optionem . An , quod in toto , idem in parte . Aratrum accipere pignori non licet , vomerem accepit . An , quod in parte , idem in toto . Lanas evehere Tarento non licet , oves evexit .	If a thing is legal before a certain occurrence, is it legal after it? Example: " The ravisher took refuge in flight. His victim married. The ravisher returned and the woman demands to be allowed her choice. " Is that which is lawful with regard to the whole, lawful with regard to a part? Example: "It is forbidden to accept a plough as security. He accepted a ploughshare." Is that which is lawful with regard to a part, lawful with regard to the whole? Example: "It is forbidden to export wool from Tarentum: he exported sheep."
2199	In his syllogismus et scripto nititur ; nam satis cautum esse dicit . Postulo , ut praecipitetur incesta ; lex est ; et rapta optionem petit , et in ore lanae sunt , similiter alia . Sed quia responderi potest ,	In all these cases the syllogism rests on the letter of the law as well: for the accuser urges that the provisions of the law are precise. He will say, "I demand that the priestess who has broken her vows be cast down: it is the law," or " The ravished woman demands the exercise of the choice permitted her by law, " or "Wool grows on sheep," and so on.
2200	non est scriptum , ut bis praecipitetur damnata , ut quandoque rapta optet , ut tyrannicida duo praemia accipiat , nihil de vomere cautum , nihil de ovibus : ex eo , quod manifestum est , colligitur quod dubium est . Maioris pugnae est ex scripto ducere quod scriptum non est ; an , quia hoc , et hoc . Qui patrem occiderit , culleo insuatur : matrem occidit . Ex domo in ius educere ne liceat : ex tabernaculo eduxit . In hoc genere haec quaeruntur ,	But to this we may reply, " The law does not prescribe that the condemned woman should be thrown down twice, that the ravished woman should exercise her choice under all circumstances, that the tyrannicide should receive two rewards, while it makes no mention of ploughshares or of sheep. " Thus we infer what is doubtful from what is certain. It is a more difficult task to deduce from the letter of the law that which is not actually prescribed by the letter, and to argue because that is the case, so also is this. Take the following problems. "The man who kills his father shall be sewn up in a sack. He killed his mother," or " It is illegal to drag a man from his own house into the court. He dragged him from his tent. "
2201	an , quotiens propria lex non est , simili sit utendum , an id de quo agitur ei de quo scriptum est simile sit . Simile autem et maius est et par et minus . In illo priore , an satis lege cautum sit , an , etsi parum cautum est , et hoc sit utendum . In utroque de voluntate legumlatoris . Sed de aequo tractatus potentissimi .	Under this heading come questions such as the following: if there is not a special law applicable to the case, ought we to have recourse to an analogous law? is the point in question similar to what is contained in the letter of the law? Now it should be noted that what is similar may be greater, equal or less. In the first ease we enquire whether the provisions of the law are sufficient, or, if they are insufficient, whether we should have recourse to this other law. In both cases it is a question of the intention of the legislator. But the most effective form of treatment in such cases will be to appeal to equity.
2202	Amphiboliae species sunt innumerabiles , adeo ut philosophorum quibusdam nullum videatur esse verbum quod non plura significet ; genera admodum pauca ; aut enim vocibus accidit singulis aut coniunctis .	I turn to tile discussion of ambiguity, which will be found to have countless species: indeed, in the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which has not a diversity of meanings. There are, however, very few genera, since ambiguity must occur either in a single word or in a group of words.
2203	Singula adferunt errorem , cum pluribus rebus aut hominibus eadem appellatio est ( ὁμωνυμία dicitur ) , ut gallus , avem an gentem an nomen an fortunam corporis significet , incertum est ; et Aiax , Telamonius an Oilei filius . Verba quoque quaedam diversos intellectus habent , ut cerno .	Single words give rise to error, when the same noun applies to a number of things or persons (the Greeks call this homonymy): for example, it is uncertain with regard to the word gallus whether it means a cock or a Gaul or a proper name or an emasculated priest of tybele; while Ajax may refer either to the son of Telamon or the son of Oileus. Again, verbs likewise may have different meanings, as, for example, cerno.
2204	Quae ambiguitas plurimis modis accidit . Unde fere lites , praecipue ex testamentis , cum de libertate aut etiam de hereditate contendunt ii quibus idem nomen est , aut quid sit legatum quaeritur .	This ambiguity crops up in many ways, and gives rise to disputes, mole especially in connexion with wills, when two men of the same name claim their freedom or, it may be, an inheritance, or again, when the enquiry turns on the precise nature of the bequest.