Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1331	Quae cum receperit , etiam verecundiae defensioni facilior erit . Sic utraque res invicem iuvabit , eritque iudex circa ius nostrum spe modestiae attentior , circa modestiam iuris probatione proclivior .	he will be all the readier to listen to our defence of our client's character. Thus the two points will render mutual assistance to each other; the judge will be more attentive to our legal proofs owing to his hope that we shall proceed to a vindication of character and better disposed to accept that vindication because we have proved our point of law.
1332	Sed ut non semper necessaria aut utilis est partitio , ita opportune adhibita plurimum orationi lucis et gratiae confert . Neque enim solum id efficit , ut clariora fiant , quae dicuntur , rebus velut ex turba extractis et in conspectu iudicum positis ; sed reficit quoque audientem certo singularum partium fine , non aliter quam facientibus iter multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia .	But although partition is neither always necessary nor useful, it will, if judiciously employed, greatly add to the lucidity and grace of our speech. For it not only makes our arguments clearer by isolating the points from the crowd in which they would otherwise be lost and placing them before the eyes of the judge, but relieves his attention by assigning a definite limit to certain parts of our speech, just as our fatigue upon a journey is relieved by reading the distances on the milestones which we pass.
1333	Nam et exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati est , et hortatur ad reliqua fortius exsequenda scire quantum supersit . Nihil enim longum videri necesse est , in quo , quid ultimum sit , certum est .	For it is a pleasure to be able to measure how much of our task has been accomplished, and the knowledge of what remains to do stimulates us to fresh effort over the labour that still awaits us. For nothing need seem long, when it is definitely known how far it is to the end.
1334	Nec immerito multum ex diligentia partiendi tulit laudis Q . Hortensius , cuius tamen divisionem in digitos diductam nonnunquam Cicero leviter eludit . Nam est suus et in gestu modus , et vitanda , utique maxime , concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio .	Quintus Hortensius deserves the high praise which has been awarded him for the care which he took over his partitions, although Cicero more than once indulges in kindly mockery of his habit of counting his headings on his fingers. For there is a limit to gesture, and we must be specially careful to avoid excessive minuteness and any suggestion of articulated structure in our partition. If our divisions are too small,
1335	Nam et auctoritati plurimum detrahunt minuta illa nec iam membra sed frusta , et huius gloriae cupidi , quo subtilius et copiosius divisisse videantur , et supervacua adsumunt et quae natura singularia sunt secant , nec tam plura faciunt quam minora ; deinde cum fecerunt mille particulas , in eandem incidunt obscuritatem , contra quam partitio inventa est .	they cease to be limbs and become fragments, and consequently detract not a little from the authority of our speech. Moreover, those who are ambitious of this sort of reputation, in order that they may appear to enhance the nicety and tile exhaustive nature of their division, introduce what is superfluous and subdivide things which naturally form a single whole. The result of their labours is, however, not so much to increase the number of their divisions as to diminish their importance, and after all is done and they have split up their argument into a thousand tiny compartments, they fall into that very obscurity which the partition was designed to eliminate.
1336	Et divisa autem et simplex propositio , quotiens utiliter adhiberi potest , primum debet esse aperta atque lucida ( nam quid sit turpius , quam id esse obscurum ipsum , quod in eum solum adhibetur usum , ne sint cetera obscura ? ) , tum brevis nec ullo supervacuo onerata verbo . Non enim , quid dicamus , sed de quo dicturi simus ostendimus .	The proposition, whether single or multiple, must, on every occasion when it can be employed with profit, be clear and lucid; for what could be more discreditable than that a portion of the speech, whose sole purpose is to prevent obscurity elsewhere, should itself be obscure? Secondly it must be brief and must not be burdened with a single superfluous word; for we are not explaining what we are saying, but what we are going to say.
1337	Obtinendum etiam , ne quid in ea desit , ne quid supersit . Superest autem sic fere , cum aut in species partimur , quod in genera partiri sit satis , aut genere posito subiicitur species , ut dicam de virtute , iustitia , continentia , cum iustitia atque continentia virtutis sint species .	We must also ensure that it is free alike from omissions and from redundance. Redundance as a rule occurs through our dividing into species when it would be sufficient to divide into genera, or through the addition of species after stating the genus. The following will serve as an example: "I will speak of virtue, justice and abstinence." But justice and abstinence are species of tile genus virtue.
1338	Partitio prima est , quid sit de quo conveniat , quid de quo ambigatur . In eo , quod convenit , quid adversarius fateatur , quid nos ; in eo , de quo ambigitur , quae nostrae propositiones , quae partis adversae . Pessimum vero , non eodem ordine exsequi , quo quidque proposueris .	Our first partition will be between admitted and disputed facts. Admitted facts will then be divided into those acknowledged by our opponent and those acknowledged by ourselves. Disputed facts will be divided into those which we and those which our opponents allege. But the worst fault of all is to treat your points in an order different from that which was assigned them in your proposition.
1339	Liber V fuerunt et clari quidem auctores , quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere ; namque et adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant , primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio , deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia gratia similibusque non oporteret , et voluptatem audientium petere , cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur , non modo agenti supervacuum , sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur ;	Book V There have been certain writers of no small authority who have held that the sole duty of the orator was to instruct: in their view appeals to the emotions were to be excluded for two reasons, first on the ground that all disturbance of the mind was a fault, and secondly that it was wrong to distract the judge from the truth by exciting his pity, bringing influence to bear, and the like. Further, to seek to charm the audience, when the aim of the orator was merely to win success, was in their opinion not only superfluous for a pleader, but hardly worthy of a self-respecting man.
1340	plures vero , qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus rationem orandi summoverent , hoc tamen proprium atque praecipuum crederent opus , sua confirmare et quae ex adverso proponerentur refutare .	The majority however, while admitting that such arts undoubtedly formed part of oratory, held that its special and peculiar task is to make good the case which it maintains and refute that of its opponent.
1341	Utrumcunque est ( neque enim hoc loco meam interpono sententiam ) , hic erit liber illorum opinione maxime necessarius , quia toto haec sola tractantur ; quibus sane et ea , quae de iudicialibus causis iam dicta sunt , serviunt .	Whichever of these views is correct (for at this point I do not propose to express my own opinion), they will regard this book as serving a very necessary purpose, since it will deal entirely with the points on which they lay such stress, although all that I have already said on the subject of judicial causes is subservient to the same end.
1342	Nam neque prooemii neque narrationis est alius usus , quam ut iudicem huic praeparent ; et status nosse atque ea , de quibus supra scripsimus , intueri supervacuum foret , nisi ad hanc perveniremus .	For the purpose of the exordium and the slatement of facts is merely to prepare the judge for these points, while it would be a work of supererogation to know the bases of cases or to consider the other points dealt with above, unless we intend to proceed to the consideration of the proof Finally,
1343	Denique ex quinque quas iudicialis materiae fecimus partibus , quaecunque alia potest aliquando necessaria causae non esse ; lis nulla est , cui probatione opus non sit . Eius praecepta sic optime divisuri videmur , ut prius , quae in commune ad omnes quaestiones pertinent , ostendamus ; deinde , quae in quoque causae genere propria sint , exsequamur .	of the five parts into which we divided judicial cases, any single one other than the proof may on occasion be dispensed with. But there can be no suit in which the proof is not absolutely necessary. With regard to the rules to be observed in this connexion, we shall, I think, be wisest to follow our previous method of classification and show first what is common to all cases and then proceed to point out those which are peculiar to the several kinds of cases.
1344	Ac prima quidem illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit , alias esse probationes , quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator , alias , quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodam modo gigneret . Ideoque illas ἀτέχνους , id est inartificiales , has ἐντέχνους , id est artificiales , vocaverunt .	1. To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle has met with almost universal approval. It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I may use the term, begets out of his case. The former therefore have been styled ἄτεχνοι or inartificial proofs, the latter ἔντεχνοι or artificial.
1345	Ex illo priore genere sunt praeiudicia , rumores , tormenta , tabulae , iusiurandum , testes , in quibus pars maxima contentionum forensium consistit . Sed ut ipsa per se carent arte , ita summis eloquentiae viribus et adlevanda sunt plerumque et refellenda . Quare mihi videntur magnopere damnandi , qui totum hoc genus a praeceptis removerunt .	To the first class belong decisions of previous courts, rumours, evidence extracted by torture, documents, oaths, and witnesses, for it is with these that the majority of forensic arguments are concerned. But though in themselves they involve no art, all the powers of eloquence are as a rule required to disparage or refute them. Consequently in my opinion those who would eliminate the whole of this class of proof from their rules of oratory, deserve the strongest condemnation.
1346	Nec tamen in animo est omnia , quae aut pro his aut contra dici solent , complecti . Non enim communes locos tradere destinamus , quod esset operis infiniti , sed viam quandam atque rationem . Quibus demonstratis , non modo in exsequendo suas quisque vires debet adhibere , sed etiam inveniendo similia , ut quaeque condicio litium poscet . Neque enim de omnibus causis dicere quisquam potest saltem praeteritis , ut taceam de tuturis .	It is not, however, my intention to embrace all that can be said for or against these views. I do not for instance propose to lay down rules for commonplaces, a task requiring infinite detail, but merely to sketch out the general lines and method to be followed by the orator. The method once indicated, it is for the individual orator not merely to employ his powers on its application, but on the invention of similar methods as the circumstances of the case may demand. For it is impossible to deal with every kind of case, even if we confine ourselves to those which have actually occurred in the past without considering those which may occur in the future.
1347	Iam praeiudiciorum vis omnis tribus in generibus versatur : rebus , quae aliquando ex paribus causis sunt iudicatae , quae exempla rectius dicuntur , ut de rescissis patrum testamentis vel contra filios confirmatis ; iudiciis ad ipsam causam pertinentibus , unde etiam nomen ductum est , qualia in Oppianicum facta dicuntur et a senatu adversus Milonem ; aut cum de eadem causa pronuntiatum est , ut in reis deportatis et assertione secunda et partibus centumviralium , quae in duas hastas divisae sunt .	As regards decisions in previous courts, these fall under three heads. First, we have matters on which judgment has been given at some time or other in cases of a similar nature: these are, however, more correctly termed precedents, as for instance where a father's will has been annulled or confirmed in opposition to his sons. Secondly, there are judgments concerned with the case itself; it is from these that the name praeiudicium is derived: as examples I may cite those passed against Oppianicus or by the senate against Milo. Thirdly, there are judgments passed on the actual case, as for example in cases where the accused has been deported, or where renewed application is made for the recognition of an individual as a free man, or in portions of cases tried in the centumviral court which come before two different panels of judges.
1348	Confirmantur praecipue duobus : auctoritate eorum , qui pronuntiaverunt , et similitudine rerum , de quibus quaeritur ; refelluntur autem raro per contumeliam iudicum , nisi forte manifesta in iis culpa erit . Vult enim cognoscentium quisque firmam esse alterius sententiam , et ipse pronuntiaturus , nec libenter exemplum , quod in se fortasse recidat , facit .	Such previous decisions are as a rule confirmed in two ways: by the authority of those who gave the decision and by the likeness between the two cases. As for their reversal, this can rarely be obtained by denouncing the judges, unless they have been guilty of obvious error. For each of those who are trying the case wishes the decision given by another to stand, since he too has to give judgment and is reluctant to create a precedent that may recoil upon himself.
1349	Confugiendum ergo est in duobus superioribus , si res feret , ad aliquam dissimilitudinem causae ; vix autem ulla est per omnia alteri similis . Si id non continget aut eadem causa erit , actionum incusanda negligentia aut de infirmitate personarum querendum , contra quas erit iudicatum , aut de gratia , quae testes corruperit , aut de invidia aut de ignorantia , aut videndum , quid causae postea accesserit .	Consequently, as regards the first two classes, we must, if possible, take refuge in some dissimilarity between the two cases, and two cases are scarcely ever alike in all their details. If, however, such a course is impossible and the case is the same as that on which the previous decision was given, we must complain of the negligence shown in the conduct of the previous case or of the weakness of the parties condemned, or of undue influence employed to corrupt the witnesses, or again of popular prejudice or ignorance which reacted unfavourably against our client; or else we must consider what has occurred since to alter the aspect of the case.
1350	Quorum si nihil erit , licet tamen dicere multos iudiciorum casus ad inique pronuntiandum valere ideoque damnatum Rutilium , absolutos Clodium atque Catilinam . Rogandi etiam iudices , ut rem potius intueantur ipsam , quam iuri iurando alieno suum donent .	If none of these courses can be adopted, it will still be possible to point out that the peculiar circumstances of many trials have led to unjust decisions; hence condemnations such as that of Rutilius and acquittals such as those of Clodius and Catiline. We must also ask the judges to consider the facts of the case on their merits rather than make their verdict the inevitable consequence of a verdict given by others.
1351	Adversus consulta autem senatus et decreta principum vel magistratuum remedium nullum est , nisi aut inventa quantulacunque causae differentia aut aliqua vel eorundem vel eiusdem potestatis hominum posterior constitutio , quae sit priori contraria ; quae si deerunt , lis non erit .	When, however, we are confronted by decrees of the senate, or ordinances of emperors or magistrates, there is no remedy, unless we can make out that there is some difference, however small, between the cases, or that the same persons or persons holding the same powers have made some subsequent enactment reversing the former decision. Failing this, there will be no case for judgment.
1352	Famam atque rumores pars altera consensum civitatis et velut publicum testimonium vocat , altera sermonem sine ullo certo auctore dispersum , cui malignitas initium dederit , incrementum credulitas ; quod nulli non etiam innocentissimo possit accidere fraude inimicorum falsa vulgantium . Exempla utrinque non deerunt .	With regard to rumour and common report, one party will call them the verdict of public opinion and the testimony of the world at large; the other will describe them as vague talk based on no sure authority, to which malignity has given birth and credulity increase, an ill to which even the most innocent of men may be exposed by the deliberate dissemination of falsehood on the part of their enemies. It will be easy for both parties to produce precedents to support their arguments.
1353	Sicut in tormentis quoque , qui est locus frequentissimus , cum pars altera quaestionem vera fatendi necessitatem vocet , altera saepe etiam causam falsa dicendi , quod aliis patientia facile mendacium faciat , aliis infirmitas necessarium . Quid attinet de his plura ? Plenae sunt orationes veterum ac novorum .	A like situation arises in the case of evidence extracted by torture: one party will style torture an infallible method of discovering the truth, while the other will allege that it also often results in false confessions, since with some their capacity of endurance makes lying an easy thing, while with others weakness makes it a necessity. It is hardly worth my while to say more on the subject, as the speeches both of ancient and modern orators are full of this topic.
1354	Quaedam tamen in hac parte erunt propria cuiusque litis . Nam sive de habenda quaestione agetur , plurimum intererit , quis et quem postulet aut offerat et in quem et ex qua causa ; sive iam erit habitat , quis ei praefuerit , quis et quomodo sit tortus , incredibilia dixerit an inter se constantia , perseveraverit in eo quod coeperat . an aliquid dolore mutarit , prima parte quaestionis an procedente cruciatu . Quae utrinque tam infinita sunt quam ipsa rerum varietas .	Individual cases may however involve special considerations in this connexion. For if the point at issue is whether torture should be applied, it will make all the difference who it is who demands or offers it, who it is that is to be subjected to torture, against whom the evidence thus sought will tell, and what is the motive for the demand. If on the other hand torture has already been applied, it will make all the difference who was in charge of the proceedings, who was the victim and what the nature of the torture, whether the confession was credible or consistent, whether the witness stuck to his first statement or changed it under the influence of pain, and whether he made it at the beginning of the torture or only after it had continued some time. The variety of such questions is as infinite as the variety of actual cases.
1355	Contra tabulas quoque saepe dicendum est , cum eas non solum refelli sed etiam accusari sciamus esse usitatum . Cum sit autem in his aut scelus signatorum aut ignorantia , tutius ac facilius id , quod secundo loco diximus , tractatur , quod pauciores rei fiunt .	It is also frequently necessary to speak against documents, for it is common knowledge that they are often not merely rebutted, but even attacked as forgeries. But as this implies either fraud or ignorance on the part of the signatories, it is safer and easier to make the charge one of ignorance, because by so doing we reduce the number of the persons accused.
1356	Sed hoc ipsum argumenta ex causa trahit , si forte aut incredibile est id actum esse , quod tabulae continent , aut , ut frequentius evenit , aliis probationibus aeque inartificialibus solvitur ; si aut is in quem signatum est , aut aliquis signator dicitur afuisse vel prius esse defunctus ; si tempora non congruunt ; si vel antecedentia vel insequentia tabulis repugnant . Inspectio etiam ipsa saepe falsum deprehendit .	But our proceedings as a whole will draw their arguments from the circumstances of the case at issue. For example, it may be incredible that an incident occurred as stated in the documents, or, as more often happens, the evidence of the documents may be overthrown by other proofs which are likewise of an inartificial nature; if, for example, it is alleged that the person, whose interests are prejudiced by the document, or one of the signatories was absent when the document was signed, or deceased before its signature, or if the dates disagree, or events preceding or following the writing of the document are inconsistent with it. Even a simple inspection of a document is often sufficient for the detection of forgery.
1357	Iusiurandum litigatores aut offerunt suum aut non recipiunt oblatum , aut ab adversario exigunt aut recusant , cum ab ipsis exigatur . Offerre suum sine illa condicione , ut vel adversarius iuret , fere improbum est .	With regard to oaths, parties either offer to take an oath themselves, or refuse to accept the oath of their opponent, demand that their opponent should take an oath or refuse to comply with a similar demand when proffered to themselves. To offer to take an oath unconditionally without demanding that one's opponent should likewise take an oath is as a rule a sign of bad faith.
1358	Qui tamen id faciet , aut vita se tuebitur , ut eum non sit credibile peieraturum ; aut ipsa vi religionis , in qua plus fidei consequetur , si id egerit , ut non cupide ad hoc descendere sed ne hoc quidem recusare videatur ; aut , si causa patietur , modo litis , propter quam devoturus se ipse non fuerit ; aut praeter alia causae instrumenta adiicit ex abundanti hanc quoque conscientiae suae fiduciam .	If, however, anyone should take this course, he will defend his action by appealing to the blamelessness of his life as rendering perjury on his part incredible, or by the solemn nature of the oath, with regard to which he will win all the greater credence, if without the least show of eagerness to take the oath he makes it clear that he does not shrink from so solemn a duty. Or again, if the case is such as to make this possible, he will rely on the trivial nature of the point in dispute to win belief, on the ground that he would not incur the risk of the divine displeasure when so little is at stake. Or, finally, he may in addition to the other means which he employs to win his case offer to take an oath as a culminating proof of a clear conscience.
1359	Qui non recipiet , et iniquam condicionem et a multis contemni iurisiurandi metum dicet , cum etiam philosophi quidam sint reperti , qui deos agere rerum humanarum curam negarent ; eum vero , qui nullo deferente iurare sit paratus , et ipsum velle de causa sua pronuntiare et , quam id quod offert leve ac facile credat , ostendere .	The man who refuses to accept his opponent's offer to take an oath, will allege that the inequality of their respective conditions are not the same for both parties and will point out that many persons are not in the least afraid of committing perjury, even philosophers having been found to deny that the gods intervene in human affairs; and further that he who is ready to take an oath without being asked to do so, is really proposing to pass sentence on his own case and to show what an easy and trivial thing he thinks the oath which he offers to take.
1360	At is , qui defert , agere modeste videtur , cum litis adversarium iudicem faciat , et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat , qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari quam suo mavult .	On the other hand the man who proposes to put his opponent on oath appears to act with moderation, since he is making his adversary a judge in his own case, while he frees the actual judge from the burden of coming to a decision, since the latter would assuredly prefer to rest on another man's oath than on his own.
1361	Quo difficilior recusatio est , nisi forte res est ea , quam credibile sit notam ipsi non esse . Quae excusatio si deerit , hoc unum relinquetur , ut invidiam sibi quaeri ab adversario dicat atque id agi , ut in causa , in qua vincere non possit , queri possit ; itaque hominem quidem malum occupaturum hanc condicionem fuisse , se autem probare malle quae adfirmet , quam dubium cuiquam relinquere , an peierarit .	This fact makes the refusal to take an oath all the more difficult, unless indeed the affair in question be of such a nature that it cannot be supposed that the facts are known to the person asked to take the oath. Failing this excuse, there is only one course open to him: he must say that his opponent is trying to excite a prejudice against him and is endeavouring to give the impression that he has real ground for complaint though he is not in a position to win his case; consequently, though a dishonest man would eagerly have availed himself of the proposal, he prefers to prove the truth of his statements rather than leave a doubt in anyone's mind as to whether he has committed perjury or no.
1362	Sed nobis adolescentibus seniores in agendo facti praecipere solebant , ne temere unquam iusiurandum deferremus , sicut neque optio iudicis adversario esset permittenda nec ex advocatis partis adversae iudex eligendus ; nam , si dicere contraria turpe advocato videretur , certe turpius habendum , facere quod noceat .	But in my young days advocates grown old in pleading used to lay it down as a rule that we should never be in a hurry to propose that our opponent should take an oath, just as we should never allow him the choice of a judge nor select our judge from among the supporters of the opposite side: for if it is regarded as a disgrace to such a supporter to say anything against his client, it is surely a still worse disgrace that he should do anything that will harm his client's case.
1363	Maximus tamen patronis circa testimonia sudor est . Ea dicuntur aut per tabulas aut a praesentibus . Simplicior contra tabulas pugna . Nam et minus obstitisse videtur pudor inter paucos signatores , et pro diffidentia premitur absentia . Si reprehensionem non capit ipsa persona , infamare signatores licet .	It is, however, the evidence that gives the greatest trouble to advocates. Evidence may be given either in writing or orally by witnesses present in court. Documentary evidence is easier to dispose of. For it is likely that the deponent was less ashamed of himself in the presence of a small number of witnesses, and his absence from court is attacked as indicating a lack of confidence. If we cannot call the character of the deponent in question, we may attack the witnesses to his signature.
1364	Tacita praeterea quaedam cogitatio refragatur his omnibus , quod nemo per tabulas dat testimonium nisi sua voluntate ; quo ipso non esse amicum ei se , contra quem dicit , fatetur . Neque tamen protinus cesserit orator , quo minus et amicus pro amico et inimicus contra inimicum possit verum , si integra sit ei fides , dicere . Sed late locus uterque tractatur .	Further there is always a certain tacit prejudice against documentary evidence, since no one can be forced to give such evidence save of his own free will, whereby he shows that he harbours unfriendly feelings towards the person against whom he bears witness. On the other hand an advocate should be chary of denying that a friend may give true evidence against a friend or an enemy against an enemy, provided they are persons of unimpeachable credit. But the subject admits of copious discussion, from whichever side it be regarded.
1365	Cum praesentibus vero ingens dimicatio est , ideoque velut duplici contra eos proque iis acie confligitur actionum et interrogationum . In actionibus primum generaliter pro testibus atque in testes dici solet . Et hic communis locus ,	The task of dealing with the evidence of witnesses present in court is, however, one of great difficulty, and consequently whether defending or impugning them the orator employs a twofold armoury in the shape of a set speech and examination. In set speeches it is usual to begin with observations either on behalf of or against witnesses in general.
1366	cum pars altera nullam firmiorem probationem esse contendit , quam quae sit hominum scientia nixa ; altera ad detrahendam illis fidem omnia , per quae fieri soleant falsa testimonia , enumerat .	In so doing we introduce a commonplace, since one side will contend that there can be no stronger proof than that which rests on human knowledge, while the other, in order to detract from their credibility, will enumerate all the methods by which false evidence is usually given.
1367	Sequens ratio est cum specialiter quidem , sed tamen multos pariter invadere patroni solent . Nam et gentium simul universarum elevata testimonia ab oratoribus scimus et tota genera testimoniorum : ut de auditionibus ; non enim ipsos esse testes sed iniuratorum adferre voces ; ut in causis repetundarum , qui se reo numerasse pecunias iurant , litigatorum non testium habendos loco .	The next procedure is the common practice of making a special attack, which all the same involves impugning the validity of evidence given by large numbers of persons. We know, for instance, that the evidence of entire nations and whole classes of evidence have been disposed of by advocates. For example, in the case of hearsay evidence, it will be urged that those who produce such evidence are not really witnesses, but are merely reporting the words of unsworn persons, while in cases of extortion, those who swear that they paid certain sums to the accused are to be regarded not as witnesses, but as parties to the suit.
1368	Interim adversus singulos dirigitur actio ; quod insectationis genus et permixtum defensioni legimus in orationibus plurimis et separatim editum , sicut in Vatinium testem .	Sometimes however the advocate will direct his speech against single individuals. Such a form of attack may be found in many speeches, sometimes embedded in the speech for the defence and sometimes published separately like the speech against the evidence of Vatinius.