Institutio Oratoria |
Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
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| 685 |
Et praestabit hunc semper orator , semper enim bene dicet . Firmum autem hoc , quod opponitur , adversus eos fortasse sit , qui persuadere finem putaverunt . Noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in eventu . Tendit quidem ad victoriam qui dicit ; sed cum bene dixit , etiamsi non vincat , id quod arte continetur effecit .
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And, what is more, the orator will always make good his professions in this respect, for he will always speak well. On the other hand this criticism may perhaps hold good as against those who think persuasion the end of oratory. But our orator and his art, as we define it, are independent of results. The speaker aims at victory, it is true, but if he speaks well, he has lived up to the ideals of his art, even if he is defeated. |
| 686 |
Nam et gubernator vult salva nave in portum pervenire ; si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus , non ideo minus erit gubernator dicetque notum illud , Dum clavum rectum teneam .
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Similarly a pilot will desire to bring his ship safe to harbour; but if he is swept out of his course by a storm, he will not for that reason cease to be a pilot, but will say in the wellknown words of the old poet "Still let me steer straight on!" |
| 687 |
Et medicus sanitatem aegri petit ; si tamen aut valetudinis vi aut intemperantia aegri aliove quo casu summa non contingit , dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit , medicinae fine non excidet . Ita oratori bene dixisse finis est . Nam est ars ea , ut post paulum clarius ostendemus , in actu posita non in effectu .
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So too the doctor seeks to heal the sick; but if the violence of the disease or the refusal of the patient to obey his regimen or any other circumstance prevent his achieving his purpose, he will not have fallen short of the ideals of his art, provided he has done everything according to reason. So too the orator's purpose is fulfilled if he has spoken well. For the art of rhetoric, as I shall show later, is realised in action, not in the result obtained. |
| 688 |
Ita falsum erit illud quoque , quod dicitur , artes scire quando sint finem consecutae , rhetoricen nescire . Nam se quisque bene dicere intelligit . Uti etiam vitiis rhetoricen , quod ars nulla faciat , criminantur , quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat .
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From this it follows that there is no truth in yet another argument which contends that arts know when they have attained their end, whereas rhetoric does not. For every speaker is aware when he is speaking well. These critics also charge rhetoric with doing what no art does, namely making use of vices to serve its ends, since it speaks the thing that is not and excites the passions. |
| 689 |
Quorum neutrum est turpe , cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur , ideoque nec vitium . Nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est , et adfectus , si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit , necessario movebit orator .
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But there is no disgrace in doing either of these things, as long as the motive be good: consequently there is nothing vicious in such action. Even a philosopher is at times permitted to tell a lie, while the orator must needs excite the passions, if that be the only way by which he can lead the judge to do justice. |
| 690 |
Imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint , ne errent . Nam , si mihi sapientes iudices dentur , sapientium contiones atque omne consilium , nihil invidia valeat , nihil gratia , nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes : perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus et prope in sola delectatione ponatur .
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For judges are not always enlightened and often have to be tricked to prevent them falling into error. Give me philosophers as judges, pack senates and assemblies with philosophers, and you will destroy the power of hatred, influence, prejudice and false witness; consequently there will be very little scope for eloquence whose value will lie almost entirely in its power to charm. |
| 691 |
Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas , arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt . Neque enim , qui recta via depulsus est , reduci ad eam nisi alio flexu potest .
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But if, as is the case, our hearers are fickle of mind, and truth is exposed to a host of perils, we must call in art to aid us in the fight and employ such means as will help our case. He who has been driven from the right road cannot be brought back to it save by a fresh detour. |
| 692 |
Plurima vero ex eo contra rhetoricen cavillatio est , quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur . Inde haec : nullam esse artem contrariam sibi , rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi ; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit , accidere hoc rhetorices operi ; item aut dicenda eam docere aut non dicenda ; ita vel per hoc non esse artem , quod non dicenda praecipiat , vel per hoc , quod , cum dicenda praeceperit , etiam contraria his doceat .
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The point, however, that gives rise to the greatest number of these captious accusations against rhetoric, is found in the allegation that orators speak indifferently on either side of a case. From which they draw the following arguments: no art is self-contradictory, but rhetoric does contradict itself; no art tries to demolish what itself has built, but this does happen in the operations of rhetoric; or again:— rhetoric teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said; consequently it is not an art because it teaches what ought not to be said, or because, while it teaches what ought to be said, it also teaches precisely the opposite. |
| 693 |
Quae omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici , quae sit a bono viro atque ab ipsa virtute seiuncta ; alioqui ubi iniusta causa est , ibi rhetorice non est , adeo ut vix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere , ut ex utraque parte orator , id est vir bonus , dicat .
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Now it is obvious that all such charges are brought against that type of rhetoric with which neither good men nor virtue herself will have anything to do; since if a case be based on injustice, rhetoric has no place therein and consequently it can scarcely happen even under the most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that is to say, a good man, will speak indifferently on either side. |
| 694 |
Tamen quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit , ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diversum trahant , ( quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se , si ratio ita duxerit , credunt ) respondebo propositis , atque ita quidem , ut appareat , haec adversus eos quoque frustra excogitata , qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent .
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Still it is in the nature of things conceivable that just causes may lead two wise men to take different sides, since it is held that wise men may fight among themselves, provided that they do so at the bidding of reason. I will therefore reply to their criticisms in such a way that it will be clear that these arguments have no force even against those who concede the name of orator to persons of bad character. For rhetoric is not self-contradictory. |
| 695 |
Nam rhetorice non est contraria sibi . Causa enim cum causa , non illa secum ipsa componitur . Nec , si pugnent inter se , qui idem didicerunt , idcirco ars , quae utrique tradita est , non erit ; alioqui nec armorum , quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem magistro eruditi inter se componuntur ;
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The conflict is between case and case, not between rhetoric and itself. And even if persons who have learned the same thing fight one another, that does not prove that what they have learned is not an art. Were that so, there could be no art of arms, since gladiators trained under the same master are often matched against each other; |
| 696 |
nec gubernandi , quia navalibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori adversus ; nec imperatoria , quia imperator cum imperatore contendit . Item non evertit opus rhetorice , quod efficit . Neque enim positum a se argumentum solvit orator sed ne rhetorice quidem , quia apud eos , qui in persuadendo finem putant , aut si quis ( ut dixi ) casus duos inter se bonos viros composuerit , verisimilia quaerentur ; non autem , si quid est altero credibilius , id ei contrarium est , quod fuit credibile .
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nor would the pilot's art exist, because in sea-fights pilots may be found on different sides; nor yet could there be an art of generalship, since general is pitted against general. In the same way rhetoric does not undo its own work. For the orator does not refute his own arguments, nor does rhetoric even do so, because those who regard persuasion as its end, or the two good men whom chance has matched against one another seek merely for probabilities: and the fact that one thing is more credible than another, does not involve contradiction between the two. |
| 697 |
Nam ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est adversum , ita nec probabili probabilius . Neque praecipit unquam non dicenda nec dicendis contraria , sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt .
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There is no absolute antagonism between the probable and the more probable, just as there is none between that which is white and that which is whiter, or between that which is sweet and that which is sweeter. Nor does rhetoric ever teach that which ought not to be said, or that which is contrary to what ought to be said, but solely what ought to be said in each individual case. |
| 698 |
Non semper autem ei , etiamsi frequentissime , tuenda veritas erit ; sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas , ut etiam falsa defendat . Ponuntur hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones : artem earum rerum esse , quae sciantur ; oratoris omnem actionem opinione , non scientia contineri , quia et apud eos dicat , qui nesciant , et ipse dicat aliquando , quod nesciat .
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But though the orator will as a rule maintain what is true, this will not always be the case: there are occasions when the public interest demands that he should defend what is untrue. The following objections are also put forward in the second book of Cicero's de Oratore: — " Art deals with things that are known. But the pleading of an orator is based entirely on opinion, not on knowledge, because he speaks to an audience who do not know, and sometimes himself states things of which he has no actual knowledge. " |
| 699 |
Ex his alterum , id est , an sciat index , de quo dicatur , nihil ad oratoris artem ; alteri respondendum , Ars earum rerum est , quae sciuntur . Rhetorice ars est bene dicendi , bene autem dicere scit orator .
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Now one of these points, namely whether the judges have knowledge of what is being said to them, has nothing to do with the art of oratory. The other statement, that art is concerned with things that are known, does however require an answer. Rhetoric is the art of speaking well and the orator knows how to speak well. |
| 700 |
Sed nescit , an verum sit quod dicit . Ne hi quidem , qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse , ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint , tradunt , nec qui intervalla siderum et mensuras solis ac terrae colligunt ; disciplinam tamen suam artem vocant . Quodsi ratio efficit , ut haec non opinari sed propter vim probationum scire videantur , eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest .
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"But," it is urged, "he does not know whether what he says is true." Neither do they, who assert that all things derive their origin from fire or water or the four elements or indivisible atoms; nor they who calculate the distances of the stars or the size of the earth and sun. And yet all these call the subject which they teach an art. But if reason makes them seem not merely to hold opinions but, thanks to the cogency of the proofs adduced, to have actual knowledge, reason will do the same service to the orator. |
| 701 |
Sed an causa vera sit , nescit . Ne medicus quidem , an dolorem capitis habeat , qui hoc se pati dicet ; curabit tamen , tamquam id verum sit , et erit ars medicina . Quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper vera dicendi , sed semper verisimilia ? scit autem esse verisimilia quae dicit .
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"But," they say, "he does not know whether the cause which he has undertaken is true." But not even a doctor can tell whether a patient who claims to be suffering from a headache, really is so suffering: but he will treat him on the assumption that his statement is true, and medicine will still be an art. Again what of the fact that rhetoric does not always aim at telling the truth, but always at stating what is probable? The answer is that the orator knows that what he states is no more than probable. |
| 702 |
Adiiciunt his , qui contra sentiunt , quod saepe , quae in allis litibus impugnarunt actores causarum , eadem in aliis defendant . Quod non artis sed hominis est vitium . Haec sunt praecipua , quae contra rhetoricen dicantur ; alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus derivata . Confirmatur autem esse artem eam breviter .
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My opponents further object that advocates often defend in one case what they have attacked in another. This is not the fault of the art, but of the man. Such are the main points that are urged against rhetoric; there are others as well, but they are of minor importance and drawn from the same sources. That rhetoric is an art may, however, |
| 703 |
Nam sive , ut Cleanthes voluit , ars est potestas via , id est ordine , efficiens , esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit ; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur , artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad fine utilem vitae , iam ostendemus nihil non horum in rhetorice inesse .
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be proved in a very few words. For if Cleanthes definition be accepted that "Art is a power reaching its ends by a definite path, that is, by ordered methods," no one can doubt that there is such method and order in good speaking: while if, on the other hand, we accept the definition which meets with almost universal approval that art consists in perceptions agreeing and cooperating to the achievement of some useful end, we shall be able to show that rhetoric lacks none of these characteristics. |
| 704 |
Quid quod et inspectione et exercitatione ut artes ceterae constat ? Nec potest ars non esse , si est ars dialectice , quod fere constat , cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat . Sed nec illa omittenda sunt , qua in re alius se inartificialiter alius artificialiter gerat , in ea esse artem , et in eo quod , qui didicerit , melius faciat quam qui non didicerit , esse artem .
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Again it is scarcely necessary for me to point out that like other arts it is based on examination and practice. And if logic is an art, as is generally agreed, rhetoric must also be an art, since it differs from logic in species rather than in genus. Nor must I omit to point out that where it is possible in any given subject for one man to act without art and another with art, there must necessarily be an art in connexion with that subject, as there must also be in any subject in which the man who has received instruction is the superior of him who has not. |
| 705 |
Atqui non solum doctus indoctum , sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit , neque essent aliter eius tam multa praecepta tamque magni , qui docerent ; idque cum omnibus confitendum est , tum nobis praecipue , qui rationem dicendi a bono viro non separamus .
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But as regards the practice of rhetoric, it is not merely the case that the trained speaker will get the better of the untrained. For even the trained man will prove inferior to one who has received a better training. If this were not so, there would not be so many rhetorical rules, nor would so many great men have come forward to teach them. The truth of this must be acknowledged by everyone, but more especially by us, since we concede the possession of oratory to none save the good man. |
| 706 |
Cum sint autem artium aliae positae in inspectione , id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum , qualis est astrologia , nullum exigens actum sed ipso rei , cuius studium habet , intellectu contenta , quae θεωρητικὴ vocatur ; aliae in agendo , quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit , quae πρακτική dicitur , qualis saltatio est ;
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Some arts, however, are based on examination, that is to say on the knowledge and proper appreciation of things, as for instance astronomy, which demands no action, but is content to understand the subject of its study: such arts are called theoretical. Others again are concerned with action: this is their end, which is realised in action, so that, the action once performed, nothing more remains to do: these arts we style practical, and dancing will provide us with an example. |
| 707 |
aliae in effectu , quae operis , quod oculis subiicitur , consummatione finem accipiunt , quam ποητικήν appellamus , qualis est pictura : fere iudicandum est , rhetoricen in actu consistere ; hoc enim , quod est officii sui , perficit .
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Thirdly there are others which consist in producing a certain result and achieve their purpose in the completion of a visible task: such we style productive, and painting may be quoted as an illustration. In view of these facts we must come to the conclusion that, in the main, rhetoric is concerned with action; for in action it accomplishes that which it is its duty to do. |
| 708 |
Atque ita ab omnibus dictum est . Mihi autem videtur etiam ex illis ceteris artibus multum assumere . Nam et potest aliquando ipsa res per se inspectione esse contenta . Erit enim rhetorice in oratore etiam tacente , et si desierit agere vel proposito vel aliquo casu impeditus , non magis desinet esse orator quam medicus , qui curandi fecerit finem .
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This view is universally accepted, although in my opinion rhetoric draws largely on the two other kinds of art. For it may on occasion be content with the mere examination of a thing. Rhetoric is still in the orator's possession even though he be silent, while if he gives up pleading either designedly or owing to circumstances over which he has no control, he does not therefore cease to be an orator, any more than a doctor ceases to be a doctor when he withdraws from practice. |
| 709 |
Nam est aliquis , ac nescio an maximus , etiam ex secretis studiis fructus ac tum pura voluptas litterarum , cum ab actu , id est opera , recesserunt et contemplatione sui fruuntur .
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Perhaps the highest of all pleasures is that which we derive from private study, and the only circumstances under which the delights of literature are unalloyed are when it withdraws from action, that is to say from toil, and can enjoy the pleasure of self-contemplation. |
| 710 |
Sed effectivae quoque aliquid simile scriptis orationibus vel historiis , quod ipsum opus in parte oratoria merito ponimus , consequetur . Si tamen una ex tribus artibus habenda sit , quia maxime eius usus actu continetur atque est in eo frequentissima , dicatur activa vel administrativa , nam et hoc eiusdem rei nomen est .
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But in the results that the orator obtains by writing speeches or historical narratives, which we may reasonably count as part of the task of oratory, we shall recognise features resembling those of a productive art. Still, if rhetoric is to be regarded as one of these three classes of art, since it is with action that its practice is chiefly and most frequently concerned, let us call it an active or administrative art, the two terms being identical. |
| 711 |
Scio , quaeri etiam , naturane plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina . Quod ad propositum quidem operis nostri nihil pertinet ( neque enim consummatus orator nisi ex utroque fieri potest ) , plurimum tamen referre arbitror , quam esse in hoc loco quaestionem velimus .
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I quite realise that there is a further question as to whether eloquence derives most from nature or from education. This question really lies outside the scope of our inquiry, since the ideal orator must necessarily be the result of a blend of both. But I do regard it as of great importance that we should decide how far there is any real question on this point. |
| 712 |
Nam si parti utrilibet omnino alteram detrahas , natura etiam sine doctrina multum valebit , doctrina nulla esse sine natura poterit . Sin ex pari coeant , in mediocribus quidem utrisque maius adhuc credam naturae esse momentum , consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo ; sicut terrae nullam fertilitatem habenti nihil optimus agricola profuerit , e terra uberi utile aliquid etiam nullo colente nascetur , at in solo fecundo plus cultor quam ipsa per se bonitas soli efficiet .
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For if we make an absolute divorce between the two, nature will still be able to accomplish much without the aid of education, while the latter is valueless without the aid of nature. If, on the other hand, they are blended in equal proportions, I think we shall find that the average orator owes most to nature, while the perfect orator owes more to education. We may take a parallel from agriculture. A thoroughly barren soil will not be improved even by the best cultivation, while good land will yield some useful produce without any cultivation; but in the case of really rich land cultivation will do more for it than its own natural fertility. |
| 713 |
Et , si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exsculpere , Parium marmor mallem rude ; at si illud idem artifex expolisset , plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore . Denique natura materia doctrinae est ; haec fingit , illa fingitur . Nihil ars sine materia , materiae etiam sine arte pretium est , ars summa materia optima melior .
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Had Praxiteles attempted to carve a statue out of a millstone, I should have preferred a rough block of Parian marble to any such statue. On the other hand, if the same artist had produced a finished statue from such a block of Parian marble, its artistic value would owe more to his skill than to the material. To conclude, nature is the raw material for education: the one forms, the other is formed. Without material art can do nothing, material without art does possess a certain value, while the perfection of art is better than the best material. |
| 714 |
Illa quaestio est maior , ex mediis artibus , quae neque laudari per se nec vituperari possunt , sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt , habenda sit rhetorice , an sit , ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet , virtus .
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More important is the question whether rhetoric is to be regarded as one of the indifferent arts, which in themselves deserve neither praise nor blame, but are useful or the reverse according to the character of the artist; or whether it should, as not a few even among philosophers hold, be considered as a virtue. |
| 715 |
Equidem illud , quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent , aut nullam artem , quae ἀτεχνία nominatur , puto , ( multos enim video sine ratione , sine litteris , qua vel impudentia vel fames duxit , ruentes ) aut malam quasi artem , quam κακοτεχνίαν dicimus . Nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo , qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem converterint .
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For my own part I regard the practice of rhetoric which so many have adopted in the past and still follow to-day, as either no art at all, or, as the Greeks call it, ἀτεχνία (for I see numbers of speakers without the least pretension to method or literary training rushing headlong in the direction in which hunger or their natural shamelessness calls them); or else it is a bad art such as is styled κακοτεχνία. For there have, I think, been many persons and there are still some who have devoted their powers of speaking to the destruction of their fellow-men. |
| 716 |
ματαιοτεχνία quoque est quaedam , id est supervacua artis imitatio , quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat , sed vanum laborem , qualis illius fuit , qui grana ciceris ex spatio distanti missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat , quem cum spectasset Alexander , donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio , quod quidem praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum .
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There is also an unprofitable imitation of art, a kind of ματαιοτεχνία which is neither good nor bad, but merely involves a useless expenditure of labour, reminding one of the man who shot a continuous stream of vetch-seeds from a distance through the eye of a needle, without ever missing his aim, and was rewarded by Alexander, who was a witness of the display, with the present of a bushel of vetch-seeds, a most appropriate reward. |
| 717 |
His ego comparandos existimo , qui in declamationibus , quas esse veritati dissimillimas volunt , aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt . Verum haec , quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus , quae bono viro convenit quaeque est vere rhetorice , virtus erit .
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It is to such men that I would compare those who spend their whole time at the expense of much study and energy in composing declamations, which they aim at making as unreal as possible. The rhetoric on the other hand, which I am endeavouring to establish and the ideal of which I have in my mind's eye, that rhetoric which befits a good man and is in a word the only true rhetoric, will be a virtue. |
| 718 |
Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt , mihi vero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione videtur esse perspicuum . Ab illis haec dicuntur . Si consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis virtus est , quae pars eius prudentia vocatur , eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit .
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Philosophers arrive at this conclusion by a long chain of ingenious arguments; but it appears to me to be perfectly clear from the simpler proof of my own invention which I will now proceed to set forth. The philosophers state the case as follows. If self-consistency as to what should and should not be done is an element of virtue (and it is to this quality that we give the name of prudence), the same quality will be revealed as regards what should be said and what should not be said, |
| 719 |
Et si virtutes sunt , ad quas nobis etiam ante quam doceremur initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura , ut ad iustitiam , cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago , nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos , ut possemus orare pro nobis , etiamsi non perfecte , tamen ut inessent quaedam ( ut dixi ) semina eius facultatis , manifestum est .
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and if there are virtues, of which nature has given us some rudimentary sparks, even before we were taught anything about them, as for instance justice, of which there are some traces even among peasants and barbarians, it is clear that man has been so formed from the beginning as to be able to plead on his own behalf, not, it is true, with perfection, but yet sufficiently to show that there are certain sparks of eloquence implanted in us by nature. |
| 720 |
Non eadem autem natura est iis artibus , quae a virtute sunt remotae . Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis , altera perpetua , quae rhetorice dicitur , altera concisa , quae dialectice ( quas quidem Zeno adeo coniunxit , ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus , illam explicatae diceret similem ) , etiam disputatrix virtus erit . Adeo de hac , quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est , nihil dubitabitur . Sed plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus volo .
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The same nature, however, is not to be found in those arts which have no connexion with virtue. Consequently, since there are two kinds of speech, the continuous which is called rhetoric, and the concise which is called dialectic (the relation between which was regarded by Zeno as being so intimate that he compared the latter to the closed fist, the former to the open hand), even the art of disputation will be a virtue. Consequently there can be no doubt about oratory whose nature is so much fairer and franker. |
| 721 |
Nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum et turpium peritus ? aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta ? aut in iudiciis , si iustitiae sit ignarus ? Quid ? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem , cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas , saepe cum periculosa potentium offensa , nonnunquam , ut iudicio Miloniano , inter circumfusa militum arma dicendum sit ; ut , si virtus non est , ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio .
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I should like, however, to consider the point more fully and explicitly by appealing to the actual work of oratory. For how will the orator succeed in panegyric unless he can distinguish between what is honourable and the reverse? How can he urge a policy, unless he has a clear perception of what is expedient? How can he plead in the law-courts, if he is ignorant of the nature of justice? Again, does not oratory call for courage, since it is often directed against the threats of popular turbulence and frequently runs into peril through incurring the hatred of the great, while sometimes, as for instance in the trial of Milo, the orator may have to speak in the midst of a crowd of armed soldiers? Consequently, if oratory be not a virtue, perfection is beyond its grasp. |
| 722 |
Quodsi ea in quoque animalium est virtus , qua praestat cetera vel pleraque , ut in leone impetus , in equo velocitas , hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est : cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione virtutem eius esse credamus , recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus : Est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus , et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis , tum aliis etiam locis virtutem eam appellet ?
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If, on the other hand, each living thing has its own peculiar virtue, in which it excels the rest or, at any rate, the majority (I may instance the courage of the lion and the swiftness of the horse), it may be regarded as certain that the qualities in which man excels the rest are, above all, reason and powers of speech. Why, therefore, should we not consider that the special virtue of man lies just as much in eloquence as in reason? It will be with justice then that Cicero makes Crassus say that "eloquence is one of the highest virtues," and that Cicero himself calls it a virtue in his letters to Brutus and in other passages. |