Institutio Oratoria (Quintilian)

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	Institutio Oratoria Author: Quintilian	Translator: Harold Edgeworth Butler
1635	superba , ut in Oppium ex epistola Cottae reum factum . Perinde praecipites , insidiosae , impotentes deprehenduntur . Ex quibus tamen fortissime invaseris , quod est aut omnibus periculosum , ut dicit Cicero pro Tullio : Quis hoc statuit unquam , aut cui concedi sine summo omnium periculo potest , ut eum iure potuerit occidere , a quo metuisse se dicat , ne ipse posterius occideretur ? aut ipsis iudicibus , ut pro Oppio monet pluribus , ne illud actionis genus in equestrem ordinem admittant .	Similarly, it may be shown that charges are hasty, insidious or vindictive. The strongest argument, however, which can be brought against a charge is that it involves peril to the community or to the judges themselves; we find an example of the former in the pro Tullio, where Cicero says " Who ever laid down such a principle as this, or who could be allowed, without grave peril to the community, to kill a man, just because he asserts that he feared that he himself might be killed by him? " An instance of the latter occurs in the pro Oppio, where Cicero warns the judges at some length not to permit such an action to be brought against the equestrian order.
1636	Nonnunquam tamen quaedam bene et contemnuntur vel tanquam levia vel tanquam nihil ad causam pertinentia . Multis hoc locis fecit Cicero ; et haec simulatio interim huc usque procedit , ut , quae dicendo refutare non possumus , quasi fastidiendo calcemus .	On the other hand there are certain arguments which at times may best be treated with contempt, as being trivial or irrelevant. This course is frequently pursued by Cicero, indeed this affectation of indifference is sometimes carried so far that we trample disdainfully under foot arguments which we should never succeed in refuting by counter-argument.
1637	Quoniam vero maxima pars eorum similibus constat , rimandum erit diligentissime , quid sit in quoque , quod adsumitur , dissimile . In iure facile deprehenditur . Est enim scriptum de rebus utique diversis , tantoque magis ipsarum rerum differentia potest esse manifesta . Illas vero similitudines , quae ducuntur ex mutis animalibus aut inanimis , facile est eludere .	Since, however, the majority of such arguments are based on similarity, we must make diligent search to discover if any discrepancy is to be found in what is put forward. It is easy to do this where points of law are concerned. For the law was drafted to cover cases quite other than the present, and consequently it is all the easier to show the difference between case and case. As to parallels drawn from dumb animals or inanimate objects, they are easy to make light of.
1638	Exempla rerum varie tractanda sunt , si nocebunt ; quae si vetera erunt , fabulosa dicere licebit ; si indubia , maxime quidem dissimilia . Neque enim fieri potest , ut paria sint per omnia , ut si Nasica post occisum Gracchum defendatur exemplo Ahalae , a quo Maelius est interfectus , Maelium regni adfectatorem fuisse , a Graccho leges modo latas esse populares , Ahalam magistrum equitum fuisse , Nasicam privatum esse dicatur . Si defecerint omnia , videndum erit , an obtineri possit , ne illud quidem recte factum . Quod de exemplis , idem etiam de iudicatis observandum .	Examples drawn from facts, if damaging to our case, must be treated in various ways: if they are ancient history, we may call them legendary, while if they are undoubted, we may lay stress on their extreme dissimilarity. For it is impossible for two cases to be alike in every detail. For instance, if the case of Ahala,2 by whom Maelius was killed, is quoted to justify Nasica for the slaying of Tiberius Gracchus, we may argue that Maelius was endeavouring to make himself king, while all that Gracchus had done was to bring forward laws in the interest of the people, and that while Ahala was Master of the Horse, Nasica was a private citizen. In the last resort, if all else prove unavailing, we must see if we can show that the action adduced as a parallel was itself unjustifiable. These remarks as to examples apply also to previous decisions in the courts.
1639	Quod autem posui , referre , quo quidque accusator modo dixerit , huc pertinet , ut , si est minus efficaciter elocutus , ipsa eius verba ponantur ; si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione , eandem rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferamus , ut Cicero de Cornelio , Codicem attigit ;	and we may do this in such a way as to defend our client; for instance, if our client is addicted to luxury, we may say, "He has been charged with living in a somewhat too liberal style." So, too, we may call a mean man thrifty and a slanderous tongue free.
1640	et protinus cum quadam defensione , ut , si pro luxurioso dicendum sit , Obiecta est paulo liberalior vita . Sic et pro sordido parcum , pro maledico liberum dicere licebit .	With regard to my statement that the manner in which the accuser stated his charges was of importance, I would point out in this connexion that if he has spoken but feebly, we may repeat his actual words; while, if he has used bitter and violent language, we may restate the facts in milder terms, as Cicero does in the pro Cornelio, where he says, "He put his hand to the tablet containing the law" :
1641	Utique committendum nunquam est , ut adversariorum dicta cum sua confirmation reteramus , aut etiam loci alicuius exsecutione adiuvemus , nisi cum eludenda erunt : Apud exercitum mihi fueris , inquit ; tot annis forum non attigeris , ab fueris tamdiu et , cum tam longo intervallo veneris , cum his , qui in foro habitarunt ,	But we must never under any circumstances repeat our opponent's charges together with their proofs, nor emphasise any of his points by amplifying them, unless we do so with a view to making light of them, as for instance in the following passage : " You have been with the army, he says, and have not set foot in the forum for so many years, and do you now on returning after so long an interval seek to compete for a post of high dignity with those who have made the forum their home? "
1642	de dignitate contendas Praeterea in contradictione interim totum crimen exponitur , ut Cicero pro Scauro circa Bostarem facit veluti orationem diversae partis imitatus , aut pluribus propositionibus iunctis , ut pro Vareno , cum iter per agros et loca sola faceret cum Pompuleno , in familiam Ancharianam incidisse dixerunt , deinde Pompulenum occisum esse , illico eo fieri vellet . Quod est utile , si erit incredibilis rei ordo et ipsa expositione fidem perditurus . Interim per partes dissolvitur , quod contextu nocet ; et plerumque id est tutius . Quaedam contradictiones natura sunt singulae ; id exemplis non eget .	Again, when we are replying to the accuser we may sometimes set forth the whole charge, as Cicero does in the pro Scauro with reference to the death of Bostar, where he virtually parodies the speech of his opponent, or we may take a number of points raised in the course of the accusation and put them together as in the pro Vareno : " They have asserted that, when he was journeying with Pompulenus through a lonely stretch of country, he fell in with the slaves of Ancharius, that Pompulenus was then killed and Varenus imprisoned on the spot until such time as this man should indicate what he wished to be done with him. " Such a procedure is useful, if the sequence of facts alleged by the prosecution is incredible, and likely to lose its force by restatement. Sometimes, on the other hand, we may destroy the cumulative force of a number of statements by refuting them singly; in fact this is generally the safest course. Sometimes, again, the different portions of our reply will be independent of one another, a case which requires no illustration.
1643	Communia bene apprehenduntur non tantum , quia utriusque sunt partis , sed quia plus prosunt respondenti . Neque enim pigebit , quod saepe monui , referre ; commune qui prior dicit , contrarium facit . Est enim contrarium , quo adversarius bene uti potest :	Common arguments are readily appropriated, not merely because they can be used by either party, but because they are of greater service to the speaker who is replying; for I shall not scruple to repeat the warning which I have often given already; the speaker who is first to employ such an argument makes it tell against himself.
1644	At enim non verisimile est , tantum scelus M . Cottam esse commentum . Quid ? hoc verisimile est , tantum scelus Oppium esse conatum ? Artificis autem est invenire in actione adversarii quae contra semet ipsa pugnent aut pugnare videantur , quae aliquando ex rebus ipsis manifesta sunt , ut in causa Caeliana Clodia aurum se Caelio commodasse dicit , quod signum magnae familiaritatis est ; venenum sibi paratum , quod summi odii argumentum est .	For an argument must needs tell against a speaker if it be one which his opponent can use with effect. " But, you say, it is not probable that a crime of this magnitude was designed by Marcus Cotta. Is it probable then that a crime of this magnitude was attempted by Oppius? " On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent, though such inconsistencies are sometimes evident from the bare facts, as for instance in the case of Caelius, where Clodia asserts on the one hand that she lent Caelius money, which is an indication of great intimacy, and on the other hand that he got poison to murder her, which is a sign of violent hatred. Tubero similarly
1645	Tubero Ligarium accusat , quod is in Africa fuerit , et queritur , quod ab eo ipse in Africam non sit admissus . Aliquando vero praebet eius rei occasionem minus considerata ex adverso dicentis oratio ; quod accidit praecipue cupidis sententiarum , ut ducti occasione dicendi non respiciant quid dixerint , dum locum praesentem non totam causam intuentur .	accuses Ligarius of having been in Africa, and complains that Ligarius refused to allow him to land in Africa. At times, however, some ill-advised statement by our opponent will give us an opportunity of demolishing his arguments. This is specially likely to occur with speakers who have a passion for producing impressive thoughts: for the temptation to air their eloquence is such that they take no heed of what they have said already, being absorbed by the topic immediately before them to the detriment of the interests of the case as a whole.
1646	Quid tam videri potest contra Cluentium quam censoria nota ? Quid tam contra eundem , quam filium ab Egnatio corrupti iudicii , quo Cluentius Oppianicum circumvenisset , crimine exheredatum ?	What is there likely to tell so heavily against Cluentius as the stigma inflicted by the censors? What can be more damaging than the fact that Egnatius disinherited his son on the ground that lie had been bribed to give a false verdict in the trial in which Cluentius secured the condemnation of Oppianicus? But Cicero
1647	At haec Cicero pugnare invicem ostendit : Sed tu , Atti , consideres , censeo , diligenter , utrum censorium iudicium grave velis esse an Egnatii . Si Egnatii , leave est , quod censores de ceteris subscripserunt . Ipsum enim Egnatium , quem tu gravem esse vis , ex senatu eiecerunt . Sin autem censorium , hunc Egnatium , quem pater censoria subscriptione exheredarit , censores in senate , cum pardem eiecissent , retinuerunt .	shows that the two facts tell against one another. " But, Attius, I would urge you to give the closest consideration to the following problem. Which do you desire to carry the greater weight—the judgment of the censors, or of Egnatius? If the latter, you regard the judgment of the censors in other cases as counting for little, since they expelled this same Gnaeus Egnatius, on whose authority you lay such stress, from his place in the senate. On the other hand, if you attach most weight to the judgment of the censors, I must point out that the censors retained the younger Egnatius, whom his father disinherited by an act resembling a censorial decision, in his position as senator, although they had expelled his father. " As regards errors such as the following,
1648	Illa magis vitiose dicuntur quam acute reprehenduntur , argumentum dubium pro necessario , controversum pro confesso , commune pluribus pro proprio , vulgare , supervacuum , constitutum contra fidem . Nam et illa accidunt parum cautis , ut crimen augeant , quod probandum est ; de facto disputent , cum de auctore quaeratur ; impossibilia aggrediantur , pro effectis relinquant vixdum inchoata , de homine dicere quam de causa malint ;	the folly shown in their commission is out of all proportion to the skill required to deal with them: I refer to mistakes such as advancing a disputable argument as indisputable, a controversial point as admitted, a point common to a number of cases as peculiar to the case in hand, or the employment of trite, superfluous, or incredible arguments. For careless speakers are liable to commit a host of errors: they will exaggerate a charge which has still got to be proved, will argue about an act when the question is who committed it, will attempt impossibilities, drop an argument as if it were complete, whereas it is scarcely begun, speak of the individual in preference to the case,
1649	hominum vitia rebus adsignent , ut , si quis decemviratum accuset non Appium ; manifestis repugnent ; dicant , quod aliter accipi possit ; summam quaestionis non intueantur , non ad proposita respondeant ; quod unum aliquando recipi potest , cum mala causa adhibitis extrinsecus remediis tuenda est , ut cum peculatus reus Verres fortiter et industrie tuitus contra piratas Siciliam dicitur .	and attribute personal faults to circumstances, as for instance if a speaker should attack the decemvirate instead of Appius. They will also contradict what is obvious, speak ambiguously, lose sight of the main issue of the case, or give replies which have no relation to the charges made. This latter procedure may, it is true, be occasionally employed when we have a bad case which requires to be supported by arguments drawn from matters foreign to the case. The trial of Verres provides an example; when accused of peculation it was alleged that he had shown courage and energy in his defence of Sicily against the pirates.
1650	Eadem adversus contradictiones nobis oppositas praecepta sunt , hoc tamen amplius , quod circa eas multi duobus vitiis diversis laborant . Nam quidam etiam in foro tanquam rem molestam et odiosam praetereunt , et iis plerumque , quae composita domo attulerunt , contenti sine adversario dicunt ; et scilicet multo magis in scholis , in quibus non solum contradictiones omittuntur , verum etiam materiae ipsae sic plerumque finguntur , ut nihil dici pro parte altera possit .	The same rules apply to objections which we may have to meet. But there is one point which requires special attention, since in such cases many speakers fall into two very different faults. For some even in the courts will pass by such objections when raised by their opponents as troublesome and vexatious details, and, contenting themselves with the arguments which they have brought ready-made from their study, will speak as if their opponent did not exist. This error is of course far more common in the schools, for there objections are not merely disregarded, but the subjects for declamation are generally framed in such a way that there is nothing to be said on the opposite side.
1651	Alii diligentia lapsi verbis etiam uel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant , quod est et infinitum et supervacuum ; non enim causa reprehenditur sed actor ; quem ego semper videri malim disertum , ut , si dixerit quod rei prosit , ingenii credatur laus esse non causae ; si forte laedat , causae non ingenii culpa .	On the other hand there are some who surfer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous. For it is not the case. but the pleader, whom they are refuting. Personally I should always prefer that a speaker should reveal his eloquence in such a way that, if what he says advances his case, the credit will be given to his talent and not to the nature of his case, while if what he says damages his case the blame will attach to the case and not to his powers.
1652	Itaque illae reprehensiones aut obscuritatis , qualis in Rullum est , aut infantiae in dicendo , qualis in Pisonem , aut inscitiae rerum verborumque et insulsitatis etiam , qualis in Antonium est , animo dantur et iustis odiis , suntque utiles ad conciliandum iis , quos invisos facere volueris , odium .	Consequently when we come across denunciations such as that directed against Rullus for the obscurity of his language, or against Piso for his utter incapacity as a speaker, or against Antony for his lack of taste and his complete ignorance both of words and things, we shall give then our sanction as reasonable concessions to passion and just resentment, and as useful in stirring up hatred against those whom it is desired to render unpopular.
1653	Alia respondendi patronis ratio ; et aliquando tamen eorum non oratio modo , sed vita etiam , vultus denique , incessus , habitus recte incusari solet ; ut adversus Quintium Cicero non haec solum , sed ipsam etiam praetextam demissam ad talos insectatus est . Presserat enim turbulentis contionibus Cluentium Quintius .	The method of reply to our opponent's counsel should be on different lines. Sometimes however we are justified in attacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but also their character, their appearance, their gait or bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero does not confine himself to these topics, but even attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing to his heels: for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave embarrassment by his turbulent harangues.
1654	Nonnunquam elevandae invidiae gratia , quae asperius dicta sunt , eluduntur , ut a Cicerone Triarius . Nam cum Scauri columnas per urbem plaustris vectas esse dixit , Ego porro , inquit , qui Albanas habeo columnas , clitellis eas apportavi . Et magis hoc in accusatores concessum est , quibus conviciari aliquando patrocinii fides cogit .	Sometimes, in order to dispel the unpopularity excited by bitter criticism, the latter may be disposed of by a jest, as for example Cicero disposes of Triarius. For to the allegation that the pillars destined for the house of Scaurus were carried on waggons through the city streets he replied, "I got my pillars from the quarries of Alba, and had them brought in panniers!" Such tactics are more readily allowed against an accuser, for the duties of counsel for the defence sometimes force him to make such personal attacks.
1655	Illa vero adversus omnes et recepta et non inhumana conquestio , si callide quid tacuisse , breviasse , obscurasse distulisse dicuntur .	On the other hand there is no objection to complaining of the conduct of the advocates on either side, so long as our complaint follows accepted practice and does not overstep the limits imposed by good manners; I refer to complaints such as that our opponents have abridged, obscured or postponed the discussion of some point, or with deliberate cunning have avoided discussing it at all.
1656	Defensionis quoque permutatio reprehenditur saepe , ut Attius adversus Cluentium , Aeschines adversus Ctesiphontem facit , cum ille Ciceronem lege usurum modo , hic minime de lege dicturum Demosthenen queritur . Declamatores vero inprimis sunt admonendi , ne contradictiones eas ponant , quibus facillime responderi possit , neu sibi stultum adversarium fingant . Facimus autem ( quod maxime uberes loci popularesque sententiae nascuntur materiam dicendi nobis , quod volumus , ducentibus ) ut non sit ille inutilis versus : " Non male respondit , male enim prior ille rogarat . " Fallet haec nos in foro consuetudo , ubi adversario ,	A change in the tactics of defence is also often selected for censure. For example, Attius in his speech against Cluentius complains that Cicero insists on the letter of the law, and Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon complains that Demosthenes refuses to consider the legal aspect of the case. It is however necessary to issue a special warning to declaimers that they should not put forward objections that can easily be met or assume that their opponent is a fool. As it is, owing to our tendency to think that the subject-matter of our speech may be drawn from our own fancy, florid commonplaces and epigrams designed to bring down the house occur to our minds with the utmost readiness, with the result that we should do well to bear in mind the lines: "A shrewd retort! Could it be otherwise? A foolish question makes for smart replies."
1657	non ipsi nobis respondebimus . Aiunt Accium interrogatum , cur causas non ageret , cum apud eum in tragoediis tanta vis esset optime respondendi , hanc reddidisse rationem , quod illic ea dicerentur quae ipse vellet , in foro dicturi adversarii essent quae minime vellet .	But such a practice will be fatal in the courts, where we have to answer our opponent and not ourselves. It is said that Accius, when asked why he did not turn advocate in view of the extraordinary skill in making apt replies which his tragedies revealed, replied that in his plays the characters said what he himself wanted them to say, whereas in the courts his adversaries would probably say just what he least wanted them to say.
1658	Ridiculum est ergo in exercitationibus , quae foro praeparant , prius cogitare quid responderi quam quid ex diverso dici possit . Et bonus praeceptor non minus laudare discipulum debet , si quid pro diversa quam si quid pro sua parte acriter excogitavit .	It is therefore ridiculous in exercises which prepare the student for the actual courts to consider what answer can be made before ever giving a thought to what the opposing counsel is likely to say. And a good teacher should commend a pupil no less for his skill in thinking out arguments that may be put forward for the opposite side than in discovering arguments to prove his own case.
1659	Rursus aliud in scholis permittendum semper , in foro rarum . Nam loco a petitore primo contradictione uti qui possumus , ubi vera res agitur , cum adversarius adhuc nihil dixerit ?	Again, there is another practice which is always permissible in the schools, but rarely in the courts. For when we speak first as claimants in a real case, how can we raise objections, seeing that our opponent has so far said nothing?
1660	Incidunt tamen plerique in hoc vitium vel consuetudine declamatoria vel etiam cupiditate dicendi , dantque de se respondentibus venustissimos lusus , cum modo , se vero nihil dixisse neque tam stulte dicturos ; modo , bene admonitos ab adversario et agere gratias , quod adiuti sint , iocantur ; frequentissime vero , id quod firmissimum est , nunquam iis responsurum adversarium fuisse , quae proposita non essent , nisi illa sciret vera esse et ad fatendum conscientia esset impulsus ; ut pro Cluentio Cicero :	Still, many fall into this error either because they have acquired the habit in declamation or simply owing to a passion for hearing their own voice, thereby affording fine sport to those who reply: for sometimes the latter will remark sarcastically that they never said anything of the kind and have no intention of saying anything so idiotic, and sometimes that they are grateful for the admirable warnings so kindly given by their opponent: but most often they will say, and this is the strongest line that they can take, that their opponent would never have replied to objections which had never been raised had he not realised that these objections were justified and been driven to admit it by his consciousness of the fact.
1661	Nam hoc persaepe dixisti , tibi sic renuntiari , me habere in animo causam hanc praesidio legis defendere . Itane est ? ab amicis imprudentes videlicet prodimur ? et est nescio quis de iis , quos amicos nobis arbitramur , qui nostra consilia ad adversarium deferat ? Quisnam hoc tibi renuntiavit ? quis tam improbus fuit ; cui ego autem narravi ? Nemo , ut opinor , in culpa est ; nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiarit .	We may find an example of this in the pro Cluentio of Cicero: " You have frequently asserted that you are informed that I intend to base my defence on the letter of the law. Really! I suppose that my friends have secretly betrayed me, and that there is one among those whom I believe to be my friends who reports my designs to my opponent. Who gave you this information? Who was the traitor? And to whom did I ever reveal my design? No one, I think, is to blame. It must have been the law itself that told you. " But there are some who,
1662	At quidam contradictione non contenti totos etiam locos explicant : scire se hoc dicturos adversarios et ita persecuturos . Quod factum venuste nostris temporibus elusit Vibius Crispus , vir ingenii iucundi et elegantis : Ego vero , inquit , ista non dico ; quid enim attinet illa bis dici ?	not content with raising imaginary objections, develop whole passages on such themes, saying that they know their opponents will say this and will proceed to argue thus and thus. I remember that Vibius Crispus in our own day disposed of this practice very neatly, for he was a humorous fellow with a very pretty wit: "I do not make those objections which you attribute to me," he said, "for what use would it be to make them twice?"
1663	Nonnunquam tamen aliquid simile contradictioni poni potest , si quid ab adversario testationibus comprehensum in advocationibus iactatum sit ; respondebimus enim rei ab illis dictae , non a nobis excogitatae ; aut , si id genus erit causae , ut proponere possimus certa , extra quae dici nihil possit : ut , cum res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit , dicat necesse est reus aut se ignorante illatam aut depositam apud se aut donatam sibi ; quibus omnibus , etiamsi proposita non sunt , responderi potest .	Sometimes however it may be possible to put forward something not unlike such objections, if some point included by our opponent in the depositions which he produces has been discussed among his advocates : for then we shall be replying to something which they have said and not to an objection which has been invented by ourselves; or again, this will be possible if the case is of such a nature that we are in a position to state certain definite objections which are absolutely essential to our opponent's case: for instance, if stolen goods have been discovered in a house, the accused must of necessity allege either that they were brought there without his knowledge or deposited with him or given to him and we may therefore answer all these points even although they have not been put forward.
1664	At in scholis recte et propositionibus et contradictionibus occurremus , ut in utrumque locum , id est primum et secundum , simul plurimum exerceamur . Quod nisi fecerimus , nunquam utemur contradictione ; non enim erit , cui respondeamus .	On the other hand, in the schools we are quite justified in answering both statements and imaginary objections; for by these means we shall train ourselves at one and the same time for speaking either first or second. Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply.
1665	Est et illud vitium nimium sollicite et circa omnia momenta luctantis ; suspectam enim facit iudici causam , et frequenter , quae statim dicta omnem dubitationem sustulissent , dilata ipsis praeparationibus fidem perdunt , quia patronus et aliis crediderit opus fuisse . Fiduciam igitur orator prae se ferat semperque ita dicat , tanquam de causa optime sentiat ;	There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points. Such a procedure makes his case suspect to the judges, while frequently arguments which, if stated without more ado, would have removed all doubt, lose their force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate preparations made for their introduction, due to the tact that the advocate thinks that they require additional support. Our orator must therefore adopt a confident manner, and should always speak as if he thought his case admirable. This quality, like all other good qualities, is particularly evident in Cicero.
1666	quod sicut omnia in Cicerone praecipuum est . Nam illa summa cura securitatis est similis , tantaque in oratione auctoritas , ut probationis locum obtineat dubitare nobis non audentibus . Porro , qui scierit , quid pars adversa , quid nostra habeat valentissimum , facile iudicabit , quibus maxime rebus vel occurrendum sit vel instandum .	For the extraordinary care which he takes gives the impression of confidence and carries such weight when lie speaks that it does not permit us to feel the least doubt and has all the force of genuine proof. Further, the advocate who knows what are the strongest points in his own and his opponent's case will easily be able to decide what points it will be most necessary for him to emphasise or to counter.
1667	Ordo quidem in parte nulla minus adfert laboris . Nam si agimus , nostra confirmanda sunt primum , tum , quae nostris opponuntur refutanda ; si respondemus ,	As regards order, there is no part of a case which involves less trouble. For, if we are prosecuting, our first duty will be to prove our own case, our second to refute the arguments brought against it. If, on the other hand, we are defending, we must begin by refutation.
1668	prius incipiendum est a refutatione . Nascuntur autem ex his , quae contradictioni opposuimus , aliae contradictiones , euntque interim longius ; ut gladiatorum manus , quae secundae vocantur , fiunt et tertiae , si prima ad evocandum adversarii ictum prolata erat , et quartae , si geminata captatio est , ut bis cavere , bis repetere oportuerit ; quae ratio et ultra ducit .	But from our answers to objections fresh objections will arise, a process which may be carried to some length. The strokes of gladiators provide a parallel. If the first stroke was intended to provoke the adversary to strike, the second will lead to the third, while if the challenge be repeated it will lead to the fourth stroke, so that there will be two parries and two attacks. And tile process may be prolonged still further.
1669	Sed illam etiam , quam supra ostendi , simplicem ex adfectibus atque ex adfirmatione sola probationem recipit refutatio , qualis est illa Scauri , de qua supra dixi ; quin nescio an etiam frequentior , ubi quid negatur . Videndum praecipue utrique parti , ubi sit rei summa . Nam fere accidit , ut in causis multa dicantur , de paucis iudicetur .	But refutation also includes that simple form of proof, which I described above, based on an appeal to the emotions and mere assertion; for an example see the words of Scaurus which I have already quoted. Nay, I am not sure that this form of proof is not actually of more frequent occurrence when something is denied. It is, however, specially important for both parties that they should see where the main issue lies. For it often happens that the points raised in pleading are many, although those on which a decision is given are few.
1670	In his probandi refutandique ratio est , sed adiuvanda viribus dicentis et ornanda . Quamlibet enim sint ad dicendum , quod volumus , accommodata . ieiuna tamen erunt et infirma , nisi maiore quodam oratoris spiritu implentur .	Such are the elements of the methods of proof and refutation, but they require to be embellished and supported by the powers of the speaker. For although our arguments may be admirably adapted to express what we desire, they will none the less be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special effort to give them life.
1671	Quare et illi communes loci de testibus , de tabulis , de argumentis aliisque similibus magnam vim animis iudicum adferunt , et hi proprii , quibus factum quodque laudamus aut contra , iustum vel iniustum docemus , maius aut minus , asperius aut mitius . Ex iis autem alii ad comparationem singulorum argumentorum faciunt , alii ad plurium , alii ad totius causae inclinationem .	Consequently the commonplaces on the subject of witnesses, documentary evidence, arguments and the like make a great impression on the minds of the judges, as also do those topics which are peculiar to the case, those I mean in which we praise or blame any action or show that it is just or unjust, or make it seem more or less important or more or less harsh than it really is. Of these topics some are adapted to the comparison of individual arguments, others to the comparison of a number, while others may serve to influence the success or failure of the whole case.
1672	Ex quibus sunt qui praeparent animum iudicis , sunt qui confirment . Sed praeparatio quoque aut confirmatio aliquando totius causae est , aliquando partium , et proinde , ut cuique conveniunt , subiicienda .	Some again prepare the mind of the judge, while others confirm it in opinions already formed. But such preparation or confirmation will sometimes apply to the whole case, sometimes only to particular portions, and must therefore be employed with due regard to circumstances.