Laelius on Friendship (M. Tullius Cicero)

[Close]

	Laelius on Friendship Author: M. Tullius Cicero	Translator: William Armistead Falconer
89	haec est , inquam , societas , in qua omnia insunt , quae putant homines expetenda — honestas gloria tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas ; ut et , cum haec adsint , beata vita sit , et sine his esse non possit quod cum optimum maximumque sit , si id volumus adipisci , virtuti opera danda est , sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus ; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur , tum se denique errasse sentiunt , cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit .	In such a partnership, I say, abide all things that men deem worthy of pursuit—honour and fame and delightful tranquillity of mind; so that when these blessings are at hand life is happy, and without them, it cannot be happy. Since happiness is our best and highest aim, we must, if we would attain it, give our attention to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor any other desirable thing; on the other hand, those who slight virtue and yet think that they have friends, perceive their mistake at last when some grievous misfortune forces them to put their friends to the test.
90	quocirca , dicendum est enim saepius , cum iudicaris , diligere oportet ; non , cum dilexeris , iudicare . sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur , tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis ; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus , quod vetamur vetere proverbio . nam , implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis , repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus .	Therefore, I repeat the injunction, for it should be said again and again: you should love your friend after you have appraised him; you should not appraise him after you have begun to love him. But we are punished for our negligence in many things, and especially are we most grievously punished for our carelessness in the choice and treatment of our friends; for we deliberate after the event, and we do what the ancient proverb forbids—we argue the case after the verdict is found. Accordingly, after we have become involved with others in a mutual affection, either by long association or by interchange of favours, some cause of offence arises and we suddenly break the bonds of friendship asunder when it has run but half its course.
91	quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria . una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis , de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt ; quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur ; multi divitias despiciunt , quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat ; honores vero , quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur , quam multi ita contemnunt , ut nihil inanius , nihil esse levius existiment ! itemque cetera , quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur , permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent . De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt ; et ei qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt , et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur , et ei qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi ; postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus , sine amicitia vitam esse nullam , si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere .	Therefore carelessness so great in regard to a relation absolutely indispensable deserves the more to be censured. For the one thing in human experience about whose advantage all men with one voice agree, is friendship; even virtue itself is regarded with contempt by many and is said to be mere pretence and display; many disdain riches, because they are content with little and take delight in meagre fare and plain dress; political honours, too, for which some have a burning desire—how many so despise them that they believe nothing more empty and nothing more inane! Likewise other things, which seem to some to be worthy of admiration, are by many thought to be of no value at all. But concerning friendship, all, to a man, think the same thing: those who have devoted themselves to public life; those who find their joy in science and philosophy; those who manage their own business free from public cares; and, finally, those who are wholly given up to sensual pleasures—all believe that without friendship life is no life at all, or at least they so believe if they have any desire whatever to live the life of free men.
92	serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui . quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae , congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit , qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus , tamen is pati non possit , ut non anquirat aliquem , apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae . atque hoc maxime iudicaretur , si quid tale possit contingere , ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum quas natura desiderat , abundantiam et copiam , hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet — quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo ?	For it creeps imperceptibly, I know not how, into every life, and suffers no mode of existence to be devoid of its presence. Nay, even if anyone were of a nature so savage and fierce as to shun and loathe the society of men —such, for example, as tradition tells us a certain Timon of Athens once was—yet even such a man could not refrain from seeking some person before whom he might pour out the venom of his embittered soul. Moreover, the view just expressed might best be appraised if such a thing as this could happen: suppose that a god should remove us from these haunts of men and put us in some solitary place, and, while providing us there in plenteous abundance with all material things for which our nature yearns, should take from us altogether the power to gaze upon our fellow men—who would be such a man of iron as to be able to endure that sort of a life? And who is there from whom solitude would not snatch the enjoyment of every pleasure?
93	verum ergo illud est , quod a Tarentino Archyta , ut opinor , dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum : si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset , insuavem illam admirationem ei fore , quae iucundissima fuisset , si aliquem cui narraret habuisset . Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur , quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est .	True, therefore, is that celebrated saying of Archytas of Tarentum, I think it was—a saying which I have heard repeated by our old men who in their turn heard it from their elders. It is to this effect: If a man should ascend alone into heaven and behold clearly the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, there would be no pleasure for him in the awe-inspiring sight, which would have filled him with delight if he had had someone to whom he could describe what he had seen. Thus nature, loving nothing solitary, always strives for some sort of support, and man’s best support is a very dear friend.
94	sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit anquirat desideret , tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea , quae ab ea monemur , audimus . est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur , quas tum evitare , tum elevare , tum ferre sapientis est . una illa subeunda est offensio ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur ; nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi , et haec accipienda amice , cum benevole fiunt .	But though this same nature declares by so many utterances what she wishes, what she seeks, and what she ardently longs for, yet we somehow grow deaf and do not hearken to her voice. For varied and complex are the experiences of friendship, and they afford many causes for suspicion and offence, which it is wise sometimes to ignore, sometimes to make light of, and sometimes to endure. But there is one cause of offence which must be encountered in order that both the usefulness and loyalty of friendship may be preserved; for friends frequently must be not only advised, but also rebuked, and both advice and rebuke should be kindly received when given in a spirit of goodwill.
95	sed nescio quo modo verum est , quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit : obsequium amicos , veritas odium parit . molesta veritas , siquidem ex ea nascitur odium , quod est venenum amicitiae , sed obsequium multo molestius , quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit ; maxima autem culpa in eo , qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur . omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est , primum ut monitio acerbitate , deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat . in obsequio autem , quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur , comitas adsit , assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur , quae non modo amico , sed ne libero quidem digna est ; aliter enim cur tyranno , aliter cum amico vivitur .	But somehow it is true, as put by my intimate friend in his Andria: Complaisance gets us friends, plain speaking, hate. A troublesome thing is truth, if it is indeed the source of hate, which poisons friendship; but much more troublesome is complaisance, which, by showing indulgence to the sins of a friend, allows him to be carried headlong away; but the greatest fault is in him who both scornfully rejects truth and is driven by complaisance to ruin. Therefore, in this entire matter reason and care must be used, first, that advice be free from harshness, and second, that reproof be free from insult. But in showing complaisance—I am glad to adopt Terence’s word, obsequium—let courtesy be at hand, and let flattery, the handmaid of vice, be far removed, as it is unworthy not only of a friend but even of a free man; for we live in one way with a tyrant and in another with a friend.
96	Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt , uta ab amico verum audire nequeat , huius salus desperanda est . scitum est enim illud Catonis , ut multa : melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri , quam eos amicos , qui dulces videantur ; illos verum saepe dicere , hos numquam . atque illud absurdum , quod ei , qui monentur , eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt , ear capiunt qua debent vacare . peccasse enim se non anguntur , obiurgari moleste ferunt ; quod contra oportebat delicto dolere , correctione gaudere .	Now we must despair of the safety of the man whose ears are so closed to truth that he cannot hear what is true from a friend. For there is shrewdness in that well-known saying of Cato, as there was in much that he said: Some men are better served by their bitter-tongued enemies than by their sweet-smiling friends; because the former often tell the truth, the latter, never. And furthermore, it is absurd that men who are admonished do not feel vexation at what ought to vex them, but do feel it at what ought not; for they are annoyed, not at the sin, but at the reproof; whereas, on the contrary, they ought to grieve for the offence and rejoice at its correction.
97	ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae , et alterum libere facere , non aspere , alterum patienter accipere , non repugnanter , sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem blanditiam assentationem : quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium , ad voluptatem loquentium omnia , nihil ad veritatem .	As, therefore, it is characteristic of true friendship both to give and to receive advice and, on the one hand, to give it with all freedom of speech, but without harshness, and on the other hand, to receive it patiently, but without resentment, so nothing is to be considered a greater bane of friendship than fawning, cajolery, or flattery; for give it as many names as you choose, it deserves to be branded as a vice peculiar to fickle and false-hearted men who say everything with a view to pleasure and nothing with a view to truth.
98	cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est , tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat , tum amicitiae repugnat maxime ; delet enim veritatem , sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest . nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus , qui id fieri poterit , si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper , sed varius commutabilis multiplex ?	Moreover, hypocrisy is not only wicked under all circumstances, because it pollutes truth and takes away the power to discern it, but it is also especially inimical to friendship, since it utterly destroys sincerity, without which the word friendship can have no meaning. And since the effect of friendship is to make, as it were, one soul out of many, how will that be possible if not even in one man taken by himself shall there be a soul always one and the same, but fickle, changeable, and manifold?
99	quid enim potest esse tam flexibile , tam devium , quam animus eius , qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem , sed etiam voltum atque nutum convertitur ? negat quis , nego ; ait , aio ; postremo imperavi egomet mihi omnia assentari , ut ait idem Terentius , sed ille in Gnathonis persona , quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est .	For what can be as pliant and erratic as the soul of the man who changes not only to suit another’s humour and desire, but even his expression and his nod? He says nay, and nay say I; he says yea, and yea say I; in fine, I bade myself agree with him in everything. This was said by Terence whom I quoted before, but he says it in the character of Gnatho; and to have such a man for a friend on any terms is a mark of inconstancy.
100	multi autem Gnathonum similes , cum sint loco fortuna fama superiores , quorum est assentatio molesta , cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas .	However, there are many like Gnatho, though his superiors in birth, fortune, and reputation, who become dangerous flatterers when their insincerity is supported by their position.
101	secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia , quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris . contio , quae ex imperitissimis constat , tamen iudicare solet , quid intersit inter popularem , id est assentatorem et levem civem , et inter constantem et verum et gravem .	But by the exercise of care a fawning friend may be separated and distinguished from a true friend, just as everything pretended and false may be distinguished from what is genuine and true. A public assembly, though composed of very ignorant men, can, nevertheless, usually see the difference between a demagogue—that is, a smooth-tongued, shallow citizen—and one who has stability, sincerity, and weight.
102	quibus blanditiis C . Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis , cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis ! dissuasimus nos , sed nihil de me , de Scipione dicam libentius . quanta illi , di immortales , fuit gravitas , quanta in oratione maiestas ! ut facile ducem populi Romani , non comitem diceres . sed affuistis , et est in manibus oratio . itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est . atque , ut ad me redeam , meministis Q . Maximo fratre Scipionis et L . Mancino consulibus , quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C . Licini Crassi videbatur ; cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur . ( Atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo .) Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat . atque id actum est praetore me , quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus . ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est .	With what flattering words Gaius Papiriusnot long ago insinuated himself into the favour of the assembly, when he was trying to carry a law making the people’s tribunes eligible for reelection! I spoke against it—but I will not talk of myself, it will give me more pleasure to talk about Scipio. Ye gods! What weight and majesty there was in his speech on that occasion! One would have said, without hesitation, that he was the leader of the Roman people, not their comrade.But you both were present; besides, his speech is published. As a result this people’s law was rejected by the people’s votes. Again—and pardon me for referring to myself—you remember when Lucius Mancinus and Scipio’s brother, Quintus Maximus, were consuls,how popular apparently was the proposed law of Gaius Licinius Crassus regarding the priestly offices—for the right to co-opt to vacancies possessed by the college was being converted into patronage for the people. (By the way, Crassus was the first man to begin the practice of facing towards the forum in addressing the people.) Nevertheless, through my speech in reply, reverence for the immortal gods easily prevailed over the plausible oration of Crassus. And this took place while I was praetor and five years before I was elected consul. Thus the cause was won more by its own merit than by the influence of one holding a very high official rank.
103	quod si in scena , id est in contione , in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est , tamen verum valet , si modo id patefactum et illustratum est , quid in amicitia fieri oportet , quae tota veritate perpenditur ? in qua nisi , ut dicitur , apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas , nihil fidum , nihil exploratum habeas , ne amare quidem aut amari , cum id quam vere fiat ignores . quamquam ista assentatio , quamvis perniciosa sit , nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei , qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur . ita fit ut is assentatoribus patefaciat auris suas maxime , qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet .	Now, if on the stage, I mean on the platform, where there is the greatest opportunity for deception and disguise, truth yet prevails, provided it is made plain and brought into the light of day, what ought to be the case with friendship which is wholly weighed in the scales of truth? For in friendship, unless, as the saying is, you behold and show an open heart, you can have no loyalty or certainty and not even the satisfaction of loving and of being loved, since you do not know what true love is. And yet this flattery of which I spoke, however deadly it may be, can harm no one except him who receives and delights in it. It follows that the man who lends the readiest ear to flatterers is the one who is most given to self-flattery and is most satisfied with himself.
104	omnino est amans sui virtus ; optime enim se ipsa novit quamque amabilis sit intellegit : ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor , sed de virtutis opinione . virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt . hos delectat assentatio , his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur , orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant . nulla est igitur haec amicitia , cum alter verum audire non volt , alter ad mentiendum paratus est . nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur , nisi essent milites gloriosi . magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi ? satis erat respondere magnas . ingentis , inquit Semper auget assentator id , quod is , cuius ad voluntatem dicitur , volt esse magnum .	I grant that Virtue loves herself; for she best knows herself and realizes how lovable she is; but it is not virtue I am talking about but a reputation for virtue. For many wish not so much to be, as to seem to be, endowed with real virtue. Such men delight in flattery, and when a complimentary speech is fashioned to suit their fancy they think the empty phrase is proof of their own merits. There is nothing, therefore, in a friendship in which one of the parties to it does not wish to hear the truth and the other is ready to lie. Nor should we see any humour in the fawning parasites in comedies if there were no braggart soldiers. In truth did Thais send me many thanks? It would have been enough to answer, Many. Millions of them, said the parasite. The flatterer always magnifies that which the one for whose gratification he speaks wishes to be large.
105	quam ob rem , quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet , qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant , tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt , ut animadvertant ne callida assentatione capiantur . aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt , nisi qui admodum est excors : callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cavendum est . nec enim facillime agnoscitur , quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur , ut is , qui illusus sit , plus vidisse videatur . quid autem turpius quam illudi ? quod ut ne accidat magis cavendum est : ut me hodie ante omnis comicos stultos sense versaris atque illusseris lautissime !	Wherefore, although that sort of hollow flattery influences those who court and make a bid for it, yet even stronger and steadier men should be warned to be on their guard lest they be taken in by flattery of the crafty kind. No one, to be sure, unless he is an utter fool, fails to detect the open flatterer, but we must exercise a watchful care against the deep and crafty one lest he steal upon us unawares. For he is very hard to recognize, since he often fawns even by opposing, and flatters and cajoles by pretending to quarrel, until at last he gives in, allowing himself to be overcome so that his dupe may appear to have seen further into the matter than himself. And yet, is there anything more discreditable than to be made a dupe? If not, then we should be all the more on our guard that it does not happen to us to have to confess: To-day, of all old fools that play the comic parts, You’ve wheedled me the most and made your greatest dupe.
106	haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est improvidorum et credulorum senum . sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum , id est sapientium — de hac dico sapientia , quae videtur in hominem cadere posse — ad levis amicitias defluxit oratio . quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando .	For even on the stage the silliest characters take the parts of old men lacking in foresight and easily deceived. But in some unaccountable way I have drifted away from the friendship of faultless men—that is, men of wisdom, such wisdom I mean as is observed to fall to the lot of man—and I have rambled on to a discussion of friendships of the frivolous kind. Wherefore, let me return to the topic with which I began and finally put an end even to that.
107	virtus , inquam , C . Fanni , et tu , Q . Muci , et conciliat amicitias et conservat . in ea est enim convenientia rerum , in ea stabilitas , in ea constantia ; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio , ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud , quod in altero est , ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia ; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando , Amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames , nulla indigentia , nulla utilitate quaesita . quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia , etiam si tu eam minus secutus sis .	Virtue, my dear Gaius Fannius, and you, my dear Quintus Mucius, Virtue, I say, both creates the bond of friendship and preserves it. For in Virtue is complete harmony, in her is permanence, in her is fidelity; and when she has raised her head and shown her own light and has seen and recognized the same light in another, she moves towards it and in turn receives its beams; as a result love or friendship leaps into flame; for both words are derived from a word meaning to love. But love is nothing other than the great esteem and affection felt for him who inspires that sentiment, and it is not sought because of material need or for the sake of material gain. Nevertheless even this blossoms forth from friendship, although you did not make it your aim.
108	hac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes illos , L . Paulum , M . Catonem , C . Gallum , P . Nasicam , Ti . Gracchum Scipionis nostri socerum dileximus . haec etiam magis elucet inter aequalis , ut inter me et Scipionem , L . Furium , P . Rupilium , Sp . Mummium ; vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate acquiescimus , ut in vestra , ut in Q . Tuberonis ; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P . Rutili , A . Vergini familiaritate delector . quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae , ut alia aetas oriatur , maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequalibus possis , quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis , cum isdem ad calcem , ut dicitur , pervenire .	Because of this friendly impulse, I, as a young man, became attached to those old men, Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, father-in-law of my deal Scipio. And while that feeling is stronger between men of the same age, as between Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius, and myself; yet, in turn, now that I am old, I find pleasure in the affection of young men, like yourselves and Quintus Tubero; and I find delight also in social intercourse with still younger men like Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since it is the law of human life and of human nature that a new generation is ever coming forth, it is really most desirable, when you can, to reach the goal, so to speak, with men of your own age—those with whom you began the race of life.
109	sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt , semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur ; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas . mihi quidem Scipio , quamquam est subito ereptus , vivit tamen semperque vivet ; virtutem enim amavi illius viri , quae exstincta non est . nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos , qui illam semper in manibus habui , sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis . nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet .	But inasmuch as things human are frail and fleeting, we must be ever on the search for some persons whom we shall love and who will love us in return; for if goodwill and affection are taken away, every joy is taken from life. For me, indeed, though he was suddenly snatched away, Scipio still lives and will always live; for it was his virtue that caused my love and that is not dead. Nor is it only in my sight and for me, who had it constantly within my reach, that his virtue lives; it will even shed its light and splendour on men unborn. No one will ever undertake with courage and hope the larger tasks of life without thinking that he must continually keep before him the memory and example of that illustrious man.
110	equidem ex omnibus rebus , quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit , nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare . in hac mihi de re publica consensus ; in hac rerum privatarum consilium , in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit . numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi , quod quidem senserim , nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod nollem ; una domus erat , idem victus isque communis , neque solum militia , sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes .	For my part, of all the blessings that fortune or nature has bestowed on me, there is none which I can compare with Scipio’s friendship. In it I found agreement on public questions; in it, counsel in private business, and in it, too, a leisure of unalloyed delight. And, so far as I was aware, I never offended him in even the most trivial point; nor did I ever hear a word from him that I could wish unsaid; there was one home for us both; we had the same fare and shared it in common, and we were together not only in our military campaigns, but also in our foreign tours and on our vacations in the country.