Laelius on Friendship (M. Tullius Cicero)

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	Laelius on Friendship Author: M. Tullius Cicero	Translator: William Armistead Falconer
45	quorsum haec ? quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur . praecipiendum est igitur bonis , ut ; si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint , ne existiment ita se alligatos , ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant ; improbis autem poena statuenda est , nec vero minor eis qui secuti erunt alterum , quam eis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces . quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle , quis potentior ? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus esset , ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit , quam ferre debuit : fecit idem quod viginti annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus . His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo ; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit .	Why do I say these things? Because without associatesno one attempts any such mischiefs. It must, therefore, be enjoined upon good menthat if by any chance they should inadvisedly fall into friendships of this kind, they must not think themselves so bound that they cannot withdraw from friends who are sinning in some important matter of public concern; for wicked men, on the other hand, a penalty must be enacted, and assuredly it will not be lighter for the followers than for the leaders in treason. Who was more eminent in Greece than Themistocles, who more powerful? But he, after having saved Greece from slavery by his leadership in the war with Persia, and after having been banished because of his unpopularity, would not submit to the injustice of an ungrateful country, as he was in duty bound to do: he did the same thing that Coriolanus had done among our people twenty years before. Not one single supporter could be found to aid these men against their country; therefore, each took his own life.
46	qua re talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est , sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est , ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi . quod quidem , ut res ire coepit , haud scio an aliquando futurum sit ; mihi autem non minori curae est , qualis res publica post mortem meam futura sit , quam qualis hodie sit .	Hence such alliances of wicked men not only should not be protected by a plea of friendship, but rather they should be visited with summary punishment of the severest kind, so that no one may think it permissible to follow even a friend when waging war against his country. And yet this very thing, considering the course affairs have begun to take, will probably happen at some future time; as for me, I am no less concerned for what the condition of the commonwealth will be after my death, than I am for its condition to-day.
47	haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur , ut ab amicis honesta petamus , amicorum causa honesta faciamus , ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur , studium semper adsit , cunctatio absit , consilium verum dare audeamus libere , plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas , eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte , sed etiam acriter , si res postulabit , et adhibitae pareatur .	Therefore let this be ordained as the first law of friendship: Ask of friends only what is honourable; do for friends only what is honourable and without even waiting to be asked; let zeal be ever present, but hesitation absent; dare to give true advice with all frankness; in friendship let the influence of friends who are wise counsellors be paramount, and let that influence be employed in advising, not only with frankness, but, if the occasion demands, even with sternness, and let the advice be followed when given.
48	nam quibusdam , quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia , placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam — sed nihil est , quod illi non persequantur argutiis — partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias , ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus ; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum ; alienis nimis implicari molestum esse ; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae , quas vel adducas cum velis vel remittas ; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem , qua frui non possit animus , si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus .	I say this because certain men who, I am informed, are considered sages in Greece, have approved certain views, which, in my opinion, are astonishing (but there is nothing that those men will not pursue with their subtleties). Some of these men teach that too much intimacy in friendships should be avoided, lest it be necessary for one man to be full of anxiety for many; that each one of us has business of his own, enough and to spare; that it is annoying to be too much involved in the affairs of other people; that it is best to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, so that we may either draw them up or slacken them at will; for, they say, an essential of a happy life is freedom from care, and this the soul cannot enjoy if one man is, as it were, in travail for many.
49	alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius , quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi , praesidi adiumentique causa , non benevolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas ; itaque ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium , ita amicitias appetere maxime : ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri , et inopes quam opulenti , et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati .	Again, there are others, I am told, who, with even less of human feeling, maintain (and I briefly touched on this point just now) that friendships must be sought for the sake of the defence and aid they give and not out of goodwill and affection; therefore, that those least endowed with firmness of character and strength of body have the greatest longing for friendship; and consequently, that helpless women, more than men, seek its shelter, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are accounted fortunate.
50	O praeclaram sapientiam ! solem enim e mundo tollere videntur ei , qui amicitiam e vita tollunt , qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus , nihil iucundius . quae est enim ista securitas ? specie quidem blanda , sed reapse multis locis repudianda . neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve , ne sollicitus sis , aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere . quod si curam fugimus , virtus fugienda est , quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit , ut bonitas malitiam , temperantia libidinem , ignaviam fortitudo . itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere , imbellibus fortis , flagitiosis modestos . ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti , et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis .	O noble philosophy! Why, they seem to take the sun out of the universe when they deprive life of friendship, than which we have from the immortal gods no better, no more delightful boon. For of what value is their vaunted freedom from care? In appearance it is indeed an alluring thing, but in reality often to be shunned. For it is inconsistent not to undertake any honourable business or course of conduct, or to lay it aside when undertaken, in order to avoid anxiety. Nay, if we continually flee from trouble, we must also flee from Virtue, who necessarily meets with some trouble in rejecting and loathing things contrary to herself, as when kindness rejects ill-will, temperance lust, and bravery cowardice. And so you may see that it is the just who are most pained at injustice, the brave at cowardice, the self-restrained at profligacy. It is, therefore, characteristic of the well-ordered mind both to rejoice at good deeds and to be pained at the reverse.
51	quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor , qui profecto cadit , nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur , quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita , ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias ? quid enim interest motu animi sublato , non dico inter pecudem et hominem , sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem ? neque enim sunt isti audiendi , qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt ; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis , ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur . quam ob rem angor iste , qui pro amico saepe capiendus est , non tantum valet , ut tollat e vita amicitiam , non plus quam ut virtutes , quia non nullas curas et molestias afferunt , repudientur .	Wherefore, if distress of mind befalls a wise man (as it certainly does unless we assume that human sympathy has been rooted out of his heart), why should we remove friendship entirely from our lives in order that we may suffer no worries on its account? For when the soul is deprived of emotion, what difference is there—I do not say between man and the beasts of the field, but between man and a stock or a stone, or any such thing? Nor are we to listen to those menwho maintain that virtue is hard and unyielding and is, as it were, something made of iron; whereas, in many relations of life, and especially in friendship, it is so pliable and elastic that it expands, so to speak, with a friend’s prosperity and contracts with his adversity. Wherefore, that mental anguish of which I spoke and which often must be felt on a friend’s account, has no more power to banish friendship from life than it has to cause us to reject virtue because virtue entails certain cares and annoyances.
52	cum autem contrahat amicitiam , ut supra dixi , si qua significatio virtutis eluceat , ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat , id cum contigit , amor exoriatur necesse est .	But, since, as I said before, virtue knits friendship together, if there should be some exhibition of shining virtue to which a kindred spirit may attach and adjust itself, then, when that happens, love must needs spring forth.
53	quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus , ut honore , ut gloria , ut aedificio , ut vestitu cultuque corporis , animante virtute praedito , eo qui vel amare vel , ut ita dicam , redamare possit , non admodum delectari ? nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae , nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius .	For is there anything so absurd as to delight in many inanimate things, like public office, fame, and stately buildings, or dress and personal adornment, and to take little or no delight in a sentient being endowed with virtue and capable of loving, and—if I may so term it—of loving back? For nothing gives more pleasure than the return of goodwill and the interchange of zealous service.
54	quid ? si illud etiam addimus , quod recte addi potest , nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo , concedetur profecto verum esse , ut bonos boni diligant asciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura . nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura . quam ob rem hoc quidem , Fanni et Scaevola , constet , ut opinor , bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam , qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus . sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet . non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba , quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque optime consulere soleat , quod non faceret profecto , si a caritate volgi abhorreret .	And what if I also add, as I may fairly do, that nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness does to friendship? Then it surely will be granted as a fact that good men love and join to themselves other good men, in a union which is almost that of relationship and nature. For there is nothing more eager or more greedy than nature for what is like itself. Wherefore, because of this very fact, I think it should be evident, Fannius and Scaevola, that the good have for the good, as if from necessity, a kindly feeling which nature has made the fountain of friendship. But this same goodness belongs also to the generality of men. For virtue is not unfeeling, unwilling to serve, or proudly exclusive, but it is her wont to protect even whole nations and to plan the best measures for their welfare, which she certainly would not do if she disdained the affection of the common mass.
55	atque etiam mihi quidem videntur , qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias , amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere . non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat , tumque illud fit , quod ab amico est profectum , iucundum , si cum studio est profectum . tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur , ut ei , qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute , in qua plurimum est praesidi , minime alterius indigeant , liberalis simi sint et beneficentissimi . atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis . ubi enim studia nostra viguissent , si numquam consilio , numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset ? non igitur utilitatem amicitia , sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est .	And again, it seems to me at any rate, that those whofalsely assume expediency to be the basis of friendship, take from friendship’s chain its loveliest link. For it is not so much the material gain procured through a friend, as it is his love, and his love alone, that gives us delight; and that advantage which we derive from him becomes a pleasure only when his service is inspired by an ardent zeal. And it is far from being true that friendship is cultivated because of need; rather, is it cultivated by those who are most abundantly blessed with wealth and power and especially with virtue, which is man’s best defence; by those least in need of another’s help; and by those most generous and most given to acts of kindness. Indeed, I should be inclined to think that it is not well for friends never to need anything at all. Wherein, for example, would my zeal have displayed itself if Scipio had never been in need of my advice or assistance either at home or abroad? It is not the case, therefore, that friendship attends upon advantage, but, on the contrary, that advantage attends upon friendship.
56	non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi , si quando de amicitia , quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam , disputabunt . nam quis est , pro deorum fidem atque hominum ! qui velit , ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur , circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere ? haec enim est tyrannorum vita , nimirum in qua nulla fides , nulla caritas , nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia , omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita , nullus locus amicitiae .	It will be our duty, then, not to listen to those besotted men of pleasurewhen they argue about friendship, of which they understand neither the practice nor the theory. For what person is there, in the name of gods and men! who would wish to be surrounded by unlimited wealth and to abound in every material blessing, on condition that he love no one and that no one love him? Such indeed is the life of tyrants—a life, I mean, in which there can be no faith, no affection, no trust in the continuance of goodwill; where every act arouses suspicion and anxiety and where friendship has no place.
57	quis enim aut eum diligat , quem metuat , aut eum , a quo se metui putet ? coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus . quod si forte , ut fit plerumque , ceciderint , tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum . quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exulantem , tum se intellexisse , quos fidos amicos habuisset , quos infidos , cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset .	For can anyone love either the man whom he fears, or the man by whom he believes himself to be feared? Yet tyrants are courted under a pretence of affection, but only for a season. For when by chance they have fallen from power, as they generally do, then is it known how poor they were in friends. And this is illustrated by the remark said to have been made by Tarquin as he was going into exile: I have learned what friends of mine are true and what are false, now that I am no longer able to reward or punish either.
58	quamquam miror , illa superbia et importunitate , si quemquam amicum habere potuit . atque ut huius , quem dixi , mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt , sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fidelis . non enim solum ipsa fortuna caeca est , sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos , quos complexa est ; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia , nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest . atque hoc quidem videre licet , eos , qui antea commodis fuerint moribus , imperio potestate prosperis rebus immutari , sperni ab eis veteres amicitias , indulgeri novis .	And yet, such was the haughtiness and perversity of the man that I wonder if he could have had anyone as a friend. Now just as the character of Tarquin could not procure him true friends, so, with many, their power, if it be very great, is a bar to faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself, but as a rule she even blinds those whom she has embraced; and thus they are generally transported beyond themselves by wanton pride and obstinacy—nor can anything in the world be more insufferable than one of Fortune’s fools. Indeed we may observe that men, formerly affable in their manners, become changed by military rank, by power, and by prosperity, spurn their old-time friends and revel in the new.
59	quid autem stultius quam , cum plurimum copiis facultatibus opibus possint , cetera parare , quae parantur pecunia , equos famulos vestem egregiam vasa pretiosa , amicos non parare , optimam et pulcherrimam vitae , ut ita dicam , supellectilem ? etenim cetera cum parant , cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent ; eius enim est istorum quidque qui vicit viribus ; amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio , ut etiam si illa maneant , quae sunt quasi dona fortunae , tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda . sed haec hactenus .	But what is more foolish, when men are in the plenitude of resources, opportunities, and wealth, than to procure the other things which money provides—horses, slaves, splendid raiment, and costly plate—and not procure friends, who are, if I may say so, life’s best and fairest furniture? And really while they are procuring those material things, they know not for whom they do it, nor for whose benefit they toil; for such things are the prey of the strongest; but to every man the tenure of his friendships ever remains settled and sure, so that even if there should be a continuance of those things which are, so to speak, the gratuities of fortune, yet life unadorned and unattended by friends could not be pleasant. But enough on this point.
60	constituendi autem sunt , qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi . De quibus tris video sententias ferri , quarum nullam probo : unam , ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus quo erga nosmet ipsos ; alteram , ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat ; tertiam , ut , quanti quisque se ipse facit , tanti fiat ab amicis .	We now have to determine in our discussion of friendship what are the limits and, so to speak, the boundary lines of affection. On this point I observe that three views are usually advanced, none of which I approve: first, That we should have the same feeling for our friends that we have for ourselves; second, That our goodwill towards our friends should correspond in all respects to their goodwill towards us, and third, That whatever value a man places upon himself, the same value should be placed upon him by his friends.
61	harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior . nec enim illa prima vera est , ut , quem ad modum in se quisque , sic in amicum sit animatus . quam multa enim , quae nostra causa numquam faceremus , facimus causa amicorum ! precari ab indigno , supplicare , tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius , quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste , in amicorum fiunt honestissime ; multaeque res sunt , in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur , ut eis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur .	I do not agree at all with any of these views. Certainly the first one is not true which holds that as a man feels towards himself, so should he feel towards his friend. For how many things we do for our friends that we never would do for ourselves! At one time we beg and entreat an unworthy man, and again we assail another too sharply or too loudly rail upon him—things not quite creditable in our own affairs, but exceedingly so in behalf of our friends; and there are numerous occasions when good men forgo, or permit themselves to be deprived of, many conveniences in order that their friends rather than themselves may enjoy them.
62	altera sententia est quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus . hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam , ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum . divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte ne plus reddat quam acceperit : neque enim verendum est ne quid excidat aut ne quid in terram defluat aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur .	The second view limits friendship to an equal interchange of services and feelings. It surely is calling friendship to a very close and petty accounting to require it to keep an exact balance of credits and debits. I think true friendship is richer and more abundant than that and does not narrowly scan the reckoning lest it pay out more than it has received; and there need be no fear that some bit of kindness will be lost, that it will overflow the measure and spill upon the ground, or that more than is due will be poured into friendship’s bin.
63	tertius vero ille finis deterrimus , ut , quanti quisque se ipse faciat , tanti fiat ab amicis . saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior . non est igitur amici talem esse in eum , qualis ille in se est , sed potius eniti et efficere ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem . alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est , si prius , quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit , dixero . negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus ; nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc , quem ad modum putaretur , a Biante esse dictum crederet , qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem ; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam . quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei , cui se putabit inimicum esse posse ? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus , quo pluris det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum : rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi dolere invidere .	But worst of all is the third limitation, which is that whatever value a man places upon himself, the same value should be placed upon him by his friends. For often in some men either the spirit is too dejected, or the hope of bettering their fortune is too faint. Therefore, it is not the province of a friend, in such a case, to have the same estimate of another that the other has of himself, but rather it is his duty to strive with all his might to arouse his friend’s prostrate soul and lead it to a livelier hope and into a better train of thought. Hence some other limitation of true friendship must be fixed, after I have first stated a view which Scipio used to condemn in the strongest terms. He often said that no utterance could be found more at war with friendship than that of the man who had made this remark: We should love as if at some time we were going to hate. And Scipio really could not, he said, be induced to adopt the commonly accepted belief that this expression was made by Bias, who was counted one of the Seven Sages; but he thought that it was the speech of some abandoned wretch, or scheming politician, or of someone who regarded everything as an instrument to serve his own selfish ends. For how will it be possible for anyone to be a friend to a man who, he believes, may be his foe? Nay, in such a case it will be necessary also for him to desire and pray that his friend may sin as often as possible and thereby give him, as it were, the more handles to lay hold of; and, again, he will be bound to feel grief, pain and envy at the good deeds and good fortune of his friends.
64	qua re hoc quidem praeceptum , cuiuscumque est , ad tollendam amicitiam valet : illud potius praecipiendum fuit , ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis , ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum , quem aliquando odisse possemus . quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus , ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat .	Wherefore this maxim, whoever its author, really has the effect of destroying friendship: rather ought we to have been enjoined to exercise such care in forming friendships that we should never begin to love anyone whom we might sometime hate. Indeed, Scipio thought that, even if we had been unfortunate in our choice, we should endure it rather than plan an opportunity for a breach.
65	His igitur finibus utendum arbitror , ut , cum emendati mores amicorum sint , tum sit inter eos omnium rerum consiliorum voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas , ut etiam si qua fortuna accident ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint , in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama , declinandum de via sit , modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur ; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit . nec vero neglegenda est fama , nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium , quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est ; virtus , quam sequitur caritas , minime repudianda est .	Therefore, these are the limits which I think ought to be observed, namely: when the characters of friends are blameless, then there should be between them complete harmony of opinions and inclinations in everything without any exception; and, even if by some chance the wishes of a friend are not altogether honourable and require to be forwarded in matters which involve his life or reputation, we should turn aside from the straight path, provided, however, utter disgrace does not follow;for there are limits to the indulgence which can be allowed to friendship. Nor indeed ought a man either to disregard his reputation, or to consider the goodwill of his countrymen a poor weapon in the battle of life, though to hunt after it with fawning and flattery is disgraceful; as to virtue we must by no means abjure it, for it is attended by regard.
66	sed — saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem , cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia — querebatur quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent ; capras et ovis quot quisque haberet dicere posse , amicos quot haberet non posse dicere ; et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam , in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas , quibus eos , qui ad amicitiam essent idonei , iudicarent . sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi , cuius generis est magna penuria ; et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum , experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia : ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem .	But Scipio—and I often recur to him, my sole authority for a discourse on friendship—Scipio used to complain that men were more painstaking in all other things than in friendship; that everybody could tell how many goats and sheep he had,but was unable to tell the number of his friends; and that men took pains in getting the former, but were careless in choosing the latter, and had no certain signs, or marks, so to speak, by which to determine their fitness for friendship. We ought, therefore, to choose men who are firm, steadfast and constant, a class of which there is a great dearth; and at the same time it is very hard to come to a decision without a trial, while such trial can only be made in actual friendship: thus friendship outruns the judgement and takes away the opportunity of a trial.