In Defense of the Proposed Manilian Law |
Translator: C. D. Yonge
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21 |
quoniam de genere belli dixi , nunc de magnitudine pauca dicam . potest enim hoc dici , belli genus esse ita necessarium ut sit gerendum , non esse ita magnum ut sit pertimescendum . in quo maxime laborandum est ne forte ea vobis quae diligentissime providenda sunt contemnenda esse videantur . atque ut omnes intellegant me Lucio Lucullo tantum impertire laudis quantum forti viro et sapienti homini et magno imperatori debeatur , dico eius adventu maximas Mithridati copias omnibus rebus ornatas atque instructas fuisse , urbemque Asiae clarissimam nobisque amicissimam Cyzicenorum oppressam esse ab ipso rege maxima multitudine et oppugnatam vehementissime ; quam Lucius Lucullus virtute , adsiduitate , consilio summis obsidionis periculis liberavit .
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Since I have spoken of the description of war, I will now say a few words about its magnitude. For this may be said of it,—that it is a kind of war so necessary, that it must absolutely be waged, and yet not one of such magnitude as to be formidable. And in this we must take the greatest care that those things do not appear to you contemptible which require to be most diligently guarded against. And that all men may understand that I give Lucius Lucullus all the praise that is due to a gallant man, and most wise man, and to a most consummate general, I say that when he first arrived in Asia, the forces of Mithridates were most numerous, well appointed, and provided with every requisite; and that the finest city in Asia, and the one, too, that was most friendly to us, the city of Cyzicus, was besieged by the king in person, with an enormous army, and that the siege had been pressed most vigorously, when Lucius Lucullus, by his valour, and perseverance, and wisdom, relieved it from the most extreme danger. |
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ab eodem imperatore classem magnam et ornatam quae ducibus Sertorianis ad Italiam studio atque odio inflammata raperetur superatam esse atque depressam ; magnas hostium praeterea copias multis proeliis esse deletas patefactumque nostris legionibus esse Pontum qui antea populo Romano ex omni aditu clausus fuisset ; Sinopen atque Amisum , quibus in oppidis erant domicilia regis omnibus rebus ornata ac referta , ceterasque urbis Ponti et Cappadociae permultas uno aditu adventuque esse captas ; regem spoliatum regno patrio atque avito ad alios se reges atque ad alias gentis supplicem contulisse ; atque haec omnia salvis populi Romani sociis atque integris vectigalibus esse gesta . satis opinor hoc esse laudis atque ita , Quirites , ut hoc vos intellegatis , a nullo istorum qui huic obtrectant legi atque causae Lucium Lucullum similiter ex hoc loco esse laudatum .
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I say that he also, when general, defeated and destroyed that great and well-appointed fleet, which the chiefs of Sertorius's party were leading against Italy with furious zeal; I say besides, that by him numerous armies of the enemy were destroyed in several battles, and that Pontus was opened to our legions, which before his time had been closed against the Roman people on every side; and that Sinope and Amisus, towns in which the king had palaces, adorned and furnished with every kind of magnificence, and many other cities of Pontus and Cappadocia, were taken by his mere approach and arrival near them; that the king himself was stripped of the kingdom possessed by his father and his grandfather, and forced to betake himself as a suppliant to other kings and other nations; and that all these great deeds were achieved without any injury to the allies of the Roman people, or any diminution of its revenues. I think that this is praise enough;—such praise that you must see, O Romans, that Lucius Lucullus has not been praised as much from this rostrum by any one of these men who are objecting to this law and arguing against our cause. |
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requiretur fortasse nunc quem ad modum , cum haec ita sint , reliquum possit magnum esse bellum . cognoscite , Quirites ; non enim hoc sine causa quaeri videtur . primum ex suo regno sic Mithridates profugit ut ex eodem Ponto Medea illa quondam fugisse dicitur , quam praedicant in fuga fratris sui membra in eis locis qua se parens persequeretur dissipavisse , ut eorum conlectio dispersa maerorque patrius celeritatem consequendi retardaret . sic Mithridates fugiens maximam vim auri atque argenti pulcherrimarumque rerum omnium quas et a maioribus acceperat et ipse bello superiore ex tota Asia direptas in suum regnum congesserat in Ponto omnem reliquit . haec dum nostri conligunt omnia diligentius , rex ipse e manibus effugit . ita illum in persequendi studio maeror , hos laetitia tardavit .
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Perhaps now it will be asked, how, when all this has been already done, there can be any great war left behind. I will explain this, O Romans; for this does not seem an unreasonable question. At first Mithridates fled from his kingdom, as Medea is formerly said to have fled from the same region of Pontus; for they say that she, in her flight, strewed about the limbs of her brother in those places along which her father was likely to pursue her, in order that the collection of them, dispersed as they were, and the grief which would afflict his father, might delay the rapidity of his pursuit. Mithridates, flying in the same manner, left in Pontus the whole of the vast quantity of gold and silver, and of beautiful things which he had inherited from his ancestors, and which he himself had collected and brought into his own kingdom, having obtained them by plunder in the former war from all Asia. While our men were diligently occupied in collecting all this, the king himself escaped out of their hands.And so grief retarded the father of Medea in his pursuit, but delight delayed our men. |
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hunc in illo timore et fuga Tigranes , rex Armenius , excepit diffidentemque rebus suis confirmavit et adflictum erexit perditumque recreavit . cuius in regnum postea quam Lucius Lucullus cum exercitu venit , plures etiam gentes contra imperatorem nostrum concitatae sunt . erat enim metus iniectus eis nationibus quas numquam populus Romanus neque lacessendas bello neque temptandas putavit ; erat etiam alia gravis atque vehemens opinio quae per animos gentium barbararum pervaserat , fani locupletissimi et religiosissimi diripiendi causa in eas oras nostrum esse exercitum adductum . ita nationes multae atque magnae novo quodam terrore ac metu concitabantur . noster autem exercitus , tametsi urbem ex Tigrani regno ceperat et proeliis usus erat secundis , tamen nimia longinquitate locorum ac desiderio suorum commovebatur .
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In this alarm and flight of his, Tigranes, the king of Armenia, received him, encouraged him while despairing of his fortunes, gave him new spirit in his depression, and recruited with new strength his powerless condition. And after Lucius Lucullus arrived in his kingdom, very many tribes were excited to hostilities against our general. For those nations which the Roman people never had thought either of attacking in war or tampering with, had been inspired with fear. There was, besides, a general opinion which had taken deep root, and had spread over all the barbarian tribes in those districts, that our army had been led into those countries with the object of plundering a very wealthy and most religiously worshipped temple. And so, many powerful nations were roused against us by a fresh dread and alarm. But our army although it had taken a city of Tigranes's kingdom, and had fought some successful battles, still was out of spirits at its immense distance from Rome, and its separation from its friends. |
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hic iam plura non dicam ; fuit enim illud extremum ut ex eis locis a militibus nostris reditus magis maturus quam progressio longior quaereretur . Mithridates autem se et suam manum iam confirmarat eorum opera qui ad eum ex ipsius regno concesserant et magnis adventiciis auxiliis multorum regum et nationum iuvabatur . iam hoc fere sic fieri solere accepimus ut regum adflictae fortunae facile multorum opes adliciant ad misericordiam , maximeque eorum qui aut reges sunt aut vivunt in regno , ut eis nomen regale magnum et sanctum esse videatur .
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At present I will not say more; for the result of these feelings of theirs was, that they were more anxious for a speedy return home than for any further advance into the enemies' country. But Mithridates had by this time strengthened his army by reinforcements of those men belonging to his own dominions who had assembled together, and by large promiscuous forces belonging to many other kings and tribes. And we see that this is almost invariably the case, that kings when in misfortune easily induce many to pity and assist them, especially such as are either kings themselves, or who live under kingly power, because to them the name of king appears something great and sacred. |
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itaque tantum victus efficere potuit quantum incolumis numquam est ausus optare . nam cum se in regnum suum recepisset , non fuit eo contentus quod ei praeter spem acciderat , ut illam postea quam pulsus erat terram umquam attingeret , sed in exercitum nostrum clarum atque victorem impetum fecit . sinite hoc loco , Quirites , sicut poetae solent qui res Romanas scribunt , praeterire me nostram calamitatem , quae tanta fuit ut eam ad auris imperatoris non ex proelio nuntius sed ex sermone rumor adferret . hic in illo ipso malo gravissimaque belli offensione L .
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And accordingly he, when conquered, was able to accomplish what, when he was in the full enjoyment of his powers, he never dared even to wish for. For when he had returned to his kingdom, he was not content (though that had happened to him beyond all his hopes) with again setting his foot on that land after he had been expelled from it; but he even volunteered an attack on your army, flushed as it was with glory and victory. Allow me, in this place, O Romans, (just as poets do who write of Roman affairs,) to pass over our disaster, which was so great that it came to Lucius Lucullus's ears, not by means of a messenger despatched from the scene of action, but through the report of common conversation. |
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Lucullus , qui tamen aliqua ex parte eis incommodis mederi fortasse potuisset , vestro iussu coactus qui imperi diuturnitati modum statuendum vetere exemplo putavistis , partim militum qui iam stipendiis confectis erant dimisit , partim M '. Glabrioni tradidit . multa praetereo consulto ; sed ea vos coniectura perspicite quantum illud bellum factum putetis quod coniungant reges potentissimi , renovent agitatae nationes , suscipiant integrae gentes , novus imperator noster accipiat vetere exercitu pulso .
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At the very time of this misfortune,—of this most terrible disaster in the whole war, Lucius Lucullus, who might have been able, to a great extent, to remedy the calamity, being compelled by your orders, because you thought, according to the old principle of your ancestors, that limits ought to be put to length of command, discharged a part of his soldiers who had served their appointed time, and delivered over part to Glabrio. I pass over many things designedly; but you yourselves can easily conjecture how important you ought to consider that war which most powerful kings are uniting in,—which disturbed nations are renewing,—which nations, whose strength is unimpaired, are undertaking, and which anew general of yours has to encounter after a veteran army has been defeated. |
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satis multa mihi verba fecisse videor qua re esset hoc bellum genere ipso necessarium , magnitudine periculosum . restat ut de imperatore ad id bellum deligendo ac tantis rebus praeficiendo dicendum esse videatur . Vtinam , Quirites , virorum fortium atque innocentium copiam tantam haberetis ut haec vobis deliberatio difficilis esset quemnam potissimum tantis rebus ac tanto bello praeficiendum putaretis ! nunc vero cum sit unus Gnaeus Pompeius qui non modo eorum hominum qui nunc sunt gloriam sed etiam antiquitatis memoriam virtute superarit , quae res est quae cuiusquam animum in hac causa dubium facere possit ?
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I appear to have said enough to make you see why this war is in its very nature unavoidable, in its magnitude dangerous. It remains for me to speak of the general who ought to be selected for that war, and appointed to the management of such important affairs. I wish, O Romans, that you had such an abundance of brave and honest men, that it was a difficult subject for your deliberations, whom you thought most desirable to be appointed to the conduct of such important affairs, and so vast a war. But now, when there is Cnaeus Pompeius alone, who has exceeded in valour, not only the glory of these men who are now alive, but even all recollections of antiquity, what is there that, in this case, can raise a doubt in the mind of any one? |
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ego enim sic existimo , in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere , scientiam rei militaris , virtutem , auctoritatem , felicitatem . quis igitur hoc homine scientior umquam aut fuit aut esse debuit ? qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae disciplinam profectus est , qui extrema pueritia miles in exercitu summi fuit imperatoris , ineunte adulescentia maximi ipse exercitus imperator , qui saepius cum hoste conflixit quam quisquam cum inimico concertavit , plura bella gessit quam ceteri legerunt , pluris provincias confecit quam alii concupiverunt , cuius adulescentia ad scientiam rei militaris non alienis praeceptis sed suis imperiis , non offensionibus belli sed victoriis , non stipendiis sed triumphis est erudita . quod denique genus esse belli potest in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna rei publicae ? civile , Africanum , Transalpinum , Hispaniense mixtum ex civibus atque ex bellicosissimis nationibus , servile , navale bellum , varia et diversa genera et bellorum et hostium non solum gesta ab hoc uno sed etiam confecta nullam rem esse declarant in usu positam militari quae huius viri scientiam fugere possit .
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For I think that these four qualities are indispensable in a great general,—knowledge of military affairs, valour, authority and good fortune. Who, then, ever was, or ought to have been, better acquainted with military affairs than this man? who, the moment that he left school and finished his education as a boy, at a time when there was a most important war going on, and most active enemies were banded against us, went to his father's army and to the discipline of the camp; who, when scarcely out of his boyhood, became a soldier of a consummate general,—when entering on manhood, became himself the general of a mighty army; who has been more frequently engaged with the enemy, than any one else has ever disputed with an adversary; who has himself, as general, conducted more wars than other men have read of; who has subdued more provinces than other men have wished for; whose youth was trained to the knowledge of military affairs, not by the precepts of others, but by commanding himself,—not by the disasters of war, but by victories,—not by campaigns, but by triumphs. In short, what description of war can there be in which the fortune of the republic has not given him practice? Civil war, African war, Transalpine war, Spanish war, promiscuous war of the most warlike cities and nations, servile war, naval war, every variety and diversity of wars and of enemies, has not only been encountered by this one man, but encountered victoriously; and these exploits show plainly that there is no circumstance, in military practice which can elude the knowledge of this man. |
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iam vero virtuti Gnaei Pompei quae potest oratio par inveniri ? quid est quod quisquam aut illo dignum aut vobis novum aut cuiquam inauditum possit adferre ? neque enim solae sunt virtutes imperatoriae quae volgo existimantur , labor in negotiis , fortitudo in periculis , industria in agendo , celeritas in conficiendo , consilium in providendo , quae tanta sunt in hoc uno quanta in omnibus reliquis imperatoribus quos aut vidimus aut audivimus non fuerunt . Testis est Italia quam ille ipse victor L .
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But now, what language can be found equal to the valour of Cnaeus Pompeius? What statement can any one make which shall be either worthy of him, or new to you, or unknown to any one? For those are not the only virtuous of a general which are usually thought so,—namely, industry in business, fortitude amid dangers, energy in acting, rapidity in executing, wisdom in foreseeing; which all exist in as great perfection in that one man as in all the other generals put together whom we have either seen or heard of. |
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Sulla huius virtute et subsidio confessus est liberatam ; testis Sicilia quam multis undique cinctam periculis non terrore belli sed consili celeritate explicavit ; testis Africa quae magnis oppressa hostium copiis eorum ipsorum sanguine redundavit ; testis Gallia per quam legionibus nostris iter in Hispaniam Gallorum internicione patefactum est ; testis Hispania quae saepissime plurimos hostis ab hoc superatos prostratosque conspexit ; testis iterum et saepius Italia quae , cum servili bello taetro periculosoque premeretur , ab hoc auxilium absente expetivit , quod bellum exspectatione eius attenuatum atque imminutum est , adventu sublatum ac sepultum .
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Italy is my witness, which that illustrious conqueror himself, Lucius Sulla, confessed had been delivered by this man's valour and ready assistance. Sicily is my witness, which he released when it was surrounded on all sides by many dangers, not by the dread of his power, but by the promptitude of his wisdom. Africa is my witness, which, having been overwhelmed by numerous armies of enemies, overflowed with the blood of those same enemies. Gaul is my witness, through which a road into Spain was laid open to our legions by the destruction of the Gauls. Spain is my witness, which has repeatedly seen our many enemies there defeated and subdued by this man. Again and again, Italy is my witness, which, when it was weighed down by the disgraceful and perilous servile war, entreated aid from this man, though he, was at a distance; and that war, having dwindled down and wasted away at the expectation of Pompeius, was destroyed and buried by his arrival. |
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testes nunc vero iam omnes orae atque omnes terrae gentes nationes , maria denique omnia cum universa tum in singulis oris omnes sinus atque portus . quis enim toto mari locus per hos annos aut tam firmum habuit praesidium ut tutus esset , aut tam fuit abditus ut lateret ? quis navigavit qui non se aut mortis aut servitutis periculo committeret , cum aut hieme aut referto praedonum mari navigaret ? hoc tantum bellum , tam turpe , tam vetus , tam late divisum atque dispersum quis umquam arbitraretur aut ab omnibus imperatoribus uno anno aut omnibus annis ab uno imperatore confici posse ?
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But now, also every coast, all foreign nations and countries, all seas, both in their open waters and in every bay, and creek, and harbour, are my witnesses. For during these last years, what place in any part of the sea had so strong a garrison as to be safe from him? what place was so much hidden as to escape his notice? Whoever put to sea without being aware that he was committing himself to the hazard of death or slavery, either from storms or from the sea being crowded with pirates? Who would ever have supposed that a war of such extent, so mean, so old a war, a war so extensive in its theatre and so widely scattered, could have been terminated by all our generals put together in one year, or by one general in all the years of his life? |
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quam provinciam tenuistis a praedonibus liberam per hosce annos ? quod vectigal vobis tutum fuit ? quem socium defendistis ? cui praesidio classibus vestris fuistis ? quam multas existimatis insulas esse desertas , quam multas aut metu relictas aut a praedonibus captas urbis esse sociorum ?
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In all these later years what province have you had free from pirates? what revenue has been safe? what ally have you been able to protect? to whom have your fleets been any defence? How many islands do you suppose have been deserted? how many cities of the allies do you think have been either abandoned out of fear of the pirates, or have been taken by them? |
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sed quid ego longinqua commemoro ? fuit hoc quondam , fuit proprium populi Romani longe a domo bellare et propugnaculis imperi sociorum fortunas , non sua tecta defendere . sociis ego vestris mare per hosce annos clausum fuisse dicam , cum exercitus vestri numquam Brundisio nisi hieme summa transmiserint ? qui ad vos ab exteris nationibus venirent , captos querar , cum legati populi Romani redempti sint ? mercatoribus mare tutum non fuisse dicam , cum duodecim secures in praedonum potestatem pervenerint ?
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But why do I speak of distant events? It was—it was, indeed, formerly—a characteristic of the Roman people to carry on its wars at a distance from home, and to defend by the bulwarks of its power not its own homes, but the fortunes of its allies. Need I say, that the sea has during all these latter years been closed against your allies, when even our own armies never ventured to cross over from Brundusium, except in the depth of winter? Need I complain that men who were coming to you from foreign nations were taken prisoners, when even the ambassadors of the Roman people were forced to be ransomed? Need I say, that the sea was not safe for merchants, when twelve axes came into the power of the pirates? |
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Cnidum aut Colophonem aut Samum , nobilissimas urbis , innumerabilisque alias captas esse commemorem , cum vestros portus atque eos portus quibus vitam ac spiritum ducitis in praedonum fuisse potestate sciatis ? an vero ignoratis portum Caietae celeberrimum et plenissimum navium inspectante praetore a praedonibus esse direptum , ex Miseno autem eius ipsius liberos qui cum praedonibus antea bellum gesserat a praedonibus esse sublatos ? nam quid ego Ostiense incommodum atque illam labem atque ignominiam rei publicae querar , cum prope inspectantibus vobis classis ea cui consul populi Romani praepositus esset a praedonibus capta atque depressa est ? pro di immortales ! tantamne unius hominis incredibilis ac divina virtus tam brevi tempore lucem adferre rei publicae potuit ut vos , qui modo ante ostium Tiberinum classem hostium videbatis , ei nunc nullam intra Oceani ostium praedonum navem esse audiatis ?
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Need I mention, how Cnidus, and Colophon, and Samos, most noble cities, and others too in countless numbers, were taken by them, when you know that your own harbours, and those harbours too from which you derive, as it were, your very life and breath, were in the power of the pirates? Are you ignorant that the harbour of Caieta, that illustrious harbour, when full of ships, was plundered by the pirates under the very eyes of the praetor? and that from Misenum, the children of the very man who had before that waged war against the pirates in that place, were carried off by the pirates? For why should I complain of the disaster of Ostia, and of that stain and blot on the republic, when almost under your very eyes, that fleet which was under the command of a Roman consul was taken and destroyed by the pirates? O ye immortal gods! could the incredible and godlike virtue of one man in so short a time bring so much light to the republic, that you who had lately been used to see a fleet of the enemy before the mouth of the Tiber, should now hear that there is not one ship belonging to the pirates on this side of the Atlantic? |
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atque haec qua celeritate gesta sint , quamquam videtis , tamen a me in dicendo praetereunda non sunt . quis enim umquam aut obeundi negoti aut consequendi quaestus studio tam brevi tempore tot loca adire , tantos cursus conficere potuit , quam celeriter Gnaeo Pompeio duce tanti belli impetus navigavit ? qui nondum tempestivo ad navigandum mari Siciliam adiit , Africam exploravit , inde Sardiniam cum classe venit atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiis classibusque munivit .
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And although you have seen with what rapidity these things were done, still that rapidity ought not to be passed over by me in speaking of them.—For who ever, even if he were only going for the purpose of transacting business or making profit, contrived in so short a time to visit so many places, and to perform such long journeys, with as great celerity as Cnaeus Pompeius has performed his voyage, bearing with him the terrors of war as our general? He, when the weather could hardly be called open for sailing, went to Sicily, explored the coasts of Africa; from thence he came with his fleet to Sardinia, and these three great granaries of the republic he fortified with powerful garrisons and fleets; |
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Inde cum se in Italiam recepisset , duabus Hispaniis et Gallia Transalpina praesidiis ac navibus confirmata , missis item in oram Illyrici maris et in Achaiam omnemque Graeciam navibus Italiae duo maria maximis classibus firmissimisque praesidiis adornavit , ipse autem ut Brundisio profectus est , undequinquagesimo die totam ad imperium populi Romani Ciliciam adiunxit ; omnes qui ubique praedones fuerunt partim capti interfectique sunt , partim unius huius se imperio ac potestati dediderunt . idem Cretensibus , cum ad eum usque in Pamphyliam legatos deprecatoresque misissent , spem deditionis non ademit obsidesque imperavit . ita tantum bellum , tam diuturnum , tam longe lateque dispersum , quo bello omnes gentes ac nationes premebantur , Gnaeus Pompeius extrema hieme apparavit , ineunte vere suscepit , media aestate confecit .
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when, leaving Sardinia, he came to Italy, having secured the two Spains and Cisalpine Gaul with garrisons and ships. Having sent vessels also to the coast of Illyricum, and to every part of Achaia and Greece, he also adorned the two seas of Italy with very large fleets, and very sufficient garrisons; and he himself going in person, added all Cilicia to the dominions of the Roman people, on the forty-ninth day after he set out from Brundusium. Will the pirates who were anywhere to be found, were either taken prisoners and put to death, or else had surrendered themselves voluntarily to the power and authority of this one man. Also, when the Cretans had sent ambassadors to implore his mercy even into Pamphylia to him, he did not deny them hopes of being allowed to surrender, and he exacted hostages from them. And thus Cnaeus Pompeius at the end of winter prepared, at the beginning of spring undertook, and by the middle of summer terminated, this most important war, which had lasted so long, which was scattered in such distant and such various places, and by which every nation and country was incessantly distressed. |
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est haec divina atque incredibilis virtus imperatoris . quid ? ceterae quas paulo ante commemorare coeperam quantae atque quam multae sunt ! non enim bellandi virtus solum in summo ac perfecto imperatore quaerenda est sed multae sunt artes eximiae huius administrae comitesque virtutis . ac primum quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores , quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia , quanta fide , quanta facilitate , quanto ingenio , quanta humanitate ! quae breviter qualia sint in Gnaeo Pompeio consideremus . summa enim sunt omnia , Quirites , sed ea magis ex aliorum contentione quam ipsa per sese cognosci atque intellegi possunt .
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This is the godlike and incredible virtue of that general. What more shall I say? How many and how great are his other exploits which I began to mention a short time back; for we are not only to seek for skill in war in a consummate and perfect general, but there are many other eminent qualities which are the satellites and companions of this virtue. And first of all, how great should be the incorruptibility of generals! How great should be their moderation in everything! How perfect their good faith! How universal should be their affability! how brilliant their genius! how tender their humanity! And let us briefly consider to what extent these qualities exist in Cnaeus Pompeius. For they are all of the highest importance, O Romans, but yet they are to be seen and ascertained more by comparison with the conduct of others than by any display which they make of themselves. |
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quem enim possumus imperatorem ullo in numero putare cuius in exercitu centuriatus veneant atque venierint ? quid hunc hominem magnum aut amplum de re publica cogitare qui pecuniam ex aerario depromptam ad bellum administrandum aut propter cupiditatem provinciae magistratibus diviserit aut propter avaritiam Romae in quaestu reliquerit ? vestra admurmuratio facit , Quirites , ut agnoscere videamini qui haec fecerint ; ego autem nomino neminem ; qua re irasci mihi nemo poterit nisi qui ante de se voluerit confiteri . itaque propter hanc avaritiam imperatorum quantas calamitates , quocumque ventum sit , nostri exercitus adferant quis ignorat ?
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For how can we rank a man among generals of any class at all, if centurionships are sold, and have been constantly sold in his army? What great or honourable thoughts can we suppose that that man cherishes concerning the republic, who has either distributed the money which was taken from the treasury for the conduct of the war among the magistrates, out of ambition to keep his province, or, out of avarice, has left it behind him at Rome, invested for his own advantage? Your murmurs show, O Romans, that you recognise, in my description, men who have done these things. But I name no one, so that no one can be angry with me, without making confession beforehand of his own malpractices. But who is there who is ignorant what terrible distresses our armies suffer wherever they go, through this covetousness of our generals? |
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itinera quae per hosce annos in Italia per agros atque oppida civium Romanorum nostri imperatores fecerint recordamini ; tum facilius statuetis quid apud exteras nationes fieri existimetis . Vtrum pluris arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestrorum armis hostium urbis an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletas ? neque enim potest exercitum is continere imperator qui se ipse non continet , neque severus esse in iudicando qui alios in se severos esse iudices non volt . hic miramur hunc hominem tantum excellere ceteris ,
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Recollect the marches which, during these latter years, our generals have made in Italy, through the lands and towns of the Roman citizens; then you will more easily imagine what is the course pursued among foreign nations. Do you think that of late years more cities of the enemy have been destroyed by the arms of your soldiers, or more cities of your own allies by their winter campaigns? For that general who does not restrain himself can never restrain his army; nor can he be strict in judging others who is unwilling for others to be strict in judging him. |